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SUMMARY 
 
Conceptually, South Africa is “one sovereign democratic state”, with a three-sphere 
governmental system operating co-operatively. Each sphere of government has “original” or 
constitutionally-allocated powers and functions, as well as legislative and executive powers. 
Thus, the governmental system is a hybrid or one sui generis, not benefiting from appropriate 
precedents. The status and autonomy given local government makes it somewhat unique in the 
world. Application of the principle of subsidiarity, and the mandate for local government to be 
developmental has resulted in the roles and responsibilities of municipalities being substantially 
increased, notwithstanding that most suffer from a lack of resources and capacity.  
 
Local authorities moved from the establishment of the first one in 1682 as providers of basic 
municipal services on the basis of race and affordability to democratically-elected ‘wall-to-
wall’ municipalities in 2000. With 257 municipalities serving a population of 55.6 million, 
South African local authorities are comparatively large, spatially and demographically.  
 
Given the constitutional-statutory framework and the resultant complex operating environment, 
it is imperative that all municipalities are able to represent their interests in an intelligent, 
forceful, and unified manner on decision-making institutions to ensure a close fit between 
policies/programmes and peoples’ needs. Hence, effective municipal representation by 
knowledgeable, ethical and committed persons is imperative. 
 
The study provides a history of representation and local authority ‘development’ and 
underdevelopment in South Africa; a theoretical basis for representation; a review of formalism 
and government’s approach to development; co-operative governance and intergovernmental 
relations as a mechanism to facilitate municipal representation; an analysis local government 
powers, functions, status, autonomy, objects, rights and duties of municipalities; local 
participatory and representative democracy; and the establishment of municipalities. The 
constitutional and statutory provisions provide the foundation and framework to facilitate 
municipal representation. The study continues by analysing other mechanisms that enable 
municipal representation; a comparative review of local government and co-operative 
governance in certain select countries.  
 
v 
 
It goes on to review the formal framework for organised local government in South Africa, 
including an overview of the South African Local Government Association (SALGA). Finally, 
findings and recommendations are made toward a model for municipal representation in South 
Africa.   
 
 
Key words: Co-operative governance; intergovernmental relations; organised local 
government; association for local authorities; spheres of government; local participatory 
democracy; municipal international co-operation; municipal representation; Co-operative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs; the South African Local Government Association. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 BACKGROUND  
 
It is trite that the South African government currently is in crisis. Although the Republic has a 
three-sphere governmental system, problems and challenges manifest themselves in the local 
sphere almost daily. Four occurrences serve to highlight this apparently chronic dilemma. These 
serve to provide background and context to the situation local government finds itself in today. 
It also highlights the complex environment municipal representatives operate in. 
 
Twenty-two years after South Africa became a democracy on 27 April 1994, youth constitute 
36.2per cent of the country’s 55.6million population.1 The unemployed numbered 9 218 000.2 
High unemployment correlates with residents’ low ability to pay. This, in turn, has an adverse 
impact on municipal revenue and concomitantly limited capability of delivering basic public 
goods and services. Despite the state setting down a detailed and comprehensive constitutional 
and legislative framework as well as guidelines for equitable and sustainable socio-economic 
development, poverty and inequality persist and grow because the implementation of policies 
and programmes has not yet reached an acceptable level.  
 
A second depiction of the malaise is poor peoples’ discontent with government is exhibited by 
community protests perceived to be due to poor service delivery by municipalities. Starting at 
10 in 2010, rising to 129 in 2015.3 There is, however, no evidence of a uniform standard or 
yardstick to measure the number and reasons for such unrest, as apparent from different figures: 
The South African Police Service stated that “there were 1 907 violent protests across South 
Africa in the 2013-2014 financial year, more than double the 812 that occurred in 2007-2008.”4  
While there may be many reasons behind community protests and all may not be based on 
dissatisfaction with service delivery and municipal performance, one reason for increase in 
numbers and of violence could be that these “uprisings give a voice to those who feel 
                                                 
1 Community Survey 2016, www.statssa.gov.za, accessed 21/11/2016.  
2 www.tradingeconomics.com, accessed 21/11/2016. 
3 SALGA (2015) Community Protest: Local Government Perceptions, 8. 
4 Mabuza, Kingdom and Graeme Hosken (2015) ‘Ghetto blaster’, Johannesburg: The Times, 22/01/2015.  
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powerless,” a self-help strategy mechanism reflecting, to some extent, inadequate 
representation in poor urban areas. The situation regarding service delivery and economic 
development in rural areas would be more dire. As an example, one case may serve to highlight 
an underlying cause of the present situation.5  
 The SA Human Rights Commission has placed the blame for the Malamulele [Limpopo] impasse at the 
 door of the Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs. ...Residents are demanding 
 that their municipality be removed from the jurisdiction of the Thulamela [district] municipality... 
 [accusing] the council of providing better services to more affluent areas.6 
 
In a letter to The Times on 22/01/2015, Minister of Co-operative Governance and Traditional 
Affairs (CoGTA), Pravin Gordhan, pointed out that “The Malamulele Demarcation Task Team 
matter is a dispute of long standing, dating back to 2000.” While the establishment of a 
municipality, per se, is no guarantee of better services, it is evident that CoGTA and the 
Municipal Demarcation Board (MDB) appear to have ignored the wishes of the community for 
fourteen years, that is, until violence erupted. This attitude seems to indicate the low status of 
local government compared with national and provincial governments. 
 
The ruling party determined that the principal mechanism for attaining its developmental ideals 
would be through effective service delivery by municipalities.7 However, former President 
Thabo Mbeki did admit that the local sphere of government was the most neglected in the 
negotiations for a democratic state.8 The situation remains largely the same in 2016. The parlous 
state of present-day municipalities can be gauged from research underlying the third revelation, 
that municipal officials are trusted by only 49 per cent of the population, little better than the 
police (46 er cent) and political parties (43 per cent)9 Given service delivery failures as the root 
cause of protests, “only half of all South Africans indicate that they have confidence in this 
sphere.10  
                                                 
5 Fakir, Ebrahim (2014) ‘Protests are a cry for political recognition’, Johannesburg: Mail & Guardian, 
29/08/2014. 
6   Dlamini, Penuell and Kingdom Mabuza (2015) ‘Gordhan gets the blame for violence’, Johannesburg: 
The Times, 22/01/2015. 
7 President Thabo Mbeki’s State of the Nation Address, Cape Town, 9/02/2001. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ndlovu, Andile (2010) ‘Blacks, whites worlds apart’, Johannesburg, The Times: 8/09/2010, based on 
the book by Roberts, Benjamin, Mbithi wa Kivilu and Yul Derek Davids (Eds) (2010) South African Social 
Attitudes, 2nd Report: Reflections on the Age of Hope, Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) Press. 
 10 De Ryhove, Shannon (2012) Doubt over local government capacity to deliver- survey, article in  
www.polity.org.za, on Institute for Justice Reconciliation (2012) SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey :2010 
Report.  
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The fourth illustration is based on the present financial situation of local government, 
graphically and concretely shown through interpretation of information provided by the 
Auditor-General showing that unauthorised; irregular expenditure rose from R7.3 billion in 
2010-11 to R14.7 billion in 2014-15, while fruitless and wasteful expenditure increased from 
R284 million in 2010-11 to R1.3 billion in 2014-15.11 In the year to 30 June 2013, municipalities 
and their entities had a total expenditure of R268 billion, made up as follows:12  
 Employment cost (including councillor remuneration) R 62 billion (23%) 
 Goods and services      R166 billion (62%)  
 Capital expenditure      R 40 billion (15%) 
 
A high percentage is spent on goods and services, but if one considers that this amount includes 
repairs, maintenance and rehabilitation, profits, administrative and other costs related thereto, 
the actual number and value spent on goods and services may be relatively low. Fifteen per cent 
on capital development indicates not much was spent on housing and infrastructure for bulk 
water storage, reticulation and purification, sewerage and sewage treatment, roads and storm 
water, power supply, and purchase of essential equipment for fire-fighting, emergency services, 
health, and so on. To ensure significant real benefits, more should be allocated to capital 
expenditure. Employment costs at 23 per cent reflect the current situation of many 
municipalities having limited-capacity. When vacant positions are filled by experienced 
professionals, the percentage would be higher, financed by ‘savings’ from other categories. This 
could worsen the service delivery situation. These figures highlight municipal inefficiency but 
not all their underlying causes.  
 
Of the 278 municipalities, 22 (7.9 per cent) received clean audits, while 8 (13.3 per cent) of the 
59 municipal entities achieved this, in the 2012-2013 financial year. A major concern expressed 
by the Auditor-General was the high level of irregular expenditure, non-compliance with laws 
and regulations, the slow rate at which root causes were being addressed by the political 
leadership, a lack of consequences for poor performance and transgressions, the large number 
                                                 
11 Auditor-General (2016) Consolidated general report on the audit outcomes of local government, 2014-
15. 
12 Auditor-General (2014) Consolidated general report on the audit outcomes of local government 2012-
2013, 16. 
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of critical positions that are vacant, and the situation where many key officials do not have 
appropriate competencies.13  
 
In addressing the slow progress with Operation Clean Audit commenced in 2009, the Auditor-
General said – 
 Although many advances had been made in transforming local government since 1994, the legislative 
 reforms and the financial and performance reporting practices had not been institutionalised. ... Except 
 for the 5% that received clean audit opinions, all the auditees had material findings on their service 
 delivery reporting and/or non-compliance with laws and regulations.14 
 
In the absence of a monitoring, evaluation and impact assessment (MEIA) system, the Auditor-
General’s annual reports may be one of few mechanisms to determine the financial and related 
performance status of local government, enabling assumptions and conclusions to be drawn, 
and inferences made. From these statements two points are to be borne in mind: the 
governmental system is a lifeless thing and will not work unless led and managed by competent 
and committed persons; and that the public should play their part for the governmental 
enterprise to operate efficiently. Based on the above findings, one could conclude that in the 
local sphere, representative government must be capable of efficiently articulating the needs of 
people in the various localities and contributing to policy development and its implementation. 
Municipal representation could be one of the mechanisms to achieve this as well as improved 
service delivery to address the challenges of unemployment, poverty, and hopelessness in the 
local sphere. In local participatory democracy, efficient representatives working with their 
respective communities could ascertain the real needs of people and assist with the design of 
programmes and projects that would be a close fit. 
 
Municipalities cannot be held solely responsible for the current sad state of affairs as it is only 
one part of the governmental system wherein all have joint and several liability. The problem 
starts and ends with the Presidency, as shown by recent media reports. Two issues serve to 
further highlight this point: 
The handling of government scandals, service delivery corruption, and rampant bribery have resulted in 
South Africa [dropping] five places in the Transparency International corruption perception index to 69 th. 
There are 174 listed countries.15 
                                                 
13 Auditor-General (2016), op cit, 19, 28. 
14 In the Foreword to the Consolidated general report on the audit outcomes of local government 2010-
11, 13.   
15 Hosken, Graeme (2012) ‘South Africa slides down graft rankings: Transparency International report 
doesn’t pull its punches’, Johannesburg: The Times, 6/12/2012. 
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It is unclear how such measurement was done, that is, how corruption in all three spheres was 
analysed and the opportunity cost of maladministration. Another article underscores the 
country’s dire situation: 
 
Moody’s credit ratings agency has lowered its outlook for South African banks to “negative” from “stable”, 
citing the banks’ overexposure to government debt, the deteriorating national economic outlook and 
unsatisfactory liquidity.16  
 
The situation regarding the country’s economic status and corruption in 2016 and currently with 
the issue of ‘state capture’ and moves to unseat the President.17 This issue has major (adverse) 
implications but cannot be discussed in detail as it is only currently unfolding. The above 
illustrations show that each sphere cannot fulfil governmental obligations on its own – there is 
need for national, provincial, and local governments to work seamlessly, in a holistic and 
integrated manner, using sound intergovernmental relations in a spirit of co-operative 
governance. However, dissatisfaction with service delivery manifests at municipalities. Given 
that from the earliest European settlement in South Africa in 1652, to the first democratic local 
government elections in 2000, local authorities served as agents of central government, 
operating in terms of provincial ordinances. No person of colour participated in the 
administration. Hence, there is a major deficit in skilled and ethical administrators in the local 
sphere. Municipal representation that is efficient and effective may go some way in resolving 
this dilemma. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 ‘Moody’s downgrades South African banks’, Johannesburg: The Times, 6/12/2012. 
17 Mkentane, Luyolo, Tebogo Monama and Khaya Koko (2017) ‘ANC war gets ugly’; Mkentane, Luyolo 
‘Molefe’s days at Eskom numbered’; Siyabonga Mkhwanazi ‘Investigation into public service graft’; Maqhina, 
Mayibongwe ‘DA demands committee to prove capture’; Mkhwanazi, Siyabonga ‘Mbete vehemently against 
judicial overreach’; Koko, Khaya and Tebogo Monama ‘NEC slammed over JZ inaction’, Johannesburg: The Star, 
30/05/2017; Ongmu, Kalden and Dennis Cruywagen (2017) ‘Widen “state capture” probe’, Johannesburg: The 
New Age, 30/05/2017; Skiti, Sabelo and Siphe Macanda (2017) ‘Spin doctors of smear – UK public relations firm 
conspired with Guptas to paint Mcebisi Jonas as corrupt’; Hunter, Qaanitah ‘Zuma’s state in the balance’; Mabena, 
Sipho ‘SA needs “day of reckoning”; Mabena, Sipho ‘DA sees lawyers about corruption’, Johannesburg: The 
Times, 29/05/2017; Skiti, Sabelo (2017) ‘Unmasked: the Gupta’s SAA mole’; Jika, Thanduxolo; ‘Here’s proof, 
Mr President’ Special Report (on “state capture”); Hunter, Qaanitah, ‘Senior leaders lead offensive against Zuma’, 
Johannesburg, Sunday Times, 28/05/2017. 
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1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
The Constitution18 prescribes for basic values and principles governing public service 
administration. With regard to the provision of services by all spheres of government, it 
stipulates that:19 
(a) A high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained; 
(b) Efficient, economic, and effective use of resources must be promoted; 
(c) Public administration must be development-oriented; 
(d) Services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably, and without bias; and 
(e) People’s needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to participate 
in policy-making. 
This obligation is reinforced by the Constitution requiring all spheres of government to provide 
effective, transparent, accountable, and coherent government for the Republic as a whole.20 In 
the multi-sphere governmental enterprise local government was established for the purpose, 
amongst others, of providing basic services.21   
 
Insofar as service delivery is concerned, it should be acknowledged that while tremendous 
strides have been made (albeit off a low base) in fulfilling the basic needs of the poor, the 
current governmental system is not operating optimally, especially in the local sphere. This is 
because alongside municipalities, national and provincial governments are also culpable as 
service delivery is a joint undertaking. This observation serves as a broader-scope problem 
statement that frames and contextualises the thesis. It is important, therefore, that the present 
governmental system is analysed rationally and objectively so as to facilitate the design and 
implementation of one that would work efficiently. This is a mammoth undertaking as the 
multitude of challenges facing the state and manifested, to some extent, in community protests, 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. Under the circumstances, one needs to be mindful that:22  
Constitutions, especially new ones which have yet to become deeply rooted, are no guarantee of democracy; 
they must be sustained by a democratic culture, and a supportive social and economic environment. 
 
                                                 
18 Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, 108 of 1996 (“Constitution”). Unless stated otherwise, all 
references to ‘the Constitution’ are to this version. 
 19 See sections 195 (1)(a)-(e) of the Constitution. 
20 See section 40(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
21 This view is supported by section 152(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution which states that the objects of 
local government are to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities, and to ensure the 
provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner. 
22 Simeon, Richard (1998) Considerations on the Design of Federations: The South African Constitution 
in Comparative Context, Working Paper (2) (1998) University of Toronto, 3.  
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Local participatory democracy is an arduous process, taking considerable time to embed and 
institutionalise itself. Considering South Africa’s limited experience, it is not prudent to 
advocate a tabula rasa approach or large-scale restructuring. This is more so because such an 
undertaking in a complex environment provides no upfront guarantees that new structures and 
processes will work better than those of the past. It is clear that government, especially the local 
sphere, must work smarter than at present in an environment of limited resources. The state has 
shown remarkable foresight and fortitude in establishing the current governmental system 
operating from the foundation and within the framework of the Constitution. Several policies, 
statutes, regulations, and priority programmes supplement and complement it to the extent that 
there is perhaps too much law and insufficient strategies to guide socio-economic development. 
Furthermore, legislation appears to be more regulatory, in the interests of local government 
compliance, than developmental. This situation may be a contributory factor to the high level 
of dissatisfaction among poor communities, a situation reminiscent of the 1980s. 
 
The ideal of local participatory democracy, with emphasis on socio-economic development 
biased in favour of the poor, required a paradigm shift to achieve the goal of “human centred” 
and “people-driven” development espoused in the Freedom Charter and the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) of the first democratic government. Whilst many countries 
face seemingly intractable problems of similar proportions, none suffered from the development 
challenges posed by institutionalised apartheid – hence the lack of appropriate “best practices” 
and the requisite experience by government officials in developing and implementing them.  
 
The Constitution is the bedrock or foundation, framework, and skeleton on which the 
transformation of South Africa is based. It mandated the establishment of mechanisms deemed 
essential for the rapid transformation of the state.23 Subsequent legislation, premised on policies 
formulated to meet the various needs of the country’s heterogeneous population, added flesh to 
the constitutional ‘bones’, thus using law as a mechanism to guide, promote, facilitate, regulate, 
and monitor development as well as, to some extent, actors’ behaviours.  
 
                                                 
23 Some of these were the founding values, the supremacy of the Constitution, entrenchment of the Bill 
of Rights, the establishment of three distinctive spheres of government, co-operative government, the National 
Council of Provinces, the Constitutional Court, the Chapter 9 institutions, followed by pro-poor legislation and the 
promotion of local participatory democracy, as well as the mandate of local government to promote social and 
economic development. 
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The magnitude and nature of the changes required were such as to create much uncertainty and 
confusion, more so because some of the greatest challenges were unique to South Africa, while 
others required a change of hearts and minds, especially of those who controlled the state and 
its economy. Unpacking the Constitution revealed a range of initiatives that were imperative 
and had to be undertaken by several diverse role occupants. While certain actions were capable 
of being implemented individually, that is, by any one of the spheres of government, in the 
context of limited financial and intellectual resources as well as a highly competitive 
environment, joint action was deemed necessary to more efficiently address the challenges in 
the public service, especially in the local sphere. 
 
One of the reasons for current poor management of municipalities is based on South Africa’s 
unique history of local authorities. The first settlement for the Dutch was established in the 
Cape of Good Hope on 6 April 1652.24  Mathenjwa (2013) argues that “local government for 
Blacks were developed only from 1 October 1986”.25 Democratic local government was 
established following the first local elections on 5 December 2000.26 Compounding the 
situation today is the “failure of the Constitution to clearly specify” the status and powers of 
traditional leaders.27 The situation still appears to remain unclear to some extent. 
 
The period from 1652 was characterised by centralisation and exclusion of “non-whites” from 
government. The result is that black persons have had no experience of government at any level. 
Local authorities operated under provincial ordinances that were regulatory rather than 
developmental. Local ‘government’ functioned largely as agents of the state delivering basic 
municipal services on the basis of colour and affordability or willingness to pay. Representation 
on municipal councils was reserved for white ratepayers. Therefore, there were no opportunities 
for “non-whites” to become schooled in governance or municipal administration. 
 
From earliest times, provincial government functioned to implement national policies, mostly 
of regulation and control, wherein local authorities operated under provincial ordinances. As a 
consequence, provincial political representatives worked as regional agents of the state and 
                                                 
24 Thornhill, C and JJN Cloete (2014) South African Municipal Government and Administration, 2nd 
Edition, Pretoria: Van Schaik, 3. 
25 Mathenjwa, MJ (2013) The Supervision of Local Government: Application of the Legal Framework, 
unpublished LLD Thesis, Pretoria: Unisa, 18, footnote 7, quoting Cloete (1997) 13. 
26 Thornhill and Cloete (2014), op cit, 4. 
27 Mathenjwa (2013), op cit, 23. 
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served to protect and promote the interests of central government and had no say in national 
policy and developmental programmes. 
 
In the apartheid era, local authorities also functioned as the state’s main machinery to promote 
racial segregation and marginalisation of blacks. Hence, ‘municipalities’ were seen as a means 
of repression. Black ‘councillors’ co-opted and enticed by the state did not command the respect 
of the non-voting public. Thus they did not learn the art, science, and mechanics of good 
governance or municipal administration. There was no democratic municipal representation. 
 
Following the 1961 constitution and the grand strategy of Total Onslaught against Communism, 
government became even more highly centralised, with local authorities serving as a monitoring 
and control mechanism of the majority. The 1983 constitution’s attempt to co-opt coloureds 
and Indians while further marginalising Africans was a failure, giving rise to increasing civic 
unrest at the local level, with calls for the toppling of government. 
 
Up to now, ‘municipal representation’ of the majority population was practically non-existent. 
It would appear that at the Congress for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) deliberations, 
local government was not an issue. The acceptance of provinces was a political compromise 
rather than based on scientific design. While the role of national government may have been 
reasonably clear as envisaged by the 1993 constitution, that of provincial and local governments 
may have not been articulated in detail and agreed upon. In implementation, it later became 
clear that the Local Government Transition Act28 was also a compromise-type of document and 
mostly process-oriented. The White Paper on Local Government29 envisaged a developmental 
role for municipalities, thus widening and deepening their responsibilities, without ascertaining 
the likelihood of them being capable of delivering on their extended mandate. 
 
Subsequently, local government was allocated fairly clear duties and responsibilities without 
there being a critical and detailed analysis of the structures, processes, and more importantly, 
the kind of people necessary to deliver on such high expectations in the context of limited 
resources and experience in democratic participatory local governance. While the LGTA did set 
the stage, and provided the framework for the establishment of municipalities on a democratic 
                                                 
28 209 of 1993 (LGTA).  
29 Ministry for Constitutional Development and Provincial Affairs (1998) White Paper on Local 
Government.   
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basis, it was not easy to implement at that stage. Municipalities in their present form were 
established from 2000. Thus, they have been operational for three terms. 
 
It would seem that in the eagerness for democracy and the euphoria of that time the structures 
and processes of a government to implement the constitutional ideals and provisions may not 
have been thought through properly. The Constitution provided for the establishment of ‘wall-
to-wall’ municipalities of different categories throughout South Africa. The mere consolidation 
of approximately 1 100 local authorities, some of which had little or no government in the 
conventional sense, may have added to the challenges rather than diminished them by a 
numbers exercise. 
 
The Constitution set out their status in a three-sphere governmental system based on the 
principles of co-operation and integration (the three spheres working together seamlessly), as 
well as its status, powers and functions, and developmental duties. The Constitution was a 
pioneering and innovative one, given that South Africa had no history of democracy and there 
was an urgent need to reverse the injustices and injuries of the past.  
 
In the absence of precedent, the current democratic governmental system was experimental. 
Municipalities went from being local agents of the state to the frontline of development, without 
the requisite tools, mechanisms, experience, and support from national and provincial 
government which were also ‘experimental’. It is therefore not unexpected that government, 
and especially municipalities, have not lived up to constitutional expectations. 
 
While it is relatively easy to set down on paper the ideals a nation strives for through the 
formulation of policies and laws, their test lies in implementation. Without the requisite 
experience, commitment, leadership, and working in co-operation, the experiment could not be 
successfully executed. Although government has done much to uplift the poor; it could have 
done more with available resources and prudent governance. This is symptomatic of a 
government perhaps unclear on what it wants and the leadership not knowing how to achieve 
the constitutional goals. Although two decades of democratic government is not long enough 
to attain major developmental objectives, it is a sufficiently long period to enable the state to 
identify and address the problems that arise systematically. The National Development Plan30 
                                                 
30 National Planning Commission (2011) National Development Plan, published 11 November 2011.  
11 
 
sets the tone and provides a guideline, but it appears to have not diagnosed the government’s 
ailments in adequate depth. It may be premature at this juncture to deem the governmental 
system a failure and propose its wholesale restructuring. However, it would have helped if a 
social cost-benefit, risk, strengths-weaknesses-opportunities-threats, and gap analyses were 
undertaken to identify and describe the problems, blockages, obstacles, etc, in the whole 
governmental system that are hindering development. For example, the costs and benefits of 
having regional or provincial governments have either not been ascertained or not disclosed.  
Again, this type of diagnosis was not undertaken perhaps because of political sensitivity. The 
state has seen fit to use law as a mechanism to promote and regulate development and has made 
very extensive provisions for this purpose. There was then an assumption that there would be 
sufficiently capable, competent, committed, and dedicated persons on hand to make these 
legally-prescribed mechanisms work efficiently. This has not been the case to date.  
 
The present structures and processes of government may, however, be accepted as the best 
available under the circumstances currently, and to try to make it work. But this is one side of 
an equation in a democratic participatory state. Provisions have also been made for the 
education, training, and mentorship of persons who will drive and maintain the governmental 
machinery. However, something appears to be missing: This is the development of a cadre of 
committed and dedicated local government political leaders and administrators to enable 
municipalities to fulfil their extended mandate and to provide services efficiently   
 
South Africa has not had a ministry of urban and/or rural development and only recently 
established an economic development ministry. The Development Facilitation Act31 attempted 
to get to grips with filling the vacuum, but was later repealed. The Local Government: 
Municipal Systems Act,32 set out in detail what municipalities are and what they are supposed 
to do, alongside that of local communities. The Spatial Planning and Land Use Management 
Act,33  belatedly explained much of what had been missing. Hence, the Constitution and several 
subsequent statutes and regulations provide the legal foundation and framework of government. 
Municipalities have since 2000 moved from local agents of the state providing basic services 
to the select and mechanisms of political and economic repression, to instruments of social and 
economic development, especially of the poor, through efficient service delivery. This is a 
                                                 
31 67 of 1995 (DFA).  
32 32 of 2000.  
33 16 of 2013.  
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complete role reversal and the magnitude of the task is enormous. It appears daunting especially 
in a local participatory and representative democracy of 55.6 million people, where most 
politicians and government administrators have had no experience in this role, and where they 
are constitutionally-bound to fulfil their duties and obligations. 
 
The problems of the state and government manifest in the local sphere, not so much with 
national and provincial government. A clear symptom of the malaise is service delivery protests 
that started around 2004 and have been increasing in violence and numbers since. After two 
decades, the state does not appear to have the solution. A challenge is diagnosis and planning 
in a systematic fashion to deal with these challenges. Another problem is lack of a long-term 
vision and mission for government as a whole, and then for each sphere. A third issue of concern 
is lack of continuity, with changes every five years. Planning then has a five-year window with 
adjustments and modifications annually, based on the State of the Nation Address (SoNA), 
instead of being led by the National Development Plan. This approach is replicated at sub-
national levels in the “state of the province address” and the “state of the city address”. While 
provinces and local government must operate within the principles, policies, and priority 
programmes devised by national government, it does not mean they cannot be innovative as 
long as they harmonise, integrate, and align their work with those formulated at the national 
level. However, it is unclear how national priority policies and programmes are developed and 
allocated to each sphere of government, and how all of them would complement and support 
each other to implement them to fulfil the requirements of constitutional and statutory 
prescripts. 
 
There doesn’t appear to be any in-depth analysis of the governmental system and how it works 
(or should work) as a co-operative whole. Quite often, as is currently evident, the blame is laid 
at local government, without consideration of the underlying or root causes of the problem. No 
consideration appears to be given to the failure of national and provincial government in 
meeting their obligations to municipalities – such as support and capacitation. Each minister of 
CoGTA seems to have different ideas of the challenges facing local government and tackles 
one or more apparently in isolation. For example, while several reviews of local government or 
municipalities have been undertaken, these are long on articulating the problems and short of 
setting out a systematic approach to their resolution. Municipalities constitute one of the three 
spheres of government and attempting to solve the challenges facing one sphere is a piecemeal 
approach. Using systems theory, one needs to analyse the whole government system and to 
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address the root causes (and not the symptoms) of the malaise. History teaches us how one 
should not repeat past policies (mistakes) but learn from them to plan for the future. The current 
governmental system is innovative, one not benefiting from centuries of experience in 
democratic implementation. The structure and mechanisms are experimental, as are the role-
players therein. Participatory democracy also is a novelty and poses new challenges. People 
have to be schooled in governance, including participation in structures and processes, without 
much financial reward. The Constitution and especially the Systems Act and the Municipal 
Finance Management Act prescribe many rights, obligations, duties, structures, and processes 
that municipalities and communities must comply with. This is onerous on both parties, 
especially in the context of numerous complex statutory and regulatory obligations without 
adequate knowledge of how to comply therewith. Some of the legislation may have been 
promulgate in haste for the rapid transformation to society, but many may be regulatory. A 
review on key legislation passed since 1994 is currently underway.34 Residents, community 
leaders, and councillors have to be educated in governance and civic responsibilities, as must 
other stakeholders, like non-governmental-organisations (NGOs), trade unions, community-
based-organisations (CBOs), etc. 
 
Challenges facing the three-sphere governmental system are deep-rooted and multifaceted. In 
order for it to function smoothly as a whole, there is need to learn from systems theory and 
organisational theory. The governmental system has to be analysed as a whole as well as from 
the perspective of its different components. Such an exercise does not appear to have been done, 
or if undertaken by the National Planning Commission, does not seem to have been disclosed. 
While a thesis cannot undertake such a task, it can address one of the constituent parts – 
municipal representation as a means to more effective governance in the local sphere of 
government. 
 
That is problem statement is lengthy is reflective of the many issues that need addressing in the 
transformation from apartheid era to the kind of democracy envisaged in the Constitution. It is 
also because there needs to be a complete understanding, based on historical underdevelopment 
                                                 
34 ‘Motlanthe appointed to chair legislative review panel’ 19/01/2016, from www.polity.org.za, accessed 
21/11/2016; Motlanthe, Kgalema (2016) ‘People’s efforts to travel long distances inspire hope’, Johannesburg: 
The Star, 17/10/2016; Nini, Asanda (2016) ‘Search for ineffectual laws starts’, Johannesburg: The Times, 
18/08/2016; Smith, Janet (2016) ‘We have plenty of new laws, but are these any good?’ Johannesburg: The Star, 
17/08/2016; Motlanthe, Kgalema (2016) ‘We’re pausing to assess the lawmaking of the past 2 decades’, 
Johannesburg: The Star, 15/08/2016.  
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of the majority population, of the innovative three-sphere governmental system functioning, for 
the first time, on a mutually-beneficial co-operative mode. It is only from an appreciation of 
such knowledge from which can be identified the gaps and shortcomings of service delivery 
and based thereon, the promotion of social and economic development by local government 
biased in favour of the poor. Hence, municipal representation should be contextualised and its 
role problematised to find an effective system. 
 
Many key questions underlying and informing the research are analysed in this study in order 
to develop answers that would be helpful in ascertaining an ideal type of municipal 
representation as well as where and how it could be most effectively made: 
i. The Constitution created and entrenched municipalities as a sphere of government.35 
This gives them the powers and functions, and concomitantly the status, to operate 
alongside the national and provincial spheres without the disadvantage of being a 
(subordinate) creature of statute as in the past. Municipal representation would be 
facilitated by co-operative governance36 in the three-sphere governmental system. 
However, given that most municipalities have had very little experience in government, 
the question is whether they would be accepted as an equal by the national and 
provincial spheres and work in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.  
 
ii. The Constitution stipulates that an Act of Parliament “must establish or provide for 
structures and institutions to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations”37 based 
on a foundation and within the framework of co-operative governance. This creates 
space for municipalities to be a party to intergovernmental relations systems and 
processes. However, nowhere in this directive did it explicitly envisage any role for an 
association of local authorities. Hence, these institutions have not been recognised for 
purposes of co-operative governance but merely to represent the interests of 
municipalities. Nevertheless, an implied role is indicated in section 41(2)(a) of the 
Constitution which stipulates that Parliament must “establish or provide for structures 
and institutions to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations”. The statute in 
                                                 
35 Sections 40(1) and (2) of the Constitution. 
36 Chapter 3 of the Constitution: Co-operative Government, section 41. 
37 Sections 41(2)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. 
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question is the Intergovernmental   Relations Framework Act38 The South African Local 
Government Association (SALGA) does undertake this function. The Constitution even 
went beyond the norm in most developing countries by prescribing for the recognition 
of an association for local authorities and its consultation with the national and 
provincial spheres as well as for representation on the National Council of Provinces 
(NCoP) and the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC).39 This directive makes it 
mandatory for municipalities to be represented on such institutions, a major advantage. 
The opportunities opened by this provision should be optimised. It would appear that 
SALGA has not been able to make full use of section 163(b)(i) of the Constitution for 
it to consult with national and provincial governments. The IRFA unfortunately appears 
to circumscribe such engagement by providing that:  
(a) Organised local government “may” be consulted only when there is a statutory 
obligation to do so and then only through an “appropriate intergovernmental 
structure”;40  
(b) Organised local government would only have “speaking rights,” for whatever that 
is worth, if it is not represented in the structure in question that raises a matter 
impacting on local government;41 and  
(c) The Premier co-ordinates intergovernmental relations with local governments in a 
province, and not with organised local government or its provincial affiliate,42 but 
would be by giving a broad interpretation of section 239 of the Constitution. The 
above IRFA provisions appear to undermine effective municipal representation but 
are not unconstitutional as organised local government is not an organ of state in the 
conventional sense and the constitutional and statutory provisions only entrench 
their recognition and not their status, autonomy, and other essentialia. 
Notwithstanding this, since co-operative governance is a constitutional requirement, 
all structures engaged therein must comply with statutory directives. SALGA is 
represented on the President’s Co-ordinating Council and on national 
intergovernmental forums dealing with any local government matter; its provincial 
affiliate has representation on a Premiers’ intergovernmental forum.43 Hence, there 
                                                 
 38 13 of 2005 (“IRFA”). 
39 Section 31(1) of the IRFA. 
40 Section 31(2) of the IRFA. 
41 Sections 31(1) and (2) and 37(b), respectively, of the IRFA. 
42 Sections 6(1)(h), 10(1)(d), 11(b), and 17(1)(f) of the IRFA. 
43 Sections 6(1)(h), 10(1)(d), 11(b) and 17(1)(f) of the IRFA. 
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appears to be adequate provision for municipal representation, but this issue is 
analysed in this study. 
 
iii. The state has chosen law to facilitate development through rigid prescriptions, such as 
those in the IRFA. These may help, but such an instrument could also circumscribe 
flexibility and local innovation. This is so, especially in the case of co-operative 
governance, given that human relations, particularly ethics and morality, cannot be 
regulated and controlled or conducted through set formulae. Thus, South Africa’s 
unique statutory-regulatory system is a necessary but insufficient mechanism to 
implement co-operative governance which goes beyond formal compliance with 
statutory provisions. The result is that South Africa’s governmental system is a hybrid 
model based, to some extent, on compromise at the Congress for a Democratic South 
Africa (CODESA) deliberations. In trying to cater for a centralised, decentralised and 
local participatory approach, the Constitution may have failed to find the right balance 
in dividing responsibilities with minimal overlap or formal concurrency among the three 
spheres of government. Nevertheless, the current model has to be used for an adequately 
long period before wholesale restructuring could be attempted. Given the uncertainties 
and de facto weaker position of local government in this mix, effective municipal 
representation becomes crucial so that the needs of municipalities are brought to the 
fore and taken seriously. The power ‘confusion’ may create opportunities for local 
government to step into the breach and motivate for a bottom-up approach to 
development, such as municipalities’ integrated development plans (IDP). 
 
iv. While co-operative governance and intergovernmental relations would be a mechanism 
to accommodate and facilitate municipal representation, the status and autonomy of 
local government alongside that of national and provincial needs to be assessed, would 
determine to some extent how effective it would be. 
 
v. Another enabler of municipal representation is the powers and functions of local 
government. While it may not be possible to clearly demarcate and retain them in a 
three-sphere governmental system that operates co-operatively, much confusion relating 
to the perceived lower status of municipalities have been cleared up by the High Courts 
and the Constitutional Court. 
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vi. The objects of local government44 appear extensive and daunting. Much can be achieved 
if national and provincial government fulfil their constitutional duty of strengthening 
and supporting the capacity of municipalities.45 Municipal representatives can play a 
role in acquiring the requisite commitments and resources. 
 
vii. Municipalities are constitutionally obligated to deliver on the Bill of Rights to their 
residents. The Systems Act gives effect to many of the recommendations of the White 
Paper on Local Government, requiring it to be developmental. While residents can 
enforce their rights against municipalities, they also have civic duties. In such 
engagement and interaction, municipal representatives can play a facilitating role. 
 
viii. Municipal representatives can play a major role in safeguarding and promoting human 
rights and community participation in municipal decision making. 
 
ix. The type of municipality46 has an influence and impact on municipal representation. For 
example, there is need for co-operation and collaboration between district and local 
municipalities. Once again, councillors can assist in establishing and maintaining 
harmonious relations.  
 
x. The Constitution and several subsequent statutes established a complex machinery that 
helps to facilitate municipal representation. These includes Parliament (the National 
Assembly and the NCoP) as well as representation on certain bodies. 
 
xi. The nature of co-operative governance and how it has been practised over a lengthy 
period in developed democracies would help to ascertain the nature and role of 
municipal representation and the kind of organisation that can give effect thereto.  
 
xii. It needs to be ascertained how one of the new institutions established pursuant to section 
163 of the Constitution, namely an association for local authorities, could play a 
meaningful role in service delivery by representing municipalities within the framework 
of co-operative governance.  
                                                 
44 Set out in section 152(1) of the Constitution. 
45 In terms of section 154(1) of the Constitution.  
46 Set out in section 155 of the Constitution and given effect to by the Structures Act.  
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The extended mandate as well as the constitutional and statutory obligations imposed on local 
government give rise to the question as to how new structures47 can without an objectively 
proven and sound rationale for their existence and in an era of limited resources, function 
effectively. This matter is analysed in some detail, as answers thereto may have a major impact 
on the success or failure of the associations for local authorities. The absence of precedent and 
experience has adverse implications for the sustainable operation of these institutions at the 
local sphere in a democratic state, generally, but particularly when co-operative governance is 
a constitutional and statutory requirement, that is, formalised.  
 
1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
This literature review is based on and falls within the framework of the structure of the study, 
namely an examination of municipal representation by councillors, facilitated through co-
operative governance and also currently as a collective undertaken by SALGA. It also arises 
from the topic and the problem statement, and thus could be divided into three distinct but inter-
related components, namely the assumption that (a) effective municipal representation should 
(b) enhance the efficiency of local government in delivering basic municipal services as well 
as promoting social and economic development, and that (c) an association for local authorities 
can play a major role in this ideal through collective or consolidated municipal representation 
on national decision-making bodies.48    
 
The point of departure is an examination of the underdevelopment of local authorities in South 
Africa under the British colonial and apartheid regimes, to reform in the 1990s. This provides 
the background and context to understanding the current situation faced by many 
municipalities, that is, service delivery protests, some violent, even where the Constitution and 
several statutes have prescribed various mechanisms and processes for community participation 
in law-making and municipal administration.  
 
                                                 
47 Particularly those promoting co-operative governance, such as SALGA and the NCoP.  
48 The literature review is structured largely based on two papers studied, namely Levy, Yair and Timothy 
J Ellis (2006) A Systems Approach to Conduct an Effective Literature Review in Support of Information Systems 
Research, 9 (2006) Informing Science Journal, 181-212, and Bolderston, Amanda (2008) Writing an Effective 
Literature Review, 39 (2008) Journal of Medical Imaging and Radiation Sciences, 86-92.    
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Theories underpinning political representation are presented to provide as a basis for 
understanding of the general history and of the current electoral and parliamentary system in 
South Africa. 
 
A review of South Africa’s constitutional and statutory provisions as well as mechanisms and 
processes facilitating municipal representation are presented next, again to highlight the 
paradigm shift in South Africa where historically local authorities functioned under provincial 
ordinances to being established by the Constitution as a sphere of government. A comparative 
study of co-operative governance incorporating local authorities and their representation is 
undertaken to provide lessons for South Africa, concluding with a review of SALGA as a 
municipal representative organ.  
 
The focus of this study is municipal representation in South Africa, a topic of considerable 
current interest as evinced through the debate as to whether the Republic’s political leaders 
practice responsible government through being accountable to the people, or serving party 
interests. This situation has dire consequences at the municipal level through possible 
politicisation of service delivery. Given the topic, the literature has to be selective so as not to 
become too generalised and attempt to ask and answer questions not directly relevant.  
 
Explanation is provided on reasons for selecting literature and its possible contribution to 
answering the problem statement. This arises from use of argumentation where a claim is made 
and reasons or warrants therefor are proffered, based on evidence, that answers questions raised 
or claims made. Another way of saying this is to make a proposition based on evidence arising 
from the literature, provide an explanation of such warrant and use this to make a claim that is 
backed up by the data.49      
 
Literature more relevant to the thesis topic are reviewed and analysed where appropriate in the 
body of the thesis and not hereunder.  
 
Understanding the history and evolution of local authorities and political representation in 
parliament from medieval times may aid in appreciating South Africa’s current governmental 
situation. To this end, literature reviewed includes a brief history of parliament with a short 
                                                 
49 Levy and Ellis, op cit, 201-202.  
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introduction to the rule of law, English constitutionalism, and parliamentary representation in 
England. 
 A Short History of Parliament by the Parliamentary Education Office, Australia, 
www.peo.gov.au. 
 MacPhail, IMM (1967) An Introduction to the British Constitution, London: Edward 
Arnold; O Hood Phillips (1967) Constitutional and Administrative Law, 4th Edition, 
London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
 
The understanding of the English parliamentary system and conventions arising from common 
law is important for an understanding of the situation in present-day South Africa, given the 
Constitutional Court’s judgment on the Nkandla matter,50 and current moves to unseat the 
President by secret ballot.51    
 
Local authorities in South Africa as creatures of statute functioned as the lowest level in a three-
tier hierarchy from the first European settlement of the Cape of Good Hope by Jan van Riebeeck 
in 1652, to the coming into effect of the Interim Constitution and the LGTA. An appreciation of 
the history, framework, and context of the evolution of local government in the Republic 
provides the foundation for an appreciation of present-day difficulties in municipal 
representation. The history of underdevelopment of local authorities in South Africa is gleaned 
largely from the following texts: 
 Hall, RJ (1928) An Historical Introduction to Civics, London: Longmans, Green & Co. 
This text is relevant to an understanding of the importance of community participation 
in government, facilitated by the Constitution and particularly the Systems Act52 and the 
Electoral Act.53  
 Macmillan, WA (1917) The Place of Local Government in the Union of South Africa, 
Johannesburg: Hortor. 
 Green, LP (1957) History of local government in South Africa: An introduction, Cape 
Town: Juta. 
Macmillan and Green specifically address the evolution of local authorities based on 
the British governmental system as applied in the Cape and Natal colonies and later to 
                                                 
50 Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Democratic Alliance v 
Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [2016] ZACC 11.  
51 See footnote 17.  
52 Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 32 of 2000, as amended.  
53 73 of 1998, as amended.  
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South Africa. Not much literature is available on local government in South Africa 
and these texts provide the necessary history and context to understanding the 
situation in present-day municipalities.  
 Davis, Gordon, L Melunsky and FB du Randt (1959) Urban Native Law, Port Elizabeth: 
Grotius Publishers. 
This text is one that provides an overview of the situation with respect to urban blacks 
and is necessary to understand the underdevelopment of the majority race group. It 
makes for required reading when attempting to understand the rationale behind the 
founding provisions of the Constitution and of its Bill of Rights.54 
 
Much of South Africa’s legal system had been modelled on English and Roman-Dutch 
structures, policies, and processes, as depicted in the following texts:  
 Hahlo, HR and Ellison Kahn (1960) The British Commonwealth: The Development of 
its Laws and Constitution – Vol. 5: The Union of South Africa, London: Stevens.  
 Hosten, WJ, AB Edwards, Francis Bosman and Joan Church (1995) Introduction to 
South African Law and Legal Theory, Durban: Butterworths. 
 
The situation of local authorities during the first Republican era (1961 to 1994) can be 
ascertained from the following texts: 
 Cloete, JNN (1982) Central, Provincial and Municipal Institutions of South Africa, 
Pretoria: JL van Schaik; Craythorne, DL (1993) Municipal Administration: A 
Handbook, 3rd Edition, Cape Town: Juta; and Cameron, Robert (1995) ‘The History of 
Devolution of Powers to Local Authorities in South Africa: The Shifting Sands of State 
Control’, Local Government Studies 2(3), 396-417; 
 Hofmeister, Wilhelm and Ingo Scholz (Eds) (1997) Traditional and Contemporary 
Forms of Local Participation and Self-Government in Africa, Johannesburg: KAS.  
These texts set out the situation of historical local authorities to present-day 
municipalities. They serve to highlight how local authorities were structured as 
subordinate organs of state providing basic municipal services on the basis of race and 
class, to the complex municipality undertaking those functions on an equal basis while 
promoting social and economic development, biased in favour of the poor. 
  
                                                 
54 Sections 1 and 3, and sections 9-35, respectively, of the Constitution. 
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The political transition that began in 1990 was largely the product of locally and nationally 
constituted social movements driven by organised workers, students, youth, professionals, 
women, and urban residents, led by the United Democratic Front, established in 1983. Due to 
South Africa’s repressive regime supported by its draconian laws, it was only from then that 
large scale organised social movements could make a decisive impact on the structures, 
policies, and strategies of the state and mainstream economic institutions. 
With neither reform from above nor revolution from below being distinct possibilities, attempts began to 
be made from the mid-1980s onwards to find negotiated solutions. …it was sustained mass action that 
tended to have a more decisive effect.55 
 
A brief overview of the phased reform of local government from 1993 initiated by the Interim 
Constitution and the LGTA serves to introduce the (1996) Constitution establishing a unique 
three-sphere governmental system contemplated to work in co-operative rather than in a 
hierarchical manner. The following texts are consulted:  
 Seidman, Ann and Robert B Seidman (1994) State and Law in the Development 
Process: Problem Solving and Institutional Change in the Third World, New York: St 
Martin’s Press;  
 Atkinson, Doreen (1998) ‘Local government in intergovernmental relations: Towards 
co-operative governance?’ in Electoral Institute of South Africa: From a tier to a sphere 
– local government in the South African constitutional order, Sandton: Heinemann, 16-
31;  
 Pimstone, Gideon (1998)(a) ‘Local Government: Constitutional Foundations’ in Khoza, 
Meshack and Yvonne Muthien, Regionalism in the New South Africa, Aldershot: 
Ashgate, Chapter 9: 131-170;  
 Pimstone, Gideon (1998)(b);  ‘The constitutional basis of local government in South 
Africa’ in Electoral Institute of South Africa: From a Tier to a sphere – local 
government in the South African constitutional order,  Sandton: Heinemann;  
 Gordhan, Pravin (1999) ‘Co-operative Government: A New Order for a New Nation’ in 
Maharaj, Gitanjali (ed) Between Unity and Diversity: Essays on Nation-Building in 
Post-Apartheid South Africa, Cape Town: Idasa, 199; and  
 Various publications by CoGTA and SALGA as well as High Court and Constitutional 
Court cases. 
 
                                                 
 55 Swilling, Mark (1997) ‘Building Democratic Urban Local Government in Southern Africa’ in Swilling, 
Mark (Ed) Governing Africa’s Cities, Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 211-273. 
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Co-operative governance and intergovernmental relations is an innovation in South Africa, 
given that government was highly centralised with local authorities functioning under 
provincial ordinances. The Constitution and various statutes emanating therefrom are analysed, 
along with literature thereon. Co-operative governance may be the sine qua non for municipal 
representation and this subject is addressed in the study. 
 
The current position of municipalities introduced by their history is depicted in:  
 Cloete, JJN and C Thornhill (2005) South African Municipal Government and 
Administration: The New Dispensation: Dotsquare Publishing;  
 Thornhill, C and JJN Cloete (2005) South African Municipal Government and 
Administration, Second Edition, Dotsquare Publishing; and 
 Craythorne, DL (2006) Municipal Administration: The Handbook, Sixth Edition.    
 
It is, furthermore, necessary to ascertain the powers and functions, and concomitantly the status 
of local government, as such an analysis could indicate what is permissible under the present 
system and how it could be supplemented and complemented with additional provisions to 
enhance local government effectiveness. Consideration of some literature on the subject could 
provide convincing arguments for and against the present system and suggestions for 
improvement. Analyses of certain High Court and Constitutional Court judgments provide 
clarity where there were ambiguities in the past. In this search, the opportunities, mechanisms 
and processes for municipal representation within the framework of co-operative governance 
are examined. Some of the literature are aimed at students and thus are largely a depiction of 
the constitutional and statutory provisions applicable to local government and as such have little 
or no analysis. 
 
Writing largely on national-provincial executive intergovernmental relations in 2004, 
Mathebula argues that – 
The limited availability of existing theory and therefore specific text material on IGR in South Africa 
created a reliance on primary information available at and from the South African government.56 
 
Twelve years later the situation remains largely the same. There is a dearth of material on co-
operative governance in the local sphere since most literature deals with national-provincial 
                                                 
 56 Mathebula, Fortunate Mashebu (2004) Intergovernmental relations reform in a newly-emerging South 
African polity, unpublished DAdmin thesis, University of Pretoria. 
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relations, and a major part of discussions therein relate to structures established for 
intergovernmental relations prior to the promulgation of the IRFA. There is even less on 
organised local government, particularly SALGA. Hence, only a few recent studies relevant to 
the topic are mentioned below. The researcher could find little or no literature on municipal 
representation in South Africa; hence this thesis fills a niche.  
 
A few studies largely addressing national-provincial governmental relations are mentioned 
insofar as they may be relevant for this study. Reference is made to the following texts relating 
or relevant to local government: 
i. Bekink, Bernard (2006) The Restructuring (Systemization) of Local Government under 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, unpublished LLD thesis, 
University of Pretoria. 
“Spanning over 22 chapters [in 730 pages], this work covers almost all legal aspects of 
the new local government dispensation”. As such it is a source of handy reference due 
to the detail and span of the study. The relatively short Chapter 9 titled: Local 
government within a system of co-operative governance, provides some useful insights. 
The value of the thesis is enhanced by its publication in 2006 as Principles of South 
African Local Government Law, Durban: Lexis-Nexis. Bekink’s text is referred to 
extensively in this study. However, in some instances, it is largely addressing the 
principles of law pertaining to local government. As such, it describes and discusses the 
Constitution and various statutes addressing the developmental duties of local 
government, intergovernmental relations, municipal powers and functions and service 
delivery. Municipal representation is dealt with only cursorily.   
 
ii. Shaidi, Elisante Walter (2013) Investigation into Causes of Service Delivery Protests in 
Municipalities: A Case Study of Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, unpublished DPhil 
thesis, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality. 
This thesis was reviewed to ascertain whether there was a link between (poor) municipal 
representation and service delivery protests in the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan 
municipality. The hypothesis was that municipalities could render services effectively 
if certain shortcomings were addressed. This includes poor public participation and 
inadequate consultation, corruption, political infighting, poor intergovernmental 
relations, low youth unemployment, and low capacity of municipalities. The protests 
were largely based on the lack of or slow pace of service delivery rather than a 
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mysterious ‘Third Force’. Other causes were poor governance, unfulfilled election 
promises, and a “complex, onerous and inhibiting legislative environment that governs 
service delivery”. Municipal representation as a mechanism to enhance service delivery 
was not addressed, and hence Shaidi’s work does not adequately address this issue and 
there is no need to analyse this literature further. 
 
iii. Mathenjwa, Mbuzeni Johnson (2013) The Supervision of Local Government: 
Application of the Legal Framework, unpublished LLD thesis, Pretoria: Unisa. 
While this study addresses provincial intervention in local government in terms of 
section 139 of the Constitution, it contains information relevant to this thesis. These are 
the history, status, powers, functions and objectives of local government in South 
Africa, co-operative governance and intergovernmental relations, establishment of 
municipalities and their developmental duties, and public participation in the business 
of local government by communities. Of significance to this study is the section titled, 
‘The status and the role of organised local government bodies in the NCoP.’ 
 
iv. Woolman, Stuart and Michael Bishop (2014) Constitutional Law of South Africa, 
Second edition, Cape Town: Juta.  
This subscription service in five volumes analyses the Constitution and its Bill of Rights 
in considerable detail. As such, it is a source to turn to on local government law. 
v. Steytler, N and Jaap de Visser (2012) Local Government Law of South Africa, Durban: 
LexisNexis. 
This text, in seventeen chapters, provides a full analysis of local government, from its 
‘development’, establishment of municipalities, governance structures, electoral 
system, powers and functions, community participation, integrated development 
planning, municipal services, administration, revenue and expenditure, and local 
government in co-operative governance. It is thus a most useful source of reference. 
 
vi. Van Donk, Mirjam, Mark Swilling, Edgar Pieterse, and Susan Parnell (Eds) (2008) 
Consolidating Developmental Local Government: Lessons from the South African 
Experience, Cape Town: Isandla Institute. 
This text deals with the developmental duties of local government and serves as a useful 
guide for socio-economic development by municipalities. 
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vii. Currie, Iain, Johan de Waal, Law Society of South Africa (2013) The Bill of Rights 
Handbook, Cape Town: Juta. 
Municipalities are in the forefront of delivering on the prescripts in the Bill of Rights in 
the Constitution, particularly sections 24 (environment), 25 (property), 26 (housing), 27 
(health care, food, water, and social security), 28 (rights of children), 32 (access to 
information), and 33 (just administrative action). The duties of local government with 
respect to these rights and insofar as they relate to municipal representation are analysed 
in conjunction with some publications of the South African Human Rights Commission 
(SAHRC), namely: 
(a) Investigative Report Volume 7 (2015); and  
(b) Annual Report 2015. 
 
viii. Du Plessis, Anel (Ed) (2015) Environmental Law and Local Government in South 
Africa, Cape Town: Juta. 
This text deals substantially with environmental law in 26 chapters, setting out in 
comprehensive detail the major role that local government can play in this field. It 
highlights the considerable responsibilities of municipalities to fulfil its extensive duties 
and to be the custodian of the environment for future generations. An appreciation of 
such responsibilities could assist municipal representatives in determining how they 
should educate themselves to care for the most vulnerable. While Du Plessis sets out in 
considerable detail the vast amount of responsibilities of municipalities in delivering on 
environmental rights,57 it does not address municipal representation as a means of 
enhancing and protecting such rights. Hence, this text is not analysed in this thesis. 
 
ix. De Visser, Jaap (2005) Developmental Local Government: A Case Study of South 
Africa, Antwerp: Intersentia. 
This work argues for and against decentralisation in South Africa, defines 
‘developmental’ local authorities, powers, functions, status, supervision of and co-
operation in local government. De Visser proposes an institutional model for 
developmental local government, arguing that this expanded role creates challenges and 
opportunities for municipal representation. 
 
                                                 
57 Set out in section 24 of the Constitution.  
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The bulk of the literature reviewed is made up of the Constitution and several subsequent 
articles and statutes, set out in the bibliography. Where applicable, literature on the 
constitutional-statutory-regulatory provisions is analysed, insofar as providing insights on the 
operations of local government generally and particularly on municipal representation. There 
does not appear to be many contradictory views but those that are relevant are further analysed.  
The above literature review is undertaken to indicate the place and role for municipal 
representation and in the search for opportunities for this function. 
 
The research examines the implementation of municipal representation from the time of 
establishment of SALGA in 1997, to date. This is undertaken through reviews by CoGTA and 
other bodies which are analysed to the extent relevant to municipal representation. 
Unfortunately, most if not all studies in South Africa deals with intergovernmental relations, as 
opposed to co-operative governance, within South Africa only. This is a limitation, as much 
attention is given to project implementation rather than local government representation. 
Furthermore, in a globalising and rapidly-changing world, co-operative international 
intergovernmental relations may be beneficial to improved service delivery through sharing of 
knowledge with foreign municipalities. This issue is addressed briefly through a review of 
municipal international relations. 
 
An overview of local government representation, mostly through associations for local 
authorities, is undertaken using models employed in the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, 
Belgium, France, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, and the United States of America. This is for 
comparative purposes and to draw therefrom lessons of experience for South Africa. Insofar as 
it relates to local government, there is a considerable amount of literature on its constitutional 
establishment in a three-sphere system, status and autonomy, powers and functions, co-
operative governance, objects, rights and developmental duties, establishment of 
municipalities, and participatory local democracy. There is also sufficient data on the 
mechanisms and processes facilitating municipal representation, such as Parliament and the 
NCoP, as well as structures established by municipalities. There may be a surfeit of reviews 
and analyses of South Africa’s innovative and therefore experimental governmental system, 
particularly the enhanced comparative role of local government. In the process, there could be 
much repetition and perhaps also contradictions. Academic and intellectual literature may be of 
little help to the practitioner struggling, to use a cliché, at the coalface.  As Shaidi (2013) has 
said that South Africa has a “complex, onerous and inhibiting legislative environment that 
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governs service delivery”, let alone municipal governance. Much time and effort could be spent 
by practitioners in understanding the plethora of laws to ensure compliance while leaving less 
time and energy for promoting social and economic development through service delivery, 
especially to the poor and under-represented.  
 
There is, however, a dearth of information on municipal representation per se, as well as on 
monitoring, evaluation and reporting on intergovernmental relations especially on local 
government’s involvement therein, achievements and failures since 2000, and the way forward. 
The enhancement of local government effectiveness through attainment of greater municipal 
efficiency is not adequately addressed in the literature. Neither is the role that municipal 
councillors can play in this function, alongside the administration, particularly in being an 
effective voice for the poor to ensure that national and provincial policies are based on and 
responsive to their needs through educated and strong local participatory democracy. This study 
fills that gap in the body of current knowledge, although much more work is required in this 
field. This lacuna has manifested itself through service delivery protests and the crisis of 
leadership, particularly of the executive. 
 
1.4  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
1.4.1 NATURE OF THE STUDY 
The nature of the study calls for qualitative research which is seen as an interdisciplinary, trans-
disciplinary and sometimes counter disciplinary field as it cuts across humanities and the social 
sciences.58 This approach is capable of incorporating the disciplines of law, public and 
municipal governance and administration, social and economic development, and co-operative 
government, including intergovernmental relations and within such context, municipal 
representation. In such a study, it has been stated59 that qualitative researchers do not start with 
a theory but rather to generate it from the data upon which it is grounded, with the aim of 
achieving an understanding of how the phenomena work.60 It has also been suggested that the 
aim of the qualitative researcher is to describe and understand events “within the concrete, 
                                                 
58 Ile, Isioma Uregu (2007) A public administration approach to managing intergovernmental relations 
system in the governance of the state: A case review of Nigeria and South Africa, Unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of Pretoria, 36. 
59 By Woods, P (2006) Qualitative Research, www.edu.plymouth.ac.uk, accessed 28/10/2015. 
60 Ibid. 
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natural context in which they occur”.61 Only if one appreciates events against the background 
of the whole context, and additionally how, in turn, such context confers meaning to the event 
concerned, that “one can truly claim to ‘understand’ the events”.62 The current research informs, 
and is informed by, local government programmes and projects that could be enhanced by co-
operative governance and through participation by associations for local authorities. The study 
involves the integration of, relations between, and use of different theoretical and conceptual 
approaches and contexts that are outlined, and arguments justifying their use are set out. While 
the topic is municipal representation and as such relates to political science, public and 
municipal administration, and perhaps other disciplines, the research has a bias in law and its 
role and influence in local government representation. 
 
1.4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research is to some extent descriptive as it has been said that most qualitative studies “do 
not go beyond the construction of models and typologies, and that this ordered, descriptive 
detail is a perfectly legitimate pursuit.”63 The qualitative research explores appropriate foreign 
national, regional, and local intergovernmental relations for comparative purposes and a 
guideline, as well as South African legislation as an enabling mechanism for municipal 
representation. This study continues with analysis of the establishment and operation of 
associations for local authorities in the promotion and maintenance of co-operative governance. 
Such review and analyses form the background and context to the focus of the study, namely 
municipal representation, which is investigated in depth. The nature of the research problem 
influences the research design. The descriptive part is to some extent based on observations 
made during the researcher’s long working experience in local government which, with the 
available literature, facilitates exploration and in-depth analyses of the topic, enabling a focus 
on municipal representation. Qualitative research, unlike quantitative research, does not allow 
one to determine choices and actions nor provide a step-by-step plan. Apart from existing theory 
and research, results of pilot studies or preliminary research, and experiments, one of the 
sources for constructing a theoretical framework or conceptual context is the researcher’s 
                                                 
 61 Babbie, Earl and Johann Mouton (2001) The Practice of Social Research, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 272.  
 62 Ibid. 
 63 Maxwell, Joseph A (2005) Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach, 
www.engin.umich.edu/research/maxwell, accessed 26/09/2016. 
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experience and technical knowledge in local government.64 This approach accommodates a 
degree of flexibility whereby the researcher is able to collect information that is open-ended. It 
also enables the unravelling of a research problem by uncovering insights into the phenomena 
rather than test specific predicts. Formalism, as adopted by South Africa, tends to focus 
primarily on governmental institutions, their legal norms, rules and regulations, as well as on 
political ideologies.  
 
In the field of co-operative governance and intergovernmental relations in particular, the 
emphasis should be on human behaviour and the interactions between and among persons and 
the performance of the several role-occupants. This is because the harmony of the constituent 
parts of the system hoped for in the design of policies and implementation mechanisms may 
not materialise. In co-operative governance, the relationship is one of engagement, 
interdependence and interaction, which results in a situation that is far from harmonious or 
stable. It is thus the task of the researcher to “ascertain how change in any one of the parts of a 
political system affects other parts and the whole.”65 In South Africa, the design of policies and 
systems is a distinctive national function, although citizens are allowed to make inputs through 
the National Assembly, the NCoP and through their municipal council processes. Hence, 
municipalities have little part in their formulation or design, save for SALGA making inputs on 
the legislative process in the NCoP and through CoGTA, but are required to implement them. 
This may be a cause of dissatisfaction among local communities. Legislation cannot prescribe 
and ensure human behaviour. Therefore, intergovernmental relations are fraught with tensions. 
Thus, the study has two main components: the structures designed to give effect to policies, and 
the behaviour of role players who execute them. Hence, observation and description facilitates 
analysing and understanding the patterned conduct and social processes of society. This 
approach enables the search for a practical model of municipal representation. 
 
1.4.3 USE OF HISTORICAL SOURCES 
This study covers, in synopsis form, the period from the earliest form of municipal government 
through parliamentary representation by local authorities in medieval England. This serves as 
a foundation to facilitate an understanding of South Africa’s local government history from 
                                                 
 64 Almond, Gabriel A and G Bingham Powell, Jr. (1978) Comparative Politics: A Developmental 
Approach, Boston: Little Brown, 3; 12-13. 
 65 Ibid. 
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1652 and much later to representation based on race and class. It also sketches the history of 
local government reform from 1993 through the recognition of and establishment of organised 
local government in 1997, to the present. Since co-operative governance largely involves 
interactions within and amongst institutions, and the roles of those responsible for the 
interactions, an understanding of them through observation forms the background to this study. 
In examining the governmental system and its constituent parts, the “main problem could be 
divided into sub-problems”66 for logical identification and assessment of developmental 
solutions. This also serves to provide a rational and logical explanation of events or situations 
in society and to facilitate a better understanding of human or social interactions.67  
 
Historical events have already occurred; therefore, the researcher cannot directly observe them. 
However, their study, description, interpretation, and analyses enable one to better understand 
the current situation and perhaps to predict emerging issues as they will to some extent be 
influenced by events and behaviours of people in the past. History facilitates a better 
understanding of the context, which, in turn, enables a deeper insight into the issue at hand. 
This is logical in the sense that human activities cannot be disassociated from their context. The 
historical information has been gathered from several sources.  
 
Primary information sources, that is, government publications, have been used to a large extent 
to ensure validity and minimise errors. The nature of many of these documents is such that they 
have to be carefully analysed to verify their ‘authenticity’ and to find what have been left unsaid. 
Where necessary, secondary sources are utilised, with the same cautionary approach. While the 
researcher has used his observations based on his employment in local government and related 
institutions, no interviews or questionnaires have been employed. 
 
1.4.4 CONSTRAINTS 
The research is somewhat hampered by the following constraints: 
(a) Except for the Western Cape, provinces do not have constitutions, which could have 
provided for greater clarity on their roles vis-à-vis municipalities located therein, 
indicating what is permissible and what is not; 
                                                 
 66 Brynard, PA and SX Hanekom (1997) Introduction in research in Public Administration and related 
academic disciplines, Pretoria: JL van Schaik, 4. 
 67 Brynard and Hanekom (1997), op cit, 6. 
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(b) The complexities of the legal arrangements may in some cases be beyond the grasp 
of councillors and officials; 
(c) There had been no policy or legislation enacted to give effect to the constitutionally-
imposed general development mandate for the local sphere, particularly the 
economic development imperative, until, to some extent, the appearance of the 
National Development Plan, while the Systems Act appears to be overly-prescriptive 
and the Municipal Finance Management Act highly regulatory to ensure local 
government compliance;  
(d) There was no policy or legislation providing for the establishment and functioning 
of institutions nationally and within the provinces for the promotion and monitoring 
of co-operative governance, until the promulgation of the IRFA on 15 August 2005; 
and  
(e) There is a dearth of research on formal, legally-constituted policies, strategies, 
structures, and procedures for the promotion of co-operative governance generally, 
and especially that pertaining to the local level, and specifically for municipal 
representation.  
 
Research indicates that the drafters of the Constitution were strongly influenced by the German 
Basic Law and certain concepts therein.68 Provisions for the formalisation of institutions and 
procedures for municipal governance and intergovernmental relations in South Africa have 
been largely based on German practice, albeit taken much further. The question arises as to 
whether such models are appropriate, given the vast differences, in many respects, between 
Germany and South Africa. Foreign good practices are generally unavailable for situations 
where the responsibility for municipal representation within the framework of co-operative 
governance rests with formally-constituted associations for local authorities, as most are 
voluntary organisations. However, their approach could have persuasive authority. Hence, it 
may be fruitful to identify other models for intergovernmental relations at the local level, and 
                                                 
68 See generally publications by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, and particularly the occasional papers by 
Bertus de Villiers (1993) ‘Intergovernmental Relations: Guidelines for South Africa’; (1994) ‘Intergovernmental 
relations: the duty to co-operate: a German perspective’ SA Publiekreg/Public Law 430-437 (1995) ‘Bundestreue: 
The soul of an intergovernmental partnership’; (1997) ‘Local-provincial intergovernmental relations: A 
comparative analysis’; (1999) ‘National-Provincial Co-operation –The Potential Role of Provincial Interest 
Offices: The German Experience’; (2008) Review of provinces and local government in South Africa: 
Constitutional foundations and practice 59-82; De Villiers and Jabu Sindane (2011) Co-operative Government: 
The Oil in the Engine, Policy Paper 6 and (2012) ‘Codification of Intergovernmental relations by Way of 
Legislation: The Experiences and Potential Lessons for Young Multitiered Systems’, Max-Planck Institut für 
ausländisches öffentiches Recht und Völkerecht, 671-694.   
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to assess their successes and failures and, therefore, the likelihood of their replicability in South 
Africa, as a basis for municipal representation. 
 
1.4.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
The purpose of setting out the scope and limitations of the study is to maintain focus, with the 
understanding that the challenges facing municipalities are multi-faceted, deep and wide, and 
all cannot be addressed in this study. 
  
The history of local government and therein municipal representation on the basis of race is 
well documented, as is its failure in this country. Much of the literature addresses the 
shortcomings or symptoms of the malaise, without seeing it within the context of present-day 
South Africa and its innovative governmental system. Hence, local government cannot be 
studied in isolation, especially in “one, sovereign, democratic state”69 with nine provinces. 
However, to keep the research within acceptable limits, the historical aspects pertinent to the 
study are kept to a minimum as this is amply recorded. 
 
The subject of socio-economic development at the local sphere is a large and complex one. Due 
to local authorities functioning as service delivery rather than policy formulation institutions, 
much of their work is of a practical nature and largely undocumented. Most available research 
is based on national-provincial relations and a large part of them is by academics, not 
practitioners. Notwithstanding that there is not much literature available, it is necessary to keep 
the study targeted and focused: Hence a degree of selectivity is essential. This is not to say that 
the large number and variety of other topics or issues are irrelevant to, or do not impact on, the 
subject matter. To incorporate the many important considerations, however, would make this 
work large and somewhat generalised. This is because the numerous issues that influence co-
operative governance generally and at the local sphere in particular in sufficient detail to do 
justice, are really of a nature suitable as topics for individual dissertations and theses in their 
own right.  
 
The South African “developmental state” is little more than transient jargon at this juncture and 
is therefore not analysed in detail, except insofar as it relates to municipal representation. 
 
                                                 
 69 Section 1 of the Constitution. 
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Although the institutions and practices in select foreign states are researched for lessons of 
experience, only a limited comparison is made between them and present mechanisms in South 
Africa through an overview of the implementation of the IRFA. 
 
Co-operative governance in the provinces is not reviewed in detail, since intergovernmental 
relations do not appear to have been undertaken in a structured and systematic manner by them 
prior to the promulgation of the IRFA, and also because there is already much documented 
material.  
 
The role of provincial government in municipal development and co-operative governance is 
discussed summarily and only insofar as they influence and impact these fields at the local 
sphere in relation to municipal representation. This is because to date there is little empirical 
evidence of such leadership, capacitation, monitoring, and oversight role in South Africa or of 
successful projects. There has already been much literature on the subject, albeit most 
describing structures and processes. However, this subject is examined where it influences or 
impacts on municipal representation. 
 
The financial and fiscal aspects of local government operations, and intergovernmental relations 
related thereto, are important but vast subjects that cannot be dealt with in this research. Where 
relevant to municipal representation, brief references are made to such issues. 
 
In one sense, local government is part of the public service, but legally at present in South 
Africa, it is not. This means that municipal officials are not subject to public service legislation 
and personnel do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Department of Public Service and 
Administration. However, they have to abide by the basic values and principles governing 
public administration.70 While corporate governance and public service reform is currently 
underway alongside numerous other important restructuring and transformation exercises, this 
subject is too large to incorporate in this study, although it will have an influence and impact 
thereon. 
 
The thesis presents data as depicted in the outline of chapters. 
 
                                                 
70 Sections 195(1) and 2(a) and (b) of the Constitution.  
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1.5 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
 
The thesis title is Municipal representation within the context of co-operative governance in 
South Africa: The place and role of organised local government. The study would then have to 
analyse municipal representation, local participatory democracy, municipal and community 
members’ respective rights, duties and obligations, service delivery, associations for local 
authorities (organised local government), and their role in municipal representation in the 
interests of efficient service delivery.  
 
2: HISTORY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT AND 
UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The background to the study is depicted through setting out the early history and 
underdevelopment of local government in South Africa; early ‘reform’ of South African local 
government; ‘reform’ of local government in 1980s South Africa; reform of local government 
in 1990s South Africa; and lessons from South Africa’s history of local government.  
 
3: THE THEORIES, CONCEPT AND HISTORY OF REPRESENTATION 
In this chapter systems, organisational, and conflict theories are reviewed to ascertain how they 
underpin and inform the design of systems, such as South Africa’s three-sphere governmental 
enterprise. This is followed by the theory and concept of political representation. Next the 
history of representation is presented to show the evolution of municipal government and 
representation of local communities in Parliament. This provides the necessary background and 
context for understanding present-day municipal representation. 
 
4: THE FOUNDATION, FRAMEWORK, CONTEXT AND MECHANISMS 
 FACILITATING MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Municipal representation based on and within the context of formalism, including use of 
formalism outside of an informing and directive systems theory; the origin of the mandate and 
the framework for municipal representation; constitutional and statutory provisions on local 
government, including: analysis of the three-sphere governmental system; status of 
municipalities in the multi-sphere government system; objects of local government; powers and 
functions of municipalities; establishment of municipalities; the electoral system; 
developmental duties of municipalities, obligations arising from the extended mandate, and the 
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implications in a local state that at this juncture faces numerous and complex challenges, a 
legacy of colonialism and apartheid; participatory and representative local democracy; and 
High Court and Constitutional Court interpretations on the above issues. 
 
5: MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES FACILITATING MUNICIPAL 
REPRESENTATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
This is an extension of Chapter 4. Here the following topics are analysed insofar as relevant to 
municipal representation: an overview of Parliament, the NCoP, and municipal representation 
therein. It also examines municipal representation on the Financial and Fiscal Commission, the 
Division of Revenue Act, and in national, provincial, and traditional leadership mechanisms. 
This chapter reviews the instruments available for representation in the local sphere, such as 
submissions, petitions, and electoral reform. Finally, representation on a municipal council and 
its several committees are examined. 
 
6: MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK AND CONTEXT 
OF CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW 
This chapter sets out the background and challenges as well as the nature and content of co-
operative governance and its application. It analyses the approach in the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, the United States of America, 
and in the developing world, setting out the lessons of experience from such states. Municipal 
international co-operation is reviewed and finally co-operative governance lessons for South 
Africa is depicted.    
 
7: MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION IN SOUTH AFRICA   
Associations for local authorities are reviewed and compared, with some detail of their design 
and operation in Germany and Sweden as a means to differentiate them from SALGA. The 
constitutional-statutory framework for municipal representation is analysed through a review 
of the Organised Local Government Act71 and its provisions for recognition of associations for 
local authorities, their participation in the NCoP, the FFC, and consultation with the other two 
spheres of government are analysed to ascertain what room has been created for municipal 
representation and what other potential opportunities may exist or could be created for local 
government interests to be promoted or enhanced on these bodies. 
                                                 
71 52 of 1997.  
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A review of SALGA is undertaken wherein its background, mandate, role, structures, processes, 
strategies, objectives and performance are examined within the context of developmental local 
government. The need and desirability of organised local government is analysed, with the 
approach of SALGA compared with that of the South African Cities Network.  
 
8: CONCLUSION 
This chapter concludes the study and makes a case for municipal representation. It highlights 
the issues researched and addressed and shows the existing and potential opportunities for 
municipal representation. Finally, it proposes a model for this function. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
HISTORY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT AND UNDER-
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The current crisis of local government, largely caused by poor service delivery, could be 
attributed, inter alia, to municipal inefficiency. The present situation could to a considerable 
degree be the result of systematic underdevelopment of the majority of the population and the 
local authorities that ‘served’ during three centuries of colonial-apartheid rule. Given the 
institutionalisation of race-based policies and practices, it is no wonder that present-day 
political representatives and administrators lack the knowledge they could have gained through 
experience of democratic government based on the values and principles expressed in the 
Constitution during this period. In order to appreciate the current nature and operations of 
municipalities, it is necessary to understand the history of local authorities and how such 
‘development’ has influenced and impacted on the way municipalities are functioning at 
present. Local underdevelopment, by design, is manifest today by poor service delivery, little 
or no local economic development, and generally poor performance by municipal 
representatives and administrations.  
 
This chapter sets out the historical ‘development’ of local authorities in South Africa. While 
most of what follows is descriptive, it serves to provide the requisite background to assist in 
ascertaining, inter alia, the following: 
i. Whether the governmental system and the colonial-apartheid state’s policies and 
practices had beneficial and/or adverse influence or impact on the present local 
government situation; 
ii. Whether there were gaps or missing ingredients that could today help in improving the 
efficiency of municipalities through learning from good and bad practices; 
iii. Whether examination of the history of local authorities enables one to ascertain the 
contribution of municipal representation and how shortcomings could now be addressed 
by the local sphere of government; and    
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iv. Whether the historical ‘development’ of local administration has shown the need, 
desirability, and potential role of associations for local authorities in contemporary 
municipal governance. 
 
The brief view below serves to determine the correctness of the assertion that the nature, status, 
powers, role and functions of local authorities, the lowest-level administration in a three-tier 
hierarchical system, coloured and negatively influenced and impacted on the present-day 
situation of municipalities.  
 
2.2 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.2.1 TRADITIONAL SOCIETIES AND THE ANCIENT CITY STATE 
Local administration preceded national governments: South Africa is no exception. Hence, it 
would be helpful to trace the history of municipal governance for an understanding of the 
current situation. Hall (1928) defines civics as the rights and duties of human beings who live 
in a political society, such as in a city, a province, or a state. He states that while politics is the 
“business of government,” with the politician being concerned with the “control and 
management of people living together in a political society”, civics, the science of citizenship, 
is the business of those who are governed.1 
 
In describing the origins of the city state, Hall (1928) asserts that, “In wandering pastoral 
communities, such as were the Hottentots, there was no division of the land.” He adds that 
uncultivated land had no value but the grass on it had, as cattle constituted the chief wealth. 
Increase in population concomitantly resulted in decrease in ability of old grazing grounds to 
support people and their livestock, compelling migration and occupation of fresh ground. An 
alternative was to develop new and better methods of obtaining a livelihood from the old 
settlements. This meant a move from the nomadic lifestyle to one of cultivation as a means of 
securing a subsidiary food supply.2 He adds a description of the system of the Bantu will help 
interest of his people as a whole. He was the protector of the tribe against the individual 
selfishness of those within the tribe.3 
                                                 
 1 Hall, RJJ (1928) An Historical Introduction to Civics, London: Longmans, 3. 
2 Hall (1928), op cit, 30-31.  
3 Ibid. 
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Hall (1928) states that in Europe, people lived in villages similar to a Zulu kraal, with their 
clans and tribes, based on blood relationships. No state as in the contemporary sense existed 
until these villages expanded to cover a large area. He adds that the growth of the city state in 
Greece, particularly that of Athens, “illustrates the change from the state based on kinship to 
the Civil State”. According to Hall (1928), Athens originally consisted of several separate 
villages located over a large area, each inhabited by kinship groups. Villagers met periodically 
at a convenient central place for festivals, trade, religious sacrifices, or settlement of disputes. 
The site, devoid of dwellers, became the location of the temple, market, courts, and the common 
assembly of the federated clans and family groups. These now large villages became contiguous 
and spread outwards, becoming a united whole. The kinship lines of the original clan-based 
villages blurred and they became what are known today as wards. With its large population, the 
city, then, was a place of refuge and a venue where citizens over the age of thirty could 
deliberate. This was the origin of the modern-day municipality, as distinct from central 
government.4 Hall (1928) contends that a typical Greek city state such as Athens between 508 
BC and 338 BC did not have “any special class of people whose work was government”. The 
peoples’ assembly appointed individuals from among their number by lot to undertake 
administrative tasks. Hence, all citizens had equal opportunity to serve the state in an official 
capacity.5 This was the birth of municipal governance. 
 
2.2.2 EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF TOWNS IN SOUTH AFRICA     
Green (1957) and Cloete (1982) state that the Dutch East India Company’s Jan van Riebeeck 
landed at the Cape of Good Hope on 6 April 1652, setting up a victualling station there. The 
Company governed and administered the Cape, at that time the only part of South Africa 
occupied by whites, from then to 1795. This country’s first ‘formal’ local authority was 
established in 1682 at Eerste River, an area that was later incorporated into Cape Town. 
Subsequent history was confined almost wholly to the Cape of Good Hope until the middle of 
the nineteenth century.6 According to Green (1957) and Craythorne (2006), formal local 
administration had two historic sources:7 The Dutch source was pre-Napoleonic and exerted its 
influence through the heemraden and landdrost system of rural government and the urban Cape 
                                                 
4 Hall (1928), op cit, 41-42. 
5 Hall (1928), op cit, 44. 
6 Green, LP (1957) History of local government in South Africa: An introduction, Cape Town: Juta, 1; 
Cloete, JNN (1982) Central, Provincial and Municipal Institutions in South Africa, Pretoria, Van Schaik, 1-2. 
7 Green (1957), op cit, 1; Craythorne, DL (2006) Municipal Administration: The Handbook (6th ed.), Cape 
Town: Juta, 9. 
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raad de geemente or Community council. Cloete (1982) explains that that these institutions 
were first established in the district of Stellenbosch where four heemraden were appointed in 
1682, followed by a magistrate in 1685, occupying his office, the drostdy. The Court of 
Landdrost and Heemraden, vested with restricted judicial powers, also functioned as an 
administrative institution having charge, amongst other responsibilities, of municipal affairs.8 
Several events, originating in the uprising at Graaf Reinet in 1795, led to the first major ‘reform’ 
of local government, culminating in the Cape Municipal Ordinance, 9 of 1836, the second, 
‘original’ source of local administrative practice.9  
 
2.2.3 DEVELOPMENT UNDER BRITISH RULE  
After being governed for 154 years by the Dutch East India Company through several statutes, 
the Cape came under British rule in 1806. Some of the Dutch placaaten continued to apply until 
all but nine were repealed by the Statute Law of the Cape of Good Hope (1862).10 In terms of 
the Cape Municipal Ordinance, 1836, the British Colonial Office adopted responsible 
administration as an educational preliminary to responsible parliamentary government. This 
enactment was copied as the Natal Ordinance of 1845 and subsequently adopted by the 
Transvaal and Orange Free State republics,11 thus becoming the starting point of ‘popular 
representation’.12  
 
Hahlo and Kahn (1960)13 argue that “truly representative” institutions in urban local 
government made their appearance as municipal boards from 1837, elected by householders on 
a liberal property qualification, and enacting regulations subject to executive approval. They 
add that at this time there was no representative government at the top or centre. The municipal 
vote was a qualified franchise, the privilege of an economically-empowered white minority. 
The tiny settlements grew into villages, later becoming townships, expanding further into 
boroughs and then proclaimed as towns. Committees, overseeing the work of commissioners 
                                                 
8 Cloete (1982), op cit, 3. 
9 Ibid; Steytler, Nico and Jaap de Visser (2007) Local Government Law of South Africa, Durban: 
LexisNexis, 1-3. 
 10 Hahlo, HR and Ellison Kahn (1960) The Union of South Africa: The Development of its Laws and 
Constitution, London: Stevens, 16. 
11 Hahlo and Kahn (1960), op cit, 21, 22, 24. 
12 Green (1957), op cit, 16. 
13 Hahlo and Kahn (1960), op cit, 52. 
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and ward masters who had responsibility for service provision, ruled these localities. However, 
in reality, they did little more than oversee the operations of these functionaries undertaking the 
implementation of England’s ‘Poor Law’,14 that is, ensuring the health of the ruling class by the 
provision of sanitary conditions. To this end, many local authorities, even into the 1980s, were 
‘health committee areas’. 
 
According to Macmillan (1917), the administration of the Poor Law was a heavy financial 
burden, which “was a factor that gave English local government its real vitality”.15 He adds that 
what gave people a vital interest in the work of government was that any fresh burden, anything 
going wrong, fell directly on themselves in the form of heavier rates. He further asserts that the 
complications arising out of the Industrial Revolution, the growth of large towns and the 
proletariat, and the chaos of the old Poor Law overwhelmed the old structures of parish, county, 
and borough in nineteenth-century England. Although the powers of the boroughs and county 
councils were extensive, they were, nevertheless, circumscribed, with the result that many local 
responsibilities were taken up by Parliament. In contrast to the numerous powers of local 
government in England, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, the kings in France and 
Spain were building up a highly centralised absolutism by the systematic overthrow of organs 
of local government.  
 
Macmillan (1917)16 maintains that the “chief glory of British constitutionalism … has hitherto 
been its remarkable faculty for avoiding revolutionary change by the adaptation of old 
institutions to new conditions”, due largely to the strength of local institutions and to a high 
development of the political instinct deriving from the powers and duties of local self-
government. He adds that this instinct, however, has its “weakness and its vicious counterpart 
in a love of ‘compromise’ which is apt to put expediency before principle”. To adapt institutions 
whose essentials were based on the cares and functions of a central government that ranged 
very little beyond elementary law and order and national defence, without revolution, to serve 
in a modern, complex society, says much for the durability and flexibility of British institutions 
and approaches. 
                                                 
14 The new Poor Law of 1834 “ensured that the poor were housed in workhouses, clothed and fed. 
Children who entered the workhouse would receive some schooling.” The cost was “paid for by the middle and 
upper classes in each town through their local taxes.” www.nationalarchives.gov.uk, accessed 15/02/2015. 
15 Macmillan, WA (1917) The Place of Local Government in the Union of South Africa, Johannesburg: 
Hortor, 8. 
16 Op cit, 9. 
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Green (1957)17 is of the opinion that the “most outstanding feature of local government history 
in South Africa is its continuity” and that the “most important event in that history” was the 
Cape Municipal Ordinance, 9 of 1836, which broke the continuity of local government between 
the Dutch and British eras. Although hailed as an innovation, it was “rooted in the past history 
of the Cape and fashioned very largely by contemporary local opinion,” that is, limited to the 
views and wishes of the affluent white community. The 1836 Ordinance saw the consolidation 
of the functions of the Resident District Magistrate with those of the Civil Commissioners, 
which replaced the local boards of Heemraden or Municipal Councillors. The new Judicial 
Institutions of the Colony were concerned mostly with the administration of justice and the 
collection of revenue from the districts. The directions for promulgation of the Ordinance, dated 
4 July 1834, provided that the new municipal boards would henceforth be relieved of such 
responsibilities and charged with the tasks of what we today would call the provision, 
rehabilitation, upgrading or improvement, management and maintenance of basic public goods 
and services. To undertake such work, they were “empowered with the sanction of government, 
to levy rates for the application of which they would be duly responsible”. The judicial and 
fiscal reforms of 1828 and 1829 saw the disappearance of the landdrost from the municipal 
field, and a change in the old appellation of heemraden. Local government ‘autonomy’ in South 
Africa, in the sense of levying rates and using locally-raised revenue within their own 
jurisdictions therefore has a fairly long history. The Cape Municipal Ordinance, 9 of 1836 was 
a link between the old and the new in politics, infusing indigenous (white) political institutions 
with a spirit of ‘democracy’ “born anew in eighteenth century Europe”, thus building the future 
of local government upon foundations first laid in Stellenbosch in the seventeenth century.18 
 
The Cape’s 1836 Ordinance, although found unsuitable for large towns, was adopted by the 
Colony of Natal.19 Letters patent were the foundation of Ordinance No 2 of 1852, culminating 
in the adoption of the ‘Constitution’ by the British-ruled colonies of Western Cape and Eastern 
Cape, on 11 March 1853. This saw, for the first time in these colonies, a wholly (but not 
democratically) elected upper house, composed of the Chief Justice, as President, and fifteen 
members, and a lower house, the House of Assembly, comprising forty-six members, sent by 
                                                 
17 Op cit, 90. 
18 Green (1957), op cit, 93. 
19 Green (1957), op cit, 27. 
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electoral divisions.20 Under this Constitution, African men enjoyed a qualified franchise until 
the Union Act of 1909 when membership of Parliament was taken away from Cape Native and 
Coloured voters.21 Such development was based on the idea of ‘responsible’ government, one 
that would be responsible to the people, as advocated by Lord Durham in 1838 in his report on 
governmental reforms in North America. Following this, “reformers in Nova Scotia established 
the first responsible government in the British Empire”.22  
 
Steytler and De Visser (2007) state – 
In 1839 a municipality was established for Cape Town that was given a charter in a dedicated ordinance 
the following year. The Cape Parliament passed a Municipal Act in 1882 that applied until its repeal by a 
provincial ordinance after the formation of the Union of South Africa.23 
 
Green (1957)24 contends that the Natal Municipal Ordinance of 1854 was a more marked 
innovation than that of the Cape’s, borrowing much from the English Municipal Corporations 
Act of 1835. The report on which this ordinance was aimed at reform rather than revolution by 
rendering local government indirect, less susceptible to the vagaries of public assemblies of 
citizens, and more capable of satisfying the local needs of the larger towns. Modelled on the 
well-tried reforms in England and Wales, this Ordinance introduced the mayor, the town clerk, 
committee system, the concept of a municipal corporation, and the substitution of the 
“professional servant of the corporation for the amateur wardmaster”.25  
 
Green (1957)26 states that “popular participation is another long-standing feature of South 
African local government”, from the beginnings of rural institutions in Stellenbosch in 1682 to 
present. However, this statement is true only insofar as it relates to the minority white 
communities, or alternatively, the concept or practice of segregation based on race coincides 
with this history.  
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Hahlo and Kahn (1960), op cit, 52-53.  
21 http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/segregation-fallacy-and-other-papers-disenfranchisement-cape-  
native, accessed 15/05/2017.  
22 http://www.the canadianencyclopaedia.ca/en/article/durham-report, accessed 15/05/2017.   
 23 Steytler and De Visser (2007), op cit, 1 – 3. 
24 Green (1957), op cit, 94. 
 25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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2.2.4 GOVERNMENT IN THE TRANSVAAL AND ORANGE FREE STATE 
According to Green (1957), the first local government in Winburg, established in 1836, 
preceded the proclamation of the Orange Free State Sovereignty in 1848.27 The Zuid-
Afrikaansche Republiek signed its Constitution at the Volksraad in February 1858.28 Green 
(1957) adds that the (British) Act 16 of 1880 repealed all previous legislation and permitted the 
establishment of municipal corporations in every town or village with at least 300 inhabitants. 
Needless to say, this refers to white residents, as all legislation was promulgated to protect and 
promote the interests of this minority group. This enactment provided for a mayor elected by a 
town council, eight councillors elected two per ward by (white) male suffrage for two years, 
management committees, a town clerk, town treasurer, and other professional officers 
appointed and paid by the council. Act 16 granted extensive powers of local government far 
beyond anything previously enjoyed, including borrowing with the government’s consent, local 
rating on land and buildings, the licensing of trades, the making of by-laws subject to central 
government approval, the planning, construction and maintenance of public works, control over 
public nuisances, establishment and maintenance of water supplies and markets, the regulation 
of buildings, fire control, sanitation, public lighting, food inspection, and the appointment of 
constables.29 Pursuant to this legislation, municipal corporations were declared in the existing 
towns of Potchefstroom, Rustenburg and Zeerust, and a town council was elected in Pretoria. 
However, six months after its promulgation, fighting broke out between the Boers and the 
(white) immigrants, nullifying Act 16, and causing serious administrative problems in the 
various boroughs and towns.30  
 
2.2.5 DEVELOPMENT OF JOHANNESBURG 
Green (1957) contends that Johannesburg’s local government had its genesis in the 
establishment of ad hoc smallpox or health committees, constituted after the outbreak of 
smallpox following discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand in 1886. Local health or sanitary 
committees, and diggers committees, established in accordance with the Transvaal Gold Act, 
1871, superseded the ad hoc smallpox committees.31 Johannesburg was inaugurated on 8 
September 1886 when the president of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek, Paul Kruger, signed 
a proclamation opening the farms of Langlaagte and Randjeslaagte as public gold diggings. 
                                                 
27 Green (1957), op cit, 77.  
28 Green, op cit, 44.  
29 Green (1957), op cit, 56.  
30 Ibid. 
31 Green (1957), op cit, 61. 
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This gave rise to a large influx of people from many parts of the world, much turmoil, and 
heightened tensions between the pastoral Boers and the gold-seeking Uitlanders. The result was 
that for fourteen years thereafter Johannesburg’s local administration was under tutelage. On 
30 November 1887, regulations were published, dividing Johannesburg into five wards for 
purposes of elections for a health committee or a sanitary board. In February 1896, a draft bill 
provided for the replacement of the sanitary board by a stadsraad or town council, with a 
salaried burgemeester or mayor appointed (and removable only) by the President, for a period 
of five years at a time, responsible to the central government. The mayor was to be assisted in 
his day-to-day activities by two schepenen or aldermen elected by the council. The latter was 
to consist of twelve members, half of whom were to be elected by non-burghers. The stadsraad 
was legally constituted in December 1897. Over the next two years, the committee was 
extended to twenty-four, having jurisdiction over a spatial area of nine square miles, with 
responsibility for sanitation, fire, markets, streets, gas and electricity services, and the making 
and enforcement of local regulations or by-laws. The organisation, comprising nine 
departments, found it difficult to enforce the by-laws or exercise its other powers. This was due 
to its inability to collect the rates due to it and to raise loans for capital improvements. It was 
generally unable to serve its community of 102 000 people (1895), despite the local authority 
owning property valued on a capital basis at GBP 5 500 000.32 The situation worsened when 
Johannesburg was embroiled in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902.33 This War was a setback 
to municipal development due to lack of essential resources. The British military administration 
became authorised by Proclamation No 8 of 1902, to reorganise local government over the next 
four years. In terms hereof, local management boards, with the powers either of a town or a 
village management board, were appointed, with mostly ex officio functionaries.34  
 
In 1903 a system of elected municipal councils and urban district boards were established to 
replace the provisional institutions operating during the War.  These were modelled on the basis 
of an indigenous and long-standing tradition of local self-government, and designed to render 
these institutions financially viable and responsible. Based on Johannesburg as a local 
government model or case study, the first municipal ordinance for Transvaal was proclaimed 
on 8 May 1901. This legislation drew largely from the Cape and Natal laws, thus linking it to a 
                                                 
32 Green (1957), op cit, 67. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Green (1957), op cit, 85, 88.  
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long-developed indigenous municipal tradition, supplemented by only one section on financial 
control by an obligatory finance committee, borrowed from the English County Councils Act 
of 1888.35 A number of experiments ensued. Significant achievements that followed the 
reorganisation were the Public Health Ordinance of 1907, and the prototype of a form of local 
government for agricultural settlements and peri-urban areas introduced by private Ordinance 
4 of 1907.36 
 
2.2.6 FORMATION OF THE UNION 
Hahlo and Kahn (1960) state that the four colonies met at the National Convention in Durban 
on 12 October 1908 to debate the formation of a unified state. The South Africa Act, 1909, being 
the Constitution of the Union of South Africa that eventually emerged, “was a lengthy 
document of 152 sections and a Schedule, very little of it making fundamental law”. The Union 
was proclaimed on 31 May 1910. In the name of ‘unity’, centralisation became policy and key 
practice.37 Green (1957) contends that the tendency towards uniformity in local government, 
beginning around 1912 and 1913 in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State respectively, 
opposed two very old features because “self-determination and variety are as representative of 
local government history in South Africa as continuity and popular participation”.38  
 
De Visser (2005) states –  
In 1909 draft Constitution was passed by the British Parliament as the South Africa Act of 1909. It created 
a unitary state, modelled on the ‘Westminster’ system…the Statute of Westminster of 1931 conferred 
autonomy on the British dominions, including South Africa.39  
 
 
The principles enunciated in the reform ordinances, according to Green (1957), could not be 
implemented without appropriate local sources of revenue, available historically in the form of 
a wide variety of taxes. Such income was supplemented by voluntary service of thousands of 
people who gave freely of their time and energy to further the interests of the local communities 
in which they lived. This was supplemented by a growing partnership between such unpaid 
laypersons and a developing local government service of paid professionals who “are on tap 
                                                 
35 Green (1957), op cit, 71.  
36 Ibid. 
37 Hahlo and Kahn (1960), op cit, 119, 126-127. 
38 Green (1957), op cit, 95. 
39 De Visser, Jaap (2005) Developmental local government: A case study of South Africa, Antwerp: 
Intersentia, 49. 
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but not on top”.40 Such partnership became the keystone of the modern local government 
system, is the “hallmark of the Union’s system today and the one distinctive British contribution 
to its local political institutions”.41 
 
The South Africa Act, 9 of 1909,42   
… did not recognise local government as a self-governing institution, but empowered the four provincial 
councils established by the Act to pass legislation governing local government in their respective 
provinces.43 
 
 
2.3 EARLY ‘REFORM’ OF SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
 
2.3.1    THE CENTRALISATION-DECENTRALISATION CONUNDRUM 
Macmillan (1917)44 points out that the grant of representative and self-governing institutions 
based on the British model in 1854, 1872, 1893 and 1906, left adjustment or institution of local 
machinery to the colonies concerned, adding that:45 
…the growing complexities of the new life make up a greater burden of responsibility than can be safely 
thrown onto one isolated central governing machine without very adequate provision for devolution to local 
authorities. 
 
Macmillan (1917) argues that there must be scope for diversity in unity by allowing greater 
opportunities for self-expression to some of the divergent elements, ideas or interests which go 
to make up the modern state. In acknowledging this diversity, one should not confuse unity 
with uniformity.46 In transcribing such thoughts to the South African context, Macmillan (1917) 
does not argue for provincial governments: his idea of decentralisation was basically only 
central and local governments.47 He adds that local authorities require material financial 
assistance, but for the most part, the only way to get the best results is to “give them the fullest 
possible responsibility for their own affairs, while contriving to make the communities 
concerned the chief sufferers of their own negligence”.48  
                                                 
40 Green (1957), op cit, 95. 
41 Green (1957), op cit, 97. 
42 (9 Edw. 7, c. 9). 
43 Steytler and De Visser (2007), op cit, 1 – 4. 
44 Op cit, 12.  
45 At 14.  
46 Ibid.  
47 Op cit, 15. 
48 Macmillan (1917), op cit, 26. 
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The discussion hereunder covers the period 1910 to the end of the 1970s. Macmillan (1917) 
points out that South Africa, like most states, traditionally had a highly centralised local 
government system. Upon becoming a Union in 1910, the country adopted the Westminster 
system of government, noted for its centralisation of powers and functions of local authorities. 
Parliament was supreme; the second tier comprised four provinces, governed by a centrally-
appointed administrator and elected (by white franchise holders) provincial councils, which 
created, defined the scope of, and supervised local authorities. The local administrations were 
single tier, multi-purpose institutions with both legislative and executive powers subordinate to 
the province concerned.49  
 
Macmillan (1917)50 states that in Great Britain, unlike most European states even before 1914, 
there was a growing and inevitable recognition that some measure of devolution was necessary 
to “relieve the increasing congestion of business in the Imperial Parliament”. It is interesting to 
note that in 1913-1914 the total receipts of local bodies in the British colonies equalled the 
Imperial revenue. Hence, there was an acknowledgement that it would be difficult finding an 
alternative source of such large revenue capable of being raised with comparatively little 
friction as was the case with local taxes. There was, further, an understanding that parliamentary 
institutions can rest satisfactorily only on a strong basis of local government.51 
 
Green (1957)52 argues that in 1917 the German Empire was the very pattern of autocracy and 
efficiency, based on a broad foundation of local government in twenty-six states. Most of these 
states had a vigorous tradition of local government, however undemocratic it may be, rooted 
far back in the Middle Ages. The Local Government Ordinance of 1912 and the consolidating 
Local Government Ordinance in 1913 firmly established a framework that remained essentially 
unchanged until South Africa became a republic in 1961.53 However, these ordinances of 
general application were unsuitable for a town of Johannesburg’s size and complexity, but its 
application for exclusion and for the enactment of special legislation applicable to it only, was 
unsuccessful.54  
                                                 
49 Macmillan (1917), op cit, 10.  
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Op cit, 30. 
53 Green (1957), op cit, 73. 
54 Green (1957), op cit, 76. 
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2.3.2    CENTRALISATION OF DECISION-MAKING 
“The sovereignty of Parliament is traditionally conceived in South Africa in the sense of 
absolute power it gained in the Middle Ages, comprising indivisibility, originality and 
illimitability.”55 Although the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215 could be seen as the 
establishment of democracy in the UK, a parliament only came into being in the late thirteenth 
century, and a qualified franchise was introduced by statute in 1429. Reforms led to the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688, which “laid the frame work for the modern constitutional monarchy”.56 
This led to: 
The Bill of Rights of 1689 – which is still in effect – lays down limits on the powers of the crown and sets 
out the rights of Parliament and rules of freedom of speech in Parliament, the requirements for regular 
elections to Parliament, and the right to petition the monarch without fear of retribution.57  
 
According to Solomon (1983), in South Africa, as in the UK, notwithstanding the high level of 
centralisation, the local authorities were expected to be reasonably self-sufficient in terms of its 
finances. The major sources of revenue were property rates and taxes, and income deriving 
from trading services, that is, the provision of basic municipal services such as water, sanitation, 
electricity and gas.58 Interestingly, Solomon (1983) points out, that in 1978 rates provided 16.3 
per cent and trading services 55.9 per cent of current revenue, while grants by central 
government delivered through the provinces accounted only for 4.2 per cent of combined capital 
and current expenditure.59  
 
Cameron (1995) says that the “most distinctive feature of South African local government was 
the existence of a racial division of powers which has co-existed with the geographical division 
of powers”.60 The principle of financial self-sufficiency resulted in black areas being in a 
deliberate state of underdevelopment, given their very limited resources.61  
 
                                                 
55 Hahlo and Kahn (1960), op cit, 146. 
56 Worthington, Daryl, 5/05/2015, History of Democracy in the UK, www.newhistorian.com, accessed 
17/05/2017. 
57 Darlington, Roger – A Short Guide to the British Political System, 
http://www.rogerdarlington.me.uk/Britishpoliticalsystem.html, 1-18, 1, accessed 17/05/2017. 
58 Solomon, D (1983) The Economic and Financial Policies of Local Government in South Africa: A 
Theoretical Analysis. Unpublished MA thesis, University of Cape Town, 23. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Cameron, Robert (1995) ‘The History of Devolution of Powers to Local Authorities in South Africa: 
The Shifting Sands of State Control’, Local Government Studies 2(3), 396-417, 398. 
61 In terms of the Natives Land Act, 27 of 1913 and the Native Trust and Land Act, 18 of 1936. 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
Upon the National Party coming into power in 1948, separate residential areas were set aside 
for coloureds and Indians,62 with the intention that they evolve into ‘independent’ local 
authorities. This experiment failed because of political opposition, lack of economic viability, 
and poor administrative capability, given the non-participation of these groups in government.63   
 
Cameron (1995) calls the period 1910 to 1979 the “era of centralisation”, the principal aim of 
the state.64  
 
According to Cameron (1995), centralisation was a tendency in both unitary and federal states, 
a situation “exacerbated by the lack of restraints on the centre’s ability to accumulate power”.65 
Furthermore, based as it was on the English model, South African local authorities had no 
constitutionally-provided and protected or otherwise entrenched rights. As such, they were 
subordinate to national and provincial governments which, additionally, could declare null and 
void any actions not specifically devolved to local authorities, in terms of the doctrine of ultra 
vires. This situation allowed the four provincial governments to control and intervene or 
interfere in the affairs of local administrations. Cameron (1995) argues that in the absence of a 
uniform policy, there was no differentiation between large and smaller local authorities, or any 
recognition of their varying capacities and competencies.66 The ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach did 
much harm to the development of local government, especially of stronger municipalities, as is 
manifest today. 
 
2.3.3    THE POSITION OF URBAN BLACKS   
Prior to Union in 1910, local authorities in the four colonies were “given a free hand in 
controlling Natives within their jurisdictions.”67  
                                                 
62 In terms of the Group Areas Act, 41 of 1950. 
63 Cameron (1999), op cit, 398-399. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Cameron (1995), op cit, 399. See also Bekink, Bernard (2006), Principles of South African Local 
Government Law, Durban: LexisNexis-Butterworths, 21. 
66 Op cit, 400. 
67 Davis, Gordon, L Melunsky and FB du Randt (1959) Urban Native Law, Port Elizabeth: Grotius 
Publishers, 1. 
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Section 147 of the South Africa Act68 “reserved to the Governor-General-in-Council the control 
and administration of Native Affairs throughout the Union”.69  
 
Following the Native Affairs Act,70 a plethora of statutes, regulations and proclamations were 
passed, regulating almost every aspect of urban black dwellers’ lives.71 
 
The Natives (Urban Areas) Act,72 established a Native Affairs Department in all local 
authorities.73 The Minister of Native Affairs asserted that – The State determines policy and the 
local authorities are the assistants in its application …as agents of central government.74 
 
Based on estimates of the tempo of urbanisation over the period 1946-1951, it was projected 
that – 
The number of Bantu in urban areas will be more than 10 000 000 in the year 2000…These figures give 
some idea of the colossal problems confronting the Department of Native Affairs in the next 40 years and 
the necessity for long-term planning in order to cope with them.75   
 
The Black (Urban Areas) Act,76 established Black Advisory Boards in urban Black townships, 
to advise the (white) municipal councils concerning management of such locations. This 
arrangement continued, in terms of the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act.77 The Black 
Urban Councils Act78 established Black Urban Councils that replaced the Advisory Boards. 
                                                 
68 9 of 1909. 
69 Davis, Melunsky and du Randt (1959), op cit, 3. 
70 23 of 1920. 
71 See list in Davis, Melunsky and du Randt (1959), op cit, ix-xv. 
72 21 of 1923. 
73 Davis, Melunsky and du Randt (1959), op cit, 5. 
74 In an address on 17 September 1936, quoted in Davis, Melunsky and du Randt (1959), op cit, 5.  
75 Extract from the Tomlinson Commission Report, 1955, quoted in Davis, Melunsky and du Randt 
(1959), op cit, 6.  
 76 21 of 1923. 
 77 25 of 1945. 
 78 79 of 1961. 
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These councils, however, had limited municipal powers. The Black Affairs Amendment Act79  
undertook municipal functions in Black townships independently of the (white) municipalities.  
The functionaries were appointed by and accountable to the national government. Following 
urban uprisings in 1976, the state provided, for the first time, for elected community councils 
under the Community Councils Act.80 These were upgraded by the Black Local Authorities Act81 
to powers similar to white municipalities. However, Steytler and De Visser (2007) contend that 
“these authorities lacked any semblance of legitimacy and were the focus of much resistance in 
the years that followed.”82    
 
The Promotion of Black Self-Government Act83  and the National States Constitution Act84  laid 
the foundations for the removal of Blacks for their ‘development’ in the Bantustans or 
homelands. Consequently, Blacks were not allowed to own property in the 87 per cent of the 
country designated as ‘white’ South Africa, but could in the areas designated as “native 
reserves”. It has been the policy of successive governments since 1923 that blacks be permitted 
to enter white areas for labour purposes only, provided they lived in segregated residential areas, 
initially single-sex hostels. A corollary of this policy was the denial of political rights to non-
whites at all tiers of government.85 This kind of management, control and regulation of the 
majority of the country’s population, with no real rights and few ‘privileges’ has had an 
immeasurable negative impact on development in South Africa, especially at the local level. 
 
In addition to the above statutes that directly and negatively impacted upon Blacks, two other 
enactments affected them also: The Population Registration Act86 facilitated the division of the 
country along racial and was the foundation and framework of the state’s apartheid policies. 
Secondly, the Group Areas Act87 reserved spatial areas on the basis of race classification and 
facilitated the removal of Blacks from urban areas. 
 
 
 
                                                 
79 45 of 1971.  
80 125 of 1977.  
81 102 of 1982.  
82 Steytler and De Visser (2007), op cit, 1 – 6.  
83 46 of 1959.  
84 21 of 1971.  
85 Cameron (1995), op cit, 398.  
86 30 of 1950.  
87 41 of 1950 and 36 of 1966.  
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2.3.4    TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES 
Mathenjwa (2013) states that “Indigenous African traditional government dates back prior to 
the occupation of South Africa by British and Dutch settlers.”88 It comprised three tiers of 
authority: the chief or king as head of traditional central government and father of his subjects; 
the headman as head of the ward; and the head of the family. The chief had a range of powers 
over his subjects, exercised by him through traditional councils. “Traditional chiefs used 
councillors as a means of reaching to their people and important decisions were taken after 
discussion in councils.”89 In the pre-colonial period, “Traditional councils were not created by 
statute”, and the nature of some of the chiefly powers, such as the levying of taxes, allocation 
of land, and delivery of basic services to the needy “would today be classified as local 
government powers.”90 Hence, ‘municipal’ representation has a long history.  
 
European occupation of South Africa spread from 1830s with the Bantu living on land under 
the control of whites.91 The Native Administration Act92 recognised the “application through a 
hierarchy of special tribunals” and provided for appointment of chiefs and headmen.93 The Act 
gave the executive “wider powers of legislation and administration over Natives”.94 
 
“After the colonial conquest, the African leaders were subordinate to the settler governments” 
which became the primary source of traditional councils’ now largely eroded powers. After 
Union, Native affairs vested in the Governor-General.95 The apartheid state further weakened 
the role of traditional authorities. Section 4 of the Black Authorities Act96  created three levels 
of traditional government, namely, tribal, regional, and territorial authorities. Among other 
functions, regional authorities were empowered to make by-laws and to levy taxes, 
corresponding to present-day local government powers.97 
                                                 
88 Mathenjwa, Mbuzeni Johnson (2013) The Supervision of Local Government: Application of the Legal 
Framework, unpublished LLD thesis, Pretoria: Unisa, 19.  
89 Ibid. 
90 Mathenjwa (2013), op cit, 20. 
91 Hahlo and Kahn (1960), op cit, 317. 
92 38 of 1927.  
93 Hahlo and Kahn (1960), op cit, 330. 
94 Mathenjwa (2013), op cit, 20. 
95 Ibid. Section 147 of the South Africa Act, 9 of 1909. 
96 68 of 1951.  
97 Mathenjwa (2013), op cit, 21. 
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2.3.5    REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA CONSTITUTION ACT, 32 OF 1961 
Devenish (2012) asserts that “When the National Party (NP) was formed in 1914, republicanism 
became one of its guiding principles” and to drive its ambitions, a republican constitution based 
on the principles of Christian nationalism was drawn up in 1941.98 The Prime Minister declared 
that the republican form of government would only be established if voters in a general election 
wished it. On 5 October 1960, the white electorate voted in a “so-called ‘referendum’, which 
was a plebiscite.”99 The vote in favour of establishing a republic was 850 408 with   775 878 
voting against it.100 At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in London some six 
months later, when it became clear the Union would be expelled from this club, South Africa 
withdrew its membership and became a republic on 31 May 1961, outside the 
Commonwealth.101  
 
Act 32 of 1961 was “not a constitution in the continental sense of the word. It did not introduce 
a system of fundamental laws,”102 as Parliament reigned supreme and could amend or repeal 
any of its provisions. The Act was “both oligarchic and racist”, with four whites serving 
coloured persons in Parliament, while Africans and Indians had no parliamentary 
representation.103 The 1961 constitution unambiguously and formally provided for the 
centralisation of decision-making in the hands of a minority white elite by stipulating that, “The 
legislative power vests in Parliament, which consists of the State President, the Senate and the 
House of Assembly.”104  
 
                                                 
98 Devenish, GE (2012), ‘The republican constitution of 1961 revisited: A re-evaluation after fifty years’, 
18(1) Fundamina, 1-14, 2-3. 
99 Devenish (2012), op cit, 4. 
100 GN 1744 Government Gazette 6557 of 26 October 1960. 
 101 Devenish (2012), op cit, 4.  
 102 Devenish (2012), op cit, 7. 
 103 Devenish, op cit, 12.  
104 Section 24(1). 
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White hegemony was further protected and entrenched by restricting membership of the Senate, 
House of Assembly, and provincial councils to registered white voters who are citizens of the 
Republic.105 Centralisation is evident in the provision that Parliament is the “sovereign 
legislative authority”106 and that “No court of law shall be competent to enquire into or to 
pronounce upon the validity of any Act passed by Parliament.”107     
 
An interesting provision that could have contemporary application in the NCoP reads: 
The State President shall when nominating senators have regard to the desirability of ensuring that the 
Senate will as far as practicable consist of persons having knowledge of matters affecting the various 
interests of the inhabitants of the Republic.108  
 
Similar qualifications would have been helpful today in nominating persons to serve on 
decision-making bodies although this type of provision would likely be unconstitutional where 
people have free choice in elections. Although the 1961 constitution repealed the whole of the 
South Africa Act, 9 of 1909, save for four sections, it did not delineate the powers and functions 
of the three tiers of government. The responsibilities of local authorities are not depicted. In 
section 84(1) it states that the provincial councils may make ordinances “in relation to matters 
coming within” twelve “classes of subjects”. This includes, as stipulated in section 84(l), which 
reads, “Generally all matters which, in the opinion of the State President, are of a merely local 
or private nature in the province”. Thus, it is evident that the State President alone, or with 
Parliament, had far-reaching, almost dictatorial powers.  
 
Section 84(f)(i) provided that provincial councils by way of ordinances would be responsible 
for “municipal institutions, divisional councils and other local institutions of a similar nature”. 
Hence, local authorities were not a level of ‘government’ in the conventional sense and were 
subordinate to and controlled by provincial councils.109 The following quote underlines 
disregard for or the low status of municipalities:110 
Notwithstanding anything in this Act contained, all powers, authorities and functions lawfully exercised at 
the commencement of this Act by divisional or municipal councils, or any other duly constituted local 
authority or body contemplated in paragraph (vi) of section eighty-five of the South Africa Act, 1909, shall 
be and remain in force until varied or withdrawn by Parliament or by a provincial council having power in 
that behalf. 
                                                 
 105 Sections 34(b) and (d); 46(a) and (c); 68(2) and 69(1), respectively. 
106 Section 59(1). 
107 Except for section 108 (equality of English and Afrikaans as official languages) and 118 (repeal or 
alteration of laws by Parliament). These will be valid only if the Senate and House of Assembly sit jointly and at 
the third reading both houses pass the Bill by a two-thirds majority.   
108 Section 29(2)(a). 
109 See also Bekink (2006), op cit, 21.  
110 Section 92.  
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The South Africa Act mainly addressed unification and centralisation, not devolution. 
Therefore, the powers and functions of subnational authorities were not spelled out, especially 
not that of local administrations. This arrangement, by design rather than default, increased 
centralisation. 
 
2.3.6 MACRO-ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES 
From a reading of the South Africa Act and the 1961 constitution, it appears that the belief of 
the politicians during that time was that only central government could ensure the formulation, 
execution, and oversight of macro-economic policies caused the state to increasingly encroach 
upon or involve itself in local authorities’ activities. This was facilitated and enhanced by the 
centre’s financial controls. With policy-making confined to a small elite, provincial councils 
and local authorities were effectively marginalised, with adverse implications for the 
development of efficient subnational government and effective political representation. 
 
2.3.7    THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT  
The following historical view on provincial authorities could be still valid today: 
The provincial structure has been called harsh names: ‘a foreign innovation’, a ‘hybrid conglomeration’, 
‘an unclassified monstrosity’, a plain failure, yielding all the evils of the party system and none of the 
advantages. Within six years of Union the Jagger Commission was recommending that it be replaced 
either by smaller divisional councils, true local authorities, or by a federal structure. But neither proposal 
proved then or ever since a political possibility.111 
 
There has been no fundamental change in provincial structures since Union,112 because since 
then the emphasis was on strong central government and decentralisation to local authorities.  
 
De Visser (2005) argues that while South Africa became a unitary state, governed in accordance 
with the Westminster parliamentary system, it retained the four provinces, a departure from 
unitarism. He adds, however, that the “status of provinces has always remained weak.” In 
addition, the role of the four provincial councils was limited.113 
 
It is clear, however, that provinces were meant to play a role in development and management 
of the state. From the cases below, it is evident that law is more than mere administration – 
interpretation may be more important.  
 
                                                 
111 Hahlo and Kahn (1960), op cit, 178-179. 
112 Hahlo and Kahn (1960), op cit, 175. 
113 De Visser (2005), op cit, 49-50. 
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The Appellate Division ruled in Middelburg v Gertzen114 that authority conferred upon 
provincial councils was original and not delegated. While it was subordinate to Parliament, a 
provincial council was a “deliberate legislative body and ... its ordinances duly passed and 
assented to must be classed under the category of statutes and not merely by-laws or 
regulations.”115 In Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company Ltd v Marshalls Township 
Syndicate Ltd, 1917 AD 662, at 666, it was held that within limits imposed, a provincial council 
could legislate as freely and effectively as Parliament. In Bloemfontein Municipality v Bosrand 
Quarries (Prop) Ltd 1930, AD 370, at 378, it was ruled that provincial councils were not agents 
of Parliament. The Appellate Division held that where the good part of an ordinance can be 
separated from the bad, the good must be given effect to, if it gives effect to the statute, or else 
the whole instrument is invalid.116 Such a test would apply to all types of legislation. Hence, 
while the Union constitution may appear not to have taken provinces seriously, the courts were 
able to interpret their powers to give a meaningful role to provincial councils, which in turn, 
ruled over local authorities. 
 
Du Plessis (2011) asserts that:117 
Because provincial councils were deliberative law-makers, provincial ordinances enacted between 31 May 
1910 and 1 July 1986, though always subordinate to parliamentary legislation were, for example, by virtue 
of the Gertzen judgment, original – as opposed to delegated – legislation. 
  
More recent views of provinces are enlightening. It had been contended that there will be a 
gradual decentralisation of powers to local government and that the respective roles of the three 
spheres will change over the next five to ten years to reflect this.118 Again, such opinions beg 
the question on the relevance and role of provincial government.  
 
The role of provinces has been diminishing, to the extent that they may be reduced to “agencies 
for poverty alleviation and ‘purveyors’ of social grants and health services, as opposed to being 
catalysts for economic growth.”119 These sentiments, expressed in 2004, have been echoed for 
                                                 
114 1914 AD 544. 
115 Per Innes CJ, at 550.  
116 Johannesburg City Council v Chesterfield House (Pty) Ltd, 1952(3) SA 809 (AD) at 822.  
117 Du Plessis, L (2011) The Status and Role of Legislation in South Africa as a Constitutional 
Democracy: Some exploratory observation, 14(4) PER/PELJ, 91-102, 97-98.  
118 Views of the then Premier of the Western Cape, Ebrahim Rasool, at the NCoP meeting held at 
Empangeni, KwaZulu-Natal, 5 November 2004, as reported by Vapi, Xolisa: ‘Provinces have no power, says 
Rasool’, Johannesburg: Sunday Times, 7 November 2004. 
119 Ibid.  
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several years thereafter, even by MECs and others in the ruling party. It was further asserted 
that if the specific role of each sphere was not clear, the whole of government would suffer.120  
 
The President, speaking on the role of provinces, responded that the NCoP has to reposition 
itself “towards improving the system of local government by increasing popular 
participation.”121 This was possible because of the diminished legislative role of the NCoP, but 
it has not come to fruition, as is evident from the following view: 
So the usefulness of this middle layer of representative government has been greatly eroded. Provincial 
governments have also lost their social development functions, which have been shifted to a newly created 
agency for distributing social grants. On the other hand, local government has become more critical as the 
engine for socioeconomic upliftment.122  
 
Hence, from historical times, provincial governments served largely as a control mechanism 
overseeing local authorities. They have not capacitated them nor were themselves 
developmental. 
 
2.3.8 THE ORIGINAL LEGAL STATUS OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES  
Dönges and Van Winsen (1953) stated that – 
A municipal corporation is a form of universitas, i.e. an aggregate of natural persons forming as a group 
a new subject of rights and duties, separate and distinct from the rights and duties of the individual persons 
who constitute the group. It is thus a legal abstraction or fiction by which the law has created a new entity 
out of a group of natural persons and has endowed it with a distinct juristic personality, capable of 
functioning in various respects as a natural person.123 
 
On a similar basis, the Council and Durban Corporation were established by way of Ordinance 
1 of 1854, For establishing Municipal Corporations within the District of Natal, published in 
Durban on 3 May. The first Town Council, consisting of 8 members representing four wards, 
was elected to office 2 August 1854.124 
According to Steytler and De Visser (2007), a municipality consisted of its ratepayers who 
jointly constitute the corporation or the body corporate, that is, the municipality.125  
 
                                                 
 120 Ibid. 
 121 Ibid.   
122 Ibid. 
123 Dönges, TE and LdV van Winsen (1953) Municipal law with special reference to the Cape Province, 
(2nd ed by Van Winsen, LdV, Lionel F Johnson and PJ Coetsee), Cape Town: Juta, 1. 
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125 Steytler and De Visser (2007), op cit, 1 – 5. 
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Since the Municipal Council comprises several councillors, in taking decisions by way of 
resolutions adopted by the majority, it acts as an agent of the body corporate.126 The municipal 
council has a trust or fiduciary relationship with its residents, similar to that of directors and 
shareholders of a company. Based on such a relationship, a ratepayer has locus standi and 
“could restrain a council from acting ultra vires acts or compel them to fulfil legal 
obligations.”127 However, it has been said: 
 Despite the theoretically-sound democratic basis of municipalities, the story of local government since 
 the incorporation of the Union was, then, how the local universitas…was defined for the next 80 years – 
 with increasing vehemence and brutality – in exclusively racial terms.128  
  
2.4 ‘REFORM’ OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE 1980s 
 
2.4.1 THE ‘TOTAL STRATEGY’ 
The National Party government eventually realised that the 1961 constitution was “unable to 
deal with the political rights and aspirations of coloured and Indian people”129 and prepared a 
new constitution. The 1980s was introduced and dominated by what the then Nationalist Party 
(NP) Prime Minister, PW Botha, called the ‘Total Strategy’, a grand plan to counter what was 
perceived to be a communist ‘Total Onslaught’. The ‘Total Strategy’ was formulated by the 
Department of Defence in 1977 as a 
… comprehensive plan to utilise all the means available to a state according to an integrated plan in order 
to achieve the national aims within the framework of the specific policies. A total national strategy is 
therefore not confined to a particular sphere, but is applicable to all levels and to all functions of the state 
structure.130 
  
 This master plan incorporated a new constitutional deal for coloureds and Indians at central 
level, and at the local sphere for them as well as for blacks (indigenous Africans). This required 
devolution of powers, which again called for more liberal labour and urbanisation policies.131 
Most of the major ‘reform’ policies in the 1980s were, according to Cameron (1995),132 crafted 
in a top-down, secretive manner by a small group of civilian reformers, who acknowledged that 
both political and economic reforms were necessary prerequisites to political stability in the 
Republic. They also held the firm view that “the principle of ‘power sharing’ without losing 
                                                 
126 De Villiers and Others v Beaufort West Municipality 1924 CPD 501 at 504, quoted by Steytler and De 
Visser (2007), op cit, 1 – 5.   
127 Steytler and De Visser (2007), op cit, 1 – 5.  
128 Ibid.  
129 Devenish (2012), op cit, 12. 
130 RSA, Department of Defence (1977) White Paper, 5. 
 131 Ibid. 
132 Op cit, 402. 
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control was to apply to all levels of government”. The desire to retain control meant that 
extensive or strategic powers could not be devolved to local authorities for fear that 
communities hostile to the state could take over.133  
 
 2.4.2 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA CONSTITUTION ACT, 110 OF 1983 
 Cameron (1995) argues that the ‘reforms’ proposed by the ‘Total Communist Onslaught 
Strategy’ were manifested in the 1983 constitution which created the tricameral parliament for 
whites, coloureds and Indians, with Blacks being left out.134 Section 7(b) established Houses of 
Parliament based on ethnicity: The House of Assembly for whites; House of Representatives 
for coloureds; and House of Delegates for Indians. Section 14(1) states that “Matters which 
specially or differentially affect a population group ... are own affairs in relation to such 
population group”. Hence, whites, coloured, and Indians had their own affairs debated in their 
respective houses. Matters not own affairs “are general affairs”.135 In the case of ambiguity or 
lack of clarity whether an issue is one or the other, it “shall be decided by the State President”.136 
Again this constitution, like that of 1961, places serious power in the hands of the State 
President, thereby centralising decision-making on strategic matters.  
 
Executive authority vested in the State President. Where it concerned own affairs, he acted on 
the “advice” of the Minister’s Council of the particular house, and when it was a general affair, 
the State President acted in “consultation” with Ministers in the Cabinet.137 “Advice” is defined 
as ‘guidance or recommendations offered with regard to future action’, while “consult” means 
to ‘seek information or advice from someone, especially an expert or professional; or to seek 
permission or approval from’. These dictionary definitions imply that coloureds and Indians 
would have less persuasive authority than whites as the State President could choose to ignore 
their ‘advice’ which he could not do so easily when he acts after consultation with the House 
of Assembly. As with the 1961 constitution, legislative power is vested in the State President 
and Parliament, again centralising power with the white Assembly (166 members), as the 
Representatives and Delegates have 80 and 40 members respectively.138 Franchise is limited to 
                                                 
133 Ibid. 
134 Steytler and De Visser (2007), op cit, 1 – 7, 1 – 8. 
135 Section 15.  
136 Section 16(1)(a). 
137 Sections 19(a) and (b). 
 138 Sections 30, 41(1)(a); 42(1)(a); and 43(1)(a). 
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whites, coloureds, and Indians who are South African citizens.139 The constitution established 
the President’s Council as an advisory body with the ratio of 20:10:5 members of the Assembly: 
Representatives: Delegates, with 25 appointed by the State President.140 It is not stipulated that 
members of the President’s Council need be experts, as was mentioned in the case of the State 
President nominating senators under the 1961 constitution. 
 
 The establishment of a State Revenue Fund and a State Revenue Account141 appears to be 
additional measures to centralise power. Section 93 stipulated that “The control and 
administration of Black affairs shall vest in the State President...” Again, this is proof of the 
powers of the head of state and centralisation of authority. The country’s largest population 
group was ignored, marginalised, and peripheralised by one section of the Act. Thornhill (2008) 
adds that urbanised blacks were removed from the authority of white municipalities when their 
own local authorities were established. “These local structures were not accepted by the black 
urban communities”. At this stage, the ability of municipalities to take policy decisions 
declined.142 
  
 Schedule 1 refers to section 14 (own affairs) where 14 powers and functions allocated to 
provincial councils in the 1961 constitution now vest in the three ethnic houses which have 
responsibility for the management and administration of their own communities. Hence, 
provinces by design or default fell away, with powers being centralised in the State President 
and divided into three chambers of parliament. In operationalising this odd and unique 
‘constitution’, local authorities were to be created for whites, coloureds and Indians, with 
overall control at the centre with the establishment of a Department of Local Government in 
each chamber. The creation of race-based, independent local authorities was contingent upon 
their financial viability. 
 
  
  
                                                 
139 Section 52. Citizenship to the status as granted by the South African Citizenship Act, 44 of 1949. 
140 Sections 70(1) and 78(1) and (2). 
141 Sections 81(1) and 82(1)(a). 
142 Thornhill, Chris (2008) ‘Local Government after Fifteen Years: Issues and Challenges’, in De Villiers, 
Bertus: Review of provinces and local government in South Africa: Constitutional foundations and practice, 
occasional papers, Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 59-82, 60. 
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 2.4.3 ‘DEVOLUTION’ OF POWERS IN THE 1983 CONSTITUTION 
 Devolution of powers to local authorities envisaged in the 1983 constitution was the result of 
an investigation and report by the President’s Council. This body accepted the principle of 
maximum devolution of authority and decentralisation of administration, and based thereon, 
recommended that provision be made for autonomy with the requisite legislative capacity being 
created at local government level.143  
  
According to Cameron (1995)144 the three major objectives of devolution were – 
a) Self- determination and the protection of group rights of the minority races;  
b) Conflict-defusion, through depoliticising highly-contentious issues and reducing 
conflict areas at the centre by transferring local development problems to local 
authorities; and  
c) Effective administration, since central rule proved inefficient and unresponsive to 
local needs and conditions. 
 
 Cameron (1995)145 contends that local government policy in the 1980s reflected elements of all 
the various forms of decentralisation, that is, devolution, delegation, decentralisation, and 
centralisation. He adds that a clear example of devolution was the establishment of Regional 
Services Councils (RSCs)146 to provide services and extra revenue therefor, particularly in areas 
of limited economic growth. The rationale for redistribution was an attempt by the state to 
defuse ongoing township unrest by uplifting the quality of life in such locations. Although the 
Act made provision for 21 functions to be performed and funded by two taxes, namely a 
regional establishment levy and a regional services levy, the enactment retained central control 
over large elements. The RSC, however, failed to turn black local authorities into economically 
viable areas.147 Cameron (1995)148 points out that the state made extensive use of delegation as 
a form of decentralisation since it was felt that in a unitary state “there should always be a higher 
approving authority”.  Deconcentration was also extensively used by the apartheid regime, with 
                                                 
143  RSA, President’s Council (1982) Joint Report of the Committee for Economic Affairs and the 
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144 Op cit, 404.  
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examples being the large-scale powers vested in provincial administrators with respect to the 
operations of the RSCs, and the extensive authority held by the Minister in charge of black local 
government regarding supervision of black local authorities. The distinguishing feature of 
centralisation was the greater macro-economic control by the Department of Finance over 
expenditure by local authorities.  
 
 2.4.4 FAILURE OF DEVOLUTION 
 Cameron (1995)149 argues that none of the objectives of the government’s devolution policy 
were met, mainly because of inherent contradictions in them. The failure is evinced in the 
observation that by the early 1990s the National Party was no longer committed to race group-
based local authorities. He ascribes the failure of the state’s devolution policy to the following 
causes: 
i. Lack of resources, particularly revenue; 
ii. Administrative inefficiency, due to lack of skilled administrative/clerical and 
professional staff; 
iii. Limits to total (central) control in an organisation; 
iv. Lack of resolve by bureaucrats in implementing devolution as this was seen as a threat 
to central and provincial departments; and 
v. Policy goals were often multiple, conflicting, and vague, leading to problems during 
implementation. 
  
 Cameron (1995)150 quotes the then Prime Minister, PW Botha, who felt that the devolution 
policy required that central government and its departments be vested primarily with general 
policy and monitoring functions, while government functions should as far as possible be 
carried out at the lowest tier of government. This, according to Cameron (1995)151 was not 
devolution, but delegation and deconcentration of the administration and execution of functions 
by local authorities. The result was vagueness and ambiguity in the policy. Cameron (1995)152 
contends that the failure of the 1980’s devolution policy lay with the contradictions within the 
policy itself, and ascribes four main reasons for this situation: 
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(a) Reform policies were elitist, to ensure that the National Party shared power without 
losing control. Central and provincial governments, for security reasons, did not devolve 
extensive powers to local authorities, and the regional Services Councils (RSCs) were 
established and functioned in a manner that facilitated national objectives. 
(b) Centralisation was based on the viewpoint that local authorities’ developmental 
processes had to be controlled from the top because of lack of skills, experience, and 
finance at the local level. 
(c) The continued need for central control was to ensure that decisions of local authorities 
were in line with the country’s macro-economic objectives and strategies. 
(d) It was felt that in a unitary state, central government should be responsible for final 
legislative authority, resulting in a high degree of control over activities at the local 
level.  
 
Hence, it could be said that the state’s strategic objectives were the most significant obstacle to 
the devolution of powers to local authorities. The National Party’s attitude to autonomous local 
authorities was dictated by national political considerations, foremost of which was the 
successful implementation of apartheid. This ideology resulted in much parliamentary 
legislation that circumscribed the autonomy of local authorities.  
 
Cameron (1995)153 argues that the “devolution policy, instead of depoliticising conflict from 
central to local level, led to major black township unrest which weakened the power of the NP 
government to rule”.  
 
Swilling (1997)154 argues that the transformation of South Africa’s local government system 
occurred in a way that is “probably unique from an international comparative perspective”. 
Such uniqueness lies in the change from authoritarianism to democracy, which took place 
simultaneously at a national and sub-national level. National transformation was precipitated 
by the crisis at local government level – the strategy to make the country ungovernable by rents, 
services, and consumer boycotts promoted by civic and consumer associations. He adds that 
the political transition that began in 1990 was largely the product of locally and nationally-
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constituted social movements driven by organised workers, students, youth, professionals, 
women, and urban residents. Due to South Africa’s repressive regime supported by its 
draconian laws, it was only from the 1980s that large scale organised social movements were 
able to make a decisive impact on the structures, policies and strategies of both the state and 
mainstream economic institutions.  
 
Swilling states that – 
With neither reform from above nor revolution from below being distinct possibilities, attempts began to 
be made from the mid-1980s onwards to find negotiated solutions. …it was sustained mass action that 
tended to have a more decisive effect.155 
 
 The way out for the targets, largely local authorities, deprived of revenue, and the constituencies 
of the social movements, deprived of services, was local-level negotiations. Hence, South 
African local governments in the 1990s were highly unstable and thus lead to the era of real 
democratic reforms in this era.     
 
 2.5 REFORM OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE 1990s 
 
Swilling (1997)156 points out that by the early 1990s, hundreds of local-level negotiations had 
broken out throughout the country. Those participating were representatives of local 
government structures, businesses, municipal service providers, civic associations and 
residents’ organisations, political parties, trade unions, and numerous community organisations. 
Such engagement led to the creation of local negotiating forums. These fora became the schools 
of the new South African democracy, and created a new culture of governance and consensus- 
building. This situation led to the establishment of a support network of technical assistance 
NGOs across the country. The first and most well-known of the local negotiating forums was 
the Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber.157  
 
Swilling (1997)158 contends that the situation of de facto “dual local power” (white and black 
local authorities) was unsustainable, and consequently, the National Local Government 
Negotiating Forum (NLGNF) was established in early 1993 to work via the local fora. The 
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NLGNF rapidly negotiated a framework for guiding local government transition and 
promulgated the Local Government Transition Act159 (LGTA) in 1993 for this purpose.160 This 
Act provided for the “transformation of the local forums into statutory forums with prescribed 
structures and procedures”.161 The local forums, divided into “statutory” and “non-statutory” 
sides, were then mandated to negotiate “locally-appropriate solutions consistent with the 
principles of non-racialism, democracy, one tax base, accountability”, and so on.162 Their first 
task was to appoint new local government structures for a phased transition to democratic local 
governance, divided into the following stages:  
i. The pre-interim phase, being the period between the appointment of the new political 
leadership by the negotiating forums and the first local government elections;163 and 
ii. The interim phase, defined as lasting from the time of the elections to the agreement at 
national level on a final Constitution, which will incorporate local government into a 
new three- ‘sphere’ system.164  
 
On 2 February 1990 when President FW de Klerk announced the unbanning of political 
parties,165 there were approximately 1 100 existing local authorities. They did not cover the 
entire spatial area of the Republic166 Indian and coloured municipal matters were dealt with by 
management committees and local affairs committees respectively. These had limited powers 
and functioned “within the policy and legal frameworks of so-called white municipalities.”167  
 
According to De Visser (2005), The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) 
started negotiations on 20 December 1991, but ended inconclusively in May 1992. The Multi-
Party Negotiating Forum (MPNF) resumed its work and finalised a negotiated settlement on 18 
November 1993.168  
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Wooldridge (2002)169 adds that –  
The Local Government Transition Act was heavily process-oriented, and did not prescribe a detailed system 
of metropolitan local government. Rather, it allowed for key issues (such as the allocation of powers and 
functions between metropolitan council and metropolitan local councils) to be negotiated in each of the six 
designated metropolitan councils. 
 
Swilling and Boya (1995)170 assert that locally-driven negotiated local governance 
transformation was protected both by Chapter 10 of the 1993 Constitution and by the LGTA, 
adding that in terms of such provisions, “new local government structures cannot … be imposed 
from above by provincial or national governments that were elected on 27 April 1994”. 
 
Swilling (1997) contends that the great significance of the Interim Constitution and the LGTA 
was the provision of a framework for negotiation at local level that “compels stakeholders to 
negotiate by law”, acknowledging that this process of mandatory negotiation was relatively 
successful. By the end of March 1995, most forums had reached agreement on the establishment 
of transitional metropolitan councils (TMCs), and transitional local councils (TLCs) for their 
areas. The approximately 400 different agreements represented a groundswell of consensus-
building around non-racial modes of governance at the grassroots of the society, a first for South 
Africa and perhaps the world.171  
 
The first round of restructuring followed the proclamation of local authorities with nominated 
councils that functioned until the first local government elections of 1 November 1995, 
followed by elections in KwaZulu-Natal and the Cape metropolitan area on 29 May 1996, in a 
consolidated 842 municipalities. The third ‘transformation’ took place after the second local 
government elections in 5 December 2000, the first democratic ballot.172   
 
Whether negotiation rather than prescription was wise, is moot, as the situation gave rise to new 
problems. For example, the Premier’s Proclamation173 establishing the Greater Johannesburg 
Transitional Metropolitan Council (GJTMC) gave the metro almost equal powers to its four 
                                                 
 169 Wooldridge, Dominique (2002) ‘Introducing Metropolitan Government in South Africa’ in Parnell, 
Susan, Edgar Pieterse, Mark Swilling and Dominique Wooldridge (Eds) Democratising Local Government: The 
South African Experience, Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 127-140, 131. 
170 Swilling, Mark and Lawrence Boya (1995) ‘Local governance in transition’ in Fitzgerald, Patrick, 
Anne McLennan and Barry Munslow Managing Sustainable Development in South Africa Cape Town: Oxford 
University Press, 168-194, 176. 
171 Op cit, 220.   
 172 Steytler and De Visser (2007), op cit, 1 – 13, 1 – 14. 
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local councils. Hence, there was quintuplication, with attendant wastage, until the situation was 
remedied following the second local government elections when the ‘unicity’ was 
established.174 
 
 2.6 LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA’S HISTORY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
 
 From the historical overview, it is clear that in 1682, South Africa’s first municipal 
administration institution was part of the Court of Landdrost and Heemraden. Since the Court 
was vested with limited judicial powers, it most likely functioned largely as a control 
mechanism mostly enforcing legal compliance. It was not developmental or democratic. 
Municipal boards, elected by white householders and those with a qualified franchise, from 
1837 served mostly to protect the health of European inhabitants by ensuring sanitary living 
conditions. These were, also, neither democratic nor developmental. At this time, there was no 
representative government. 
 
 In 1853 an upper house and a (lower) House of Assembly were elected by white voters and 
those with a qualified franchise, thereby for the first time creating ‘representative’ government. 
Although municipal corporations established by the (British) Act 16 of 1880 had extensive 
‘powers’, these were granted on the basis of decentralisation because the local authorities 
functioned as agents of central government. The establishment of representative and self-
governing local institutions was a result of the realisation of the difficulty of parliamentary rule, 
the need to maintain the considerable and easily-collected local revenue from the colonies, and 
the practicability of making local authorities financially self-sufficient and self-administering. 
In England after 1906, decentralisation occurred out of necessity and convenience, without 
devolution of powers, based on the need for local authorities to have the “fullest possible 
responsibility for their own affairs”.175 In South Africa, ‘devolution’ following the 1983 
constitution was based on the same rationale, transferring problems to the local authorities. In 
practice, power was still centralised in race-based institutions overseeing their respective local 
authorities throughout the Republic. In both countries, there was no consideration of regional 
governments. 
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 The first division of a town (Johannesburg) into wards for the purpose of electing sanitary 
boards started in 1887, and a decade later for election of a town council. It is interesting to note 
that Johannesburg’s nine departments and 24 councillors administering an area of nine square 
miles, home to 102 000 people between 1898 and 1899 failed to function effectively.176 Hence, 
municipal inefficiency has a long history. Between 1970 and 1979, despite a high level of 
centralisation of powers, local authorities were expected to be financially self-sufficient.177 
 
 The South Africa Act of 1909, the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 1961, and the 
Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 1983 all centralised power in the State President 
alone or in collaboration with the supreme Parliament. All three enactments were not 
democratic in the conventional sense, did not cater for the development of ‘non-whites’, and in 
the process of disenfranchisement, left a void in that persons of colour were not allowed to 
participate in and learn from the business of politics and governance. Between 1682 and 2000, 
there was no clear division of powers among the three levels of authorities; power was at the 
centre with provincial councils having authority over their regions and local authorities therein. 
Hence, there was no education and experiental learning through participation in governance by 
persons of colour.  
 
 Following British practice, considerable powers were decentralised, not devolved, to local 
authorities, but they were prescribed on a racial basis with central government retaining control 
and the final say. Local authority powers, as was the case in Britain, were allocated more as a 
compromise, putting expediency before principle. Local authorities operating under the 
centrally-imposed principle of financial self-sufficiency and financial viability had to deal with 
problems at their localities. They would have had little help from the (centralised) State 
Revenue Fund and thus black areas were in a deliberate state of underdevelopment, given they 
had limited own local resources. 
 
 Uniformity in local authorities beginning in 1912 meant no differentiation between large and 
small institutions and of varying capacities and competencies. This ‘one size fits all’, practised 
currently, served as a brake on the development ideals of the stronger municipalities capable of 
innovative service delivery practices.  
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 The ‘devolution’ ideal in the 1983 constitution was over-ridden by the need for centralisation 
because the local government developmental processes had to be controlled from the top due 
to lack of skills, experience, and finance within local authorities.178 It would have made more 
sense for national and provincial governments to capacitate local authorities to undertake work 
decentralised to them such that after three decades, municipalities would be better equipped 
today to provide services. This would have had positive effect on the quality of contemporary 
municipal representation.  
 
 Capacity has been and is also a current problem, as evinced by research tabled by the Gauteng 
oversight committee showing that personnel in the Premier’s Office “lacked the skills to draft 
legislation” and that many new staff were “still acquiring the skills necessary”. A concern was 
that the Premier’s Office provided leadership, but an indicator of its capacity is that of the R329 
million budget for the 2014-2015 financial year, it had “spent only 60.88% by the end of the 
third quarter”.179 Consideration could be given to use of volunteers who may contribute their 
time and knowledge to development at low cost as they would be remunerated with an 
honorarium.   
 
 From the foregoing, the questions in the Introduction could now be answered: 
 
i. The governmental system, policies and practices from 1682 to the advent of democracy 
had an adverse influence and negatively impacted on the country and its majority 
population. They also did not permit persons of colour to be part of the state apparatus, 
thereby denying them the opportunity to learn politics and governance. 
 
ii. There were numerous gaps that if filled timeously would have facilitated a more 
efficient government machinery today. Some of these were the high level of 
centralisation of powers, especially in the State President and a (white) Parliament; lack 
of clear definition of provincial and local authorities’ roles and functions; 
disenfranchisement of non-whites resulting in non-representation; race-based 
legislation that divided the people in a ‘unitary state’; decentralisation without 
devolution of powers; lack of accountability to a largely non-existent electorate; local 
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authorities delivering basic municipal goods and services to a small white population 
and not being developmental or alleviating poverty; absence of a code of ethics to aid 
good governance; ‘reforms’ were antidemocratic; executive supremacy; non-
democratic traditional authorities; the low status of local authorities; and many other 
essential but missing components. 
 
iii. No space or opportunity was created in the colonial-apartheid governmental system for 
effective or efficient and democratic municipal representation by persons who were not 
white. Hence, they could make no contribution to socioeconomic development and 
municipal administration. Under the current democratic government, there are many 
opportunities for political representation in and by municipalities as well as for 
representatives to be more effective than at present in influencing policy decisions in 
the other two spheres of government. This is a major part of the present research. 
 
iv. The absence of political and technical representation within local authorities and on 
provincial and national decision-making bodies points to a dire need for this function. 
In the process, there may well be the potential for associations for local authorities to 
contribute to efficient contemporary municipal practice. 
 
 2.7 CONCLUSION 
  
 This chapter traced the ‘development’ and ‘reform’ of local government from the 17th century 
to the early 1990s. It could be seen that the underdevelopment of people at the local sphere was 
a direct result of colonial and apartheid segregation ideologies, aimed at dividing and ruling, on 
the basis of race. The situation was exacerbated by the high level of centralisation of policies 
and management control of their implementation at the local level. The lack of rights of people 
of colour and absent mechanisms to enforce any that may have had ensured that they were 
marginalised and remained on the periphery of society. This situation, and the fact that the upper 
white classes at the local level protected and promoted their own economic interests, meant that 
communities were divided and thus unable to collectively fight for their autonomy. The policies 
and their implementation were self-reinforcing, to the extent that the apartheid ideology became 
untenable from the mid-1980s. It could be said that the road to democracy was built at the local 
level, with rent and services, as well as consumer boycotts, initiated and sustained by local civic 
movements. 
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The history of local authorities’ development in South Africa shows that municipalities were 
the passive providers of basic public goods and services to those constituencies, mostly white, 
that could or were willing to pay for them. Whilst local authorities participated in the provision 
of welfare, they did so as agents of the state. Apartheid policies precluded them from promoting 
social and economic development on a level that would have made a positive impact on their 
communities of colour. Hence, today, the lack of experience in responsible democratic local 
self-government is manifest. This translates to municipalities not being able to deliver services 
efficiently due to, inter alia, institutional inefficiency, and concomitantly, not being able to 
represent their people effectively. The state’s apartheid policies ensured that there was no need 
for organisations such as associations for local authorities. A long involvement in local 
government affairs during the apartheid era, perhaps alongside civic bodies and non-
governmental organisations, would have better equipped municipal representative organs in 
assisting with the development of government at the local level. Over three centuries of 
underdevelopment is manifest today in the limited ability of many municipalities to undertake 
their constitutional duties efficiently. An in-depth, holistic, objective, scientific and integrated 
review by an independent, that is, impartial body may be required, so that the governmental 
system generally and municipalities in particular, could undertake restructuring (again), but on 
a more systematic basis than before. One among many issues is municipal representation.
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CONCEPT, HISTORY AND RATIONALE OF MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, South Africa’s approach to development over the past two decades is reviewed 
and analysed. The five-year State of the Nation (SoNA) approach is shown to be unsatisfactory. 
Consequently, it is necessary to identify problems causing systems failure or malfunction in the 
three-sphere governmental system to live up to ideals and expectations. To flesh out root causes, 
several theories are assessed in finding a means to develop a system based on sound scientific 
principles to base the governmental enterprise on, moving forward. The analysis of the 
theoretical basis and framework enable the concept of municipal representation to emerge. Even 
a comparatively young government like South Africa cannot exist in a vacuum: History has to 
a large extent influenced and shaped the Republic’s model of governance. To show its origins, 
assemblies and representation in ancient times are depicted for background and context. This 
overview introduces the subject of municipal representation in South Africa. 
 
Local authorities are the implementing agents of national policies and programmes; they deal 
with ‘bricks and mortar’ or ‘bread and butter’ issues, to use clichés. This type of work is usually 
not documented. Thus, there is little literature on theories of municipal representation, 
especially insofar as it relates to South Africa’s somewhat unique three-sphere governmental 
system and the constitutional-statutory-regulatory approach. There are many theories that 
inform representation, many of which derive from mathematics, the social and natural sciences, 
and politics. The search, therefore, is for one or a combination that would be practical, relevant, 
and applicable. This model would have to make sense of the South African co-operative 
approach to governance, political representation generally and particularly by municipal 
councillors and administrators on their own structures as well as on those in the other two 
spheres of government. Such representation would be based upon the foundation and operate 
within the framework and context of co-operative governance and intergovernmental relations. 
In the belief that some theories or parts thereof could assist in the development of a 
governmental system or explain causes of some of its failures, a few are reviewed as an aid to 
analysis.  
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3.2 CURRENT APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
3.2.1 BACKGROUND  
Present-day community protests are a reminder of the rents, services, and consumer boycotts at 
the local government level between 1976 and the late 1980s. Current dissatisfaction with service 
delivery could to a large extent be attributed to the failure of municipalities. However, local 
authorities are an integral part of South Africa’s three-sphere governmental system. Failure of 
one component could have a domino effect. It is thus necessary to take a holistic view to 
ascertain the real reasons for failure and the contribution of national and provincial governments 
to the problems manifest in the local sphere.   
 
Given its colonial-apartheid history and a nation divided on racial, class, ethnic, cultural 
linguistic and other lines,1 South Africa’s governmental system comprising three spheres reliant 
on co-operative governance is a bold experiment. Within this model an essential ingredient is 
intergovernmental relations, the “oil of the engine”.2 Absent the ‘oil’ or any of the 
constitutionally-prescribed essentialia or malfunctioning of any one of the constituent 
components could result in system failure. The result would be the governmental enterprise not 
functioning smoothly or according to expectations, as is the present case.   
 
This analogy applies to machinery and therefore to the South African government if it was 
staffed solely by robots. However, it is applicable to the current governmental enterprise, where 
missing, malfunctioning or defective constituent parts result in the three spheres not working in 
unison. The failure of the system is manifest in community protests for better service delivery.3 
Municipal representation is also reliant on effective co-operative governance and therefor any 
discussion thereon has to keep this in mind. 
 
A contributory factor to systemic failure is the capabilities, competencies, and commitment of 
municipalities, with councillors and administrators as their visible faces. The human dimension 
in the governmental machinery does not appear to have been given much attention by national 
                                                 
1 See Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
2 De Villiers, Bertus and Jabulani Isaac Sindane (2011) Co-operative Government: The Oil of the Engine, 
Policy Paper No 6, Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1. 
3 See Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
77 
 
and provincial governments over the past two decades, until recently.4 The instruction to 
municipalities by the Minister of CoGTA “to expel all senior municipal managers who are 
unqualified and incompetent” is a welcome but belated move. However, it is one side of a coin. 
The other is: had national government supported and capacitated provincial executives who 
could in turn do the same for municipalities,5 local government could perhaps be better-
functioning today.  
 
The failure of service delivery starkly exposed at the local sphere could be a diagnosis based 
on symptoms exhibited by an ailing patient. But the current crisis in local government was 
inevitable and had been long in the making, a chronic condition suffered over more than three 
centuries of neglect and underdevelopment.6 Nevertheless, there is need for specialist prognosis 
and diagnosis to ascertain the root cause of the malaise as a point of departure to base the design 
of the governmental system reliant on co-operative governance to make and keep it working.     
 
Ile refers to four theoretical perspectives in the field of intergovernmental relations,7 the 
essential lubricant of the governmental system: 
(a) Democratic approach: This is a separatist view where all levels of government have a 
right to their existence and autonomy; 
(b) Constitutional approach: The constitution prescribes a hierarchy of governments and 
may make provisions for their relationships inter se; 
(c) Financial approach: Governmental relations are based largely on responsibilities and 
the related financial resources to execute them; and 
(d) Normative operational approach: This incorporates broad elements such as values, 
technical considerations, geographical factors, resource distribution, and so on. 
It would appear that the Republic adopted all four of the above, and more, in the 
conceptualisation and design of its governmental system. However, given the complex nature 
of South Africa’s innovative three-sphere governmental system based on a constitutionally-
mandate to operate co-operatively, one cannot say with certainty which theories and models 
                                                 
4 Mabuza, Kingdom and Shenaaz Jamal ‘Gordhan calls for firing incompetent town officials’, 
Johannesburg: Sunday Times, 8/03/2015. 
5 In terms of their duties imposed by sections 154(1) of the Constitution. 
6 Refer Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
7 Ile, Isioma Uregu (2007) A public administration approach to managing intergovernmental relations 
system in the governance of the state: A case review of Nigeria and South Africa, PhD thesis, University of Pretoria, 
60. 
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were used in its design. Hence, the above four theories are not discussed further, but a number 
are addressed below.8 Given the ‘value orientation’ of the Constitution, the hope or intention 
was that a “normative operational approach” would accompany the constitutional one, since 
these are not mutually exclusive. South Africa used the “constitutional approach”, 
supplemented and complemented by several accompanying statutes.  The result could be 
excessive formalism, a theory criticised by Almond and Powell (1978) because of its emphasis 
on governmental institutions and their legal norms, rules and regulations, or on political 
ideologies, instead of performance, interaction, and behaviour. They argue that functional 
systems have a static or conservative bias and imply an equilibrium or harmony of its 
component parts, whereas in reality most political systems exhibit interdependence, not 
harmony and stability, given the large amount of interactions involved. The writers suggest that 
research needs to be directed at ascertaining how a change in any one of the parts in a political 
system affects other components and the whole.9  The degree of harmony, stability, and well-
oiled functioning is contingent on the ‘quality’ of the actors, in terms of capabilities and 
competencies, on the one hand, and their ability to work effectively in an environment that may 
still be influenced by race, class, ethnic, cultural, gender, and other inhibiting factors.  Systems 
theory could help such enquiry. 
 
3.2.2 THE FIVE-YEAR STATE OF THE NATION ADDRESS APPROACH 
Refer to Table 3.1, which is a snapshot of the five-year planning cycle with local government 
highlighted, to serve as a point of departure for the review that follows.  
 
South Africa has concentrated its efforts on the establishment of structures and processes 
mandated by the Constitution and prescribed by several subsequent statutes. These mechanisms 
were supplemented by guidelines and “tool boxes” produced by CoGTA10 to explain how the 
enterprise would operate, theoretically or conceptually. Add the human dimension – leaders 
and managers directing machine operators and maintenance staff – the machinery could work 
well, but may not be as productive as originally estimated or may not be progressive.  
 
 
                                                 
 8 Under 3.3 of this thesis. 
 9 Almond, Gabriel A and G Bingham Powell Jr (1978) Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, 
Boston: Little Brown, 3, 12-13. 
10 Refer to Bibliography. 
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Date/Presi-
dent/Note 
Statements directly relating to local 
government 
Statements indirectly pertaining to local 
government 
24/05/1994 
 
Nelson 
Mandela 
 
Note 1 
“The government will take steps to ensure 
the provision of clean water on the basis of 
the principle of water security for all and the 
introduction of proper sanitation sensitive 
to the protection of the environment.”  
Government is “inspired by the single vision of 
creating a people-centred society”, “expansion of 
the frontiers of human fulfilment”, commitment to 
an entrenched human rights culture”, 
government’s ideals will be achieved through the 
RDP to which R2.5 billion will be allocated in the 
1994/95 budget... rising to “more than R10 billion 
by the fifth year of the life of this government... 
think of new ways to meet the challenges of 
reconstruction and development”. “The 
government is determined forcefully to confront 
the scourge of unemployment, not by way of 
handouts but by the creation of work 
opportunities”. 
 
25/06/1999 
 
Thabo Mbeki 
 
Note 2 
“The Municipal Infrastructure Programme 
is now beginning to progress. To increase 
the momentum requires further 
improvements in local government 
financial management. These matters 
affecting the critical local government 
sphere will be attended to in a vigorous 
manner.... We will also work with SALGA 
to lend all necessary assistance to ensure 
that this [local] sphere of government 
improves its effectiveness and efficiency, 
bearing in mind that this is the point at 
which our entire system of government 
delivers services to the people. In this 
context, we must make the point that to 
overcome the problem of urban poverty will 
require that local government adopts and 
pursues a consistent programme of poverty 
relief, without discrimination on the basis 
of race or colour. Our Government is ready 
and willing to support this effort.”  
 
“The RDP and GEAR will remain the basic policy 
objectives of the new government to achieve 
sustainable growth, development and improved 
standards of living... The government will continue 
to give priority to the issue of job creation.... We 
will have to focus on an outcomes-based 
assessment as well as quality management 
systems.... We will speed up the completion of the 
skills and service audits currently being carried 
out. The audit is aimed at defining service needs, 
the availability of skills and the possibilities for 
redeployment to support the process of the 
restructuring of the public service. Action will be 
taken on the basis of the audit, as well as other 
initiatives, to right-size the public service, to 
improve skills levels, to improve the quality of 
management and release more resources for the 
actual provision of services to the people.” 
 
21/05/2004 
 
Thabo Mbeki 
 
Note 3 
[Government has committed itself, inter 
alia, to] “Strengthen our system of local 
government”. 
“Within the next six months, we will 
complete the process of ensuring the 
harmonisation of municipal IDPs, the 
provincial Growth and Development 
Strategies and the National Spatial 
Development Perspective. Among other 
things, this will increase the capacity of 
local government to discharge its 
responsibilities with regard to the challenge 
of economic growth and development.” 
    
[Government is committed to] “Further integrate 
our system of governance, responding effectively 
to the requirement of co-operative governance.” 
...The government is also in the process of refining 
our system of Monitoring and Evaluation [M&E], 
to improve the performance of our system of 
governance and the quality of our outputs, 
providing an early warning system and a 
mechanism to respond speedily to problems, as 
they arise.” Forty goals/priorities articulated. 
06/02/2009 
Kgalema 
Motlanthe 
Note 4 
“...household access to potable water has 
improved from 62% in 1966 to 88% in 
2008; electricity (58% to 72%); and 
sanitation (52% to 73%). 
 
“...made the fight against corruption one of the 
core areas of focus.” “...the Accelerated and 
Shared Growth Initiative (AsgiSA) is being 
implemented...” 
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17/06/2014 
 
Jacob Zuma 
 
Note 5 
“...the local government-based Community 
Work Programme will be expanded to 
provide a million work opportunities by the 
end of 2019....We would like our people’s 
experience of local government to be a 
pleasant one .... We have listened to the 
complaints and proposals of South Africans 
over the past five years, relating to the 
performance of municipalities... our plan of 
action to revitalise local government.... We 
have evaluated all our municipalities. We 
have inspected their financial management, 
how they work within legislative processes 
as well as their ability to roll out projects 
and to address capacity constraints.... how 
they respond to service delivery protests. 
There have been many successes... 
However we face a number of challenges in 
others. We are pleased that eleven 
municipalities [out of 278] stand out for 
consistent good performance in audits, 
expenditure on municipal infrastructure 
grants and service delivery.... One hundred 
numerous projects, mainly in water and 
sanitation, will be started and the objective 
is to complete them over the next 12 
months.” National government will help 
five municipalities in four districts on 
infrastructure projects, while Johannesburg 
will be assisted with its billing system... 
“Meanwhile work is underway to eradicate 
the bucket system throughout the country.... 
A key focus area in local government in the 
next five years will be how to respond to the 
reality of rapid urbanisation. South Africa is 
becoming an urban country. By 2011 
almost 63% of our population were residing 
in towns and cities and this trend is 
expected to continue over the coming 
decade. Our government’s Integrated 
Urban Development Framework will be 
finalised by 30 July 2014. It will... set out a 
policy framework on how the urban 
system... can be reorganised so that cities 
and towns can become inclusive, resource 
efficient and good places to live over the 
next 20 to 30 years. Together let us move 
local government forward!”     
 
“In the February State of the Nation Address...we 
stated that South Africa is a much better place to 
live in than in 1994...However, as the National 
Development Plan [NDP] and the Presidency 
Twenty Year Review highlight, the triple 
challenges of poverty, inequality and 
unemployment continue to affect the lives of many 
people. As we enter the second phase of our 
transition from apartheid to a national democratic 
society, we have to embark on radical socio-
economic transformation to push back the triple 
challenges. Change will not come about without 
some far-reaching interventions. We have put in 
place a programme of action based on the ANC 
Manifesto and the NDP. The economy takes centre 
stage in this programme.... We have set a growth 
target of 5 per cent by 2019.... Given the impact of 
the untenable labour relations environment on the 
economy, it is critical for social partners to meet 
and deliberate on the violent nature and duration of 
the strikes....  
 
Secondly, government will play its part in the 
implementation of the landmark Framework 
Agreement for a Sustainable Mining Industry....An 
Inter-Ministerial Committee on the Revitalisation 
of Distressed Mining Communities has been 
established...To further promote improved living 
conditions for mine workers, Government is 
monitoring the compliance of mining companies 
with Mining Charter targets...We will continue to 
engage business in promoting inclusive growth and 
to build a prosperous society...[through the] 
Presidential Business Working Group... We need 
to respond decisively to the country’s energy 
constraints...”      
 
Table 3.1: President’s State of the Nation Address Relating to Local Government  
Source: Compiled from government websites: www.gov.za; www.gcis.gov.za, accessed on 
3/03/2015.  
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The theories hereunder, consolidated to inform the planning and construction of a system, may 
serve as a blueprint for designing the governmental machinery or used to methodically analyse 
causes for breakdown or failure. Select aspects of the SoNA are discussed briefly below. 
  
3.2.3 A CRITIQUE OF THE FIVE-YEAR APPROACH 
This modus operandi shows that the state used only part of the functional theory in the design 
of the governmental system, as the relational aspect only came to the fore when the 
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Bill was gazetted on 26 November 2004, becoming 
an Act of Parliament a year later. Again, this enactment mandates the establishment of 
structures and processes, without prescribing a mechanism determining how the role players in 
the several and diverse institutions would make them function effectively. Thus, for over a 
decade the state neglected to make provision for co-operative governance and for measurement 
of interventions and solutions to challenges as they arose during implementation. A real-time 
outcomes-based monitoring, evaluation and Impact Assessment (MEIA) system used regularly 
could have indicated problems and facilitated a ‘learning by doing’ process, enabling monitors 
to adjust the system to address breakdowns and failures. Absent this instrument, it would be 
difficult for leaders to know whether any plan or strategy would be successful as they would 
not have been informed by the past and present. A measuring mechanism, both for policies and 
people, is essential since the success of intergovernmental relations has much to do with human 
behaviour and particularly the interactions between and among persons involved, and the 
performance of role occupants.  
 
Excessive statutory regulation also indicates that South Africa attempted a hybrid approach, 
incorporating all of the above and more, though neglecting the human dimension in 
representation and co-operative governance. The nature of a democracy, particularly one reliant 
largely on sound intergovernmental relations, is such that it would inevitably experience both 
co-operation and conflict, especially where powers and functions cannot be set out explicitly. 
Hence, overlaps and encroachment into another’s functional area would invariably occur.  
 
The wording of the Constitution could be interpreted as a compromise, being all things to all 
people, a reflection of the Congress for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) deliberations.11 
                                                 
11 Refer Chapter 2, Item 2.5: Reform of local government in the 1990s. 
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In practice, the de facto three spheres of government often appears to operate as tiers, thereby 
questioning whether the innovative South African system is itself one that generates conflict.12 
   
Intergovernmental tensions could be minimised by better co-operation, communication, co-
ordination, consolidation, cohesion, and harmonisation, a situation aided by legislation but not 
eliminated by statutory regulation as one is dealing with human interaction. The cause of the 
current service delivery protests may in part be explained by Cloete’s (2008), view that the 
numerous constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to the “autonomous local 
government sphere” have not been “fully and appropriately implemented”, resulting in the 
inability of municipalities to execute their statutory obligations. He adds that the outcome and 
the current untenable situation is “not that of a bad constitutional system but rather of the bad 
implementation of an appropriate existing system”.13 It may be fruitful to explore the underlying 
or deep-seated causes of the situation by using systems theory. A “system” is ‘a complex whole; 
a set of things working together as a mechanism or interconnecting network; an organised 
scheme or method’, while “systematic” is defined as ‘done or acting according to a fixed plan 
or system; methodical.’14 It would appear that even with a National Development Plan (NDP) 
setting out a strategy to year 2030, national government appears to be reactionary, responding 
to crises after they occur, rather than planning and implementing polices and strategies on a 
systematic or methodical basis. The annual State of the Nation Address (SoNA) is indicative of 
this piecemeal approach, with restructuring every five years and annual modifications.  
 
It would seem that these periodic changes are not based on sound monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E) of successes and failures over the past years. An outcomes-based M&E system would 
have formed a sound foundation for the largely unplanned SoNA and in its absence the speech 
                                                 
12 See Chapter 2, Item 2.3.2: Centralisation of decision-making, on the historical tendency of 
centralisation. An example of this trend in the current three-sphere governmental system is highlighted by 
Mathenjwa, MJ ‘Challenges facing the supervision of local government in South Africa’, (1) 2014 TSAR 140-150, 
147 where he states “...the inferior status of the local government representatives on the [National Council of 
Provinces] render them more or less helpless...”. Another example of local government ‘inferiority’ is depicted in 
the work of the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) where, in terms of section 18(4) of the South 
African Human Rights Commission Act, 40 of 2013, it reports on human rights violations by municipalities to the 
national and provincial executives to take action, requesting them to indicate whether they “intend taking any steps 
to give effect to” the findings or recommendations of the SAHRC. Other instances of the low status of 
municipalities are shown in several places in this study.  
13 Cloete, F ‘Service delivery: Conceptual and practical issues and challenges’, in De Villiers, Bertus (Ed) 
(2008) Review of provinces and local government in South Africa: Constitutional foundations and practice, 
Occasional papers, Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 93-106, 101.   
14 South African Concise Oxford Dictionary. 
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is an annual repetition of the challenges and rapid responses thereto, to be managed by the local 
sphere. There is need for a systematic approach to government and in this context, knowledge 
of potentially applicable theories may help reveal why something is not working in the three-
sphere governmental system and how errors can be rectified timeously. This is particularly so 
when there are several role occupants and different institutions making up government and the 
need to work co-operatively in furthering its aims in “one sovereign, democratic state”.15 The 
summarised overview of the SoNA between 1994 and 2014 is depicted to show the apparently 
haphazard approach to formulating and achieving objectives of government and therefore 
indicates the need for a systematic approach to this crucial exercise. In the table, statements 
having a direct impact on local government are shown to highlight an inconsistent and 
unsustainable approach. With reference to Table 3.1, the following comments are made. 
 
Note 1: 
President Mandela’s speech did not articulate clear goals and priorities because it may have 
been too soon for the ANC government to give much thought to the way forward. However, 
the President stressed the need to address past injustices through the establishment of a “people-
centred” society based on respect and promotion of human rights and dignity. This was to be 
done largely through implementation of the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) and subscription to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Social and Economic 
Rights. Other instruments to redress poverty, inequality, and human dignity were employment 
creation, water security, and provision of adequate sanitation, expressed in a humanitarian-
based philosophical tone rather than a project-based approach. 
 
Note 2: 
President Mbeki was known for unceremoniously dumping the RDP and replacing it with the 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy. He reiterated the need for job 
creation to address urban poverty, perhaps through, inter alia, the Municipal Infrastructure 
Programme. Of interest was the skills and service audit to right-size the public service, but it 
appears nothing came of this and the implementation of an outcomes-based assessments. 
Furthermore, it seems that a disproportionate number of the President’s views were on 
municipalities without seeing them holistically, that is, within the context of the three-sphere 
                                                 
15 Section 1 of the Constitution. 
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governmental system. The argument is for a systems or systematic or methodical approach, 
both to governmental design and the formulation of policies and projects.  
 
Different theories are reviewed below to show how some and components of others may aid in 
making the current South African governmental system work better than it is doing currently. 
It ought to be remembered, though, that the state is not like a machine, and that in Abraham 
Lincoln’s concept of representative democracy as “government of, by and for the people”,16 the 
human dimension therein cannot be ignored. 
 
There seems to be no report-back on the President’s commitment to work with SALGA to 
improve local government’s “effectiveness and efficiency”. In his long speech, the President 
made statements on a large number of issues without articulating how so many ‘priorities’ could 
be successfully addressed in five years. 
 
Note 3: 
The President committed government to more than forty objectives for the forthcoming five-
year period, a mammoth undertaking considering the apartheid legacy and limited resources. 
Of interest was the acknowledgement of the importance of local government and the need to 
“strengthen” it. He spoke of the need to “further integrate our system of governance” and co-
operative governance and to “building government-civil society co-operation.” The last-
mentioned goal appears to have been abandoned as no concrete plans have been formulated and 
implemented. This comment is apt for the statement: 
The government is also in the process of refining our system of Monitoring and Evaluation, to improve the 
performance of our system of governance and the quality of our outputs, providing an early warning system 
and a system to respond speedily to problems, as they arise.17 
 
This is because although the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation was 
established in the Presidency, not much has been reported on its implementation and no real-
time M&E seems to have been done as evinced by service delivery protests. The objective to 
“complete the process of ensuring the harmonisation” of municipal, provincial and national 
spatial development plans “within the next six months” did not come to fruition. 
 
                                                 
16 Weisner, Claudia (2008) ‘Democratic Legitimacy, Democratisation and Democratic Identity in the 
European Union – Old Questions, New Challenges’, 12 (2008) Redescriptions, 96-122, 97.  
17 SoNA by President Thabo Mbeki, 21/05/2004.  
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Note 4: 
President Motlanthe’s speech was more philosophical than concrete and precise. He introduced 
the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (AsgiSA) but subsequently this strategy seems to 
have been abandoned, like the RDP was. 
 
Note 5: 
President Zuma’s speech underlines government’s piecemeal, disconnected, and reactionary 
approach to ‘development’. The evaluation of all 278 municipalities appears to have been in 
isolation, that is, outside of the context that they are an integral part of the three-sphere 
government system and that the failure of local government cannot be attributed to it alone. A 
sudden focus on assisting municipalities, especially district ones, is a knee-jerk reaction to 
community protests. Likewise, attention to “distressed mining communities” arises from 
mineworkers’ strikes and the killings in Marikana. The “one hundred numerous projects” to be 
completed in a year is again a fragmented, ad hoc, and unsystematic approach of appeasement. 
While welcome, it will not address the underlying causes of community discontent. 
Acknowledgement of rapid urbanisation and the formulation of the Integrated Urban 
Development Framework is a welcome response to this phenomenon.  
 
General note: 
The SoNA over two decades manifests a government taking a piecemeal and reactionary 
approach to development of the people. The five-yearly and annual statements are often a 
restatement of challenges with too many objectives to address them, without prioritising the 
priorities. These statements of intent often do not derive from evidence-based proof of the actual 
challenge or situation and therefore are rather ideals to strive for in satisfying voters through 
promises of a better life. Every year statements are made on employment creation and tackling 
corruption, without depiction of plans to deal with and report on them regularly. Another 
constant refrain is making government “more efficient, effective and responsive” but it’s not 
clear what plans were in place or to be developed to achieve these aims. Absent a record of 
achievements and failures and a social cost-benefit and risk analysis, it is difficult to plan 
without being informed of the past. A project-based approach without analysing the root causes 
of underdevelopment is problematical. Also, this modus operandi does not facilitate 
institutional and thereby human development, that is, the capacity and competency of 
councillors and administrators. The approach is one of crisis management based on articulation 
of five-year objectives, often too many and not based on logical sequencing or a critical path, 
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with annual adjustments to take care of problems as they arise. There is much rhetoric without 
clear action plans, articulation of the “whats” and not much detail on the “hows”, and little or 
no report-back on previous five-year objectives to guide planning over the forthcoming period.  
While a thematic approach, such as five-year plans to “eradicate the bucket system” or to ensure 
every household has access to potable water, would be difficult as other priorities cannot be 
ignored in the meantime, there is need for systematic planning and monitoring of development.  
 
The need to strengthen local government has been mentioned in a few SoNA, but no 
accompanying systematic plan has been forthcoming. Neither has mention been made of 
national and provincial governments’ intentions or plans to “support and strengthen the capacity 
of municipalities”.18 It was stated that national government “resolved to ensure that all national 
departments partner with municipalities to assist them to address their challenges”. A further 
statement reads, “Provincial governments should improve their support and oversight of the 
local sphere of government...”19 These statements are contradicted later in the speech when the 
Minister said, “...quite a number of municipalities were placed under section 139 and that they 
got out of it on technicalities...”20 This is a repetition of the statement, “...we will not fail to 
intervene and act decisively in using sections 139 and 100 of the Constitution” made earlier.21 
This ‘stick’ approach is one of corrective or curative action, rather than the often more 
economical and preferable preventive one based on sound forward planning. This could have 
been facilitated by a sound M&E system. With SMART22 objectives, key performance areas 
(KPAs), key performance indicators (KPIs) targets could be set for later measurement. They 
would, in turn, enable impact assessments to be undertaken. These, alongside minimum-scope 
social cost-benefit and risk analysis would guide government in prioritisation and selection of 
projects. It would seem that little or no objective impact assessments have been done to date on 
government’s planned interventions, priorities, and outcomes. With reference to the M&E, the 
ministers of the Department of Human Settlements (DoHS) and of the Department of 
Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) confirmed that monitoring was a challenge 
in the service delivery process and that it requires transparency, especially in overseeing how 
                                                 
18 In terms of the duty imposed by section 154(1) of the Constitution. 
19 Minister for CoGTA, Richard Baloyi, in his SoNA debate, 15/02/2012. 
20 Ibid. 
21 By the then Minister for CoGTA, Sicelo Shiceka in his SoNA debate, 4/06/2009.  
22 Specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and time-bound. 
87 
 
budgets are spent.23  It would seem that provinces are quick to intervene in failing or apparently 
dysfunctional municipalities without first taking positive or proactive measures in terms of 
section 154(1) of the Constitution to capacitate and strengthen them. In the Gauteng Provincial 
Government’s budget of R95.391 billion for 2015, no mention was made of such assistance in 
its “ten pillar programme”.24 The duty of a sphere to support another that fails to meet its 
obligations in the spirit of co-operative governance in “one, sovereign democratic state” was 
articulated by the Constitutional Court.25  
 
Failure of the SoNA approach 
That the piecemeal SoNA approach to development is not working is manifest in increasing 
and often violent service delivery protests, sometimes fatal, based largely on general neglect of 
the poor, unfulfilled election promises, dissatisfaction with poor service delivery, the low rate 
of housing development, youth unemployment, corruption, and limited municipal capacity, as 
articulated by Shaidi (2013)26 as applying to the Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan 
municipality but seems to have general application, as observed from recent protests. After 
being largely ignored for a long period, government now seems to be taking notice.27 general 
dissatisfaction with the government, particularly the executive, the unconstitutional behaviour 
of the President and recent attempts to remove him office.28 A rational, scientific and objective 
long-term approach to service delivery and socio-economic development is required. Hence, a 
systems approach based on theory may help. 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Views expressed at the South African Human Rights Commission’s, ‘The 2013 National Water and 
Sanitation Hearing’ held on 21 March 2013, depicted in its Report on the Right to Access Sufficient Water and 
Decent Sanitation in South Africa 2014, www.sahrc.org.za.    
24 Tabled by the MEC for Finance on 3 March 2015. 
25 In Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 CC, paragraph 74, quoted 
by Mathenjwa, Mbuzeni ‘The constitutional obligations imposed on a provincial government in instances where a 
municipality cannot provide basic services as a result of crisis in its financial affairs’ (1) 2015 TSAR, 59-75, 62. 
26 Shaidi, Elisante Walter (2013) Investigation into Causes of Service Delivery Protests in Municipalities: 
A Case Study of Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, unpublished DPhil thesis, Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality.  
27 Smillie, Shaun (2017) ‘The poor rise to rage against unjust system’, Johannesburg: Sunday Times, 
14/05/2017; Tlhabye, Goitsemang (2017) ‘Gauteng in bid to tackle roots of protest’, Johannesburg: The Star, 
16/05/2017; Musyoka, Jason (2017) ‘Call for accountable governments’, Johannesburg: The New Age, 16/05/2017; 
Nkosi, Ntombi (2017) ‘Unite against housing corruption’, Johannesburg: The New Age, 17/05/2017; Mavuso, Sihle 
(2017) ‘Service delivery protests increase’, Johannesburg: The New Age, 18/05/2017;  Zwane, Nokuthula (2017) 
‘Mashatile reports back to locals’, Johannesburg: The Star, 22/05/2017; Nqcobo, Khanyisile ‘Housing backlog 
protests addressed’, Johannesburg: The Star, 22/05/2017; Oppelt, Phylicia, ‘The forgotten part of a “world class” 
city’; Johannesburg: The Star, 22/05/2017.  
28 See Chapter 1, footnotes 17 and 50.  
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3.3 THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES                     
 
3.3.1 SYSTEMS THEORY 
 
i. Definition  
Systems theory is defined as a transdisciplinary study of the abstract organisation of 
phenomena, independent of their substance, type, or spatial or temporal scale of existence. In 
other words, it abstracts and considers a system as a set of independent and interacting parts, 
exploring both the principles common to all complex entities and models used to describe them. 
Its main goal is to study general principles of system functioning to all types of systems in all 
fields of research. As such, it serves as a bridge for interdisciplinary dialogue between what 
may be autonomous fields of study and within the area of systems science itself. The systems 
view is based on several fundamental ideas. It provides that all phenomena could be seen as a 
web of relationships among elements, or a system. Furthermore, all systems have common 
patterns, behaviours, and properties that can be understood. Such understanding allows one to 
use greater insight into the behaviour of complex phenomena.29 Systems theory has been used 
to describe the interdependence of relationships in an organisation, and thus it could be of 
practical use in analysing intergovernmental relations. 
 
ii. Systems 
A system is an organised collection of parts or sub-systems that are highly integrated to 
accomplish an overall goal. Such integration means that if one of the components of the system 
is changed, the nature of the overall system is also changed. Thus, by definition, the system is 
systemic, meaning it relates to or affects the entire system. Complex systems comprise 
numerous sub-systems which are arranged in hierarchies, each with its own boundaries, inputs, 
processes, and outputs, working to achieve the goal of that sub-system and thereby that of the 
overall system. As such, complex systems usually interact with their environments and are 
called open systems.30  
 
                                                 
29 Ansari, Shahid (2004) Teaching Note: Systems Theory and Management Control, 
http://faculty.dardenvirginia/ansaris/systems. 
30 McNamara, Carter, http://managementhelp.org/systems/systems.htm, accessed 14/09/2014. 
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Since inputs, their processing, and the production of outputs, working together, achieve the 
planned overall goal of the system, it follows that lack of an objective or a clear one can cause 
breakdown of the system due to policy confusion and inconsistencies. This may be the case of 
South Africa where there is no precedent for democracy or its three-sphere governmental 
system. Consequently, it is an experiment with no clear or predictable outcomes.   
 
In formulating his general systems theory, Von Bertalanffy (1997) asserted that 
... there exist models, principles, and laws that apply to generalised systems or their subclasses, irrespective 
of their particular kind, the nature of their component elements, and the relationships or ‘forces’ between 
them. It seems legitimate to ask for a theory, not of systems of a more or less special kind, but of universal 
principles applying to systems in general.31   
 
Bertalanffy (1997) also showed the assumption that a system could be broken down into its 
individual parts so that each component could be analysed as an independent entity and that the 
elements could be added in a linear fashion to describe the totality of the system, to be false.  
He asserted that a system is characterised by the interaction of its parts and the non-linearity of 
those interactions. Bertalanffy argued that systems operate through differentiation and co-
ordination among its parts, and a characteristic of any organisation, whether a living organism 
or a society, are notions like those of wholeness, growth, differentiation, hierarchical order, 
dominance, control, and competition.32  This interaction of the parts, for the purpose of this 
study, is analogous to the relationship between the three spheres of government and their several 
role players. Unlike a motor car engine, one part or component, such as municipalities, cannot 
be removed and repaired if found to be malfunctioning and thereby placing the whole ‘system’ 
in jeopardy. The three spheres must function as an integrated and organic whole. The human 
dimension appears to have been neglected in the design of South Africa’s governmental system 
generally, but particularly that of the co-operative governance ‘sub-system’. 
 
Co-operative governance should be understood in the context of order in a complex system. 
Such a system may require a spontaneous approach since it cannot comprise only of rules and 
regulations, and the expectation that they will work harmoniously. This is because the social 
order consists of a complex web of rules and institutions executing them, “leading to a recurrent 
social pattern of co-operation and co-ordination.” Thus, there is a complex network of 
                                                 
31 Von Bertalanffy, Ludwig (1997) General System Theory: Foundation, Development, Applications, 
New York: Harper, 32. 
 32 Walonick, David S (1993) General Systems Theory, www.survey-software-
solutions.com/walonick/systems-theory.htm, accessed 14/09/2014. 
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interrelated organisations with the interweaving of several different types of rules that are 
spontaneous, explicit or tacit, enforced deliberately or practised informally.33 
 
 iii. Models and approaches in systems theory 
In 1974 Kuhn formulated a model showing that the role of a decision is to move a system 
towards equilibrium, facilitated by communication and transaction. He argued that culture is 
“communicated, learned patterns ... and society as a collective of people having a common body 
and process of culture.” He argues that a subculture could be defined only relative to the current 
focus of attention. In his model, when society is viewed as a system, culture is seen as a pattern 
in that system. Kuhn posits that a study of systems can follow two approaches:34 
(a) the cross-sectional approach, dealing with the interactions between two systems; and 
(b)  the developmental approach, which addresses changes in a system over time. 
 
A system from Kuhn’s frame of reference would be one made up of regularly-interacting and 
interrelating groups of activities. Open systems perspectives of the theory questioned 
conventional closed or cybernetic systems; thus, there was a shift from absolute and universal 
authoritative principles and knowledge to “relative and general conceptual and perceptual 
knowledge”.35                                                                               
 
This is different from conventional models, as used in South Africa, that focus on structures or 
departments or units or individuals separately, rather than acknowledging the interdependence 
or inter-relatedness between groups of individual role occupants and the structures and 
processes that enable institutions to work effectively. These, collectively make up the 
governmental system. 
 
iv. Evaluation of sub-systems 
Kuhn (1974)36 states that there are three general approaches for evaluating sub-systems: 
(a) Holism: the holistic or gestalt approach examines a system as a complete functioning 
unit. It focuses on the arrangement of and the interrelationships among the constituent 
                                                 
33 Chaumont-Chancelier, F (2003) ‘Civil society in a contemporary social order’ in Breton, A, G Galeotti, 
P Salmon and R Wintrobe (Eds) The rational foundations of democratic politics, Cambridge: University Press, 70. 
34 Kuhn, A (1974) The Logic of Social Systems, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 154-156. 
35 Bailey (1994: 3-8), quoted by Ansari (2004), op cit. 
   36 Ibid. 
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parts in order to understand how the sub-systems link and work together as a unified 
whole. It does so without reducing an organisation or institution into its individual 
components in isolation. This is because the way the elements are organised and how 
they interact with each other determines the properties of the particular system, the 
behaviour of which is independent of the characteristics or peculiarities of the parts. 
Thus, one cannot understand the behaviour of the whole by studying the behaviour of 
its various parts. The holistic approach to understanding phenomena is useful because 
Hegel asserted that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. This thinking relates 
to the idea that systems are made up of sets of many interrelated and interconnected 
parts that, put together, make the behaviour of the whole greater, different and distinct 
from the sum of the behaviour of its individual components. Generally, a system means 
a configuration of parts that are connected and joined together by a web or family of 
relationships among the members acting as a whole. The emphasis on systems theory is 
not on the constitutive parts but on their organisation.37 This is because these parts are 
not static and constant or stable and in harmony, but dynamic processes. Systems theory 
provides the meta-language to resolve a problem regardless of the discipline.38 This 
approach serves to warn designers of unintended consequences if they fail to appreciate 
the linkages and interrelatedness by focusing exclusively on the individual components. 
South Africa does not appear to have used the holistic approach advocated in systems 
theory in the design of its governmental system.39 If it did, the three spheres may have 
worked better as one organic whole rather than as de facto tiers.  
 
(b) The reductionist approach looks downward and examines the sub-systems within the 
system. Reductionism advocates the study of properties or functioning of a system’s 
individual parts in order to understand phenomena. It is therefore the opposite of the 
systems approach. This may have been part of a strategy used in South Africa and could 
explain the situation that the country is in today in relation to co-operative governance.40     
(c) The functionalist approach looks upward to explore the role sub-systems play in the 
 larger system. This is the situation in South Africa: The national sphere formulates 
                                                 
37 Schein (1980: 4-11); Laszlo (1972: 14-15); Banathy (1997: 22), quoted by Ansari (2004), op cit. 
38 Ansari (2004), op cit. 
39 See generally, Smuts, Jan (1927) Holism and Evolution, London: Macmillan. 
 40 Kuhn (1974), op cit. 
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 policy and designs programmes that are implemented by municipalities through their 
 integrated development plans (IDPs). Provincial government acts as intermediaries.41  
It serves no real purpose in classifying or categorising the approach used in South Africa as its 
governmental system does not appear to be reliant on any theory of government. 
  
v. Key concepts or tenets of the systems theory 
Theorists42 assert that general systems theory incorporates at least six key concepts or tenets: 
(a) It is open43 to and interacts with the environment. It is characterised by the dynamic 
interaction of its components, while the basis of a closed or cybernetic model is the 
feedback cycle. Open systems exhibit higher levels of organisation than closed systems.  
 
(b) Behaviour in systems is teleological or purposeful. The system studied has a goal, 
arrived at by a conscious decision. 
 
(c) An open system is an ongoing process of taking inputs from the environment and 
transforming them into outputs that go back into the environment in a constant 
exchange. Input is defined as the movement of information from the environment into 
the system, while output is the movement of information from the system to the 
environment. Both input and output involve crossing boundaries that define the system. 
 
(d) Feedback enables a system to achieve its desired or steady state.  A high-functioning 
system continually exchanges feedback among its various components to ensure they 
remain closely aligned to and focused on achieving the system’s objective. Should any 
of the parts or processes become weakened or misaligned, the system makes the 
necessary adjustments so that it can achieve its goals. There are two types of feedback 
loops: The negative or error control feedback is one on which the system reacts to after 
the fact, or after errors have occurred. The system uses this information on small errors 
to take corrective action. The feed forward control is anticipatory in nature: The system 
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ansari (2004), op cit, quoting Kast and Rosenweig (1972); Walonick, op cit; McNamara, op cit. 
43 Emphasis in the original. 
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anticipates what may occur and takes preventive or corrective action before the errors 
or disturbances affect the system. 
 
(e) The concept of homeostasis refers to the ability of a system to achieve a state of dynamic 
equilibrium. However, the system does not return to its original state, but to one that 
maximises its chances of survival and growth. This state may or may not be one from 
which the system originally started. 
 
(f) Equifinality is defined as the ability of a system to attain the same final result from many 
different initial conditions. 
 
3.3.2 SYSTEMS THEORY LESSONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
From the foregoing brief analysis, some lessons emerge that are worth considering in the three-
sphere governmental system in the context of co-operative governance and municipal 
representation in South Africa: 
i. A complex system, such as the government of a nation, should be seen as an integrated 
whole although divided into sub-systems, such as provincial and local government and 
further into departments in all spheres, and arranged in a hierarchy. Whilst each is a 
self-contained unit, none can function optimally without interacting and interrelating on 
an ongoing basis with others in achieving the goal of the whole system. The system 
cannot survive unless it is open (democratic) and constantly interacting with the 
environment, that is people and where they live, play and work. This notion of 
hierarchies calls into question the viability of South Africa’s three spheres and the 
concept of ‘equality’. Use of the term ‘system’ when applied to an integrated 
government means it comprises relationships, partnerships and networks as well as 
social, political, organisational, and cultural contexts that underlie them. 
 
ii. The whole being greater than the sum of its parts implies that policies, programmes, and 
projects in the provincial and local spheres must contribute to the attainment of the 
state’s overall goals. This objective is more easily achieved if all sub-systems work 
holistically, harmoniously, and co-operatively, rather than competitively.  
iii. Any analysis and repairs to a part, say to an apparently dysfunctional municipality, 
outside the context of the entire system, would be counterproductive. Hence, to blame 
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local government for service delivery failure shows this is a reductionist approach, 
unless such criticism is justified after analysis of the whole system of governance. 
 
iv. The system must have a rationally-planned goal or else the confusion will cause it to 
flounder to the extent that the centre will not be able to hold. 
 
v. For the system to reach equilibrium or an ideal state, logical decisions need to be taken 
from time to time to keep it dynamic. 
 
vi. The functionalist-reductionist approach appears to come closest to the one adopted by 
South Africa. However, as stated above, there is no need for theoretical classification of 
the approach to governance. While the Constitution and statutes have facilitated the 
design and construction of policies, structures, frameworks, and guidelines, the 
operational or implementation aspects have not been adequately addressed. This relates 
both to the capacity and development of human resources, particularly to the 
measurement of their performance. 
 
vii. An organisation or institution functions through regularly-interacting and interrelating 
groups and their activities. Such relations should be constantly monitored and analysed 
to minimise risk, conflicts and breakdowns, and harmony encouraged. 
 
viii. A system works better when it facilitates transaction through interaction. Such 
requirement appears to be inadequate in South Africa’s intergovernmental system. This 
means that a relational system, per se, or the mere statutory provision therefor is a 
necessary but insufficient requirement. It is essential to ascertain whether this approach 
helps or hinders service delivery for it may well be that some of the numerous structures 
established are themselves serving as blockages. 
 
ix. Within a complex system, clarity of roles, expectations, and mandates through effective 
communication and co-ordination among the relevant stakeholders are essential, 
although acknowledging that overlaps may occur. Also required is a culture of 
participation, commitment, and strong leadership. Ile (2007) argues for the need for 
cohesion and consistency, especially where local discretion is permissible and desirable 
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in order not to over-centralise or homogenise the system or to preclude broad autonomy 
of local institutions.44         
Systems theory has given rise to several other theories. Of relevance to this study is 
organisational theory. 
 
3.3.3 ORGANISATIONAL THEORY 
Theorists45 argue that organisational theory derives from systems theory since organisations use 
complex, dynamic, goal-oriented bodies. The systemic view of institutions is transdisciplinary 
and integrative, as it transcends the perspectives of individual disciplines and integrates them 
on the basis of the formal apparatus provided by systems theory. This approach gives primacy 
to the interrelationships, not to the components, of the system. From these dynamic interactions, 
new properties of the (whole) system may emerge, providing useful insights into causes of 
failures or successes. Systems thinking incorporates techniques for studying phenomena in 
holistic ways. Thus, it is an improvement on conventional reductionist methods. Organisational 
development and the management of organisations or institutions have benefited from systems 
theory because: 
Management control systems consist of all organization structures and sub-systems designed to elicit 
behaviour that achieves the strategic objectives of an organisation at the highest level of performance with 
the least amount of unintended consequences and risk to the organization.46 
 
Using general systems theory, management control systems could be viewed much like 
biological organisms that exist in constant engagement with their environment. If an institution 
is an open system constantly interacting with its environment, then the environment becomes 
very important in determining and explaining the organisation’s behaviour. Hence, the study of 
a management control system ought to begin by understanding and characterising an 
institution’s environment. Furthermore, general systems theory applied to management control 
asserts that the organisation would exhibit teleological or purposeful behaviour. The reason for 
control is to achieve the vision, mission, and strategic goals of the institution, and to minimise 
unintended consequences. Management control systems consist of many interrelated sub-
                                                 
44 Ile (2007), op cit, 68.  
45 McNamara, Carter, http://managementhelp.org/systems/systems.htm; Von Bertalanffy, Ludwig (1997) 
General System Theory: Foundation, Development, Applications, New York: Harper, 32;Walonick, David S 
(1993) General Systems Theory, www.survey-software-solutions.com/walonick/systems-theory.htm; Ansari, 
Shahid (2004) Teaching Note: Systems Theory and Management Control, 
http://faculty.dardenvirginia/ansaris/systems accessed 14/09/2014. 
46 Ansari (2004), op cit.  
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systems. Some are structural components, such as information, delegation of authority, policies 
or legislation, while others may be behavioural or cultural factors, such as motivating behaviour 
or building the right values. Because these systems are interrelated, each element must be 
designed while recognising its impact on the other parts. Thus, a management control system 
must bring together the institution’s structural elements and mesh them with its behavioural and 
cultural components so that all three work together as a singular whole.47 
 
Walonick (1993)48 argues that planned organisational or social change is an attempt to solve a 
problem or to catalyse a vision. Such change would affect other system variables. Knowledge 
of the non-linearity of relationships gives designers the potential to make large changes in a 
variable with relatively small changes in another. Thus, systems theory enables planners to 
widen their perspective by affording them the opportunity to consider how their decisions may 
affect the other parts of the system and the environment. He asserts that our culture and 
experience define our understanding of systems.  
 
Since systems theory recognises the relativity of perception, it provides a framework for 
examining and understanding our environment and a common method for studying societal and 
organisational patterns. Organisations cannot function outside their context since there is a 
relationship between the institution and the environment in which it operates. This interaction 
is the primary source of complexity and interdependence.49  
 
Organisational theory, within the framework and context of systems theory, could have been 
used to better design South Africa’s governance system, especially the sub-systems of powers 
and functions and of co-operative governance. The absence of such a theory in the design of 
the three-sphere governmental system may be manifest in the ‘transformation’ of governmental 
structures through frequent restructuring. Such piecemeal reorganisation sometimes has no 
sound rationale behind it, being based on the wishes or whims of the political leadership or of 
senior managers. At times, the transformation may be little more than a change in name of the 
department or a unit, such as in the case of CoGTA. This has adverse implications for 
institutional integrity and continuity.  
                                                 
 47 Ibid. 
 48 Walonick (1993), op cit. 
49 Ibid. 
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Ile (2007)50 argues that South Africa has attempted to establish an enabling environment 
through a constitutional and statutory regulatory framework, thereby using organisational 
abstraction. It has paid scant attention to functional abstraction, where the state consists of a set 
of institutions executing particular goals. In reality, one categorisation cannot exist without the 
other. Organisational categorisation may be a prerequisite for functionality of government, but 
in the context of intergovernmental relations, the emphasis is on functionality. If functionality 
was used as a basis for the design of structures for co-operative governance, the result may be 
better. This is especially so given the plural nature of South African society which requires 
multifaceted institutions to facilitate decentralisation and intergovernmental relations.  
 
Since it involves human interaction, the nature of co-operative governance is such that it will 
generate conflict. It may thus be of assistance to provide a brief overview of conflict theory. 
 
3.3.4 CONFLICT THEORY 
According to Christian (2010), systems theory can be used to assess a conflict, thereby gaining 
a broad perspective on the social systems involved. In such an exploration, three factors are 
crucial:  
(a) analysing the workings of the entire system and its sub-systems; 
(b) determining the recurring patterns within the system that are connected to the conflict; 
and 
(c) identifying individual contributions to the overall system.51  
Rather than blaming one person as the cause of the entire conflict, it would help to look for a 
predictable chain of events because what an individual does will affect every other person 
involved in the conflict. There is a need to ascertain the role of each person in the system to 
help the process itself to change. Just as a person develops individual characteristics, an entire 
system, such as an institution, can also assume its own characteristics, influenced by the 
behaviour of role occupants therein.  In a systems theory analysis, attention should be paid to 
the relationships rather than on individual behaviours. This is because the conflict and the way 
parties to it act can be different, depending on the relational type of the persons involved. A 
                                                 
 50 Ile (2007), op cit, 69-70. 
51 Christian, Robin (2010) How Systems Theory Relates to Conflict: How a Full Assessment of Conflict 
Can Aid Conflict Management, www.associatedcontent.com, accessed 14/09/2014. 
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complete assessment of the conflict may enable the “introduction of new rules, understand and 
acknowledge micro-events, and have difficult conversations.”52  
 
A micro-event is defined as repetitive communication patterns that carry information about the 
underlying conflict structure, that is, a repetitive loop with the same outcome. A micro-event is 
a descriptive behaviour that can occur in clusters. Whilst not every interaction is a micro-event, 
non-defensive listening could assist in identifying those that are.53  
 
In addition to analysing the system and its sub-systems as well as conflicts therein, it may help 
to understand human behaviour. Symbolic interactionism focuses on the subjective aspects of 
social life rather than on objective, macro-structural components of social systems. For 
interactionists, humans are pragmatic actors who must continually adjust their behaviour to the 
actions of other role players. This is because society consists of organised and patterned 
interactions among individuals. Such change in behaviour is dependent on the ability to 
interpret the desired action. The attention paid to interaction and the meaning of events or 
situations to persons participating in them shifts attention of interactionists away from stable 
norms and values toward more changeable, continually readjusting social processes. Role 
taking is a key mechanism of interaction, enabling one to see things from another’s perspective 
and what one’s actions may mean to others.54  
 
An understanding of conflict theory based upon the foundation and within the framework of 
both organisational theory and systems theory may have enabled the design of a better and more 
complete system of co-operative governance thus enhancing harmony by reducing 
intergovernmental conflicts. 
 
3.3.5 THEORIES OF REPRESENTATION 
The concept of representation is based on the theory of authorisation and consent (See Table 
3.2). Since it may be difficult for the majority to be present when decisions affecting them are 
taken by government, its wishes are conveyed by a representative chosen by the people. 
                                                 
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid. 
54 McClelland, Kent (2000) Symbolic Interactionism, http://web.grinell.edu/courses/soc111-
01/IntroTheories/Symbolic.htm, accessed 14/09/2014. 
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Thereby arose the theory of governmental accountability. Political representation based on the 
conception of a constituency as the aggregation of persons began in England with the Curia 
Regis or Kings Council after the Norman Conquest of 1066 (see Item 3.4 below). Since 
individuals cannot delegate all their authority or alienate all their rights, delegation was always 
subject to the reservation that the delegate does nothing contrary to the faith and to sound 
morals. This notion gave rise to the representative’s accountability and responsibility to the 
constituency. An important function of the representative was to serve as a two-way channel of 
communication.55  
 
Theories of representation in literature on the American legislature are largely based on Hannah 
Fenichel Pitkin’s notion of making “present that which is not literally present.” This, in turn, is 
related to several theories:56 
(a) The authorization theory derives its name from the representative being authorised 
by a constituency to represent its views, giving a person the right to act that he or she 
did not have before, with the proviso that the constituency takes responsibility for the 
consequences as if it had acted itself. This theory describes the initial relationship but 
not the process that takes place after the authority has been granted to the elected 
official. 
 
(b) The standing for theory incorporates two types of representation: ‘Descriptive’ 
representation refers to a situation where a person is a mirror of the people in a 
constituency and reflects its wishes. ‘Policy’ representation is the opposite end, where 
a constituency is represented by someone who does not necessarily share the common 
characteristics of the people in a particular locality. 
 
(c) The acting for theory merely provides a general description of a tie between the 
representative and those for whom he or she acts.  
 
                                                 
55 http://science.jrank.org.pages/11124/Political Representation; 11123-Medieval-Corporatism, accessed 
17/09/2014. 
56 Summarised from: Representation, http://web.missouri.edu/webberd/316/Rep.html. 
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(d) The trustee (or independence) theory pertains to the situation where the representative 
is entrusted to make decisions that will benefit the spatial area he or she represents, 
thus acting for a geographical-based constituency. 
 
(e) The delegate (or mandate) theory is based on the notion that the representative should 
act only on the instruction of the local group; and delivers that localised group’s vote. 
The delegate may not act in accordance with his or her own conscience and does not 
need to take the good of the region (state or province) or country into account. The 
representative simply acts as the voice of those who are not literally present. 
 
(f) The politico theory is a skilful mix of the trustee and delegate models, and is 
associated with representatives who are career politicians acting in a way that will 
help them get re-elected.      
 
(g) Liberalism theory is based on many different interests, often associated with factions 
or interest groups. 
 
(h) Burkean theory differs from liberalism as it focuses on individual interests. It believes 
that the good of the nation does not lie in the opinions of constituents in any form, 
but in reason and judgment. This is similar to the symbolic mode of representation, 
where a delegate represents the nation, not just those in the constituency. In his 
Speech to the Electors at Bristol at the Conclusion of the Poll in 1774, British 
politician Edmund Burke spoke against the notion that elected officials should exactly 
mirror the opinions of the electorate. 
 
(i) The transmission belt theory derives from the responsiveness of the representative to 
the wants and needs of constituents in the form of policy, service, resource allocation, 
and so on. This theory incorporates both a delegate and a trustee version, with the 
representative acting according to the wishes of the constituency but any action must 
be in accordance with the good of the locality or the nation. 
 
(j) The constitutive theory combines the four major concepts of representation: 
authorisation, descriptive, symbolic, and acting for the electorate. In this theory, 
public opinion provides a circle within which the representative is free to act. 
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(k) Social representation theory57 is based on the idea that for people in groups to talk 
with each other they need a system of common understanding, particularly of the 
concepts and ideas that are outside of such ‘common’ understanding or which have 
particular meaning for that group. Social representation is described as systems of 
values, ideas, and practices with a two-fold function. The first is to establish an order 
that will enable individuals to orientate themselves in their material and social world 
and to master it. The second is to enable communication amongst members of a 
community by providing them with a code for clearly naming and classifying the 
various aspects of their world and their individual and group history. This is because 
meaning is created through a system of social negotiation rather than being a fixed 
and defined thing. Furthermore, the interpretation of meaning may require an 
understanding of additional aspects of that social environment. 
 
(l) Dyadic theory refers to that kind of representation where the degree and manner in 
which elected legislators represent the preferences or interests of their specific 
geographic constituencies.58  
This is the kind of constituency-based representation that opposition parties are 
calling for in South Africa at the national and provincial levels, rather than the 
existing proportional representation electoral system. 
 
(m) Collective theory is defined by the answer to the question whether it is preferable that 
Parliament, or specifically the National Assembly, as an institution should 
collectively like a unit represent the people rather than an MP representing his or her 
district or constituency.59 
 
(n) Command Theory or Imperative Theory of law – This was expounded by John Austin 
(1790-1859), an English legal philosopher. He asserted that “law is the aggregate of 
the rules set by men as political superior or sovereign to men as politically subject”.60 
                                                 
57 Summarised from: http://changingminds.org/explanations/theories/social_representation.htm, 
accessed 17/09/2014.   
58 Summarised from: Representation, http://web.missouri.edu/webberd/316/Rep.html, accessed 
17/09/2014.  
59Representation, http://web.missouri.edu/webberd/316/Rep.html.  
60 http://www.desikanoon.co.in/2012/08/the -nature-of-law.html – accessed 16/05/2017 (“desikanoon”).  
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Law was seen as the command of a sovereign that imposed a duty backed by sanction 
for non-compliance. 
 
While this theory may have had some or partial application during Austin’s time and 
by present-day dictators, it cannot stand current scrutiny. There were laws that 
predate or are independent of a state; not all laws are general; not all laws can be 
expressed as commands; and there may be no sanctions for certain (civil) laws. The 
imperative/command theory makes no allowance for the existence and application of 
“customs, traditions, and unspoken practices”; international, constitutional and 
personal laws (such as Hindu, Mohammedan or Canon laws). It makes no mention of 
ethics nor the relationship between justice and law, or the purpose of law, such as to 
promote social welfare. It also ignores natural law or moral law.61 “In order to remain 
relevant, law has to grow with the development of the society…the definition of law 
is ever changing with the change in society.”62 Austin’s theory has no place in South 
Africa’s constitutional democracy. 
 
It is clear that in a democracy in South Africa, Austin’s theory has no place as an 
executive president could do as a ‘sovereign’ pleases. The head of the executive or 
the President must act within the framework of the Constitution63. Furthermore, laws 
are not made by the sovereign but by Parliament, with participation of the people64 
as prescribed, as the constitutionally-desired form of ‘responsible government’. The 
people’s dissatisfaction with the government and its leaders could lead to their 
removal, as shown by recent attempts to remove the President from office.65    
                                                 
61 Desikanoon, op cit.   
62 Ibid.  
63 As shown by the Constitutional Court in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National 
Assembly and Others; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [2016] ZACC 11. 
64 Where Parliament fails to engage with the public in its law-making process, this has been ruled 
unconstitutional – see Mary Patricia King and Others v Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of Control and Others, 
Case 561/04, SCA, delivered 20 September 2005, paragraphs 1, 9 and 22; see, generally Doctors for Life 
International v Speaker of the National Assembly (CCT 12/05) ZACC 11; 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC); 2006 (6) 
SA 416 (CC) (17 August 2006; Earthlife Africa Johannesburg and Another v Minister of Energy and Others 
(19529/2015) [2017] ZAWCHC 50 (26 April 2017). See also Czapanskiy, Karen Syma and Rashida Manjoo 
(2008) The Right to Public Participation in the Law-Making Process and the Role of legislature in the Promotion 
of this Right 19(1) (2008) Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, 19(1) (2008), 1-40. 
65 Refer Chapter 1, and footnotes 17 and 50, where this matter is discussed. 
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(o) Free Will Theory – is a “philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of 
rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives.”66 It is 
connected with the concept of moral responsibility for one’s action. “Philosophers 
distinguish between freedom of action and freedom of will”. This is because the 
ability to carry out one of a range of actions successfully sometimes depends on 
factors wholly beyond the actor’s control, that is, because of external constraints or 
influences. The Free Will theory also presupposes that the person is capable of 
rational deliberation, capacity to reflect on desires and beliefs, and capable of control 
and causation. All of these point to one’s “capacity for deliberation and the potential 
sophistication of some of our practical reflections.”67  
 
The full application of the Free Will theory in contemporary society is moot. In South 
Africa, for example, the question is whether voters in an election exercise their free 
will in the context of incentives, intimidation, nepotism, corruption, and so on. 
Another question is whether elected representatives exercise responsible government, 
that is, represent the people, rather than their political party’s wishes or that of the 
President. This begs the question as to whether people in contemporary society have 
or can exercise free will. The current ‘state capture’ saga suggests not. 
 
(p) Theory of Intergovernmental Relations – This subject, alongside co-operative 
governance, forms a major part of this thesis and is reviewed throughout the study. 
Hence, the theory of IGR is addressed only briefly and for the sake of completeness. 
Agranoff and Radin (2014) argue that the first emergence of intergovernmental relations was 
in the nineteenth century during the construction of the nation-state. It was then that “legal 
distinctions of government were initially defined”, with emphasis on law and politics.68 The 
                                                 
 66 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill (29/10/2010) - accessed 17/05/2017. 
 67 Ibid. 
68 Agranoff, Robert and A Radin (2014) Deil Wright’s Overlapping Model of Intergovernmental 
Relations: The Basis for Contemporary Intergovernmental Relations, Paper: Deil Wright Symposium – 
Understanding Intergovernmental Relations: Reflections and Directions, 14 March 2014, 1-28, 5.  
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number of role players in IGR rose steadily from the early twentieth century to present day 
networks operating globally and where power “is evermore dispersed”. In the network IGR 
phase, officials from various levels of government, universities, non-profit NGO “sit down with 
one another at the same table to discuss, explore, negotiate, and solve issues interactively.”69  
 
Agranoff and Radin assert that relations between governments was identified by William 
Anderson in the 1930s, and published in his book, Intergovernmental Relations in Review in 
1960.70 They argue that Deil Wright in his book, Understanding Intergovernmental Relations 
(1978) posited three models of intergovernmental relations:71  
i. Co-ordinate authority model – which depicts distinct boundaries distinct boundaries 
between the levels of government with a clear separation between “national and 
state/local relationships”; 
ii. Inclusive authority model – where intergovernmental engagement was based on a 
“hierarchical set of relationships” with the national level predominating; and 
iii. Overlapping authority model – where intergovernmental relations is depicted as a 
“set of overlaps between national, state, and local levels simultaneously”. 
 
Agranoff and Radin (2014) argue that in the overlapping model, “autonomy and discretion” in 
any level is “constrained” and the power and influence that one level has is limited. In such a 
model, bargaining between and among levels becomes commonplace. They refer to Wright 
(1998:37) who contended that IGR, with “complex multiunit interactions beyond nation-state 
relationships”, includes a multitude of “activities and meanings that are neither explicit nor 
implicit in federalism”. The overlapping model is characterised by substantial 
intergovernmental interaction necessary for co-operative federalism. It also requires suitable 
methods of collaboration between the various levels or institutions of government while at the 
same time “preserving and strengthening” them as separate or distinctive actors.72 Malan (2005) 
defines intergovernmental relations as – 
 A set of formal and informal processes as well as institutional arrangements and structures for bilateral 
 and multilateral co-operation within and among the three spheres of government.73 
 
                                                 
69 Agranoff and Radin (2014), op cit, 23. 
70 Agranoff and Radin (2014), op cit, 3. 
71 Agranoff and Radin (2014), op cit, 2. 
72 Agranoff and Radin (2014), op cit, 3-4. 
73 Malan, L (2005) Intergovernmental relations and co-operative government in South Africa: The ten-
year review, 24(2) (2005) Politeia, 226-243, 28. 
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She adds that IGR has become a necessity because of the current “complexity and 
interdependency of political systems.” Malan distinguishes IGR as a concept from co-operative 
governance, describing the latter as a “fundamental philosophy of government” governing all 
its aspects and activities, including deconcentration of power, organisation and exercise of 
political power. Co-operative governance is also the conceptual framework that aims to 
promote a development-oriented state.74  
 
Malan (2012) argues that whereas intergovernmental relations consist of the horizontal and 
vertical relationships among institutions and individuals in the three spheres of government, the 
principles of co-operative government lock these relations into a particular normative 
framework. The core of this framework is that the decentralisation of state power in terms of 
the Constitution…is not based on competitive federalism but on the norms of co-operative 
government.”75 
 
With South Africa’s intergovernmental relations directed by the Constitution and the IRFA, it 
seems that Deil Wright’s overlapping model is being implemented, although there is a long way 
to go in achieving the results desired by an emerging participatory democracy. A dozen years 
have passed since the promulgation of the IRFA; no scientific and objective review appears to 
have been done to indicate its successes and failures and how to proceed further with the Act. 
However, IGR in Africa is discussed briefly in this thesis.76  
 
Theories have been combined and modified to create political representation (See Table 3.2).  
 
3.3.6 POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 
Based on Hanna Pitkin’s definition, political representation is the activity of making citizens’ 
voices, opinions, and perspectives ‘present’ in public policy-making processes. Such 
representation occurs when political actors speak, advocate, symbolise, and act on behalf of 
others in the political arena. Representation requires the following four components (using 
examples relevant to this study):77 
                                                 
74 Malan (2005) op cit, 230. 
75 Malan, LP (2012) Intergovernmental relations in South Africa: A revised policy approach to co-
operative government, 5(3) (2012) African Journal of Public Affairs, 115-124, 115. 
76 In Chapter 6, 6.4.10 Co-operative Governance in the Developing World. 
77 Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2006) Political Representation, http://plato.stanford.edu. 
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Table 3.2: Four views on representation (Adapted from the Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy, 2006), accessed 14/01/2015. 
Four views Brief description Main research 
questions in each view 
Implicit standards for 
evaluating 
representatives 
1. Formalistic 
Representation 
The institutional 
arrangements that 
precede and initiate 
representation. Formal 
representation has two 
dimensions: 
authorisation and 
accountability. 
 
What is the institutional 
position of the 
representative? 
None. 
(Authorisation) The means by which a 
representative obtains his 
or her standing, status, 
position or office. 
What is the process by 
which a representative 
gains power (e.g. 
elections) and what are 
the ways in which a 
representative can 
enforce his or her 
decisions? 
No standards for 
assessing how well a 
representative behaves. 
One can merely assess 
whether a representative 
legitimately holds his or 
her position. 
 
(Accountability) The ability of 
constituents to punish 
their representative 
for failing to act in 
accordance with their 
wishes (e.g. voting a 
representative out of 
office) or the 
responsiveness of the 
representative to the 
constituents. 
 
What are the 
sanctioning 
mechanisms 
available to 
constituents? Is the 
representative 
responsive towards 
his or her 
constituents‟ preferences? 
No standards for 
assessing how well a 
representative behaves. 
One can merely 
determine whether a 
representative can be 
sanctioned or has been 
responsive. 
2. Symbolic 
Representation 
The ways that a 
representative stands – 
that is, the meaning that a 
representative has for 
those being represented. 
What kind of response is 
invoked by the 
representative in those 
being represented? 
Representatives are 
assessed by the degree of 
acceptance that the 
representative has among 
the represented. 
 
3. Descriptive 
Representation 
The extent to which a 
representative resembles 
those being represented. 
Does the 
representative look 
like, have common 
interests with, or 
share certain 
experiences with the 
represented? 
 
Assess the 
representative by the 
accuracy of the 
resemblance between 
the representative and 
the represented. 
4. Substantive 
Representation 
The activities of 
representatives – that is, 
the actions taken on 
behalf of, in the interests 
of, and as a substitute for 
the represented. 
Does the 
representative 
advance the policy 
preferences that 
serve the interests of 
the represented? 
Assess a 
representative by the 
extent to which policy 
outcomes advanced 
by a representative 
serve 
„the best interests‟ of 
their constituents. 
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(a) a party that is representing, such as SALGA; 
(b) a party that is represented, such as municipalities in the province of Gauteng; 
(c) something that is being represented, such as the necessity of district municipalities; 
and  
(d) a setting within which representation is taking place, such as an intergovernmental 
relations (IGR) forum. 
Political theorists posit four main views of the concept of representation, but Pitkin argues that 
one must know its context in order to determine its meaning.  
 
In 1997 David Plotke stated that emphasis on mechanisms of authorisation and accountability 
was especially useful in the context of the Cold War, but that in contemporary society one must 
broaden the scope of our understanding of political representation to incorporate interest 
representation. This requires further debate on the proper activities of representatives. Today, 
international, transnational, and non-governmental actors play a major role in advancing public 
policies on behalf of citizens. Thus, it is no longer desirable to limit one’s understanding of 
political representation to elected officials within the nation-state. Furthermore, associational 
life through participation in social movements, interest groups, and civic associations is 
becoming increasingly important for the survival of representative democracies.78 
 
Jane Mansbridge refers to multiple forms of representation and thus the concept should not be 
conceived as a monolithic one. Nor should it be seen as consisting simply of a relationship 
between elected officials and constituents within his or her voting district, or one of principle-
agent, and should not be territorially based.79 
 
Nadia Urbinati argues for representation as advocacy, which has two main features: the 
representative’s passionate link to the elector’s cause, and the representative’s relative 
autonomy of judgment. This approach improves our understanding of deliberative democracy 
as it avoids the common mistake of focusing on the formal procedures of deliberation at the 
expense of examining the sources of inequality within civil society. Iris Marion Young asserts 
that it is unreasonable to assume that representation should be characterised by a ‘relationship 
of identity’ for the legitimacy of a representative is not primarily a function of his or her 
                                                 
78 Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (2006), accessed 14/01/2015. 
79 Ibid. 
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similarities to the represented. Furthermore, democratic representation is a dynamic process 
that moves between moments of authorisation and moments of accountability. It is the 
movement between these moments that makes the process democratic.80 
 
There are three persistent problems associated with political representation:81 
i. the proper institutional design for representative institutions in democratic polities; 
ii. ways in which democratic citizens can be marginalised by representative 
institutions, especially since these structures and role players therein may be biased; 
and 
iii. the relationship between representation and democracy. 
The above challenges lead to the question: Does democratic representation require 
representatives to advance the preferences of democratic citizens or does it demand a 
commitment to democratic institutions? Since it cannot be presumed that all forms of 
representation are democratic, one needs to analyse the relationship between different forms of 
representation and ways that some may be undermining democratic representation.82 
 
3.4 HISTORY OF REPRESENTATION 
 
3.4.1 ASSEMBLIES IN ANCIENT TIMES 
The gathering of leaders to discuss and decide on important matters was common in many 
ancient cultures. Archaeological evidence shows that citizens’ get-togethers were convened in 
Mesopotamia (modern-day Syria and Iraq) around 2500BC. The precursor of modern 
parliaments was the Assembly or Ecclesia in Greece around 500 BC that met 40 times a year 
and wherein male citizens of 18 and over could vote on matters by a show of hands. The Roman 
Republic, founded around 509 BC, was ruled by two elected Consuls acting on behalf of a 
Senatus or council of elders. This ‘parliament’ consisted of 300 members drawn from wealthy 
and noble families but representing all citizens. These assemblies did not initiate laws but 
approved them by vote.83  
 
                                                 
80 Ibid.  
81 Ibid.  
82 Ibid.  
 83 Adapted from www.peo.gov.au/learning; en. ParliamentofEngland, accessed 4/03/2015. 
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This is unlike South Africa where in the Union and during the (apartheid) republic, Parliament 
was the supreme law-making body, although not voted into power by the majority of the 
country’s population. 
 
An early model of representation originated with Cicero when an actor represented someone 
else on stage as if that person seemed present. The second method of representation originating 
in antiquity arose in the law courts where litigants appointed professional representatives. The 
client or an accredited authority, such as today’s Legal Aid Board, had to authorise the 
representative. Such representation was nothing more than having the authority to act in the 
name of someone else as the authoritative person “was not present, but needed to be represented 
in such a way that their authority continued to hold good”. Political representation refers to the 
act of authorising other people, such as members of Parliament, legislators, and executives, to 
speak and act in the name of the public.84 
 
Political representation could be traced to Iceland which claimed to have the oldest parliament 
or althing dating back to 930. The rule of law, however, may have emerged in 1037 when 
German Emperor Conrad II issued a charter stating that “no one will be imprisoned except 
according to the law”.85 This gave rise to the notion that the ruler is subject to and not above 
the law. 
 
The Cortes or parliament’s impositions on the power of the king in the kingdoms of Leon and 
Aragon in Spain predate and were more extensive than the Magna Carta. Lesser nobility or 
gentry in Hungary compelled the king to grant them significant rights and privileges.86 
 
3.4.2 EARLY ASSEMBLIES IN ENGLAND 
In the Anglo-Saxon period, before the Norman conquest of 1066, England was divided into 
small ‘regions’ called shires. William the Conqueror, the powerful Duke of Normandy, France, 
distributed English land to his Norman followers in a manner that none of them could become 
a dangerous rival to the king. After the conquest, these sub-divisions became known as counties. 
This strategy gave rise to the feudal system wherein the king granted land and other assets to 
                                                 
84 Skinner, Quentin (2008) ‘Comments on Frank Ankersmit’s “Political Representation and Political 
Experience: An Essay on Political Psychology” (12) (2008) Redescriptions, 227-231. 
85 Adapted from www.peo.gov.au/learning; en. ParliamentofEngland, accessed 4/03/2015; MacPhail, 
IMM (1967) An Introduction to the British Constitution, London: Edward Arnold, 1. 
86 MacPhail (1967), op cit, 1. 
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barons and knights in exchange for their support, especially during times of war, and was 
adopted by most European countries in the Middle Ages.87  
 
The British Parliament had its origins in two early Anglo-Saxon assemblies, the Witanegemot 
or Witan, and the moots. The Witan, dating from the eighth century, advised the King on 
strategic matters. It did not have a permanent membership, being comprised of advisors and 
nobles who met when called by the King. The Witan had no lawmaking powers. After the 
conquest of England, the Duke of Normandy ruled with the aid of a smaller group of permanent 
advisers, the Curia Regis or King’s Council, made up of noblemen and church leaders appointed 
by the King. Hence, they did not democratically or formally represent anyone. It was dissolved 
in 1215, to be replaced by the Parliament of England until 1707, when succeeded by the 
Parliament of Great Britain (1707-1801).88 The geography of a country often determines its 
history. England’s political development in many respects was based on the country’s size. A 
large state like France was divided into separate provinces ruled by powerful nobles capable of 
defying the king. In Germany and Spain, the small size of the kingdoms or duchies made 
rebellion impractical. England was small enough for a king to control but also for people 
throughout the country to combine in united action against the monarch. England’s long series 
of wars made it necessary for the kings to raise taxes beyond their ordinary revenues. This made 
them dependent on Parliament. The wars against the French strengthened English unity, 
enabling different classes of people to join in combined action. This was also facilitated by the 
small size of English cities (except for London), making it easier for residents of different 
classes to co-operate with the country gentry in the House of Commons.89 The moots were 
assemblies held in each shire or county to address matters of concern to the community, and to 
hear legal cases. They comprised local lords, bishops, the sheriff, and four representatives from 
each village in the shire. The moot was the forerunner of the House of Commons and an 
example of constituency-based representation within a small geographical area.90 In return for 
their support, the powerful subjects wanted restrictions on the power of the king. To this end, 
in 1215, King John of England signed the Magna Carta, agreeing to restrictions on his power, 
thereby setting a precedent for medieval limited monarchies. Thereafter representatives, known 
as Knights of the Shire, with some local clergymen, were summoned to attend Parliaments.91 
                                                 
87 MacPhail, op cit, 1-3. 
88 Ibid. 
89 MacPhail (1967), op cit, 2-3. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
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Thus, (undemocratic) representation was of and by the wealthy landowning nobles, as in 
colonial and apartheid South Africa.  
 
3.4.3 PARLIAMENTARY SUPREMACY IN BRITAIN 
In Parliament’s first sitting on 20 January 1265, two elected representatives from each county 
(knights of the shire) and city or town (burgesses) were summoned, for the first time 
representing constituencies of the commoners. From 1327 peoples’ representatives sat 
permanently in what became known as the House of Commons, which with the monarch and 
the House of Lords, constituted Parliament. The Great Council evolved into the Parliament of 
England. One of the main functions of the Commons was to petition the King and the House of 
Lords to resolve local and national issues through laws. These petitions were the basis of bills 
or proposed laws, (a tradition practised in present-day democratic South Africa). The King 
needed approval of the Commons for the imposition of taxes as these had the greatest impact 
on the people.92  
 
In the late 14th century, the franchise was introduced, limited to the number of people who could 
vote in elections for the House of Commons. From 1430 onwards, the franchise was restricted 
to “Forty Shilling Freeholders”, that is, men who held freehold property of this minimum value 
in the county where they vote. In the 16th and 17th centuries, Parliament was not a democratic 
representative institution, being dominated by the nobility and the clergy, with elections 
controlled by local grandees.93  
 
Over the centuries, the English Parliament progressively limited the power of the monarchy, 
culminating in the Glorious Revolution of 1688 when parliamentary supremacy became settled 
and the role of all future sovereigns was restricted to that of constitutional monarchs with 
limited executive authority.94 
 
The legislative supremacy or “sovereignty” of Parliament means that it exercises supreme 
control over all branches of government. The courts have no power to “review” parliamentary 
legislation and declare it unconstitutional. Parliament also supervises the general conduct of the 
executive. This was the approach in pre-democracy South Africa and practised as a virtual 
                                                 
92 MacPhail (1967), op cit, 1-3. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
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democracy by the minority white elites. “Responsible government” means ministers are 
responsible to Parliament, that is, the House of Commons. “The key to responsible 
parliamentary government lies in the Cabinet system.” Representative government is based on 
the assumption that electors are free to organise themselves into political parties which emerged 
in England in 1688, dominated by the Whigs and the Tories.95  
 
This was not the case in South Africa where only the minority white group had the franchise, 
alongside the qualified franchise of some coloureds and natives in the provinces of the Cape 
and Natal. Secondly, local government largely served to protect and enhance the health and 
well-being of this small group by the provision of municipal goods and services rather than 
engaging in socio-economic development. 
 
The “Mother of Parliaments” is the title given to the British Parliament.96 This is a model 
adopted in South Africa after Union in 1910 and as a republic in 1961, with white enfranchised 
whites as rulers. 
 
Following annexation by the British from the Dutch in 1806, to 1910, the Cape became a British 
colony.97 As a member of the British Commonwealth, it adopted the laws and institutions of 
England, including the Westminster parliamentary system that applied to the four provinces, 
then to the Union after 1910, and the republic between 1961and 1994. It has been said that 
during this period – 
The sovereignty of Parliament is traditionally conceived in South Africa in the sense of absolute power it 
gained in the Middle Ages, comprising indivisibility, originality and illimitability.98 
 
Rule by a small white minority from 1652 to 199499 and application of the above model, with 
the franchise and representation during this period reserved for whites, people of colour were 
not given the opportunity to learn the art and science of government or representation therein. 
This lack of experience and expertise manifests itself in the leadership in all three spheres of 
government in South Africa today. Even after two decades of democracy, the current situation 
remains untenable. This is evinced, inter alia, by several service delivery protests at numerous 
                                                 
95 Phillips, O Hood (1967) Constitutional and Administrative Law, 4th Edition, London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 27-28. 
96 MacPhail (1967), op cit, 2-3. 
97 Hahlo and Kahn (1960), op cit, 5.  
98 Hahlo and Kahn (1960), op cit, 146. 
99 See Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
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municipalities; the ruling by the Constitutional Court that the President acted unconstitutionally 
in the Nkandla matter;100 and current attempts to remove the President from office.   
 
3.5 REPRESENTATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
3.5.1 BACKGROUND 
Municipal representation should be understood within the framework and context of the 
evolution of local government in South Africa and of representation therein. This 
‘development’ had been shaped by the constitutions and legislation since the first occupation 
of the Cape by Jan van Riebeeck in 1652. A notable feature of laws pertaining to government 
had been centralisation and concomitantly the low status of local authorities. The regulatory 
rather than developmental role of provinces further entrenched the weak position of local 
authorities. Continuation of this model resulted in the present-day situation where politicians 
and officials appear to lack the knowledge, experience, and understanding to be efficient 
municipal administrators. Not surprisingly, local authorities have been ill-prepared to play a 
meaningful role in community upliftment after almost 350 years as providers of basic pubic 
goods and services to a small, white, rate-paying public. Given divisions along class, ethnic, 
cultural, language, and other lines, it cannot be said that communities at the local level were 
homogeneous. Development or rather the provision of local government goods and services 
along racial divisions, further fragmented people in their localities.101 
 
For an understanding of some of the dilemmas currently facing municipalities, it is necessary 
to appreciate the evolution of local authorities from historical times to present day. Since law 
was used as an instrument to regulate and control the populace, it would be helpful to trace how 
this mechanism was used and how it could have contributed to the problems faced by local 
government today. Within such a review, it may be opportune to analyse local government 
representation and whether and how it contributed to development or underdevelopment. Such 
an assessment may show the pitfalls of past practises and provide indicators on how not to 
design and implement democratic participatory local self-governance. The struggle for 
democracy began at the local level through rents and services boycotts to make the country 
ungovernable. The same mechanisms appear to be in use today to express dissatisfaction of the 
                                                 
100 Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Democratic Alliance v 
Speaker of the National Assembly and Others [2016] ZACC 11.   
101 Refer Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
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majority protesting against denial of democratic rights, entitlements, privileges, and of poor 
service delivery. 
 
Municipal representation through structures and processes can be better understood in the 
context of the times they were practised in. This requires an assessment of the history of local 
government,102 followed by democratic reforms debated within and outside the Congress for a 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA). The governmental reforms from the 1990s suggest a 
massive social re-engineering exercise opposite to the design of the grand apartheid experiment. 
Going from one extreme to the other means spanning a chasm and in the process, much could 
have been overlooked or glossed over in the ideal or in redressing rapidly the social injustices 
of apartheid. 
 
Given the then extant problems of underdevelopment and exploitation of the masses, a strategy 
acceptable to the majority and the ruling elite had to be fashioned. This was the Interim (1993) 
Constitution. At the local level, developmental transformation was to be guided by the Local 
Government Transition Act (LGTA) of 1993 and then the 1996 Constitution. These were 
supplemented and complemented by several statutes and regulations. Hence arose one of the 
world’s most comprehensive and complex governmental system. 
 
The above discourse may assist in formulating a conceptual form of representation by an 
appropriate organisation of a constituency comprising 278 municipalities103 in nine regions. 
Whilst the Constitution made a peremptory provision for the recognition of national and 
provincial associations representing municipalities,104 it is silent on local organisation.105 Thus 
it is necessary to ascertain the space or opportunities available for municipal representation, 
gaps in the system and how they can be filled, the nature of representation and representatives, 
and other issues.    
 
 
                                                 
102 Addressed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
103 The number was confirmed in the ‘Summit Overview’ at the Presidential Local Government Summit 
2014 – Back to Basics: Serving our communities better! Johannesburg: 18 September 2014.  
104 Section 163(a) of the Constitution. 
105 Sections 163(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the Constitution. 
 
 
 
115 
 
3.5.2 THE FRAMEWORK AND CONTEXT OF MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION  
Several issues need analysis before a model for municipal representation could be formulated. 
These are depicted below and are addressed in the subsequent chapters of this study. 
 
i. The origin of the mandate for municipal representation 
(a) Analysis of the three-sphere governmental system; 
(b) The structure of local government; 
(c) The status, powers and functions of local government, including High Court and 
Constitutional Court interpretations thereof; 
(d) Co-operative governance; 
(e) The duties and obligations of the three spheres of government, particularly the local 
state, including High Court and Constitutional Court interpretations thereof; 
(f) The developmental duties of municipalities; 
(g) Local participatory responsible self-governance; 
(h) The rights, privileges, entitlements, and duties and responsibilities of members of local 
communities; 
(i) The electoral system; 
(j) Service delivery by municipalities; and 
(k) A human rights-based approach to service delivery. 
ii. The case for municipal representation    
(a) Need, desirability and rationale for municipal representation; 
(b) Nature of municipal representation; 
(c) Existing opportunities for municipal representation; 
i. within municipalities, such as on a ward committee or a municipal council 
ii. on national and provincial institutions, such as the NCoP, FFC, etc; 
iii. on national and international bodies, such as the NPC and International Union of 
Local Authorities (IULA); 
iv. research and developmental organisations, both domestic and international; and 
v. others. 
iii. Challenges to effective municipal representation 
 
iv. Review of implementation of municipal representation 
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3.5.3 REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFICIENT MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION 
From the foregoing review and analysis, a model will be developed depicting the nature of 
municipal representation that will fulfil the mandate of local government, namely efficient 
service delivery as a means to enhance social and economic development in accordance with 
the prescripts of the Constitution and applicable statutes, biased in favour of the poor. 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
 
Chapter 1 set out the current situation regarding failure of local government to provide services 
efficiently and on an equitable basis, manifest by community protests since 2004 to date. The 
crisis of the local state gave rise to the problem statement (Chapter 1). The cause of the current 
dilemma should be understood through an understanding of local government history generally 
but particularly its under-development in South Africa, addressed in Chapter 2. Exclusion of 
the majority from participation in government and the economy did not prepare the present 
government to be effective and efficient. This was acknowledged in the CoGTA Minister’s 
response to a journalist’s query: 
On the question of experience, I suppose there was nobody who was born a minister so there’s no issue that 
somebody will say I’ve got no experience to do the work.106 
 
This is at the heart of the matter of municipal representation – the need for experienced, mature, 
knowledgeable, dedicated, and committed councillors and administrators. The unacceptable 
developmental model manifest in the five-year SoNA statements is fragmented, piecemeal, and 
reactionary approach to development practised at present is tantamount to crisis management. 
Service delivery is unlikely to improve if the same strategy persists in the future. One of the 
ways to address this dilemma is the correct calibre of public representatives, especially at the 
local level in a participatory and representative democracy. In concluding, the requirements 
thereof are set out and addressed in chapters that follow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
106 Minister Collins Chabane’s remarks at a media briefing on the Macro Structure of Government, 
21/05/2009, www.gov.za, accessed 6/03/2015. 
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     CHAPTER 4 
 
THE FOUNDATION, FRAMEWORK, CONTEXT AND MECHANISMS 
FACILITATING MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter analyses the constitutional and statutory provisions forming the foundation, 
framework, and context that could potentially accommodate, enable, and facilitate municipal 
representation in South Africa. These may also provide the opportunities to enable the search 
of a rationale and niche for municipal representation within a relatively prescriptive, rigid, and 
regulated environment, when compared with the approaches of older democracies. Many 
policies, strategies, priority programmes, factors, variables, and components shape, influence, 
and impact on representation and these should be read into their purposive interpretation. Given 
the plethora of constitutional, statutory, and regulatory directives potentially applicable, it is 
necessary to be selective and to review only those directly or indirectly related to the topic, 
municipal representation.  
 
The aim is to ascertain how rights and duties and their fulfilment create spaces wherein 
municipal representatives could be proactive. The assessment, therefore, serves to identify 
those structures and processes that could accommodate municipal representation, any gaps or 
deficiencies therein, and how they could be addressed, all in the interest of increasing municipal 
competency and effectiveness. This chapter is prefaced by an overview of the state’s approach 
to development over the past two decades. The formalistic, prescriptive, and managerialist 
modus operandi, a hallmark of the apartheid regime, albeit modified, continues to occupy centre 
stage in a democratic state, particularly in the local government sphere. It thus serves as 
foundation and context against which the current multi-sphere governmental system could be 
compared or measured. It also provides a motivation for community and human development 
within municipalities wherein councillors, technocrats, and community leader 
s could play a major role. 
  
Following an analysis of formalism, the origin of the mandate and the framework for municipal 
representation is assessed through analysis of constitutional and statutory provisions affecting 
118 
 
or impacting on local government. This incorporates a review of the foundational values and 
rights-based approach espoused in the Constitution; an analysis of the three-sphere 
governmental system; local government as a party in the co-operative governance modus 
operandi; the status, powers, functions, objectives and developmental duties of municipalities; 
municipal representation as a means to promote and protect human rights; direct, participatory 
and representative democracy; establishment of municipalities; and the current municipal 
electoral system. Included in the review is discussion of issues and challenges arising from the 
constitutional-statutory-regulatory mandate and how the judiciary has addressed them.  
 
4.2 MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION IN THE CONTEXT OF FORMALISM 
 
This section serves as an introduction to and a counter argument to South Africa’s formal and 
prescriptive approach to government and development. It is addressed here because, on the one 
hand, state policy serves as a guideline for socio-economic upliftment via organs of state. On 
the other, if development of communities is incorporated as a holistic programme, the present 
modus operandi, then, is shown up as a partial approach. This is because it largely ignores the 
component that comprises residents, their leaders, and representatives who could play a 
meaningful role in local participatory democracy. 
   
Formalism is defined as ‘excessive adherence to prescribed forms; excessive concern with form 
rather than content.’1 The use of formalism outside the context of an informing and directive 
systems theory constitutes a piecemeal, fragmented or partial strategy. It is argued that 
government is giving insufficient consideration to this approach, as was in the case of grand 
apartheid design.2 In other words it can at best be part of a more comprehensive strategy and 
system of governance.   
 
It is a truism that South Africa during the colonial but more particularly through the apartheid 
era was one of the most ‘governed’ countries in the world, with a multitude of legislation 
‘legitimised’ by Parliament. This was supplemented, to a lesser extent, by provincial ordinances 
and local government by-laws, to entrench and advance minority white interests. At the same 
time, law was used as a leading instrument to disenfranchise, marginalise, and control the 
masses. Local authorities, as field agents of the centrally-controlled state, were the 
                                                 
 1 South African Concise Oxford Dictionary. 
 2 See Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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implementing mechanisms of these coercive and repressive laws, and consequently these 
localities were arenas of struggle for a new democratic order. A massive bureaucracy enforced 
the ‘rule of law’. Hence, the legal order was used as a strategic weapon to ensure development 
or underdevelopment, depending on one’s colour. Persons who were not white did not form 
part of the ruling class and therefore there were no political representatives to further or defend 
their interests.3 
 
In a democratic state, however, law could be used to promote development in an equitable and 
sustainable manner if planned and implemented on a solid foundation such as that provided by 
the Constitution, supplemented and complemented by subsequent statutes and regulations. This 
is because: 
Operating through law, the state, warts and all, serves as the organised polity’s primary instrument for the 
conscious social change that development requires … The legal order constitutes the operative form of state 
policy. Government can only implement policy through laws directed at influencing the behaviour of people 
… Government policy has no effective content until expressed as law.4 
 
Yet, law, per se, is not and cannot be the magic wand that eradicates poverty and ensures 
equitable and sustainable socio-economic development. In a country attempting to establish a 
new society after the damage and ravages inflicted during 342 years of colonialism and 
apartheid, much more is needed. One of these mechanisms is democratic political 
representation at the municipal level, made possible from the elections of 5 December 2000.5 
 
In the apartheid era, policy placed emphasis on centralisation of power and division of the 
populace largely on a racial basis. This massive social engineering experiment was doomed to 
failure. In the new dispensation, law is again the principal instrument to establish, monitor, and 
regulate the governmental system and development of the state and its peoples.  
 
Based on the values and ideals of the Constitution to create a democratic and egalitarian society, 
power is allocated to three spheres of government which are to co-operate in giving effect to 
the laws establishing and maintaining a democratic governmental modus operandi.6 However, 
there appears to be insufficient attention to an essential ingredient that will enable this 
                                                 
 3 See Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
 4 Seidman, Ann and Robert B Seidman (1994) State and Law in the Development Process: Problem 
Solving and Institutional Change in the Third World, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1.   
 5 In terms of the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act, 27 of 2000; www.elections.org.za.   
 6 South Africa’s values are set out in section 1 of the Constitution; section 40(1) establishes the three-
sphere governmental system; section 41 lays down the “principles of co-operative government and 
intergovernmental relations”.  
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mechanism to work, namely, the human dimension: the persons who will direct and operate this 
new and complex machinery. This is a major component of participatory democracy and therein 
political and technical representation. 
 
Commentators have argued that in a complex and uncertain environment manifest at local 
government, the state has fallen back on “technocratic managerialism, i.e. performance 
management”.7 They add that the refined developmental local government agenda “rests on two 
tracks,” namely a content-driven one and the other based on institutional reform that 
concentrates on “financial management, intergovernmental co-ordination and performance 
management.” Performance management is “seen as a precondition for the former, but both 
tracks must be pursued in tandem.”8 “Technocratic managerialism” through statutory and 
regulatory instruments are extended and backed up by the Department of Co-operative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA’s) intentions relating to local government, 
apparently being seen as the only troublesome or malfunctioning component in the three-sphere 
governmental system. This is evident by several recent bids being called for various services.9 
This strategy hints of crisis management, a reaction to the increasing number and intensity of 
community protests mostly against poor service delivery.10 As such, it is a short-term and a 
partial approach treating the manifest symptoms of a deep-seated problem. It has been said – 
 …government has a tendency to jump from one quick fix or policy fad to the next, rather than pursuing a 
long-term sustained focus on tacking the major obstacles to improving the performances of the public 
sector.11 
 
While one could agree with this view, it is argued that the National Development Plan (NDP) 
is also somewhat piecemeal as it has little to say on how municipal councillors, communities 
and their leaders could be developed to function efficiently. This is the demand side of the 
interventions that national government must supply, but CoGTA sees managerialism, a part of 
                                                 
 7 Pieterse, Edgar and Mirjam van Donk ‘Developmental Local Government: Squaring the Circle Between 
Policy Intent and Impact’ in Mirjam van Donk, Mark Swilling, Edgar Pieterse et al (Eds) (2008) Consolidating 
Developmental Local Government: The South African Experience, Cape Town: UCT Press, Chapter Three, 51-75, 
71 (“Van Donk et al”).  
 8 Ibid. 
 9 These bids were placed on the CoGTA website between 17/02/2014 and 12/12/2014, www.cogta.gov.za, 
accessed 11/03/2015, and included, inter alia, “Back to Basics”; competency assessments; forensic investigations; 
human resource experts; section 139 interventions; change management intervention in CoGTA; and monitoring 
and reporting system for local government.  
 10 See Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
 11 The Presidency – National Planning Commission (2011) National Development Plan (NDP), Chapter 
13: Building a Capable State, 363-393, 364. 
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formalism, as the way out of the dilemma of poor service delivery by municipalities. The NDP 
states that the 2030 South Africa will include a “sense of togetherness” and a “mobilised, active 
and responsible citizenry.”12 This is an ideal that could remain unfulfilled unless clear short and 
long-term sustainable action plans are designed, implemented, and monitored. 
 
While CoGTA’s “A Programme for Change” aims to “put people and their concerns first”, the 
strategy document is little more than statements of intent on achieving “effective public 
participation and improvement of living conditions by consistently delivering municipal 
services to the right quality and standard.”13 One of the three priorities articulated by the 
CoGTA Minister was performance management, without mention of national and provincial 
government’s obligations to firstly capacitate municipalities.14 The five ‘building blocks’ to the 
“Approach” are good governance, public participation, financial management, infrastructure 
services, and institutional capacity.15 The onus is on municipalities to implement provisions of 
the Systems Act in relation to “public participation”, while CoGTA would do little other than 
monitor compliance therewith. Similarly, under the building block “institutional capacity”, 
CoGTA’s aim of “ensuring that administrative positions are filled with competent and 
committed people whose performance is closely monitored,” especially of persons occupying 
the top six posts is again a statement without unambiguous strategies and time/budget-bound 
measurable objectives and outcomes related thereto.16   
 
The “provincial government programmes of enforcement and support” has the same ‘building 
blocks’ as that of national and local government, with emphasis on monitoring of municipalities 
to ensure compliance.17 While understandably at this early stage the “Back to Basics Approach” 
appears to be little more than oft-articulated statements of intent, the strategy is no more than a 
hurried reaction to service delivery protests. Hence this is, as before, a technocratic-
managerialist approach to ‘development’ with scant attention paid to addressing the real needs 
of people that could be articulated through local public participatory democracy, especially the 
widening and deepening thereof. The six ‘priorities’ in the “putting people first” objective in 
                                                 
 12 NDP, op cit, Chapter 15: Transforming Society and Uniting the Country, 411-430, 414. 
 13 Local Government Back to Basics Approach – ‘Summit Overview’ at the Presidential Local 
Government Summit 2014 – Back to Basics: Serving our communities better! Johannesburg: 18 September 2014, 
Strategy document, 7.  
 14 In terms of section 154(1) of the Constitution. 
 15 Local Government Back to Basics Approach – Strategy document, op cit, 10-12. 
 16 Back to Basics Approach, op cit, 12. 
 17 Back to Basics Approach, op cit, 15-17. 
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the local government sphere are simply short statements reminding municipalities to fulfil their 
responsibilities stipulated in the Systems Act, without mention of resources or support to be 
provided to municipalities by national and provincial government. The five-yearly State of the 
Nation Address (SoNA) with annual restatements highlight the apparently short-term approach 
of the state insofar as local government is concerned. 
 
In his post-election address,18 President Mbeki, in summarising the SoNA presented three 
months previously, said the country committed itself, inter alia, to – 
 “ensure that the public sector discharges its responsibilities to our people…; 
 focus especially on raising skills levels within the public sector, and ensure its 
managerial and technological modernisation…; 
 strengthen our system of local government; 
 further integrate our system of governance, responding effectively to the requirement 
for co-operative governance.” 
In the subsequent SoNA,19 President Mbeki did not report on the achievements since the last 
one, but restated that the country needed to – 
…develop leadership...leadership qualities are needed to improve service delivery in local government, 
adjust to the ever-changing demands of local authority as well as address the inequalities of the past. 
Moreover, local government needs to change from an institutional to a developmental organisation. 
Vehicles to achieve these objectives are not embedded. 
 
In the SoNA of 2008,20 President Mbeki mentioned the state’s 24 Apex Priorities, and said, 
inter alia, that the state would – 
 “…further strengthen the machinery of government to ensure that it has the capacity to 
respond to our development imperatives…; 
 … deliberately focus on matters of skills development…; 
 …continue this year with efforts to improve the machinery of government so that it 
meets the obligations to citizens; 
 …[continue] with the overall effort to improve the organisation and capacity of the 
state.” 
 …continue this year to intensify the efforts to strengthen local government capacity in 
line with the 5-year Local Government Strategic Agenda. To ensure strategic 
                                                 
 18 21 May 2004.  
 19 11 February 2005.  
 20 On 8 February 2008.  
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monitoring in this regard, SALGA [the South African Local Government Association] 
has agreed to provide quarterly reports on the work being done. 
 …assist the first 150 of our municipalities to develop anti-corruption strategies.” 
It would appear that the Mbeki administration was well-aware of the need for governmental 
capacity, especially in the local sphere. On cue, the Minister of Provincial and Local 
Government stated that his ministry would design a new system of local government to 
implement “Vision 2014” and the Apex Priorities announced by the President in his SoNA of 
2008. The SoNA approach implies that local government remains the lowest tier in a hierarchy 
in that it must accept and implement nationally-set priorities and programmes. With such a 
status, the integrated development plans (IDPs) of municipalities are given little consideration 
by national and provincial governments, resulting in no ‘bottom-up’ planning being accepted 
and undertaken jointly by the three spheres of government. This may result in service delivery 
as well as social and economic development by municipalities not being based on the real needs 
on the ground, perhaps resulting in service delivery protests.21 Furthermore, the promises of 
capacitation of local government since the Mbeki era appear not to have been fulfilled. Little is 
known of what became of this new local government system. Further, there does not appear to 
be reports of progress on the numerous priorities, programmes and projects. In this respect, 
Pretorius and Shurink (2007) contend that constant monitoring and evaluation is necessary.22 
They quote Vil-Nkomo who said that – 
‘a need exists to develop new skills in leadership… Technical or functional skills are no longer sufficient. 
Leaders are required to be strategic, to lead beyond boundaries, and importantly to keep sight of the vision 
ahead with their feet firmly on the ground.’ (Vil-Nkomo, 1998, 201).23  
 
CoGTA stated that in order to address the problem of service delivery and finances in 
municipalities, the Presidency in 2010 adopted “Outcome 9” for local government.24 The 
Minister and Members of the (provincial) Executive Councils (MECs) reached consensus on 
trying to achieve agreed results in 7 critical issues to attain the overarching goal or vision of a 
responsive, accountable, effective and efficient local government system by 2014. These were: 
(i) a differentiated approach to municipal financing, planning and support; (ii) ensuring 
improved access to essential services; (iii) initiate ward-based programmes to sustain 
livelihoods in communities; (iv) contribute to the achievement of sustainable human settlements 
                                                 
 21 The SoNA approach is described in Chapter 3, 3.2.2 and criticised in 3.2.3.  
 22 Pretorius, Dalené and Willem Shurink (2007) ‘Enhancing service delivery in local government: The 
case of a district municipality’ 5(3) (2007) SA Journal of Human Resources Management, 19-29, 19.  
 23 Pretorius and Shurink (2007), op cit, 20. 
 24 www.cogta.gov.za, website accessed 24/02/2015.   
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and quality neighbourhoods; (v) strengthen participatory governance; (vi) strengthen the 
financial and administrative capability of municipalities; and (vii) address co-ordination 
problems and strengthen cross-departmental initiatives. 
 
Given that national government annually makes several promises to improve and strengthen 
the governmental system particularly in the local sphere, it is essential to develop an outcomes-
based monitoring, evaluation and impact assessment (MEIA) system to measure achievement 
of objectives. Municipal representatives can play a major role in policing such promises and 
holding government accountable for constitutionally-mandated capacitation and support. Little 
is known of the achievements on undertakings by provinces articulated in their annual state of 
the provinces addresses. 
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that formalism is manifest in the supply side of CoGTA’s statutes, 
regulations, policies, priority programmes, and interventions. The demand side is adequate 
service delivery, as a minimum of basic municipal services, designed and driven by competent 
community representatives (councillors) and an informed citizenry.  
    
Two views on the managerial-regulatory approach are enlightening: Comparing the South 
African developmental strategy to that followed in Porto Alegre in Brazil, and Kerala in India, 
Heller (2001) argues that the Republic’s post-apartheid – 
…planning processes have served largely as instruments for exerting bureaucratic and political control and 
as vehicles for marketization, rather than as institutional spaces for democratic mobilization... [and that] 
the ANC’s technocratic concern with getting the institutions right has all but obviated efforts to build local 
democracy and build local participation.25 
 
Friedman (2008) appears to agree with Heller as he contends that the “key to effective local 
government is not better technique and control but rather ‘a revived respect for democratic 
politics’.”26 An analysis of constituent parts of government would have highlighted weaknesses 
and thus costs to the system, such as, historically and currently, the limited, if any, contribution 
to development by provincial government, particularly support to municipalities. 
  
                                                 
 25 Heller, P (2001) ‘Moving the state: The politics of democratic decentralization in Kerala, South Africa, 
and Porto Alegre,’ in 29 (1) (2001) Politics and Society, 131-163, 144,146. 
 26 Friedman, Steven ‘A quest for control: High modernism and its discontents in Johannesburg, South 
Africa,’ in Ruble, B, R Stren and J Tulchin (Eds) Urban governance around the world, Washington DC: Woodrow 
Wilson International Centre for Scholars, quoted by Harrison, Philip ‘The Origins and Outcomes of South Africa’s 
Integrated Development Plans,’ in Van Donk et al (2008) op cit, Chapter Fourteen, 321-337, 327. 
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As was evident from the Congress for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) deliberations, 
provinces were retained more out of political expediency and compromise, than scientific 
design.27 Lack of commitment to and capacity for implementation of any law makes it equally 
ineffectual. Thus, alongside policies and laws, there is a need for appropriate institutions for 
their development and enforcement, with competent and committed functionaries. While the 
governmental machinery has been constructed in accordance with the constitutional-statutory 
blueprint, the development of its drivers and maintenance crew through education, training, 
mentorship, and other mechanisms has largely been ignored. Hence, this ‘new’ strategy of 
CoGTA is, again, a partial and piecemeal approach.  
 
Meeting the demand side through having qualified councillors, administrators, and community 
leaders, that is, through community and human development, as well as the building and 
maintenance of an enabling and developmental culture, is largely the responsibility of SALGA 
and individual municipalities. However, this is an area where the support of CoGTA and 
provincial government is necessary.             
 
The Minister in the Presidency (2011) said that “at the core” of the NDP is a “focus on 
capabilities; the capabilities of people and of our country and of creating the opportunities for 
both.” Among these capabilities for individuals are education and skills.28 The NDP states: 
“Between now and 2030, we need to move towards a state that is more capable, more 
professional and more responsive to the needs of its citizens.”29 “Capable” is defined as ‘having 
the ability or quality necessary to do something’ and with reference to a person, it means 
‘competent’.30  
 
The formalistic-technocratic-regulatory-managerialism modus operandi has been practised for 
two decades without adequate benefits. However, because there can be no upfront guarantee of 
the success of any governmental system and developmental model, a radical approach may not 
be prudent; rather use what exists and modify it through learning from experience.   
 
                                                 
 27 See the NDP, Chapter 13: Building a Capable State, 363-393, 385. 
 28 Foreword to the NDP by Trevor Manuel, MP, Minister in the Presidency, on behalf of the National 
Planning Commission, 11 November 2011. 
 29 The NDP, page 399.  
 30 South African Concise Oxford Dictionary. 
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It would appear that neither councillors nor SALGA has taken national and provincial 
governments to task for partial or non-fulfilment of promises regularly and consistently made 
with respect to their capacitation and strengthening duties to municipalities, but little of 
substance has been undertaken. It may well be that this is due to lack of commitment or courage 
or intellect to present a strong case. This, then, is a call for capacitation and education of 
councillors and SALGA.  
 
The Seidmans assert that using the problem-solving method, legislators could promulgate 
appropriate laws that would further development, provided institutions are changed or 
established so that they are of a nature that will ensure this goal. It is acknowledged that an 
institution is more than a self-contained organisation – rather it is one because its personnel 
behave in “repetitive patterns”.31 The legal order could directly or indirectly influence patterns 
of social behaviour but it cannot by itself and without the necessary institutional and mind-set 
changes ensure development. Nevertheless, within this framework, it is useful to analyse how 
law can be used to design, promote, protect, and monitor equitable and sustainable socio-
economic development, particularly of the poor, in the local sphere through efficient service 
delivery aided by representation of South Africa’s 257 municipalities in the state’s decision-
making structures. At this stage, it is necessary to analyse the constitutional and statutory 
provisions that collectively and individually provide the foundation, framework, context, 
directives, and guidelines for municipal representation. 
  
4.3 CONSTITUTIONAL-STATUTORY MANDATE AND FRAMEWORK  
 
The legal foundation and framework for, municipal representation is discussed hereunder. 
 
4.3.1 BACKGROUND 
The numerous constitutional and statutory directives that directly and indirectly influence or 
impact on municipal representation cannot be compartmentalised and discussed individually. 
Many provisions are inter-related and cross-cutting, with some introducing or serving to 
contextualise others. For purposes of clarity, they are reviewed under sub-headings. One needs 
to be mindful, though, that such categorisation is somewhat arbitrary, and that some duplication 
and overlaps are unavoidable. 
                                                 
 31 Seidman and Seidman (1994), op cit, 1. 
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The central theme of this study is municipal representation within the framework and context 
of the three-sphere governmental system and therein a major guiding and shaping component, 
co-operative governance. Municipal representation may be divided into four distinct but inter-
related components: 
(a) Councillors and administrators (technocrats) as representatives within their own 
municipalities; 
(b) Councillors and administrators as representatives on external bodies; 
(c) National and provincial representatives of associations for local authorities (ALAs) 
working with municipalities to enhance their efficiency; and 
(d) SALGA as a national institution acting for local government as a collective on external 
decision-making bodies. 
 
It is assumed that ALAs are institutions that can add value to developing and maintaining 
efficient municipal representation. This entails promoting the interests of local government 
generally, but particularly on high-level decision-making institutions. The ideal result would be 
a significant contribution to enhancing the capability of municipalities in fulfilling their own 
core roles and functions in line with prescribed powers. Within this context, co-operative 
governance is acknowledged as a mechanism to facilitate municipal representation as one of 
the means to give effect to government’s decision to use service delivery as the primary tool 
for poverty alleviation and socio-economic development. This developmental strategy places 
municipalities at the forefront as drivers and loci of various policies and programmes in the 
‘human centred’ and ‘people-driven’ approach envisaged in the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP). Unfortunately, this ideal appears to have been abandoned 
over the past two decades,32 as is evident from several SoNA and reaffirmed in the ‘new’ “Back 
to Basics” approach announced by the Minister of CoGTA regarding development of the local 
government sphere.33  
 
Given South Africa’s history, it became imperative that the Constitution lays down the law and 
thus guides the fledgling democracy to address past injustices and to embark rapidly on a path 
to development of the people. The successes and failures manifest from implementation of the 
democratic government’s model could facilitate a learning-from-doing approach based on 
                                                 
 32 See Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
 33 ‘Summit Overview’ at the Presidential Local Government Summit 2014 – Back to Basics: Serving our 
communities better! Johannesburg: 18 September 2014.  
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experiences gained from implementation. This will enable adjustments and amendments from 
time to time to legislation, policies, structures, and processes rather than a major restructuring. 
It is submitted that sufficient time has elapsed to enable decision-makers to acknowledge that 
monitoring and support of local government has been inadequate but also that no clear statute, 
programmes or policy has been formulated thus far to do so. One of these would be the 
development of leadership in municipalities and in their communities. 
 
4.3.2     LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A THREE-SPHERE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 
South Africa is “one, sovereign, democratic state” based, inter alia, on the foundational values 
of human dignity, equality, and human rights,34 as well as on a common citizenship.35 The 
Constitution and the values and principles it espouses are thus the bedrock on which a complete 
change from the colonial-apartheid past is founded. Upon this foundation is to be constructed a 
new government to establish and maintain a new society. Hence, socio-economic development 
through service delivery cannot, as was the case in the past, take place on the basis of skin 
colour and affordability, as ruled in the Walker case.36  Here, in issue was the violation of the 
right to equality, as depicted in section 8 of the interim Constitution.37 This arose from what 
was argued as unfair (or indirect) discrimination on the basis of differentiated tariffs for the 
same service delivered to whites and blacks.38  Although municipalities are not part of the public 
service, they are nevertheless bound by the basic values and principles governing public 
administration.39   
 
All South Africans are “equally entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship,” 
while also “equally subject to the duties and responsibilities” related to such status.40 In 
expanding on the foundational values, the Constitution asserts that “the state must respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.”41 Hence, there is a duty or obligation 
on all spheres of government to give effect to them, subject to limitations,42 as the “Bill of 
Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs 
                                                 
 34 Chapter 1: Founding Provisions, section 1(a) of the Constitution. Note: South Africa is not defined as 
a unitary state but as “one sovereign democratic state.” 
 35 Section 3(2) of the Constitution. 
 36 Pretoria City Council v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC); 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC), paragraph 93; see 
also Walker v Stadsraad van Pretoria 1997 (4) SA 189 (T); 1997 (3) BCLR 416 (T). See Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
 37 Per Langa DP, paragraph 1.  
 38 Paragraphs 5 and 6.  
 39 Sections 195(1)(a)-(i) and 195(2)(a) and (b) of the Constitution.  
 40 Sections 3(2)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. 
 41 Section 7(2) of the Constitution, in Chapter 2: Bill of Rights. 
 42 Section 7(3), referring to the limitation clause in section 36 of the Constitution. 
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of state.”43 The rights relevant particularly to municipalities are equality; human dignity; 
environment; housing; health care and water; a child’s right to care by family or parents, and to 
basic shelter; access to information; and just administrative action.44 Some of these rights may 
be cross-cutting or operate in conjunction with others. For example, the right to basic 
education45 may be infringed if a child is unable to attend school due to inadequate provision 
of a basic level of water and sanitation on the premises. Likewise, an elderly or infirm person’s 
right to water may be infringed where he or she has to purchase it due to non-supply and further 
pay someone to fetch this basic necessity. The right of access to information entitles a resident 
to be informed of what a municipality plans or implements in the community46 and in executing 
such action, protection is provided to residents through the right to just administrative action.47  
 
The package of rights places corresponding duties or obligations on municipalities which in 
fulfilling them are entitled to the support of national and provincial government in strengthening 
local government capacity. The Constitution prescribes that – 
The national government and provincial governments, by legislative and other measures, must support and 
strengthen the capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs, to exercise their powers and to 
perform their functions.48  
 
Use of the modal verb “must” signifies a duty or obligation. Such support and strengthening 
should precede provincial intervention undertaken when municipalities fail to meet a 
constitutional or statutory obligation.49 This issue is dealt with extensively by Mathenjwa 
(2013).50 He adds that “the Constitution values local government in principle equal to the other 
spheres of government.”51 He echoes the view of the Constitutional Court that held, “Local 
government is as important a tier of public administration as any.”52 Failure to satisfactorily 
fulfil this obligation is a contributory factor to local government’s low ability to provide 
services efficiently. Inadequate provincial support also impacts negatively on the competency 
or capability of municipal representatives to function effectively.     
 
                                                 
 43 Section 8(1) of the Constitution. 
 44 Sections 9; 10; 24; 26; 27; 28(1)(b) and (c); 32; and 33, respectively, of the Constitution. 
 45 In terms of section 29(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
 46 Section 32 of the Constitution and the subsequent Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2 of 2000.  
 47 Section 33 of the Constitution and the subsequent Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 3 of 2000.  
 48 In terms of section 154(1) of the Constitution. 
 49 Provincial intervention in local government is authorised by section 139(1) of the Constitution. 
 50 Mathenjwa, MJ (2013) The Supervision of Local Government: Application of the Legal Framework, 
unpublished LLD thesis, Pretoria: Unisa.  
 51 Mathenjwa (2013), op cit, 16.   
 52 Pretoria City Council v Walker, op cit, paragraph 93.  
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One of the principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental relations depicted in 
section 41(1)(h)(ii) of the Constitution is: “All spheres of government and all organs of state 
within each sphere must co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by assisting 
and supporting one another.” This is a mutual obligation of support. According to Steytler and 
De Visser (2014),53 this is different from the section 154(1) provision. They assert that this 
“duty of support flows from the hierarchical position” of national and provincial governments 
vis-à-vis local government and that the duty of national government arises from its power to set 
the “framework and benchmarks within which municipalities must operate.” They add that the 
provincial duty of support arises from the MEC’s power to establish municipalities54 and 
intervention therein.55 The Constitutional Court56 held that – 
…the Province must, as the Constitution envisages,57 “promote the development of local government 
capacity to enable municipalities to perform their functions and manage their own affairs.” 
 
Borgström and Naidoo (2016)58 argue that the “power of support” or “support and strengthen”59 
is for the purpose of promotion of capacity. They add that the monitoring power60 does “not 
represent a substantial power in itself. It is not a power to control local government affairs.”61  
 
That the three-sphere governmental system is not without its challenges as manifested over two 
decades of operationalisation is understandable, because, in De Villiers’s (2012) view – 
Young federations and decentralised unitary systems (“multitiered systems”) must often, soon after the 
enactment of a new constitution, respond to a challenge that they are generally unprepared for – how to 
facilitate, co-ordinate and integrate the activities of the respective levels of government…62 
 
The ‘problem’ of democratisation is compounded by the decentralisation process being 
designed and implemented in the absence of a “historic experience of democratic government” 
                                                 
 53 Steytler, Nico and Jaap de Visser ‘Local Government’ in Woolman, Stuart and Michael Bishop (2014) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa, Second Edition, Cape Town: Juta, Chapter 22, 22 – 133.   
 54 In terms of sections 155(6)(a) and (b) and 155(7) of the Constitution.  
 55 In terms of section 139 of the Constitution.  
 56 In Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape v 
The Habitat Council and Others; Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development 
Planning, Western Cape v City of Cape Town and Others [2014] ZACC 9, at paragraph 27 (“Habitat”).    
 57 In section 155(6)(b) of the Constitution.  
 58 Borgström, David and Uday Kiran Naidoo, ‘Playing with Power: The Competing Competencies of 
Provincial and Local Government’ in (2016) Constitutional Court Review Vol VI, Cape Town: Juta, 57-74, 61.  
 59 In sections 155(6)(a) and 154(1), respectively, of the Constitution.  
 60 Granted to provinces in terms of section 139 of the Constitution.  
 61 These views may arise from the First Certification Judgment, particularly paragraphs 370, 372, 377. 
 62 De Villiers, Bertus (2012) ‘Codification of “Intergovernmental Relations” by Way of Legislation: The 
Experiences of South Africa and Potential Lessons for Young Multitiered Systems’ Zeidschrift für auslädisches ö 
Recht und Völkerecht (ZaöRV) 72 (2012), 671-694, 672.  
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and in a unified, though not unitary quasi-federal system.63 The Constitution does not define 
the nature of the state, particularly as to whether it is unitary or federal.64 Only after 
implementation of the first decade of democracy was it realised that there was “no watertight 
separation between the spheres of government”.65 The position and status of local government 
evolved and from time to time was clarified by the Courts. Regarding the importance of local 
government in the three-sphere system and particularly in respect of development through 
service delivery, the Constitutional Court said: Local government is the closest government can 
get to the people. That is where delivery must be seen to be taking place. The challenge facing 
government at local level is profound.66   
 
Budhu and Wiechers (2003) in interpreting several Court decisions,67 state that the 
“restructuring of local government in a state of continuous metamorphosis”, particularly of 
those serving urban areas will be “extremely difficult and infinitely challenging”.68  
 
Galvin (1999) poses the question whether South Africa will “achieve an effective local 
government system with devolved powers or fall prey to centralising tendencies.” She argues 
that there are three conditions for accountable governance and development in municipalities: 
“effective devolution of powers to local government”, its synergy with civil society, and 
“cohesive local structures”.69 As with the trend in other African countries, centralisation will 
arise due to local government’s lack of capacity and the “desire of the national government to 
control planning and development.”70 Galvin (1999) adds that municipalities will have “neither 
the level of authority and autonomy nor the necessary funding adequately to address 
developmental problems on its own.”71 Thus, they will be reliant on assistance from the other 
two spheres of government, “each of which has its own aims and concerns and may try to exert 
                                                 
 63 De Villiers (2012), op cit, 673, 678.  
 64 Budhu, S and M Wiechers (2003) ‘Current judicial trends pertaining to devolution and assignment of 
powers to local government’ 18 (2003) SAPR/PL, 468-474, 468.   
 65 Rautenbach, IM (2004) Rautenbach-Malherbe Constitutional Law, 6th Edition, Durban: LexisNexis, 
Butterworths, 263.  
 66 Executive Council of the Western Cape v Minister for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional 
Development of the RSA 1999 12 BCLR 1360 (CC) 1377, at paragraph 44.  
 67 In particular, Uitvoerende Raad van die Wes-Kaapse Wetgewer v President van die Republiek van Suid 
Afrika, 1995 9 BCLR (C) 1253.  
 68 Op cit, 471. Emphasis in the original.  
 69 Galvin, Mary (1999) ‘The Impact of Local Government on Rural Development in South Africa’ 40 
(1999) Transformation, 87-111, 87. 
 70 Ibid.  
 71 Galvin (1999), op cit, 88. 
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control through centralisation.” Under such circumstances local government will need the 
support of civil society organisations and a modus operandi to work in partnership.72 Galvin 
(1999) quotes Evans (1996:19) who identified three properties necessary for successful state-
society synergy, namely a high level of social capital, governmental capacity, and a supportive 
political regime.73 Under the circumstances, strong and committed municipal leadership and 
representation are required to claim the resources and support required for municipalities to 
fulfil their constitutional and statutory obligations. 
 
The Constitution lists five parties that have locus standi to approach a court of law seeking 
relief where a right in the Bill of Rights is threatened or infringed. Section 38 reads, “The 
persons who may approach the court are – 
(a) anyone acting in their own interest; 
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; 
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; 
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and 
(e) an association acting in the interests of its members.”     
 
This provides opportunities for any representative to act on behalf of an aggrieved community 
and is also a mechanism to force municipalities to fulfil their obligations and where they fail, 
to approach provincial and national government for redress. Another avenue is the Public 
Protector who may investigate an allegation of maladministration, inter alia,74         
 “13(1)(b) on receipt of a complaint made by  
(i) a complainant acting in the complainant’s own interest;  
(ii) an association acting in the interest of its members;  
(iii) a person acting on behalf of a complainant;  
(iv) a person acting on behalf, and in the interest, of a group or class of persons; or  
(v) an anonymous person.” 
 
A third mechanism is use of the Human Rights Commission. Its governing statute defines a 
“complainant” as a “person, group or class of persons, organisation and/or association as 
defined in article 2 of these procedures and whose fundamental rights, it is alleged, have been 
violated or threatened.”75 Section 2 reads: “The following persons who allege an infringement 
or a threat of a fundamental right may lodge complaints with the Commission – 
2.1   anyone acting in their own interest;   
2.2   anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name;   
2.3   anyone acting as a member of, or in the interests of a group or class of persons;   
                                                 
 72 Ibid.  
 73 Galvin (1999), op cit, 103.  
 74 Section 13(1) of the Public Protector Act, 15 of 2016. 
 75 Section 1.7 of the South African Human Rights Commission Act, 40 of 2013. 
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2.4   anyone acting in the public interest; and   
2.5   an association acting in the interest of its members.”   
 
Another organisation established in terms of Chapter 9 of the Constitution: “State institutions 
supporting constitutional democracy” that can be approached to enforce one’s right, where 
appropriate, is the Commission for Gender Equality.76 
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Constitution and several subsequent statutes made 
adequate provisions for the enforcement of human rights by residents and their municipal 
representatives. Unlike in the past where it was the local agent of the state and subordinate to it 
and provincial government,77 local government is now constitutionally established with 
entrenched powers.78 Steytler and De Visser (2007) state that – 
Local government in South Africa is an integral part of the constitutional system of decentralised 
government ushered in by the democratic elections of 27 April 1994.79 
 
Although de facto it may be regarded as ‘inferior’ to the other two spheres, it is clear that the 
Constitution and the Constitutional Court see local government as an integral part of 
government.80 This somewhat unprecedented and elevated status in itself creates many 
opportunities for local government acting through SALGA to present its case and demand 
representation on decision-making bodies. To do so effectively, councillors and technocrats 
should be qualified and competent.  
 
4.3.3 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AS A PARTY IN CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE 
The status of local government within a multi-sphere governmental enterprise can be 
meaningfully ascertained only alongside that of the other two spheres. This requires a review 
and understanding of the constitutional concept and practise of co-operative governance. In 
                                                 
 76 Established under section 187 of the Constitution. 
 77 See Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
 78 Sections 40(1) and 151; Schedule 4: Part B and Schedule 5: Part B of the Constitution. 
 79 Steytler, Nico and Jaap de Visser (2007) Local Government Law of South Africa, Durban: LexisNexis- 
Butterworths, Chapter 1, 1-3. 
 80 See, inter alia, the following Constitutional Court decisions: Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v 
Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others (CCT 7/980 [1998] ZACC 17, 1999 (1) SA 
374, 1998 (12) BCLR 1458, paragraphs 38, 39, 41, 46, 55, 127 and 138 (“Fedsure”); Executive Council of the 
Province of the Western Cape v Minister for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development of the RSA 1999 
12 BCLR 1360 (CC) 1377, paragraph 44; Premier, Western Cape v President of the Republic of South Africa 1999 
(3) SA 657 (CC), 1999 (4) BCLR 382 at paragraphs 54, 55, 83; Cape Metropolitan Council v Minister of Provincial 
Affairs and Constitutional Development 1999 (11) BCLR 1229 (T) at paragraph 29; Uthukela District Municipality 
v President of the Republic of South Africa 2003 (1) SA 687 (CC) at paragraph 18.  
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devoting an entire chapter of the Constitution to this subject,81 and in making detailed 
provisions for it, South Africa may have gone beyond any other country in this field.82  
 
Section 40 of the Constitution reads: 
(1) In the Republic, government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government which 
are distinctive, interrelated and interrelated. 
(2) All spheres of government must observe and adhere to the principles in this Chapter and must conduct 
their activities within the parameters that the Chapter provides. 
 
While not written ex abundanti cautela, the Constitution nevertheless shows that co-operative 
governance is peremptory by its use throughout of the modal verb ‘must’, signifying an 
obligation and an insistence. These provisions are underpinned by the “principles of co-
operative government and intergovernmental relations.”83 The Constitution further provides 
that “An Act of Parliament must – 
(a) establish or provide for structures and institutions to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations; 
and 
(b) provide for appropriate mechanisms and procedures to facilitate settlement of intergovernmental 
disputes.”84   
 
Belatedly, the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act85 was enacted to give effect to the 
above provisions. Intergovernmental relations (IGR) is prescribed in and facilitated by Chapter 
3 of the Constitution requiring all spheres of government to undertake such modus operandi. 
This study posits the hypothesis that local government efficiency may result in effective 
representation of municipalities by their councillors. A condition sine qua non for this cordial 
and mutually-beneficial intergovernmental relations based on the foundation and within the 
framework of co-operative governance. This is a major part of this thesis and discussed in 
greater detail below.86       
 
Organs of state are obliged to “make every reasonable effort to settle the dispute by means of 
mechanisms and procedures provided for that purpose, and must exhaust all other remedies 
                                                 
 81 Chapter 3. 
 82 Pimstone, Gideon ‘Local Government: Constitutional Foundations’ in Khoza, Meshack and Yvonne 
Muthien (1998), Regionalism in the New South Africa, Ashgate: Aldershot, Chapter 9: 131-170, 139-140. 
 83 Section 41(1)(a)-(h) of the Constitution. 
 84 Section 41(2)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. 
 85 13 of 2005 (IRFA). 
 86 See 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 and Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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before it approaches a court to resolve the dispute.”87 If these prescripts are not followed, the 
court may ‘refer the dispute back to the organs of state involved.”88 
 
Thus, Chapter 3 is not aspirational, and, to use a cliché, not a ‘motherhood and apple pie’ type 
of provision or desideratum. It is one that recognises the “complexity of modern government, 
the existence of concurrent powers among spheres of government and intergovernmental 
competition in general.”89  
 
The language used in the Constitution is suggestive of a hybrid model – the division and 
allocation of powers and functions to three spheres of government, tempered with the provision 
that they cannot exercise them wholly autonomously.  Chapter 3 enhances and protects the 
status of municipalities. This model, as opposed to the hierarchical one in the colonial-apartheid 
era where municipalities were little more than local agents of central government, theoretically 
creates opportunities for local government to engage with top policy formulators and decision-
makers. The Constitution explicitly devolves powers in a mode unique thus far to 
decentralisation practices. It does this on the basis of three fundamental elements encapsulated 
in the terms “distinctive”, interdependent”, and “interrelated”.90  
 
In relations between the provinces and local government, such terminology has the following 
meanings:91 
i. Distinctive: refers to autonomy in the sense that each sphere is a final decision-maker 
in a particular matter falling within its own area of competence, that is, one sphere’s 
decision is not subject to the discretion of another’s; 
ii. Interdependent: means that in the exercise of its autonomy a municipality may be 
supervised by the other two spheres, which can make final decisions binding on the 
local and state organs therein; and 
iii. Interrelated: signifies that each sphere exercises its autonomy not for its own ends, but 
for the good of the nation, by co-operating with each other. 
 
                                                 
 87 Section 41(3) of the Constitution.   
 88 Section 41(4) of the Constitution.  
 89 Pimstone (1998), op cit, 140.  
 90 Section 40(1) of the Constitution. 
 91 Department of Provincial and Local Government (2002) A Guideline Document for Provincial-Local 
Intergovernmental Relations, 9-10. 
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Bekink (2006)92 adds that within the entrenched three specific spheres of government – 
The word “distinctive” protects and confirms each sphere’s independence or autonomy and it influences 
the manner in which each sphere is to operate and fulfil its powers and functions. The words 
“interdependent” and “interrelated” in turn refer to the constitutional commitment to an overall system of 
co-operative government in the Republic. 
 
The terms used indicate that the Constitution envisaged that all three spheres would work in a 
co-operative rather than as individual spheres to attain the obligations stipulated. Bekink asserts 
that the term “sphere” connotes a specific area of jurisdiction or territory, “emphasising a new 
relationship between the different branches of government”,93 different from the previous 
hierarchical levels.  The wording of section 40(1) of the Constitution envisaged that each sphere 
would have its own constitutionally-determined and entrenched powers and functions. Bekink 
(2006) argues that use of the term “sphere” rather than ‘level’ has positive implications and 
connotations for autonomy. He adds that there can be no autonomy if a government institution 
does not have a say or is not “permitted participation in the governmental processes that have 
a direct or indirect influence on its own powers and functions.”94 Bekink (2006) further asserts 
that the word “sphere” enhances the autonomy of each while strengthening and advancing 
“intergovernmental participation and support”.95  In this sense, South African local government 
is somewhat unique. 
 
While the Constitution makes provision for co-operative governance in substantive terms, up 
to now such ideals do not appear to have been met in practice. This is to some extent because 
of the absence of sound and structured relationships between provinces and municipalities 
therein, and the co-ordination thereof. The result is non-alignment of policies and strategies, 
duplication of services, and absence of early warning systems to avert crises in municipalities.96  
This challenge to a certain extent can be remedied by effective municipal representation and 
the establishment and maintenance of sound relationships with the provincial leadership and 
administration.  
 
                                                 
 92 Bekink, Bernard (2006) Principles of South African Local Government Law, Durban: LexisNexis- 
Butterworths, 63.  
  93 Op cit, 64. 
 94 Ibid.  
 95 Ibid. 
 96 Department of Provincial and Local Government (2002) Discussion Document: Towards a National 
Policy on Intergovernmental Relations, 6. 
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The Minister of CoGTA, in presenting his Back to Basics approach,97 mentioned that a third of 
municipalities were functioning adequately, a third was “just managing” and a third was 
“frankly dysfunctional”. This shows that while all municipalities are governed by the same laws 
and regulations, that is, a uniform system, they perform differently. In this context, De Visser 
and Steytler (2016) argue that “Local government cannot be seen as a uniform institution, 
operating in the same manner, facing the same challenges.”98 The unsatisfactory performance 
of local government has many causes, but the question of viability of many municipalities, the 
(wrong) approach by national government to these challenges has been two-fold: 
First, a persistent drive to continuously tighten the legislative framework for municipalities, and second, a 
series of support programmes. The first strategy is based on the vain belief that systemic problems can be 
legislated out of existence, whereas, in fact, the more regulation was poured over local government, the 
greater the lawlessness that ensued.99 
 
In a state divided into nine provinces with each having both legislative and executive authority 
and thus exhibiting many federal characteristics and behaviours arising from its history, the 
drafters of the Constitution perhaps found it necessary to provide specifically for co-operative 
governance as a means to minimise intergovernmental competition.  
 
According to Bekink (2006), the values espoused in the Constitution100 are based on the will of 
the general population. Thus, they are not merely lofty ideals to be ignored – they have profound 
implications for government, especially municipalities, to give effect thereto in a practical 
manner. South Africa follows the value-orientated approach to constitutional law, meaning that 
government is bound by the underlying values incorporated in the Constitution. These values, 
in turn, create aspirations and expectations, justifying governmental action since they 
legitimately call for both substantive rights and procedures for their fulfilment.101  
 
The constitutional values can guide co-operative governance. Hence, local government has to 
establish appropriate mechanisms to deliver on these promises. This is easier said than done, 
given the resource and capacity constraints suffered particularly by this sphere. In attempting 
to fulfil the values, municipalities must in their workings be democratic, responsive, 
                                                 
 97 Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs (2014) Back to Basics: Serving our 
Communities Better! www.cogta.gov.za/summit2014, accessed 6/11/2016.  
 98 De Visser, Jaap and Nico Steytler, ‘Confronting the State of Local Government: The 2013 
Constitutional Court Decisions, (2016) Constitutional Court Review Vol VI, Cape Town: Juta, 1-23, 1.    
 99 De Visser and Steytler (2016), op cit, 4.   
 100 In the Preamble and in sections 1(a) and 195(1) of the Constitution. 
 101 Bekink (2006), op cit, 4. 
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transparent, and sensitive to the needs of their various constituencies. The policies, strategies, 
legislation, communications structures, networks, and processes for participatory democracy 
are particularly onerous, since society was itself divided on racial, class, ethnic, religious, 
cultural, linguistic, and other bases, that government was autocratic and communicated 
minimally, and the nature of politicians and bureaucrats was such as to leave people out of 
important discussions affecting them. Not giving effect to the values and principles stipulated 
in the Constitution renders the acts and omissions of government unconstitutional. This calls 
for a culture of ubuntu and commitment to equitable socio-economic development designed, 
implemented, and monitored by competent councillors, administrators, and community leaders.   
 
That local government is now a constitutionally-established part of the governmental system is 
in itself a major boost to its status, powers, and functions. This situation creates the space for 
municipalities and their representative national and provincial organs to become a major player 
in the state’s policy and decision-making structures and processes. Municipalities should be 
capacitated through development of leaders and technocrats of the highest calibre to undertake 
this role efficiently in the interests of the country and especially of its poor. 
 
 The Systems Act addresses co-operative governance and therein section 3(3) applies to SALGA 
as it states: “For the purpose of effective co-operative government, organised local government 
must seek to – 
(a) develop common approaches for local government as a distinct sphere  of 
 government; 
(b) enhance co-operation, mutual assistance and sharing of resources among 
 municipalities; 
(c) find solutions to problems relating to local government generally; and 
(d) facilitate compliance with the principles of co-operative government and 
intergovernmental relations.” 
 
The National Environmental Management Act102 explicitly provides for “co-operative 
environmental governance”103 through the establishment, inter alia, of the National 
Environmental Advisory Forum; the Committee for Environmental Co-ordination; setting out 
the Procedures for Co-operative Governance; and provision for Environmental Management 
                                                 
 102 107 of 1998 (NEMA).  
 103 In the Preamble.  
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Co-operation Agreements.104 It remains to be seen whether the ideals espoused by this Act will 
work in practice. However, these mechanisms create opportunities for municipal 
representatives to be involved in policy-making in compliance with expectations of local 
government envisaged in sections 24(a) and (b) of the Constitution. It has been said that the 
extended developmental tasks of municipalities “must be executed in tandem with concomitant 
environmental duties.”105 The Constitutional Court pronounced on this matter thus:  
The Constitution recognises the interrelationship between the environment and development… [and] the 
need for the protection of the environment …[alongside] social and economic development…It envisages 
that environmental considerations will be balanced with socio-economic consideration through the ideal of 
sustainable development.106 
In its Preamble, the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act107 seeks to “promote co-operation 
between the national, provincial and local spheres of government on fiscal, budgetary and 
financial matters.” Two persons “nominated by organised local government” may sit on the 
Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC).108 The Act created the Local Government Budget 
Forum for consultation by organised local government with the Minister of Finance and the 
MECs for finance, on the allocation of revenue raised nationally.109 It is unclear what SALGA’s 
contributions and achievements have been on this body and whether representation is adequate. 
Although the Municipal Finance Management Act110 devotes an entire chapter111 to ‘co-
operative government’, the subject matter is dealt with cursorily, as the core content is finance. 
However, the Act does stipulate that national and provincial governments must assist in building 
municipal capacity;112 provides for national and provincial allocations to local government;113 
and sets out the requirements for promotion of co-operative government by municipalities.114 
                                                 
 104 Sections 3, 7, 11(4), 16(1), 17, 23(2)(d), 23(3), 24(7)(d) and (g), 28(4), 30(1)(c)(i), 31(1)(b), 
31(5)(a)(ii), 35(2)(a)(i), 42(1)(b), and 46(1)-(4).  
 105 Du Plessis, Anel (Ed) (2015) Environmental Law and Local Government in South Africa, Cape Town: 
Juta, 6. 
 106 Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General: Environmental Management, 
Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC) at 
paragraph 45. 
 107 97 of 1997. 
 108 In terms of section 221(1)(c), as provided for in section 163(b)(iii) of the Constitution. 
 109 Steytler, Nico and Jaap de Visser (2007), op cit, Chapter 22, 22-131. 
 110 Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act, 56 of 2003 (MFMA). 
 111 Chapter 5. 
 112 Section 34(1) of the MFMA. 
 113 In terms of sections 214(1)(a) and (c) of the Constitution, given effect to by sections 34, 36 and 37 of 
the MFMA. 
 114 Section 37(1)(a) of the MFMA. 
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Whilst some provisions are merely exhortative, others are peremptory and hence innovative. 
As such, they may help to improve the financial position of municipalities, but there appears to 
be no provisions for their enforcement by those in need of assistance from the National 
Treasury.115  
 
A puzzling qualifier negates some of the positive provisions of the Act in that inaction or non-
compliance by national and provincial governments “does not affect the responsibility of a 
municipality” to comply.116 This provision appears to condone failure of the two other spheres 
of government to capacitate and support municipalities.117 It also seems to contradict section 
154(1) of the Constitution which obliges national and provincial governments to “support and 
strengthen the capacity of municipalities”, and also section 34(1) of the MFMA. If there was no 
genuine desire to do so, no ‘motherhood and apple pie’ type of provision should be incorporated 
in legislation. 
 
Sections 34-44 of the MFMA deal with co-operative government. Sections 34-37 restates and 
reinforces the constitutional directives for support of local government by national and 
provincial governments by providing for, respectively, capacity building, promotion of co-
operative government by national and provincial institutions, allocations to municipalities, and 
promotion of co-operative government by municipalities. However, Steytler and De Visser 
(2014)118 assert that “the chapter incorrectly contains provisions” relating to stopping of funds 
to municipalities, stopping of equitable share allocations to municipalities, and stopping of 
equitable share allocations to municipalities. 
 
                                                 
 115 Section 34(4) of the MFMA. 
 116 Ibid. 
 117 In terms of section 34(1) of the MFMA. 
 118 Steytler and De Visser (2014), op cit, Chapter 22, 22 – 131. 
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The Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act119 repealed the Development Facilitation 
Act.120 It regulates municipal and provincial planning.121 SPLUMA’s objectives are, inter alia, 
to “ensure that the system of spatial planning and land use management promotes social and 
economic inclusion”, co-operative government and sound intergovernmental relations.122 In 
addressing the delineation of municipal powers in land use planning, De Visser and Steytler 
(2016)123 argue that in this field, both the Structures Act and the Systems Act – 
…do little more than restate the Constitution. They do not provide for any alternative for the intricate and 
critically important scheme set forth by LUPO124 and there is no neatly identifiable that can be removed to 
address the unconstitutionality. 
 
They attempt to answer the question by reviewing four Constitutional Court cases. 
 
In the stand-off between the Gauteng Development Tribunal and the City of Johannesburg,125 
the City argued that the powers for establishment of townships and subdivision of land within 
its jurisdiction fell within its “constitutional competency for ‘municipal planning’ and that 
provinces could not usurp those powers.” The Court agreed and struck down the provisions of 
the Development Facilitation Act126 that empowered provincial tribunal to do such work.127   
 
In Maccsand128 the issue was whether a company that had obtained a mining licence over the 
land in question from the Minister of Minerals and Energy obviated the need for to acquire the 
City’s approval for land use planning. The assumption was that such licence trumps municipal 
authority. The Court dismissed this argument on the basis that the LUPO (15 of 1985) “regulates 
the use of land and not mining.”129   
 
                                                 
 119 16 of 2013 (SPLUMA). 
 120 67 of 1995 (DFA). 
 121 In sections 2(1)(a) and (b), respectively. 
 122 Sections 3(b) and (e), respectively. 
 123 De Visser, Jaap and Nico Steytler (2016), op cit, 6. 
 124 Western Cape Land Use Planning Ordinance, 15 of 1985.  
 125 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal and Others [2010] 
ZACC 11, 2010 (6) SA 182 (CC), 2010 (9) BCLR 859 (CC) (“Gauteng Development Tribunal”). 
 126 67 of 1995. 
  127 De Visser, Jaap and Nico Steytler (2016), op cit, 5. 
 128 Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others [2012] ZACC 7, 2012 (4) SA 181 (CC), 2012 (7) 
BCLR 690 (CC) (“Maccsand”). 
 129 De Visser, Jaap and Nico Steytler (2016), op cit, 5; Maccsand, op cit, at paragraph 47. 
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In Lagoonbay130, the impact of the proposed development would stretch beyond the boundaries 
of the George Municipality. The Court ruled that a validly enacted provincial law, in this case 
the LUPO, 15 of 1985, was “valid until set aside by the Constitutional Court.” Furthermore 
“Decisions taken in terms of those laws are valid, no matter how incompatible they may be with 
the Constitution.”131 This judgment placed emphasis on the rule of law.  
 
It was argued that the MEC acted ultra vires by usurping a municipal planning function. He 
acted on the basis that the development would have effects beyond the one municipality, and 
this “triggered the province’s power to control provincial and regional planning. Reliance may 
have been placed on the interpretation by Jafta J in the Gauteng Development Tribunal case 
that the “functional areas allocated to the various spheres of government are not contained in 
hermetically sealed compartments.”132 A contrary view, based on the recent judgments: is 
expressed thus:133 
The Constitutional Court’s approach implies that certain types of planning decisions are, by their very 
nature, always municipal – regardless of the impact of the actual activity in a case. There is no room for 
overlap. The functional areas are thus more hermetically sealed than it had previously suggested. This 
approach has the benefit of certainty and an element of predictability. 
 
In the Habitat case,134 the Court held that the “provincial appellate capability impermissibly 
usurps the power of local authorities to manage ‘municipal planning’ intrudes on the 
autonomous sphere of authority the Constitution accords to municipalities, and fails to 
recognise the distinctiveness of the municipal sphere.”135 The appeal provision was section 44 
of the Western Cape LUPO.136 
 
The above review of the powers and status of local government based on the municipal planning 
function gives some idea of the practical application of the constitutional provisions on powers 
and functions in the three-sphere governmental system. It also indicates that local government, 
objectively viewed, may not be the lowest institution in a hierarchy.  
                                                 
 130 Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning of the Western Cape 
v Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] ZACC 39, 2014 (1) SA 521 (CC), 2014 (2) BCLR 182 
(CC) (“Lagoonbay”), paragraphs 45-47.  
 131 De Visser, Jaap and Nico Steytler (2016), op cit, 7.  
 132 Gauteng Development Tribunal, op cit, paragraph 55; Borgström and Naidoo (2016), op cit, 67.  
 133 Borgström and Naidoo (2016), op cit, 72.  
 134 Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape v 
The Habitat Council and Others; Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development 
Planning, Western Cape v City of Cape Town and Others [2014] ZACC 9, 2014 (4) SA 437 (CC), 2014 (5) BCLR 
591 (CC) (“Habitat”).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 135 Habitat, op cit, paragraph 13.  
 136 15 of 1985. 
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4.3.4 LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 
(a)  Background 
Based on experiences with multitiered systems in Kenya, Iraq, Ethiopia and South Africa, De 
Villiers (2012) argues that – 
…often so much energy goes into the drafting of new constitutional arrangements, that insufficient attention 
is given as to how, in practice, the respective levels of government would cooperate, coordinate and 
integrate in the discharge of their functions immediately after the constitution takes effect.137  
 
He adds that most of the intergovernmental forums and meeting points in older federations are 
informal, spontaneous, and ad hoc, with no explicit mention of intergovernmental relations in 
their constitutions. These activities are based on pragmatism rather than on some philosophy or 
master plan, and a result of need rather than design. On the other hand, young multitiered 
systems do not have the luxury of time. In this sense, “Chapter 3 is unique amongst modern 
constitutions.138 This view may have been based on that of Watts (1997) who observed that 
“while some federal or unitary constitutions include some provisions establishing 
intergovernmental structures, the South African Constitution is virtually unique in setting forth 
in Chapter 3 a specific set of Directive Principles for intergovernmental co-operation.”139  
 
De Villiers (2012) adds that the philosophy, duty and practice of co-operation between the 
German federal government and its Länder in the “unwritten rule of the duty of Bundestreue 
was accepted by the African National Congress (ANC) as “underlying the spirit of 
intergovernmental relations in the Constitution as a binding code of conduct.”140 The then 
proposed White Paper on intergovernmental relations141 was intended to formalise the ad hoc, 
un-coordinated and often inefficient manner in which co-operative governance had to at that 
time been conducted. That this promised document was enacted only ten years later seems to 
indicate the difficulty of neatly compartmentalising activities or prescribing how they are to be 
conducted and managed, especially where it is human, interpersonal relationships constitute the 
subject matter.  
 
                                                 
 137 De Villiers (2012), op cit, 672-673.  
 138 De Villiers (2012), op cit, 674, 679.  
 139 Watts, RL (1997) Intergovernmental Relations, report commissioned by the Department of 
Constitutional Development and Provincial Affairs, 7.  
 140 De Villiers (2012), op cit, 680. 
 141 Announced by the Minister of Constitutional Affairs in July 1995 (and published as the 
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Bill in 2004), reported by Atkinson, Doreen ‘Local government in 
intergovernmental relations: Towards co-operative governance?’ in Electoral Institute of South Africa (1998) 
From a tier to a sphere – local government in the South African constitutional order, Sandton: Heinemann, 16-
31, 29. 
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The wisdom of regulating them at a time when there are insufficient clear practices emerging 
is questioned. This is because in many critical areas further empirical work is required. Among 
them is “the capacity of local government associations, the diversity of provincial approaches 
to local government”, and clarity on the role of local government in interdepartmental co-
ordination in provinces and at the national level.142 
 
De Villiers (2012) contends that –  
By 2005 there was general consensus that South Africa needed more certainty and consistency in 
intergovernmental relations as far as structures, processes, representation, objectives, decision-making, 
accountability and reporting were concerned…143 
 
In compliance with sections 41(2)(a) and (b) of the Constitution, the Intergovernmental 
Relations Framework Act144 was enacted to give effect to its co-operative governance 
provisions. De Villiers (2012) argues that a second reason was that Parliament expected a 
statute would enhance certainty and predictability of intergovernmental relations albeit 
“without limiting spontaneous developments when and if the need arises”, that is, allowing for 
balance through allowing a measure of informality in such relations.145 He adds that what makes 
the South African experience unique is the codification of intergovernmental “structures as a 
result of a constitutional imperative.”146 De Villiers (2012) cautions that intergovernmental 
relations are a “work in progress” and that the practical functioning of these institutions – 
…depends on many factors such as political commitment, training, seniority of persons attending meetings, 
and follow-up decisions. The IGR Act is only a legal framework and it does not, by itself, make things 
happen. Ultimately it depends on human interaction to make intergovernmental relations perform 
optimally.147  
 
(b) The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act   
This section briefly reviews and then analyses the IRFA and the structures and processes 
mandated by it relating to or potentially affecting municipal representation, to identify 
opportunities and spaces therefor. Its ultimate appearance as a framework rather than a 
conventional rigid, formal and prescriptive enactment, perhaps underlines the difficulty of 
prescribing what to a large extent relates to human behaviour and interactions. 
                                                 
 142 De Villiers (2012), op cit, 683. 
 143 De Villiers (2012), op cit, 684.  
 144 13 of 2005 (IRFA). 
 145 De Villiers (2012), op cit, 684. 
 146 De Villiers (2012), op cit, 687. 
 147 De Villiers (2012), op cit, 688.  
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(i) Definitions 
‘Consultation’ is defined as “a process whereby the views of another on a specific matter are 
solicited, either orally or in writing, and considered”. Steytler and De Visser (2014) contend 
that this is a “common law understanding of the concept”.148 They refer to the Cape High 
Court’s acceptance of the definition: “The essence of consultation is the communication of a 
genuine invitation, extended with a receptive mind, to give advice.”149 From the dicta of High 
Court decisions150 Steytler and De Visser (2014)151 assert that ‘consultation’ has three basic 
elements: 
(1) an invitation to hear the views of a particular party (or public in general on a specified matter; 
(2) an adequate opportunity to submit considered views; and 
(3) the party inviting views must consider the views in good faith. 
 
Municipal representatives and SALGA ought to be mindful of the above definition. 
 
A ‘forum’ is not defined by the IRFA, while an “intergovernmental forum” is, in terms of seven 
types listed in the Act.152 A forum is defined as ‘a place of or meeting for public discussion’.153 
Hence, it has no legal status in the conventional sense, nor does it have executive authority. If 
it did, then it would conflict with the powers held by organs of state. Since “any Cabinet member 
may establish a national intergovernmental forum” and given that any Ministers and Members 
of Executive Councils (MinMEC) forums existing or to be established qualify,154 there could 
eventually be several forums, enhancing the risk of duplication, overlaps, wastage, and conflict. 
Meaningful representation on too many forums would put a strain on resources and on 
participants. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 148 Op cit, 22 – 134. 
 149 Steytler and De Visser (2014) op cit, 22-135, quoting Maqoma v Sebe NO and Another 1987 (1) SA 
483, 491E (Ck).  
 150 Robertson and Another v City of Cape Town; Truman-Baker Hayes and Another v City of Cape Town 
2004 (9) BCLR 950 (C) (“Robertson HC”) at paragraph 108. 
 151 Op cit, 22-134.  
 152 These are: National – President’s Co-ordinating Council (section 6 of the Act); National 
intergovernmental forums (section 9); Provincial – Premier’s intergovernmental forum (section 16); other 
provincial intergovernmental forums (section 21); Local – district intergovernmental forum (section 24); inter-
municipality forums (section 28); and intergovernmental technical support structures (section 30). 
 153 The Oxford English Reference Dictionary. 
 154 Sections 9(1) and (2) of the Act. 
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“Organised local government” is limited to mean:  
(a) the ‘national organisation recognised by the Minister in terms of the Organised Local 
Government Act, 52 of 1997; or 
(b) in relation to a provincial intergovernmental forum, a provincial organisation recognised 
by the Minister in terms of that Act for the relevant province.  
 
This implies that other organisations such as the South African Cities Network (SACN), not 
formally recognised, are excluded, unless invited to a forum or a structure by the chairperson 
thereof, to participate, in addition to SALGA, as a local government representative. 
 
“Organ of state” is defined in section 239 of the Constitution (quote) as – 
(a) any department of state or administration in the national, provincial or local sphere of government; or 
(b) any other functionary or institution – 
(i) exercising a power or performing a function in terms of the Constitution or a provincial 
constitution; or 
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation, but 
does not include a court or a judicial officer. 
  
The Act, however, excludes Parliament and provincial legislatures, the Judiciary, institutions 
established under section 34 and Chapter 9 of the Constitution, and other constitutionally-
independent structures. This is regrettable as such bodies can certainly do much to promote co-
operative governance. This narrow definition restricts opportunities for municipal 
representation. 
 
The definition of “statutory power” is limited but also somewhat vague and ambiguous when 
it is defined in the Act as “a power conferred by – 
(a) the Constitution or legislation; or  
(b) an agreement or other instrument emanating from the Constitution or legislation.”  
 
There may be no limit to the number and nature of such ‘agreements’. It is unclear whether an 
assignment to a municipality by a Minister or MEC qualifies. As SALGA and the provincial 
local government associations (PLGAs) are recognised by statute, it is not certain whether an 
agreement they have concluded may be included in the definition which should be specific and 
restricted to those between organs of state in the three spheres of government, in terms of any 
specified constitutional provision.155 Since municipal by-laws are legislation of their councils, 
as the highest decision making bodies of such institutions, the number of statutory powers can 
                                                 
 155 Such as, for example, section 156(4) of the Constitution. 
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be enormous, resulting in heightened confusion and potential for conflict as well as duplication, 
fragmentation, overlaps, and wastage. The lack of clarity also serves to marginalise local 
government and its representatives. However, this undesirable situation could prompt 
municipal representatives to make proposals in the interest of local government. 
 
(ii) Provisions that may impact on municipal representation 
The definition of “organ of state” is repeated and reinforced by the exclusion of certain 
institutions therein mentioned from application of the Act.156 Only an organ of state may 
participate in an intergovernmental structure, subject to the qualification that it is specifically 
referred to in Chapter 2 of the Act or has been invited by the chairperson of the particular forum 
to take part.157 While SALGA is not an organ of state as defined in section 239(a), it is in terms 
of section 239(b) of the Constitution. Notwithstanding this constitutional status, it can 
participate only by invitation or by it being a member of a particular IGR structure. This is a 
limitation or qualification on participation and representation on policy-formulation bodies and 
bodes ill for local government. 
 
(iii) Object of the Act 
The “Object of the Act”158 is somewhat limited as it relates in some cases only to: 
i. the provision of a framework [only] for all spheres of government and all organs therein 
to facilitate co-ordination [only] in the implementation [only] of policy and legislation, 
thereby omitting certain other essential functions, such as inter-sphere planning, 
budgeting, consolidated inter-municipal services, and so on, that can aid co-operative 
governance and municipal representation therein; and 
ii. monitoring and implementation [only, not the formulation and planning] of policy and 
legislation, is again a limitation on local government participation and representation. 
 
(iv) Intergovernmental structures 
Chapter 2 establishes several consultative forums whose composition and roles are stipulated 
as are in some instances their meetings, reports and referrals.159 A concern is whether 
                                                 
 156 Section 2(2) (a)-(g) of the Act. 
 157 Section 2(3)(b) of the Act. 
 158 Section 4. 
 159 Sections 6-34 of the Act. 
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cognisance has been taken of research that highlighted several weaknesses associated with 
decentralisation generally and with co-operative governance in particular.160 Since many of the 
institutions already created may be either dysfunctional or moribund, the need to establish more 
is questioned. Further, there are no assurances that new structures will fare any better, especially 
in the context of limited time, financial, and intellectual resources. Also, the commitment and 
culture of working co-operatively appears to be non-existent. Form follows function: The 
creation of new structures and the elaborate processes they have to implement and manage have 
the potential to sow further confusion and conflict, and the time for them to settle in often is so 
long that they could be inimical to rapid and sustainable socio-economic development. 
Legislating on and statutorily creating institutions are no guarantees of their success, but the 
Act is not as prescriptive as conventional statutes and it does create a framework to guide co-
operative governance. As such, it ought to be implemented and lessons documented, so as to 
facilitate learning from doing. However, it provides limited opportunities for municipal 
representation; alternatively, it minimises such space.  
 
While the provisions that a “municipal councillor designated” by SALGA for representation on 
the Premier’s Co-ordinating Committee (PCC) and the Premier’s intergovernmental forum is 
welcome,161 such participation in a national intergovernmental forum is limited to the functional 
area for which that particular structure is established. This effectively side-lines local 
government. A further qualification is that the provision applies only if it is covered by powers 
and functions applying to local government or if national legislation specifically provides for 
municipal membership. Hence, municipal representatives are relegated to the periphery even 
though almost every national policy and programme affects their councils directly or indirectly.  
 
A Premier’s intergovernmental forum162 is a most useful structure where mayors of district and 
metropolitan councils are members. Given that local municipalities cannot be accommodated 
because of their large number, it is expected, or assumed, that the provincial affiliate of SALGA 
                                                 
 160 Among others, Department of Provincial and Local Government (1999) Final Report on the 
Intergovernmental Relations Audit; Layman, Timothy (2003) Intergovernmental Relations and Service Delivery 
in South Africa: A Ten-Year Review; and Department of Provincial and Local Government (2008) 15 Year Report 
on the State of Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa. 
 161 Sections 6(1)(h) and 17(f) of the Act. 
 162 Section 16 of the Act. 
  
 
  
149 
 
can represent them effectively.163 Unfortunately, representation will favour larger, stronger or 
more articulate municipalities that are physically closer to the centre of power. The provision 
assumes that the PLGAs will have the capacity and authority to efficiently represent their 
constituent municipalities. Consideration ought to be given to better functioning institutions, 
such as the SACN, perhaps as advisor, as they could add value to certain forums. However, 
‘side-lining’ could be overcome or neutralised or minimised by the stipulation that the Premier 
may invite any person to the forum.164 Some of the provisions, such as the establishment of 
interprovincial and inter-municipality forums and their roles are superfluous,165 since provinces 
and municipalities have the legislative and executive authority to do so anyway.  
 
While an intergovernmental technical support structure166 of professionals and experts would 
be most useful in the efficient operation of a forum, this question is linked to the need for a 
specialist organisation, either akin to the German Bundesrat,167 or the ACIR.168  
 
The NCoP is not akin to the Bundesrat, and a review of both these institutions may help in 
determining how the former can function more effectively, especially in facilitating better 
municipal relations therein.169 
                                                 
 163 Sections 17(d) and (f) of the Act.  
 164 Section 17(3) of the Act. 
 165 Sections 22 and 23; and 28 and 29, respectively, of the Act. 
 166 Sections 30(1) and (2) of the Act. 
 167 “The Bundesrat is the forum through which the 16 Länder participate in the legislative process and 
administration of the Federation (see Art. 50 of the Basic Law). As a matter of principle, the Bundesrat participates 
in the passage of every law adopted by the Bundestag. The extent of its participation, however, depends on whether 
the bill in question is one to which the Bundesrat may lodge an objection or one requiring the Bundesrat’s consent. 
The German Bundestag is elected by the German people …The most important tasks performed by the Bundestag 
are the legislative process and the parliamentary scrutiny of the government and its work. Another of its functions 
is election of the German Federal Chancellor.” www.bundestag.de, accessed 22/08/2016. Although not directly 
comparable, the Bundestag could be likened to South Africa’s National Assembly and the Bundesrat, to the NCoP. 
 168 “The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) was an independent, bipartisan 
intergovernmental agency established by public law 86-380 in 1959. The mission of the ACIR was ‘To strengthen 
the American federal system and improve the ability of federal, state and local governments to work together 
cooperatively, efficiently, and effectively’. The ACIR was constituted by representatives of all three spheres, as 
well as, perhaps, suitable representatives   from outside of government who could undertake research, formulate 
and disseminate policy, and advise the forums on co-operative governance and other related matters. The ACIR 
was disbanded in September of 1996.” http://www.library.unt.edu/govinfo/digital-collections/acir, accessed 
22/08/2016.     
 169 The NCoP is reviewed in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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The NCoP was established by section 42(1)(b) of the Constitution which provides for 
participation by “not more than ten part-time representatives designated by organised local 
government…to represent the different categories of municipalities.” These representatives 
participate “when necessary” and “may not vote.”170 It would seem that the constitutional 
provision that local government “may designate representatives to participate” in the NCoP,171  
has been watered down. It is not clear when a Premier’s “obligation … to consult organised 
local government on any matter”172 arises and how this duty will be met in the Premier’s 
Intergovernmental Committee. If there is such lack of clarity, SALGA may effectively be 
marginalised through non-consultation. A qualifier or delimiting factor is that such interaction 
must be “conducted [only] through an appropriate intergovernmental structure” and not 
directly.173 This is cumbersome and may delay development, especially if a matter is urgent. 
However, there are many opportunities, particularly within the political realm, for an executive 
mayor or MEC to bring important and urgent matters to the attention of decision makers either 
through an IGR structure or by appropriate communication outside of formal mechanisms.174  
 
A further limitation is that if SALGA or one of its provincial affiliates is not a member of a 
forum, a representative may only have “full speaking rights.”175 There is no guarantee that 
organised local government is or will be a member of any intergovernmental structure. 
Furthermore, a ‘speaking right’ amounts to nothing of substance. Although the Act176 provides 
inadequate opportunities for representation, the onus is on SALGA to make best use of these 
                                                 
 170 Section 31(1) of the Act.  
 171 Ibid.  
 172 Section 31(2) of the Act. 
 173 Section 67 of the Constitution, providing participation by organised local government in the NCoP. 
 174 Unfortunately, most of the structures are forums with no decision-making mechanisms that can 
influence lawmaking in the NCoP. Examples are the National Municipal Managers Forum and the South African 
Cities Network. The latter operates largely through grants from member municipalities (the nine largest cities in 
South Africa) and support from donors. For local government legislation to be done through municipalities and 
with representation from their residents, the NCoP ought to be reconstituted to incorporate better representation of 
local government. 
 175 Section 163(b)(ii) of the Constitution. 
 176 Sections 32(1) and (2). 
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structures to advance the interests of local government. By proving its effectiveness, albeit on 
a limited number of forums, it can request greater representation. 
 
It is stipulated that “an intergovernmental structure is a forum for intergovernmental 
consultation and discussion.” As such it is “not an executive decision-making body.”177 An 
intergovernmental structure is a forum or can be one, but a forum is not an intergovernmental 
structure, as defined, for the latter is limited to only certain specific forums.178 No provision 
appears to be made for mechanisms that may arise in the future, outside of those statutorily 
provided for. The IRFA approach is anti-developmental as it does not incorporate the necessary 
degree of flexibility and informality requisite for a dynamic field that is intergovernmental 
relations through human interaction. 
 
The 1993 Constitution179 and Local Government Transition Act180 mandated the establishment 
of several structures in all spheres of government. These were enlarged by the IRFA. The table 
below depicts those that could be relevant to co-operative governance from which SALGA 
could determine where municipal representation could be most effective. 
 
(v) Analysis of the IRFA 
The South African Constitution is unique in going so far as even formalising and entrenching 
institutions and their practise of co-operative governance, as well as their relationships inter se. 
There are no directly comparable precedents to this innovation and hence the model is 
experimental. Consequently, institutions and practices should be allowed to grow and develop 
with time, such that our indigenous or endogenous models could become ‘good’ practices. 
                                                 
 177 Ibid.  
 178 Only those established in terms of sections 6-34 of the Act. 
 179 Republic of South Africa Constitution Act, 200 of 1993. It made provision for, inter alia, the Public 
Protector (section 110), provincial constitutions (160), Commission of Provincial Government (163), 
establishment of “categories of metropolitan, urban and rural governments, with differentiated powers, functions 
and structures…” section 174(2), A local government may, in its discretion, by means of a resolution of its council 
provide for the assignment of specified functions to local bodies or submunicipal entities within its area of 
jurisdiction – section 174(6), Recognition of Traditional Authorities and indigenous law (184), Provision for 
Establishment of Volkstaat Council (184A).  
 180 Local Government Transition Act, 209 of 1993, established, inter alia, Provincial Committee for Local 
Government – section 3(1)(a), Establishment of Administrator – 4(1), Recognition and Establishment of 
Negotiating Forums (6), Local Government Co-ordinating Committee – 7(1)(c), Establishment of Transitional 
Councils – 8(1), Establishment of Local Government Demarcation Boards – 11(1).   
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Table 4.1: Co-operative governance structures (Refer list of abbreviations) 
Source: Compiled from literature reviewed. 
* ‘Formal’ means established in accordance with provisions of the IRFA. 
                                                 
 181 Date structure came into effect. 
STRUCTURE SPHERES FUNCTIONS ESTAB- 
LISHED181 
ACHIEVEMENTS NATURE 
Judiciary All Adjudication 1994 Enforced Bill of Rights Formal 
Parliament: NA National Legislature 1994 Several enactments Formal 
Parliament: 
P legislatures 
Provincial Legislature 1994 To be researched due 
to limited activity  
Formal 
Parliament: 
NCoP 
N – P Legislation, 
monitoring and 
oversight; LG 
represented by 
SALGA 
1996 Legislative functions 
burdensome; some P 
supervision; real need 
questionable  
Formal 
PCC * N – P, includes 
Minister of  
COGTA 
Implement N 
legislation; P 
policy and 
legislation, 
promote and 
supervise LG and 
co- op 
2005 Too ambitious; very 
high expectations; 
delivery remains to be 
seen 
Formal – 
executive 
co-
operation 
National IGF * All, but mostly 
N – P and 
OLG (when 
appropriate) 
Established by any 
Cabinet Minister 
for the functional 
area concerned 
 
2005 
Minimal, if any Formal 
Premier’s IGF * P-L Executive co-
operation 
Post-IRFA Not measured since 
formal establishment 
Formal 
Premier’s Co-
ordinating 
Forum 
Premier, 
mayors, 
municipal 
managers, 
SALGA 
Discuss common 
issues 
Varies Not clear; only 
Gauteng appears to be 
minimally operational 
Informal; 
replaced by 
Premier’s 
IGF 
Provincial IGF 
* 
Functional 
area of spatial 
part of a 
province 
Inter-departmental 
within a province 
(internal) 
Post-IRFA Not documented Informal 
Interprovincial 
forums * 
2 or more 
provinces 
Matters of mutual 
interest 
Post-IRFA Not documented Informal 
District IGF * District and 
local 
municipalities 
 Post-IRFA Not documented Informal 
Inter-municipal 
* 
2 or more 
municipalities 
 Post-IRFA Not documented Informal 
MinMECs N – P; SALGA 
represented 
only on 
sectoral issues 
Concurrent 
responsibilities; 
sectoral executive, 
policy/strategies 
1994 Minimal, if any; 
mostly information 
dissemination 
Informal 
Technical 
support * 
All; officials 
and others 
Formal technical 
support to a forum 
Post-IRFA  Informal 
FFC All Fiscal/financial m 1997 Reasonable progress  Formal 
OLG (SALGA) All  Represent LG 1997 Nothing of note Formal 
PLGA P-L Represent LG in P  1998 None Informal 
Budget Council 
Budget Forum 
All  Fiscal relations 1997 Not clear Formal 
(MinMEC) 
HEDCom 
 
National Education 
Ministers 
1997 None of note Formal 
(MinMEC) 
FOSAD N – P Admin/technical  1998 None Informal 
SACN 9 SA cities; 
 
Co-operation, 
sharing 
2001 Research, publications  Informal 
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The IRFA has been in implementation for over a decade. At this stage, there appears to be no 
indication of its achievements or usefulness – time will tell. The Constitutional Court182 
lamented the delay by Parliament in enacting legislation in compliance with section 41(2) of 
the Constitution. Malherbe (2006), writing a year after the promulgation of the IRFA, states that 
it “does not contain much innovation or surprises.”183 He argues that during the long delay in 
its emergence provinces functioned more as agents of the state than as a sphere of government 
and many have performed unsatisfactorily.  Under the circumstances the use of formal and 
informal intergovernmental structures may have resulted in a de facto situation of national 
dominance184 or national domination over the other spheres of government,” and that a major 
shortcoming is that it does not apply to Parliament.185 Bekink (2006) argues that –Local 
authorities serve as an effective counterweight to the over-concentration of governmental 
authority in the other two levels/branches of government. This positive influence can be 
achieved only if local governments are afforded a certain measure of autonomy.186   
 
The IRFA does not prohibit informal intergovernmental relations or the establishment of forums 
to facilitate such engagement. Intergovernmental forums are not legislative bodies and as such 
participants cannot be held liable or accountable for decisions taken. They can be held liable to 
their own legislatures and they, in turn must report to Parliament on the conduct of 
intergovernmental relations.  
 
De Villiers (2012) contends that codification of intergovernmental relations has contributed to 
“greater certainty and transparency” but that there remains “much ambivalence” about the 
nature of decisions and recommendations of the forums, as well as their inability to “supervise 
and enforce” them.187 He points out that the IRFA facilitates training of new politicians and 
bureaucrats in the “basic philosophy and structures of intergovernmental relations”, its policies 
and processes, conflict resolution, and the “role of each individual in the overall mosaic of 
                                                 
 182 In National Gambling Board v Premier of KwaZulu-Natal 2002 2 BCLR 156 (CC) at paragraph 32. 
 183 Malherbe, EFJ ‘Does the Intergovernmental Framework Act 13 of 2005 confirm or suppress national 
dominance?’ 2006 – 4 TSAR, 810-818, 813. 
 184 Malherbe (2006), op cit, 812. 
 185 Malherbe (2006), op cit, 817-818. 
 186 Bekink (2006), op cit, 61. 
 187 De Villiers (2012), op cit, 690. 
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intergovernmental relations.”188 He adds that the Act can “contribute to the widening and 
deepening of democratic institutions and processes in young democracies.”189  
 
In conclusion, the view of De Villiers (2012) is helpful. 
The certainty, predictability and institutional development that are associated with an IGR Act seem to far 
outweigh any risks associated therewith.190 
 
Notwithstanding certain shortcomings, the IRFA does create opportunities for municipal 
representation. In this respect, it is necessary for municipalities and SALGA to show their 
effectiveness in the limited spaces provided thus far and based on successes achieved thereon, 
request for more means of municipal representation on intergovernmental structures and 
processes. 
 
4.3.5 STATUS AND AUTONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
(a)       Background 
Unlike South Africa’s colonial and apartheid past when local government was subordinate both 
to Parliament and to provincial councils, it is now established and protected by the Constitution 
and operates alongside the national and provincial governments as a distinctive “sphere”. The 
relative autonomy granted constitutionally to local government makes it unique in the world. 
Whilst being innovative and developmental in a positivist sense,191 this distinction and 
recognition of what was previously the lowest tier in a hierarchical relationship also creates 
many challenges.  
 
Atkinson (1998) argues that provisions for co-operative governance were premised on inherent 
and anticipated tensions between the three spheres, based on the “ambiguities and diversity 
which characterise central government policies.”192 The essence of the tension is the difference 
between the autonomy of municipalities, on the one hand, and their powers and functions, on 
                                                 
 188 At 688.  
 189 At 692-693.  
 190 De Villiers (2012), op cit, 694.  
 191 Positivism is based on the theory that laws derive validity from the fact of having been enacted by 
authority or deriving logically from existing decisions, rather than from any moral considerations (South African 
Concise Oxford Dictionary).  
 192 Atkinson (1998), op cit, 17. 
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the other.193 Municipal autonomy in its clearest sense is depicted in the constitutional allocation 
of powers and functions.194  
 
Legal personality bestowed upon municipalities195 means they can sue and be sued, as can their 
political office bearers and administrators, acting within the scope of their employment. While 
the local community is part of a municipality, they cannot be held liable for their actions. 
 
(b)  Status of local government 
It has been said that – 
Any discussion of local government often elicits a kind of cognitive dissonance. We know, and we are told 
by the courts and politicians, that local government is important. At the same time, local matters are 
associated with the parochial and petty, and are often viewed as being mundane or just unglamorous. Yet 
the work performed by municipalities marks our everyday experiences of government. These experiences 
in turn shape our perceptions of being governed.196 
 
While the Constitution and subsequent statutes have set out the powers and functions of local 
government, it has taken the Courts to point out in practical terms what they mean.197 
 
(c)  ‘Relative’ or limited autonomy 
Local government ‘inferiority’ is evident in the provision that a municipality’s “right” to govern 
on its “own initiative” is conditional in the sense that it is “subject” to national and provincial 
legislation.198 However, the two (de-facto) superior spheres “may” not “compromise or 
impede” local government’s ability or right to function effectively.199 The powers of local 
government were confirmed in the Certification Judgment200 and subsequently.201 Thus, 
                                                 
 193 Sections 151 and 156, respectively, of the Constitution. 
 194 In Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5 of the Constitution. 
 195 By section 2(d) of the Systems Act. 
 196 Bergström and Naidoo (2016), op cit, 57. 
 197 See, inter alia, Fedsure, op cit, paragraphs 26 and 38; City of Cape Town v Robertson, op cit, paragraph 
60; CDA Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Others [2007] ZASCA 1, 2007 
(4) SA 276 (SCA), paragraphs 37-40. Although the following cases reviewed deal largely with municipal planning, 
the status of municipalities could be ascertained from the interpretation of the constitutional provisions by the 
Constitutional Court: Gauteng Development Tribunal; Maccsand; Lagoonbay; and Habitat. 
 198 Section 151(3) of the Constitution. 
 199 Section 151(4) of the Constitution. 
 200 Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (CCT 
37/96) [1996] ZACC 24; 1997 (1) BCLR 1; 1997 (2) SA 97 (4 December 1996), paragraphs 73, 78, 80 and 82. 
 201 See Budhu and Wiechers (2003), op cit, 471. 
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intervention is not unconditional. Use of the modal verb ‘may’ implies possibility, that is, the 
other spheres of government in practice could compromise or impede a municipality’s right or 
ability to exercise its powers or perform its functions. There has been “judicial trends in 
recognising an increased level of autonomy of local governments” compared with those of 
national and provincial spheres. In arriving at a solution when faced with such a challenge, “the 
courts will certainly endeavour to give as much cognisance to local government autonomy as 
possible.”202  
 
In Fedsure, the Constitutional Court ruled that – 
Local governments have a place in the constitutional order, have to be established by a competent authority, 
and are entitled to certain powers…203  
 
In a later case, the High Court204 held that the language used in certain sections205 of the 
Constitution, “is suggestive of an equality” among the three spheres of government, and that 
the “clear intention is that local government structures should not be penalised for showing 
industry and initiative in revenue gathering…” 
 
Municipalities can only exercise their autonomy if they have the ability to do so. The 
Constitution stipulates that the other two spheres must capacitate and support them, as well as 
monitor such support.206 Apart from status and autonomy directly conferred by the Constitution, 
they also arise from powers and functions allocated to local government in other legislation. 
Although one perceives municipalities to constitute a “sphere” of government (rather than the 
lowest tier in a hierarchy), their subordinate status is evident from it being provided only 
executive, and not also legislative authority over matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part 
B of Schedule 5. This evident from the following constitutional provision:  
 A municipality has executive authority in respect of and the right to administer –  
(a) The local government matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5.207  
                                                 
 202 Budhu and Wiechers (2003), op cit, 472. 
 203 Fedsure, op cit, paragraph 38. 
 204 Uthukela District Municipality v President of the RSA 2002 5 BCLR 479 (N), at 485G-H and 487D-
H, following the precedent set by Cape Metropolitan Council v Minister for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional 
Development 1999 11 BCLR 1229 (C) 1255, at paragraph 115. 
 205 In sections 40(1), 151(1), 156, 230, 227(3) and 239. 
 206 In sections 154(1) and 155(6)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. 
 207 Section 156(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
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Legislative power, however, is conferred on municipalities to enable them to make “by-laws 
for the effective administration of the matters which it has the right to administer”.208 
Furthermore, any by-laws in conflict with legislation of the other two spheres would be 
invalid.209 This relatively lower status is evinced in certain other provisions in the Constitution, 
for example: 
 local government matters not addressed by the Constitution are to be prescribed by 
national and/or provincial legislation;210 
 an Act of Parliament providing for “equitable share” of revenue;211 
 national legislation prescribing the form of municipal budgets;212 
 national legislation to prescribe a framework for procurement;213  
 national legislation, formulated on the advice of the Financial and Fiscal Commission 
(FFC), prescribing municipal loan guarantee compliance;214 
 municipal fiscal powers and functions regulated by national legislation;215  
 national legislation prescribing how a municipality may raise loans;216 
 provincial legislative powers over municipalities;217 
 provincial supervision of local government;218 and 
 local government may make only representations on national or provincial enactments 
affecting their own status, institutions, powers or functions.219  
                                                 
 208 Section 156(2) of the Constitution, referring to section 156(1)(a), that is, the “local government matters 
listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5”. 
 209 Section 156(3) of the Constitution. 
 210 Section 164 of the Constitution. 
 211 Sections 214(1) of the Constitution. 
 212 Section 215(2) of the Constitution. 
 213 Sections 217(3) of the Constitution. 
 214 Sections 218(1) and (2) of the Constitution. 
  215 Sections 229(1)(b); 229(2)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. 
 216 Sections 230A(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. 
 217 Sections 104(1)(a), (b) and (c); 104(3) of the Constitution. 
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Several statutes confirm the ‘relative’ autonomy or comparatively ‘inferior’ status of local 
government – see review below. While alluding to local government’s de facto subordinate 
status, these provisions nevertheless serve to align the three spheres and to highlight their 
interrelatedness and the need for them to function harmoniously. Notwithstanding what may be 
seen as limitations and qualifiers, which are necessary and correct, given that municipalities 
operate in association with national and provincial spheres in “one sovereign democratic 
state,”220 their status and autonomy is relatively high when compared to the situation before the 
1995 local government elections. Such (minimal) limitations are justified as municipalities 
generally lack the know-how to go it alone, that is, without the co-operation and support of the 
other two spheres. Furthermore, within the context of co-operative governance, a three-level 
compartmentalised governmental system would be unworkable. 
 
Steytler and De Visser (2014) contend that local government autonomy is a relative matter in 
the sense that it is exercised “subject to national and provincial legislation”.221 They add that 
the limitation on local government autonomy is permissible subject to three conditions, namely 
that legislative oversight must be provided for in national and provincial legislation, as 
stipulated in the Constitution. Secondly, that the “nature and quality of such intervention is 
subject to an inner core of local autonomy”, wherein a municipality’s ability or right to exercise 
its powers or perform its functions may not be compromised or impeded. Thirdly, local 
government’s right to govern imposes a duty on national and provincial spheres of government 
to “allow a municipality to govern within its demarcated space”.222  
 
Local government, however, cannot exercise its autonomy independently, as spheres are 
“interdependent”: It operates under the supervision of the other two spheres. Within the context 
of concurrency, the constitutionally-mandated responsibility for supervision of local 
government by provincial government comprises four “distinct but interrelated activities” 
namely regulation, monitoring, support, and intervention.223 Such type of actions can cause 
tension and conflict, requiring, perhaps, a mixture of formal and informal friendly relations.  
                                                 
 220 Section 1 of the Constitution. 
 221 Steytler, Nico and Jaap de Visser, ‘Local Government’ in Woolman, Stuart and Michael Bishop (Eds) 
(2014) Constitutional Law of South Africa (Second Edition), Cape Town: Juta, Chapter 22, 22 – 1. 
 222 Ibid. 
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Any intervention should be strictly in accordance with the constitutional provision,224 and the 
First Certification Judgment.225 Where interventions are undertaken in accordance with the 
spirit and letter of the law as well as in compliance with the provisions of co-operative 
governance, they create the circumstances and opportunities for councillors and municipal 
technocrats to engage with their provincial counterparts. Although the Constitution states, 
“National legislation may regulate the implementation of this section, including the processes 
established” therein, no statute for this specific purpose has yet been enacted.226 Mathenjwa 
(2013) argues that the role of the NCoP and the Minister in such interventions “should be 
extended to include oversight of provincial government monitoring of local government.”227 
More meaningful and stronger local government representation on the NCoP could assist this 
process. A most welcome provision of informing and consulting allows the public, 
municipalities, and organised local government to comment on draft national and provincial 
legislation affecting their functions and localities.228 There is a prior obligation on national and 
provincial governments before an intervention in a municipality. This relates to their duty to 
support and strengthen local government.229 The Constitution, then, presumes the existence of 
capacity, competency, and ability of SALGA to do so in a meaningful manner, but makes no 
provision for such views to be taken into account. Nevertheless, this is a well-intentioned clause 
that goes to further co-operative governance and could, in time, be used meaningfully by 
municipal representatives. 
 
The Constitution circumscribes the powers and functions of municipalities and, according to 
Bekink (2006) thus have a “restrictive impact on the fulfilment of the sweeping duties and 
objectives”.230 Secondly, “they are ultimately exercised under the watchful eyes of the national 
and provincial governments.”231 Bekink (2006) adds that “The biggest negative impact of a 
                                                 
 224 Section 139. See Mathenjwa (2013), op cit, particularly 79-81, 322, 349-350, 358-359. 
 225 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (CCT 23/96) [1996] ZACC 26; 
1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) (6 September 1996), paragraphs 264, 289, 359, 363, 370, 373. 
 226 Section 139(8). 
 227 On supervision and monitoring of and intervention in local government by provincial government 
generally, see Mathenjwa (2013), op cit, 93. 
 228 Section 154(2) of the Constitution. 
 229 In compliance with section 154(1) of the Constitution. See Bekink (2006), op cit, 110. 
 230 Op cit, 214. 
 231 Ibid. See section 155(7) of the Constitution. 
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municipal council having both executive and legislative powers is the fact that the built-in 
checks and balances of one government body over the other is lost.”232 However, the entrenched 
power of control and supervision of municipalities by national and provincial government,233 if 
exercised diligently, may be an adequate check over any abuse. 
 
“Although the municipalities have been afforded a new status and autonomy, such autonomy is 
not absolute”, according to Bekink (2006).234 Both national and provincial governments have 
legislative and executive oversight and control over local government’s functions and 
responsibilities. Hence, although autonomy is enhanced on the one hand, it is limited on the 
other. Bekink (2006) argues that such autonomy corresponds with the intent of legislative 
drafters adding that “superior control and supervision … is indeed essential in achieving the 
objects and developmental functions of local governments.”235 Furthermore, local government 
powers and functions are not absolute in the sense that they are subject to national and 
provincial legislation. Bekink (2006) asserts that they “must be exercised to fulfil constitutional 
objectives and developmental duties.”236 This kind of ‘hierarchical’ operationalisation of the 
three-sphere governmental system is dependent on co-operation amongst all spheres and 
support to local government. Bekink (2006) argues that local government does “not have a 
comparable autonomy to what national or even provincial spheres have”, and secondly that it 
is subject to intervention by the ‘higher’ spheres. Furthermore, local government autonomy can 
be compromised without the financial support and provision of infrastructure by them.237   
 
Local government cannot have ‘full’ autonomy because this would be untenable in a multi-
sphere form of government. However, the ‘relative’ or limited autonomy granted is adequate 
for it to function effectively within the system and context of co-operative governance. Hence, 
the innovative autonomy can be used by municipal representatives to strengthen the position of 
local government. Notwithstanding limitations, understandable in a three-sphere governmental 
system, municipalities have sufficient autonomy to be a major player in national policy-making 
                                                 
 232 Ibid. 
 233 In terms of sections 154(1) and 155(6)(b) of the Constitution. See Budhu and Wiechers (2003), op cit, 
471-472; Bekink (2006), op cit, 62, 67, 69. 
 234 At 520. 
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 236 At 523. 
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through its representative organ. However, this requires leadership of the highest calibre to 
make a positive difference.   
 
4.3.6 POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
(a) Background 
The Constitution, though well intentioned, flexible and facilitative, has created certain 
confusion and contradictions insofar as local government is concerned. For example, 
municipalities are at the same time neither fully autonomous nor subordinate (as shown above), 
since they are – 
… located in a complex web of power and function relationships which, while entailing a large measure of 
municipal integrity and distinctiveness, requires other spheres to take responsibility for initiating and 
controlling vital legislative and executive processes. This is essential to the functioning of a modern, unified 
democratic state.238 
 
At the time of the Constitutional Assembly’s deliberations, local government was not a priority 
agenda item. The compromises made by the Congress for a Democratic South Africa 
(CODESA) were evident in the Local Government Transition Act.239 The role of local 
government at that time was a work in progress and appears to remain so today. However, in 
arguing for a clearer demarcation of powers and functions, especially concurrent ones, it should 
be noted that the governmental system does not function by itself but through strong leadership 
and a competent and committed workforce. Even where precise allocation of roles and 
responsibilities is possible, problems could be encountered considering that fallible human 
beings mind the machinery of government. Within the context of autonomy, the Constitution 
provides local government with two sources of powers, original and assigned. 
 
It has been said that there is need to – 
Evaluate whether the powers and functions designated to local government enable it to effectively and 
efficiently meet this developmental mandate …[because] there are significant shortcomings in the manner 
[in which they are] interpreted and implemented.240 
 
 
 
                                                 
 238 Pimstone (1998), op cit, 162. 
 239 209 of 1993, subsequently repealed by the Constitution. 
 240 Community Law Centre (2007) Paper 1 – Developmental Local Government: Determining 
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(b) Original powers 
In section 40(1) of the Constitution, the word “sphere” instead of ‘tier’ suggests that 
government is not hierarchically arranged, as in the past. The implication is that local 
government now has an elevated status, but it is not clear to what position. A dictionary 
definition of “sphere” is unhelpful in determining whether municipalities are autonomous. 
Since the status-conferring provision is an empowering one, municipalities, constituting a 
“sphere” of government having both legislative and executive powers as well as the “right to 
govern on its own initiative”, now have a standing ‘comparable’ with the other two spheres. 
Status and autonomy are important for the effective functioning of municipalities and 
consequently also for an association representing local government. But in and of themselves 
status and autonomy are meaningless if municipalities do not have adequate capacity to 
undertake their responsibilities. “Hence, the question arises: Which comes first, status or 
capacity?”241 National government departments still almost exclusively formulate policies 
impacting on municipalities without much meaningful participation by them. This situation 
highlights the perceived and real low status of local government and its representative organ by 
national and provincial governments. 
 
Steytler and De Visser (2014) argue242 that the Constitution entrenched “local autonomy by 
listing the powers of municipalities, limiting the oversight powers of other spheres of 
government and, more importantly, securing a stable base for municipal revenue”.243 
 
Section 43 of the Constitution vests local government with legislative authority alongside 
national and provincial governments. The Constitutional Court ruled that “the institution of 
local government as a sphere of government and the powers of municipalities are now 
recognised and protected by the Constitution”.244 This statement is also a reference to section 
151(2) of the Constitution which states: “The executive and legislative authority of a 
municipality is vested in its Municipal Council.” The Court added that the exercise of legislative 
power by a municipal council is “no longer a delegated function subject to administrative 
                                                 
 241 Singh, Anirood (2000) Co-operative Governance and the Promotion of Economic Development by 
Local Government Associations: A First Exploration, unpublished LLM Dissertation, Pretoria: Unisa, 17. 
 242 Op cit, 22 – 7. 
 243 In terms of section 227(1)(a) of the Constitution which provides that “Local government in each 
province is entitled to an equitable share raised nationally to enable it to provide basic services and perform the 
functions allocated to it.” 
 244 In Fedsure, op cit, paragraph 26. 
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review, but a political process that represents the will of the municipal residents.”245 This view 
is also based on the sections of the Constitution which provide: 
A municipality has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of its community, 
subject to national and provincial legislation, as provided for in the Constitution.246 
And 
The national or a provincial government may not compromise or impede a municipality’s ability or right 
to exercise its powers or perform its functions.247 
 
Steytler and De Visser (2014) assert that the word ‘right’ in these two provisions indicates an 
entitlement to govern and the term ‘govern’ “connotes a regulatory and policy making role” 
rather than one of implementing or administering laws.248  They contend that a municipality’s 
right to govern is facilitated by the provision of three constitutionally-mandated instruments, 
namely, executive authority,249 the right to administer, and the right to make by-laws.250 They 
add that the phrase ‘on its own initiative’ means that municipalities “do not have to await 
instructions from the other two spheres of government before “using their legislative, executive 
and administrative authority.” They argue that the detailed powers and functions of local 
government do not have to be firstly determined by a higher competent authority, such as a 
provincial or the national government, before a municipality can exercise its original power.251 
Section 151(4) of the Constitution refers to national and provincial governments, not to their 
legislation. However, municipalities must act in accordance with the constitutionally-mandated 
national and/or provincial legislation. Hence, local government does not enjoy unfettered 
autonomy. Section 156(1) of the Constitution sets out the executive and administrative 
functions of municipalities as listed in Schedule 4B and Schedule 5B. These are original powers 
that cannot be changed or repealed by national or provincial legislation but only by 
constitutional amendment.252  
 
                                                 
 245 Fedsure, paragraphs 5-11, referring to section 151(2) of the Constitution. 
 246 Section 151(3) of the Constitution. 
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 249 In terms of sections 156(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. 
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Municipalities have authority253 over specific matters enumerated.254  The listed powers can be 
added to, but not subtracted from, by provincial government, as they are constitutionally-
derived or original powers. They cannot be removed by parliamentary legislation either. As 
plenary powers, that is, responsibility to regulate and administer particular functional areas, 
they do not have to be set out in detail. While provincial governments also have powers over 
those listed specifically for municipalities, they are limited to certain provisions only.255 A 
municipality’s original powers have been confirmed in several cases by the Constitutional 
Court.256 A municipality enjoys “original” and constitutionally entrenched powers, functions, 
rights and duties that may be qualified or constrained by law and only to the extent that the 
Constitution permits.257 
 
However, the listed powers are not allocated exclusively to local government in that they may 
be subject to or regulated by national and provincial governments or constrained by the 
Constitution itself, such as in its Bill of Rights.   
 
Section 156(5) of the Constitution grants municipalities “the right to exercise any power 
concerning a matter reasonably necessary for, or incidental to, the effective performance of its 
functions.” It is contended that local government’s “constitutional authorisation” to perform 
ancillary functions is based on its original powers which “allow the repository to assume all 
those additional powers which are necessary and incidental to the exercise of such powers.”258  
                                                 
 253 In terms of sections 151(2) and 156(1) of the Constitution. 
 254 In Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5 of the Constitution. 
 255 To those specified in sections 155(6)(a) and 155(7) of the Constitution. 
 256 See, inter alia, Robertson, op cit, paragraphs 59-60; Gauteng Development Tribunal, op cit, paragraphs 
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Budhu and Wiechers (2003) argue that where devolution of powers is concerned, Courts “will 
no doubt adopt a flexible, pragmatic approach” and that judicial reasoning would be based on 
the “idea of supporting the establishment of viable and successful local government.”259  They 
add that the judiciary would use a purposive approach and interpret local government powers 
and functions broadly to “ensure that the goals of social security, economic advancement, etc 
are well served”, giving “as much scope as possible” to them.260 This modus operandi will 
increase and enhance not only the powers and functions but also the obligations on 
municipalities. Hence, their representatives must be alive to the situation and lobby for the 
support from national and provincial governments as provided for in the Constitution. This 
would be on the basis of the constitutional directive of national and provincial governments’ 
duty to support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities.261  
 
Chapter 2 of the Systems Act sets out the legal nature of a municipality, its role in co-operative 
government, and the rights and duties of municipal councils.262 It also stipulates the “rights and 
duties of members of the local community”.263 The Act also sets out the “Duties of municipal 
administrations”.264 
 
 Chapter 3 of the Systems Act sets out municipal powers and functions. Section 8 is titled 
“General empowerment”, under which the Act confirms local government’s constitutionally-
entrenched and assigned powers and functions, with the qualifier that they must be exercised 
subject to Chapter 5 of the Structures Act.265 The second confirmation is that “A municipality 
has the right to do anything reasonably necessary for, or incidental to, the effective performance 
of its functions and the exercise of its powers.”266  
  
                                                 
 259 Op cit, 471. 
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 Section 11 of the Systems Act addresses executive and legislative authority of municipalities. 
Such authority vests in the council and can be exercised only within its geographical 
boundary.267 The Act lists 14 prescribed powers.268 It sets out legislative procedures that provide 
that “Only a member or committee of a municipal council may introduce a draft by-law in the 
council.”269 The Act provides, “A by-law must be made by a decision taken by a municipal 
council”,270 and in accordance with prescribed procedures.271 “No by-law may be passed by a 
municipal council unless” certain prescribed procedures are adhered to.272  
 
 From the foregoing, it is clear that the Systems Act has made extensive and detailed provisions 
for executive committees, executive mayors, metropolitan sub-councils, and ward committees. 
Hence, representation by councillors is permissible on any of these structures. 
 
 A brief review of some decided cases serves to highlight the original powers of local 
government, even though most are based on municipal planning.  
 
 In the Gauteng Development Tribunal case, the Constitutional Court held that the Constitution’s 
allocation of governmental powers proceeds from a “functional vision of what was appropriate 
to each sphere.”273  
 
 In the First Certification Judgment, the Constitutional Court held that the power of national and 
provincial governments to monitor local government274 “does not represent a substantial power 
in itself, certainly not a power to control [local government] affairs”. It also does not bestow 
“additional or residual powers of provincial intrusion on the domain of local government”. It 
                                                 
 267 Sections 11(1) and (2), respectively, of the Systems Act. 
 268 Sections 11(3)(a)-(g) of the Systems Act.  
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stated that the Constitution envisaged a “hands-off relationship” with regard to by other spheres 
of government vis-à-vis local government.275  
 
 Referring to the Gauteng Development Tribunal case, Cameron J in Habitat said – 
 …provinces should not be allowed to intervene in functions that the Constitution reserves for 
municipalities. This would be in direct conflict with this Court’s jurisprudence…no justification for a 
provincial power to overturn municipalities’ land-use decisions.276 
 
 Cameron J in Habitat277 quotes Moseneke J in the Robertson case: 
 The Constitution has moved way from a hierarchical division of governmental power and has ushered in a 
new vision of government in which the sphere of local government is interdependent, ‘inviolable and 
possesses the constitutional latitude within which to define and express its unique character’ subject to 
constraints permissible under our Constitution…A municipality enjoys ‘original’ and constitutionally 
entrenched powers, functions, rights and duties that may be qualified or constrained by law and only to the 
extent the Constitution permits. 
  
 Cameron J in Habitat278 quotes Mhlantla AJ in Lagoonbay:279 
 This Court’s jurisprudence clearly establishes that: (a) barring exceptional circumstances, national and 
provincial spheres are not entitled to usurp the functions of local government; the constitutional vision of 
autonomous spheres of government must be preserved… 
 
 Detailed and extensive powers, perhaps ‘over-prescription’, has a downside in that municipal 
officials may be overwhelmed by them, especially those in weaker municipalities. In this 
context, it has been said that – 
  …many rules make compliance impossible, leading to compliance fatigue and the resultant lawlessness. 
 The multiplicity of laws also threatens to undermine the municipalities’ constitutionally-entrenched 
 independence and authority over their own affairs.280  
 
 Alongside a plethora of statutes and regulations requiring strict compliance therewith, the 
number of municipalities will reduce from 278 to 257, serving a population of 55.6 million.281 
Apart from population size, the spatial areas of South Africa’s municipalities are comparatively 
large as shown by Atkinson (2003): 
 Xhariep District Municipality in the Southern Free State is the size of Hungary; the Northern Free State 
District Municipality has the same diameter as Belgium; and the Namakwa District Municipality is almost 
as wide as Texas.282  
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 280 Ntliziywana, Phindile, ‘Adding Injury to Insult: Intrusive Laws on Top of a Weak System’ (2016) 
Constitutional Court Review Vol VI, Cape Town: Juta, 32-56, 32.   
 281 Statistics South Africa: 2016 Community Survey, www.statssa.gov.za, accessed 7/11/2016.  
 282 Atkinson, Doreen ‘Post-apartheid Local Government Reforms: A Small Town Perspective’ (2003) 
Occasional Paper, Johannesburg: Centre for Development and Enterprise, 2.  
168 
 
 Ntliziywana (2016) argues that a “suit of parallel and overlapping laws were promulgated” by 
CoGTA, National Treasury and the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) 
in their attempt to “professionalise municipal administration through regulation… This set the 
scene for tripwires of ‘must do’ requirements.”283 She adds that these regulations do “not meet 
the rule of law requirement that the law must be clear and must serve a rational purpose.”284 
Ntliziywana (2016) contends that – 
 The practice of throwing laws at a problem can also potentially fail the constitutional test for violating its 
various provisions relating to the municipalities’ ability or right to exercise their powers and regulate their 
internal affairs without any impediments. The relevant provisions that are threatened by this practice are ss 
151(4) and 160 of the Constitution.285   
 
 These regulations, then, may be unconstitutional, judging from the Constitutional Court’s 
rulings. Ntliziywana (2016) adds that the “problems experienced by poor-performing 
municipalities are not created by under-regulation, or necessarily solved by additional 
regulation.”286  She suggests that a “special Cabinet Committee on provincial and local 
government” be established to “discuss and scrutinise all policy and legislation on sub-national 
government before they go to Cabinet for decision.”287 This is supposed to be a task of the 
NCoP. But this view may be a confirmation that this house is not functioning effectively.   
 
(c) Assigned powers 
Assigned powers refer to municipal authority over matters delegated to municipalities by 
national and provincial governments. Assignment is prescribed under the following sections of 
the Constitution: 
44(1)(a)(iii) From Parliament to any legislative authority; 
99                 By a Cabinet member to a Municipal Council; 
104(1)(c)      By a provincial legislature to a Municipal Council;  
126               By a MEC to a Municipal Council; and 
156(4)         By national and provincial governments to municipalities. 
 
These provisions have ostensibly been made because municipalities do not constitute a static 
sphere of government: They are expected to grow and develop, and in the progress of time 
                                                 
 283 Ntliziywana (2016), op cit, 37-38.  
 284 Ntliziywana (2016), op cit, 47. 
 285 Ibid. Section 151(4) of the Constitution reads: “The national or a provincial government may not 
compromise or impede a municipality’s ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its functions.” Section 
160 sets out the internal procedures of a municipal council.     
 286 Op cit, 63.   
 287 Ntliziywana (2016), op cit, 55. 
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assume greater responsibilities. However, municipalities’ capabilities or competencies vary 
greatly, and so they cannot be expected to develop uniformly. Hence, there is provision for 
asymmetry among municipalities where acknowledging that powers and functions will not be 
exactly the same, assignment would be made according to their differentiated capacities. 
Devolution of powers by provinces to local authorities is through assignment as well as by 
means of authorisations and adjustments. The two latter delegations are only by district to local 
municipalities within its jurisdiction.288  
 
Assignment is the entrenchment or a concrete manifestation of the principle of subsidiarity in 
that national and provincial governments are compelled289 to assign to municipalities the 
specified functional areas of concurrent national and provincial legislative competence and of 
exclusive provincial legislative competence.290  
 
Subsidiarity is defined as ‘the principle that a central authority should have a subsidiary function 
and perform only tasks which cannot be performed effectively at a local level’.291 Carpenter 
(1999) states that subsidiarity is “not the same as devolution”; the latter means that the centre 
holds the original power.292 She asserts that – 
The essence of subsidiarity is the recognition that certain responsibilities and powers belong not to the 
centre but at the edges – or lower down or further away, depending on how one likes to phrase it.293 
 
De Visser (2010) argues that “neither the Constitution nor the Constitutional Court uses the 
term subsidiarity”.294 He quotes Van Wyk295 who states that “use of the ‘spheres’ instead of 
‘tiers’ renders the Constitution in principle one of the most ‘subsidiarity-friendly’ 
                                                 
 288 Department of Provincial and Local Government (2002) A Guideline Document for Provincial-Local 
Intergovernmental Relations, 6-7. 
 289 In terms of sections 99, 126, and 156(4)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. 
 290 Depicted in Part A of Schedule 4 and Part A of Schedule 5 of the Constitution. 
 291 The Oxford English Reference Dictionary.  
 292 Carpenter, Gretchen (1999) ‘Co-operative Government, Devolution of Powers and Subsidiarity: The 
South African Perspective’, paper delivered at the Conference: Subnational Constitutional Governance and 
publication thereon, Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 45-54, 45.  
 293 Ibid.  
 294 De Visser, Jaap ‘Institutional Subsidiarity in the South African Constitution’, Stellenbosch Law Review 
(2010) (1), 90-115, 100.  
 295 Van Wyk, Dawid (1998) ‘Subsidariteit as Waarde wat die Oop en Demokratiese Suid-Afrikaanse 
Gemeenskap ten Grondslag Lê’ in Carpenter, Gretchen (Ed) Suprema Lex: Opstelle oor die Grondwet aangebied 
aan Marinus Wiechers (1998) 263.  
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Constitutions”.296 The subsidiarity principle is given effect, for example, by section 151(4) of 
the Constitution.297  
 
Assignment is permissible provided the function can most effectively be administered locally, 
and that the municipality in question has the requisite administrative capacity, or else they could 
become dumping grounds of responsibilities vested in the other two spheres. Attainment of an 
acceptable level of socio-economic development as an objective of the state through the 
mechanism of service delivery is based on the assumption that all three spheres of government 
can function co-operatively. While national and provincial authorities may assign the 
administration of some of their functions,298 municipal powers are limited to narrowly 
prescribed activities, and then largely to their executive and administrative responsibilities 
only.299 Therefore, contrary to true devolution, where the principle of subsidiarity applies, that 
is, a function is undertaken by the lowest tier of government and assigned ‘upwards’ only if the 
municipality is incapable of its implementation and management, assignment is the opposite. 
Much of the wording in the Constitution connotes devolution of power, implying autonomy, 
discretion, choice, no direct control, and so on. However, use of terms such as “administration” 
suggests deconcentration, or limited or qualified assignment of powers. Such ambiguity can 
give rise to tensions, more so because, as Atkinson (1998) says, the system of co-operative 
governance “cannot operate dogmatically.”300 The confusion is exacerbated by the situation 
that municipalities have and do undertake functions outside of those listed in Part B of Schedule 
4 and part B of Schedule 5 of the Constitution, and that ‘downward’ assignment of powers will 
largely rest on how they are prioritised by national and provincial governments.  
 
Atkinson (1998) argues that the relationships between and among the spheres of government 
will “depend on their reciprocal attitudes and abilities,”301 with the complex governmental 
system requiring some fine-tuning.  
                                                 
 296 De Visser (2010), op cit, 100.   
 297 Section 151(4) reads: “The national or a provincial government may not compromise or impede a 
municipality’s ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its functions.”  
 298 Those listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5 of the Constitution. 
 299 In terms of sections 156(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution.  
 300 Atkinson (1998), op cit, 29. 
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Section 9 of the Systems Act elaborates on assignments, while section 10 deals with assignment 
to specific municipalities. Section 10A provides that where an assignment is made in terms of 
sections 9 or 10 of the Act, the Cabinet member or MEC “must take appropriate steps to ensure 
sufficient funding and such capacity-building initiatives as may be needed” for execution of the 
assignment.302  This should act as an incentive for municipal and community leaders and 
technocrats as the better performing municipalities will have more and greater assigned powers, 
accompanied (hopefully) by the necessary resources. The development of a committed and 
competent cadre of municipal officials is necessary so they can strive for greater achievements. 
Bekink (2006) argues that sections 9 and 10 of the Systems Act do not appear to address 
assignment by national and provincial governments to municipalities on the basis of 
subsidiarity, the administration of Part A of Schedule 4 and Part A of Schedule 5.303   
 
(d) Agency and delegation 
The Constitution makes provision for an executive organ of state in any sphere of government 
to delegate any statutory power or function to any other organ of state, on a delegation or agency 
basis.304 Thus, over time, local government could end up with many duties which it may or may 
not be capable of executing. To avoid loading municipalities with additional responsibilities, 
these functions should be assigned in strict accordance with the relevant constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and provided that it is objectively demonstrated that the municipality in 
question has the requisite capacity. 
 
While the functions and responsibilities of municipalities will increase as more are assigned or 
delegated to them, municipal representatives can negotiate by requesting the requisite resources 
for them. Bekink (2006) argues that “functions are often vaguely defined, especially where 
services are vertically integrated or shared by other spheres.”305 This provides an opportunity 
for municipal representatives to engage with decision-makers for certain functions, such as 
Human Settlements, Water and Sanitation, Transportation, Energy, and so on, to be delegated 
with the necessary resources and support. 
 
                                                 
 302 In terms of sections 238(a) and (b) of the Constitution. 
 303 Bekink (2006), op cit, 215. 
 304 In terms of section 238 of the Constitution.  
 305 Bekink (2006), op cit, 215. 
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The comprehensive powers and functions of local government, operating in a three-sphere 
governmental system, enables municipalities and their representatives to achieve the 
constitutional and statutory ideals and duties. This could be facilitated and enhanced by 
capacitation, support, and monitoring of municipalities by national and provincial governments. 
 
4.3.7       OBJECTS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
According to section 152(1) of the Constitution, “The objects of local government are – 
(a) to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; 
(b) to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; 
(c)  to promote social and economic development; 
(d)  to promote a safe and healthy environment; and 
(e)  to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in them 
matters of local government.” 
 
An “object” is ‘a goal or purpose’.306 A duty, on the other hand, is defined as a ‘moral or legal 
obligation’ or ‘a task required as part of one’s job’.307 Thus local government is, strictu sensu, 
not bound to deliver on its objectives, as can be evident from the choice of words used. 
“Provide” means ‘make available for use or to supply’; the verb “ensure” is defined as ‘to make 
certain that (something) will occur or be so’; “promote” means to ‘further the progress of’, or 
‘encourage’ or ‘publicise’; while “encourage” is defined as ‘to give support, confidence or hope 
to’.308 Hence, the objects are goals or aims that municipalities must strive to achieve, but cannot 
be held responsible if for good reasons they fail to attain their objectives to a particular level or 
standard. Use of the word “sustainable” regarding provision of services is a qualifier since the 
term means ‘capable of being kept going over time or continuously’.309 If municipalities can 
show they are incapable of providing services in such manner, they cannot be held liable as 
they are not duty bound. Furthermore, they cannot force communities and their representative 
organisations to participate in local government matters, that is, to undertake or perform their 
civic duties. A further qualifier is section 152(2) of the Constitution which provides: “A 
municipality must strive, within its financial and administrative capacity, to achieve the objects 
                                                 
 306 Defined by the South African Concise Oxford Dictionary. 
 307 South African Concise Oxford Dictionary. 
 308 South African Concise Oxford Dictionary. 
 309 South African Concise Oxford Dictionary. 
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set out in subsection 1.” “Strive” means no more than to ‘make great efforts’,310 in other words, 
to try. The wording in the Constitution gives some credence to the argument by Bekink (2006) 
that “functions are often vaguely defined, especially where services are vertically integrated or 
shared by other spheres.”311 
 
While local government’s objects cannot be equated with duties, they are goals to be aimed at 
and to be attainable over a reasonable period, especially if capacitated by national and 
provincial governments.312 Within this context, it is up to enlightened, committed and 
competent leaders and administrators to build a developmental culture with their communities 
so residents would be happy to undertake their civic duties and help municipalities achieve their 
jointly-planned goals and targets within a resource-constrained environment. Municipal 
representatives can play a major role in assisting to specify and achieve objectives. Bekink 
(2006) contends that setting down of specific objects for local government is linked to and 
founded upon the “traditional purpose of local authorities and is in confirmation of its role and 
duties.”313 He adds that “in essence the specified objects are to confirm the new constitutional 
commitment to an overall democratic state and accountable government…”314 
 
In Fedsure the Court ruled that one of the objectives of local government is to eliminate 
disparities and disadvantages that are the consequences of past policies and to upgrade services 
in previously disadvantaged areas and to provide equal services to all as soon as possible.315 
These objects then become obligations on local government.  
 
Municipalities need to form pacts with their communities and other parties to jointly plan and 
implement initiatives that contribute to fulfilling or meeting the goals and objectives of local 
government. Hence, sound leadership and civic responsibility are necessary. Therefore, 
municipalities must create a climate conducive to social and economic development. 
 
 
                                                 
 310 South African Concise Oxford Dictionary.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 311 Bekink (2006), op cit, 215. 
 312 In terms of section 154(1) of the Constitution. 
 313 Bekink (2006), op cit, 67. 
 314 Bekink (2006), op cit, 68.  
 315 Op cit, paragraphs 1464 and 1488.  
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4.3.8 RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENTAL DUTIES OF MUNICIPALITIES   
The former Minister of Provincial and Local Government said in 2007:316 
Although agreement has still to be achieved on a characterisation of the developmental state in South Africa, 
a broad consensus appears to exist around the idea that the process of development involves more than just 
economic growth but includes life-and-death issues such as poverty, personal security, distributive equity, 
social justice and environmental sustainability. 
 
A developmental state incorporating developmental local government cannot be achieved 
without the participation of leaders, municipal representatives, and local communities.  
Although sub-titles or marginal notes have no legal standing, that introducing section 153 
clearly states the “developmental duties of municipalities”. This is reinforced by the mandate 
to promote social and economic development,317 and to participate in development programmes 
of the other two spheres.318  
 
Whereas local authorities were previously the providers of basic municipal services, they must 
now carry out their additional responsibilities, such as promotion of social and economic 
development and ensuring that rights are given effect to. These are functions that inadequately-
resourced and insufficiently-committed municipalities may fail to do. Notwithstanding the 
problems associated with such additional duties, the lack of suitable precedents also throws up 
serious challenges to municipalities already stretched to render minimal services. The situation 
is ‘exacerbated’ when post-apartheid legislation is unmistakably pro-poor, and rightly so, by 
providing, upgrading and rehabilitation of services, including extension to hitherto un-serviced 
and under-serviced areas, without clarity and consensus on resources. Additionally, the 
provision of a minimum, nationally-set level of free basic services for all in order to aid the 
indigent, create enormous difficulties especially for weak local institutions. Despite such 
challenges, it is clear that the Constitution requires and mandates municipalities to be 
developmental; thus one sees law as an instrument for development, particularly for fulfilling 
the entitlements in the Bill of Rights operationalising what in most countries are entitlements or 
privileges or, as in the case of India, directive principles of state policy explicit and inherent in 
its Bill of Rights. Municipalities are constitutionally-bound to deliver the rights to equality; 
labour relations; environment; property; housing; health care, food, water and social security; 
                                                 
 316 At the Developmental State Seminar at Pretoria on 19 October 2007, quoted in the book edited by Ben 
Turok (2008): ‘Wealth Doesn’t Trickle Down: The Case for a Developmental State in South Africa’, Cape Town: 
New Agenda, 1. 
 317 Section 153(a) of the Constitution.  
 318 Section 153(b) of the Constitution.  
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children’s rights; access to information; and just administrative action.319 Such rights place 
correspondingly onerous duties, obligations, and responsibilities on municipalities. Even when 
they may be subject to limitations and qualifications restricting their implementation,320 most 
could be enforceable,321 especially with innovative interpretation and where the courts are true 
to the Constitution, rather than towing the line set by the government of the day. 
 
To fulfil their developmental duties, section 153 of the Constitution provides that: 
“Municipalities must – 
(a) structure and manage its administration and budgeting and planning processes to give 
priority to the basic needs of the community, and to promote the social and economic 
development of the community; and 
(b) participate in national and provincial developmental programmes.”  
 
The above “duties” do not amount to much of substance. However, Bekink (2006) argues that 
if it can be shown that a municipality did not give priority to the needs of its community and to 
promoting socio-economic development within its jurisdiction, “its actions or programmes will 
be contrary to the constitutional obligation” and could be declared “unconstitutional and 
invalid.”322 In such a situation judicial intervention is permissible.323 Municipal representatives 
and administrators need to heed this requirement. Following on the constitutional directive, 
certain governmental publications and enactments, such as White Paper on Local Government 
(1998) and the Systems Act required that local government become ‘developmental’. This term 
has not been defined in the Constitution and has thus been variously interpreted by local 
government and other role occupants in this sphere. It was contended324 that this extended 
mandate had been imposed at a time when most municipalities were having great difficulty in 
fulfilling their primary or traditional role.325 The lack of precedent or appropriate ‘best practices’ 
                                                 
 319 Respectively, sections 9, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32 and 33 of the Constitution. 
 320 Section 36 of the Constitution. 
 321 In terms of section 38 of the Constitution. 
 322 Bekink (2006), op cit, 68. 
 323 In terms of sections 2, 8 and 172 of the Constitution. 
 324 By Singh, A (2000) Co-operative Government and the Promotion of Economic Development by Local 
Government Associations: A First Exploration, unpublished LLM Dissertation, Pretoria: Unisa, 1.  
 325 As provider of basic public goods and services on the basis of race and affordability. 
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in South Africa for the planning, promotion, and management of socio-economic development 
or even local economic development (LED), the limited human capital and material resources 
for their successful implementation, and the creation of new institutions and processes within 
the three spheres of government to fulfil the developmental mandate have resulted in much 
duplication and fragmentation, as well as unhealthy competition, thereby delaying, deferring, 
postponing, stifling or neglecting development.326  
 
It has been argued that – 
The current local government functions do not enable it to make the maximum social and economic impact 
envisaged by the Constitution and the White Paper… [as there is] this mismatch between the notion of 
developmental local government and the powers of local government.327 
 
Local government now have significant powers and functions. It is how they prioritise their 
planning and operations so that it can be developmental requires qualified and competent 
leadership and technocrats. A disadvantage is the confusion created by the mandate of economic 
development and the various interpretation of this and LED in the local sphere. Municipalities, 
as governmental institutions closest to the people, feel the impact of underdevelopment first 
and most.  
 
The Constitution prescribed local participatory democracy and in the process several policies 
were formulated and then concretised through statutes. The system, for the first time, involved 
the governed, through community engagement and consultation, with democratically elected 
councillors in the forefront. Several statutory obligations with a pro-poor bias were enacted 
whereby the mandate of local government was considerably increased, especially by the 
requirement of promoting social and economic development. A pooling and sharing of 
resources through working in a co-operative rather than a competitive mode could enhance 
service delivery. Municipal representation could facilitate this. 
 
Duties connote obligations that municipalities are obliged to fulfil. The transformation of local 
authorities from agencies of the state providing basic municipal services to one of designers 
                                                 
 326 For example, the Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council was established by 
Premier’s Proclamation on 3 December 1994. The city was divided into a metropolitan council with seven 
metropolitan substructures, some six months later local councils were consolidated into four. There were, thus, 
five structures for practically all functions, until the ‘unicity’ was established after the local government elections 
of 2000, see www.joburg.org.za (archives). 
 327 Community Law Centre (2007) Paper 1 – Developmental Local Government: Determining 
Appropriate Powers and Functions, Cape Town: University of the Western Cape, 6-7. 
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and deliverers of sustainable socio-economic development constitutes a paradigm shift. Once 
again, local government must be assisted and supported by national and provincial governments 
to achieve this extended and onerous mandate. Municipal representatives must demand what 
has been promised by the Constitution and consistently in the SoNA in order to meet local 
authorities’ hitherto unknown responsibilities. This relates particularly to capacitation by 
national and provincial governments.328 The Constitutional Court held329 that “the Province 
must, as the Constitution envisages, ‘promote the development of local government capacity to 
enable municipalities to perform their functions and manage their own affairs.330 In this context, 
the view of Mathenjwa (2013) is informative: 
Despite the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the MEC for Local Government Mpumalanga 
case331 that courts cannot enforce provincial governments to support local government, the duty of 
provincial government to support local government is enforceable…if the conditions for support exist and 
the provincial government is able to render such support.332  
 
While the judiciary is not a lawmaker, its job is to interpret the law. Post-1996 Courts appreciate 
the “important role local government fulfil not only in establishing a democratic foundation for 
the whole country, but also in performing most important developmental tasks.” Court 
decisions “often give direction and new meaning to existing legal norms and principles.333  
 
Cloete (2008) argues that the numerous constitutional and statutory obligations placed on local 
government have not been “fully and appropriately implemented,” adding that: 
A contributing factor to bad service delivery is the weak quality of municipal councillors and the general 
political leadership and management at the local government level…334 
 
Cloete (2008) asserts that the biggest challenge in the local sphere is bad management and 
implementation, not poor constitutionally-mandated structures and policies. Therefore, what is 
required is better municipal decision-making and management practices. He argues that the 
outcome is not that of a bad constitutional system but the poor implementation of an appropriate 
existing one.335 While one can agree that the governmental system, an experimental one, may 
have been appropriate at the time and under the circumstances, poor service delivery cannot be 
                                                 
 328 In terms of section 154(1) of the Constitution.  
 329 In Habitat, op cit, paragraph 27.  
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attributed to municipalities alone since they are part of a three-sphere system and to date the 
national and provincial governments have not lived up to the constitutional promises and 
expectations of capacitating local government. In this context, a committed, dedicated, and 
competent cadre of municipal leaders and representatives can make forceful demands for what 
is their due.  
 
The Systems Act defines ‘development’ as “sustainable development and includes integrated 
social, economic, environmental, spatial, infrastructural, institutional organisational and human 
resources upliftment of a community aimed at – 
(a) improving the quality of life of its members with specific reference to the poor and 
other disadvantaged sections of the community; and  
(b) ensuring that development serves present and future generations.” 
 
This definition is unhelpful. “Develop” means ‘grow or cause to grow and become larger or 
more advanced’.336 It also does not elaborate on what is meant, more so in terms of community 
and human development. 
 
Given the enlarged or expanded role of municipalities both functionally and geographically, 
they need to develop capacity speedily. Bekink (2006) argues that “municipalities will have to 
become more strategic in their orientation … be open and flexible to new or unforeseen 
demands … maximise integrated capacity, both inside and outside the municipal jurisdiction 
… and be more community orientated.”337 Further, they have to “develop mechanisms to 
interact with community groups and to identify service needs and priorities.” The design, 
implementation and monitoring of new policies and strategies and policies require a “strong 
municipal leadership.” However, “it is ultimately the responsibility of national and provincial 
governments to monitor and oversee the effective performance by municipalities of their 
functions.”338 It is argued that monitoring and oversight are only two responsibilities in a 
package that includes support and capacitation of municipalities. This must be done first and if 
municipalities thereafter fail then only intervention by provincial government should be 
permitted. 
                                                 
 336 South African Concise Oxford Dictionary.  
 337 At 286-287.  
 338 Bekink (2006), op cit, 287.  
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Section 4(1)(a)-(c) of the Systems Act sets out the rights of municipal councils. Bekink (2006) 
highlights the importance of distinguishing between rights and duties, on the one hand, and 
powers and functions, on the other.339 While the Constitution340 explicitly prescribes the powers 
and functions of municipalities, it does not pronounce on their rights and duties.341 The Systems 
Act does so in this section. 
 
Section 152(2) of the Constitution constitutes a qualifier of the objects of local government set 
out in section 152(1)(a)-(e), in that it states a municipality has to “strive, within its financial 
and administrative capacity” to achieve them. Absent this capability, community members’ 
rights may be unfulfilled. Under such circumstances, it is incumbent upon national and 
provincial government to “support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities”342 until they 
are able to meet their obligations. Section 4(2) of the Systems Act reinforces this constitutional 
qualifier by stipulating that the duty applies provided it is undertaken “within the municipality’s 
financial and administrative capacity and having regard to practical considerations.” An 
apparently contradictory provision is that the municipality must act “in the best interests of the 
community” when exercising its legislative and executive authority and using resources.343 It 
is unclear whether this stipulation overrides section 4(2) of the Systems Act where obligations 
are to be met to the extent that a municipality’s financial and administrative capacity permits 
them.  Sections 4(2)(b)-(j) reaffirms and expands on the constitutional obligations and 
particularly on the rights to the environment; property; housing; health care, food, water, and 
social security; and education.344 These provisions have implications for municipal 
representatives in that a council has to operate optimally within a context of limited resources. 
In such a situation, intellectual capital can play a major role. 
 
 ‘Developmental’ municipalities, since 2000, are something radically different from what local 
authorities, as providers of basic pubic goods and services in their geographical areas, have 
undertaken hitherto. They now have to promote and fulfil human rights, provide at least a 
minimum of their communities’ basic needs, while addressing inherited backlogs and spatial 
                                                 
 339 Op cit, 83.  
 340 Section 156.  
 341 Save for the stipulation of giving priority to the basic needs of communities in its administration, 
budgeting and planning processes, and local government participation in national and provincial programmes – 
sections 153(a) and (b) of the Constitution.   
 342  In terms of section 154(1) of the Constitution. 
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distortions, and providing safe, habitable living environments. This can be achieved through 
competent and committed municipal and community representatives and local government 
administrators, working in a co-operative fashion inter se, and with the provincial and national 
spheres of government. Bekink’s (2006) summary of the current situation merits an extended 
quote: 
 The Constitution provides local government with a sound foundation as a distinctive sphere of government 
with its own entrenched autonomy and specified powers and functions. Local government will not be able 
to fulfil and comply with its various objectives and duties without the constructive assistance of other 
spheres of government, the positive and committed support of administrators, a purposeful and public-
oriented, effective, efficient and accountable political leadership and a supportive, informed and fully 
committed local community.345  
 
 
4.4 MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION TO PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Chapter 9 of the Constitution establishes six state institutions supporting constitutional 
democracy. Section 181(1)(a) provides for the Public Protector; 181(1)(b) the South African 
Human Rights Commission (SAHRC); and 181(1)(d) The Commission for Gender Equality 
(CGE). These institutions are “independent, and subject only to the Constitution and the law”, 
and are accountable to the National Assembly to which they must report at least annually.346  
These and several non-governmental-organisations as well as councillors and SALGA can 
function as representatives to promote the rights of citizens. 
 
The Public Protector has the power, as regulated by the Public Protector Act,347 “to investigate 
any conduct in state affairs, or in the public administration in any sphere of government, that is 
alleged or suspected to be improper or to result in any impropriety or prejudice,348 and “must 
be accessible to all persons and communities.”349 Hence, councillors, community leaders, and 
residents can use the services of the Public Protector.  
 
The CGE “must promote respect for gender equality and the protection, development and 
attainment” thereof.350 It has the power, inter alia, to “monitor, investigate, research, educate, 
                                                 
 345 Op cit, 78. 
 346 Sections 181(2) and (5) of the Constitution.  
 347 15 of 2016.  
 348 Section 182(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
 349 Section 182(4) of the Constitution.  
 350 Section 187(1) of the Constitution.  
181 
 
lobby, advise and report on issues” within its mandate.351 Any person can report or make a 
complaint on gender discrimination and abuse. 
 
In terms of section 13.1(b)(v) of South African Human Rights Commission Act,352 the SAHRC 
“must review government policies relating to human rights and may make recommendations”. 
Section 12.2(a) empowers it to make recommendations to all legislatures on the “adoption of 
new legislation which will promote respect for human rights and a culture of human rights”. 
Section 12.3(b) grants the SAHRC locus standi to “bring proceedings in a competent court or 
tribunal in its own name, or on behalf of a person or a group or class of persons.” This is a 
powerful mechanism that councillors and community representatives can bring to force 
municipalities to fulfil their obligations or for local government leaders to demand support from 
the provincial and national spheres of government when municipalities fail to fulfil their 
constitutional or statutory obligations, especially in respect of the provisions in the Bill of 
Rights. 
 
In advocating a rights-based approach to service delivery and a generic right to adequate water 
and sanitation, the SAHRC takes as a point of departure the rights to dignity, privacy, and a 
clean and healthy environment. It considers meaningful public participation an essential 
component in fulfilment of such entitlements. Provincial and national government should be 
held accountable where municipalities fail.  
 
In attempting to fulfil these rights through service delivery, municipalities must have regard to 
the key principles of “active participation, social cohesion and community empowerment”.353 
They have to provide evidence that “effective and interactive community participation” with 
active communication and proactive information sharing” took place in the “planning, 
implementation and evaluation of a project”.354 This requirement is based on the belief that 
adequate consultation in conceptualisation would provide local government with “clear insight 
of the community’s needs and its own capacity to respond accordingly”.355 In terms of the 
Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA), it is incumbent on the municipality to consult 
communities on the budget for specific projects within the context of the Medium Term 
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Expenditure Framework (MTEF), especially in regard to a municipality’s plan to deal with 
water shortages. The SAHRC contends that “Access to information is a fundamental right 
entitling people to information that public bodies hold, and facilitating informed participation 
in decisions which affect their daily lives.”356 By a municipality complying with the Promotion 
of Access to Justice Act (PAJA) on all aspects of the project process, including tenders and how 
residents can access information, it can enable consumers to not only participate meaningfully 
but also to hold that municipality accountable. In most cases, the respondents (municipalities) 
have been shown to have failed to share information and consult, thus being in breach of their 
constitutional obligation.  
 
Of interest is the SAHRC’s Water and Sanitation Reports based on complaints received and 
investigations undertaken. In 2011 and 2013 there were reports on five municipalities.357 The 
SAHRC investigations are undertaken and reported on in a format established by international 
and domestic legal frameworks. Section 3 of the Water Services Act, 108 of 1997 provides 
(quote): 
(1) Everyone has a right of access to basic water supply and basic sanitation;  
(2) Every water services institution must take reasonable measures to realise these rights; and  
(3) Every water services authority must, in its water services development plan, provide for measures to 
realise these rights. 
 
Section 5 stipulates that where a water services institution is “unable to meet the requirements 
of all its existing consumers, it must give preference to the provision of basic water supply and 
basic sanitation to them.” Regulation 3 of the Compulsory National Standards sets out the 
minimum standard of basic water supply services. Basic sanitation is defined as “The prescribed 
minimum standard of services necessary for the safe, hygienic and adequate collection, 
removal, disposal or purification of human excreta, domestic waste water and sewage from 
households, including informal households.” The Free Basic Sanitation Strategy358 requires 
municipalities to ensure that every household has access to basic sanitation, as per the 
                                                 
 356 Ibid.  
 357 Gareth van Onselen, on behalf of the Democratic Alliance (Complainant) v Moqhaka Local 
Municipality, Free State Province (Respondent), report signed 16/05/2011; Henro Kruger on behalf of the 
Democratic Alliance (Complainant) v The Administrator: Emalahleni Local Municipality (Witbank) and the 
Municipality (Respondents), report signed 18/12/2013; George Mkhwanazi on behalf of residents of Klipgat C 
(Complainant) v Madibeng Local Municipality, North West Province (Respondent), report signed 18/12/2013; 
South African Human Rights Commission on behalf of residents of Senekal (Complainant) v Setsoto Local 
Municipality, Free State Province (Respondent), report signed 18/12/2013; and South African Human Rights 
Commission on behalf of residents of Henneman v Matjhabeng Local Municipality, Free State Province 
(Respondent), report signed 18/12/2013.      
 358 Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 2009. 
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Constitution, Water Services Act, and the Systems Act. It acknowledges that there is “a right of 
access to a basic level of sanitation service” enshrined in the Constitution.359 
 
In dealing with the constitutionality of the death penalty, the Constitutional Court in S v 
Makwanyane360 pronounced on the right to human dignity. It did so again in NM v Smith361 
where it was defined and the rationale for its value explained, alongside the rights to equality 
and freedom, as “justiciable and enforceable rights that must be respected and protected”. 
 
Erasmus J of the Western Cape High Court in Beja v Premier of the Western Cape362  held that: 
Any housing development which does not provide for toilets with adequate privacy and safety would be 
inconsistent with Section 26 of the Constitution and would be in violation of the constitutional rights to 
privacy and dignity. 
 
He added that section 73(1)(c) of the Systems Act sets down the minimum level of basic services 
and based thereon, there was violation of constitutional rights under sections 10 (human 
dignity), 12 (freedom and security of the person), 14 (privacy), 24 (environment), 26 (housing), 
and 27 (healthcare).363 
 
In reading sections 152 and 153 of the Constitution,364 alongside the applicable provisions of 
the Systems Act and Housing Act, the Constitutional Court in Joseph v City of Johannesburg365  
found that a “public right to basic municipal services” existed, imposing a duty on 
municipalities to provide them. The Court held that “electricity is one of the most common and 
important basic municipal services and has become virtually indispensable, particularly in 
urban society.” It stated that the “provision of basic municipal services is a cardinal function, if 
not the most important function of every municipal government.” The Court added that the duty 
to deliver such services is a “central mandate of local government” and a “matter of public 
duty.”366  It held further that – 
                                                 
 359 Free Basic Sanitation Strategy, op cit. 
 360 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
 361 2007 (5) SA 250 (CC) at paragraphs 49-51. 
 362 (21332/10) [2011] ZAWCHC 97; [2011] 3 All SA 401 (WCC); 2011 (10) BCLR 1077 (WCC) (29 
April 2011) at paragraph 147. 
 363 Ibid. 
 364 “Objects of local government” and “Development duties of municipalities”, respectively.   
 365 Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (CCT 43/09) [2009] ZACC 30; 2010 (3) BCLR 
212 (CC); 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) (9 October 2009). 
 366 Joseph, op cit, paragraphs 34 and 47. 
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… Batho Pele gives practical expression to the constitutional value of ubuntu which embraces the relational 
nature of rights. Courts must move beyond the common law conception of rights as strict boundaries of 
individual entitlement.367 
 
Bilchitz (2010) refers to the ruling in Joseph as giving rise to a “‘new’ public law duty that 
government has towards its citizens to deliver basic services.” He argues that this could stem 
from three possible citizen-government relationships, namely, “Citizen as customer”; “citizen 
as a party to a social contract”; and “Citizen as a friend/Community.”368  
Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local Council369 was one of the first 
cases to explicitly recognise the constitutional right to water and concomitantly the duty of the 
local council to progressively provide for that entitlement.  
 
In Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg370  the Constitutional Court confirmed section 27(1)(b), 
the right to sufficient water. 
 
The North Gauteng High Court in Federation for Sustainable Environment v the Minister of 
Water Affairs371 reaffirmed the responsibilities of local government as stipulated in section 152 
of the Constitution. 
 
In its report372 the SAHRC stated that “Dignity is the recognition of the inherent worth and 
value of every human being” reiterating that the Constitution reinstated it as its “first founding 
value and as a substantive right in the Bill of Rights.” It goes on to suggest that “National 
treasury must specify that funds it allocates to local government must be “used to improve lives 
of the poorest communities” while building municipal capacity to manage them.373 It adds: 
                                                 
 367 Joseph, op cit, footnote 39. 
 368 Bilchitz, David ‘Citizenship and Community: Exploring the Right to Receive Basic Municipal 
Services in Joseph (2010) Constitutional Court Review Vol III, 45-78, 46. 
 369 2010 (43) SA 55 (CC). 
 370 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
 371 (35672/12) [2012] ZAGPPHC 128 (10 July 2012), at paragraph 14. 
 372 SAHRC (2014) Report on the Right to Access Sufficient Water and Decent Sanitation in South Africa 
2014, 7. 
 373 Page 8. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
185 
 
The report highlights systemic failures in governance and budgeting, particularly in the implementation of 
and spending on projects. These failures point to the need for government to evaluate the current models of 
governance and funding.374 
 
A concern in the SAHRC report was the proposed devolution by assignment of the human 
settlements function to accredited municipalities “given the current lack of capacity, skill and 
service delivery backlogs at local government.”375 During The 2013 National Water and 
Sanitation Hearing,376 a letter dated 3 June 2013 from the Minister of Finance showed that 
“during the period 2013/14, just over R30 billion was allocated to municipalities for delivery 
of water and sanitation services to poor households...” The Minister also stated national 
government’s concern that the substantial resources provided “are not being used optimally and 
that the pace of service delivery rollout suffers as a result.” This points to inefficient use of 
available financial resources and calls for monitoring of such funding. It is also indicative of 
National Treasury’s and CoGTA’s approach – the need for monitoring rather than only on 
capacitating and supporting errant and especially weak municipalities. The situation would be 
worse in rural areas. 
 
 The above investigations by the SAHRC highlight the need of the poor to be represented so that 
their plight can be brought to the attention of decision-makers. One method being used 
increasingly today is through violent community protests. A better alternative is for a local 
activist or a ward or opposition councillor to represent aggrieved residents or the municipality 
itself. Here, a view applicable to municipal representation may be apt: 
 Ultimately, however, it is the ‘human factor’ that determines if the fine legal principles contained in the 
Constitution and the IGR Act are turned into practical reality.377 
 
 This could be taken further by the Chapter 9 institutions and brought to the attention of 
Parliament. As the peoples’ representative, the House of Assembly and the NCoP, and in rural 
areas, the National House of Traditional Leaders, could demand that the executive urgently take 
appropriate action. Hence, representation is the preferred mode of making municipalities fulfil 
their obligations, and if they fail, for provincial government to intervene.378  
 
                                                 
 374 Page 14. 
 375 Page 17. 
 376 With the theme “The Right to Water and Sanitation”, held on Human Rights Day, 21 March 2013, 
report pages 65-66. 
 377 De Villiers (2012), op cit, 690.  
 378 In terms of section 139(1) of the Constitution. 
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 4.5 LOCAL PARTICIPATORY AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
 
Budhu and Wiechers (2003) argue that the LGTA and the Structures Act “lay the foundations 
for representative democracy in the local sphere of government in the whole of the country.” 
They assert that the “spheres of government have the obligation to consult each other and to co-
operate.”379 This provides an opportunity for municipal representatives to demand that they be 
involved in policy matters affecting local government. The Systems Act operationalises many 
of the constitutional provisions pertaining to local government. It is an excellent example of 
how law can be used to promote social and economic development, particularly of previously 
disadvantaged or marginalised communities, through co-operative governance and service 
delivery. For municipalities to do this more effectively, they need to be represented on select 
decision-making structures. 
 
Chapter 2 of the Systems Act sets out the legal nature and rights and duties of municipalities. 
With respect to the legal nature, sections 2(b)(i) and (ii) of the Act prescribe that a municipality 
is constituted by its political structures and administration, for the one part, and its community, 
on the other. Formal incorporation of the community as a component of a municipality has 
important implications and consequences for representation. Section 2(c) stipulates that a 
municipality functions within its territorial jurisdiction “in accordance with its political, 
statutory and other relationships between its political structures, political office bearers and 
administration and its community.” Bekink (2006) points out that the “constitutional objective 
of community involvement/public participation is specifically incorporated.” He adds that 
emphasis on the political dimension of the local structures is to show that they “represent the 
local interests within each municipal council.”380 This indicates that a municipality operates on 
the basis of both local participatory direct democracy and representative democracy. 
 
The constitutionally and statutorily bestowed status on members of a community, alongside 
their rights and duties, concomitantly places onerous responsibilities on community and 
municipal representatives. Now more than ever, they must be equal to their tasks.  
 
                                                 
 379 At 470, 473.  
 380 Bekink (2006), op cit, 82. 
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Section 4(3) of the Systems Act confirms and reinforces a municipality’s responsibility in the 
exercise of its executive or legislative authority to “respect the rights of citizens and those of 
other persons protected by the Bill of Rights.” The judgment in Fedsure made mention of the 
trust between a municipality and its ratepayers. This ruling was confirmed by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal,381 where it was held that a fiduciary relationship exists between a municipality 
and its ratepayers. 
 
Section 5(1)(a)-(g) of the Systems Act prescribes the rights of members of a local community, 
thereby confirming the right of public participation in municipal affairs. It also places an onus 
on the municipality to respond promptly to community inputs. The right to information on 
decisions of the council on residents’ rights, property, and reasonable expectations is innovative 
in that municipalities cannot operate by might or stealth as in the apartheid past.  
 
Disclosure of a municipality’s state of affairs may provide early warning, thus enabling 
residents and ratepayers to act timeously to safeguard their rights and to exercise a measure of 
control over a municipality’s actions. This community oversight and control is also facilitated 
by committee and council meetings being open to the public.  
 
The corollary of citizens’ rights are the duties imposed on them by sections 5(2)(a)-(e) of the 
Systems Act. One of them, 5(2)(b), is the duty,382 to pay promptly services fees and surcharges 
thereon; property rates and other taxes; and any levies or duties. This provision appears to imply 
that where a community member without just cause does not pay as prescribed, his or her rights 
are null and void. It is incumbent on the municipal or ward representative to educate the 
communities on rights and responsibilities, as well as consequences relating thereto. 
 
Section 6(1) of the Systems Act sets out the duties of municipal administration, stipulating that 
it is founded upon the basic values and principles governing public administration383 and 
reaffirming that these principles apply to “administration in every sphere of government” and 
to all organs of state.384 The provisions in sections 6(2)(a)-(b) and (d)-(f) of the Act apply to the 
                                                 
 381 In Kempton Park/Tembisa Metropolitan Substructure v Kelder (51/98) [2000] ZASCA 22; 2000 (2) 
SA 980 (SCA); [2000] 2 All SA 451 (A); (31 March 2000). 
 382 Subject to exceptions stipulated in section 97 of the Systems Act. 
 383 Prescribed in section 195(1)(a)-(i) of the Constitution. 
 384 Sections 195(2)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. 
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administration’s obligations and responsibilities to and relationships with the local community. 
Section 6(2)(c) requires the municipal administration to “take measures to prevent corruption.” 
 
Bekink (2006) emphasises that in the three-sphere governmental system – 
Each component has its own rights and duties within that specific sphere of government, and strong 
interactions and co-ordination between the various components is a sine qua non for political stability, 
community participation, regular payment for services and a committed and effective local 
administration.385 
 
 Chapter 4 of the Systems Act addresses community participation. Sections 16-22 elaborate on 
what municipalities are duty-bound to do to promote local participatory democracy. 
Community participation is a welcome and innovative provision as for the first time it is 
explicitly stated that communities have rights and duties.386 Municipalities are therefore 
statutorily bound to establish a culture of community participation387 and to facilitate 
municipality-community engagement.388 Examples of the mechanisms to be set up are: making 
meetings open to the public389 and by establishing and maintaining effective communication 
systems.390 The definition of “community” is innovative as it incorporates visitors using 
services in localities where they are not resident, and local non-governmental, civic, private 
sector, and labour organisations. As such, they may be the bearers of rights, capable of 
enforcement and therefore adds to and complicates the role and responsibilities of 
municipalities and their representatives.  
  
 The rights of the community and individuals therein can place corresponding yet onerous 
responsibilities on the municipality, particularly its executive mayor, but it is a practical way of 
promoting participatory democracy. Council-community engagement can aid input by a 
representative body on strategic structures thus ensuring that policies and national priority 
programmes are designed on the real needs of the people. The clear import of such selective 
treatment and elaborate provisions is perhaps a genuine desire on the part of the state to attain 
a more egalitarian society through giving the governed a greater say in decisions affecting their 
lives and livelihood. The intention of engagement or interaction would be to get first-hand 
                                                 
 385 Op cit, 87.  
 386 Chapter 4 generally, especially section 5, of the Systems Act.  
 387 Section 16.  
 388 Section 17. 
 389 Section 20. 
 390 Section 18. 
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information on needs and aspirations so as to achieve a better fit between them and the products 
and projects designed by the bureaucracy.  
 
 Local government policies and actions should be purposive, the end being development of the 
poor. The community now has specific rights391 that the municipal chief executive is duty 
bound392 to give effect to, through several prescribed mechanisms and procedures.393 The local 
community is now statutorily entitled to contribute to decision-making by the council and to 
make oral or written submissions, recommendations, representations and complaints, with 
prompt responses required thereto from the municipality, to regular disclosure of the 
municipality’s state of affairs, and to be informed of decisions affecting their rights.394 
 
The preamble to the Systems Act is considerably forward-looking and ambitious, and time will 
tell whether the ideals espoused therein will be achieved by the three-sphere governmental 
system. The large number of duties and responsibilities posited by the Systems Act in a context 
of resource constraints means that municipalities should find innovative ways of promoting 
socio-economic development and attracting investment for this purpose. It would also be 
necessary to work in partnership with a competent, committed, and enlightened leadership both 
in the council and within local communities. A municipality would need effective internal and 
external communications and knowledge sharing, raising awareness of human rights and 
obligations related thereto, and efficient municipal ward councillors. 
 
Bekink (2006) argues that “one of the main objectives of local democracy is to ensure public 
involvement and participation.” This requires accountable leadership which must be capable of 
motivating, encouraging, and sustaining community participation.395 Social inclusion is 
therefore an obligation on municipalities as is citizen participation on residents.  
                                                 
 391 Section 5(1). 
 392 In terms of section 4(2). 
 393 Section 6(2) and Chapter 4. 
 394 Sections 5(1)(a)-(e).  
 395 Op cit, 72. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
190 
 
Bekink (2006) remarked that “public participation within all spheres of government is a 
constitutional prerequisite.”396 The Systems Act concretises this directive and that of 
accountability, responsiveness, and openness, insofar as local government is concerned.397 
Bekink (2006) adds: 
The process of ensuring participation and accountability in local government represents major challenges 
for all municipalities… Many members of society do not have the opportunities that others do to express 
themselves. The lack of resources and education often excludes people from participatory processes.398  
 
Municipal leaders and administrators will have to be innovative in giving effect to the 
constitutional and Systems Act directives of local participatory and representative democracy. 
In such a system responsibility and accountability would be foremost.  “Responsible” means 
‘having an obligation to do something, or having control over someone’ while “accountable” is 
defined as ‘required or expected to justify actions or decisions’399 and includes an obligation to 
provide answers for specific actions or conduct. In this respect, the High Court held – 
All three components of a municipality … must be accountable in municipal matters. A system that 
encourages participation also deepens local democracy, as citizens feel more confident about participating 
when they know that their inputs count and those responsible can be held accountable. Accountability in 
local government further ensures that the actions of the council also reflect the aspirations of the relevant 
community.400 
 
Chapter 5 of the Systems Act is devoted to integrated development planning. The integrated 
development plan (IDP) is an innovation, albeit introduced earlier by the Local Government 
Transition Act and the Development Facilitation Act. It requires401 that municipal planning be 
“developmentally oriented”, and, as the title suggests, be integrated so as to fulfil the objectives 
of local government.402 The Act stipulates the developmental duties of municipalities;403 and 
                                                 
 396 At 309.  
 397 In compliance with sections (1) founding values) and 152 (objects of local government) in the 
Constitution. See also Bekink (2006), op cit, 476.  
 398 Bekink (2006), op cit, 476. 
 399 South African Concise Oxford Dictionary. 
 400 In Umzinto North Town Board v Moodley 1996 (1) SA 539 (D), at paragraphs 543-545. 
 401 In section 23 of the Systems Act. 
 402 As depicted in section 152 of the Constitution. 
 403 As set out in section 153 of the Constitution. 
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their contribution to realisation of fundamental rights entrenched in the Constitution.404 It is a 
practical mechanism to promote local participatory democracy as it allows the people to 
determine priorities and to shape the municipality’s budgets. The Act provides that the IDP is 
the municipality’s “principal strategic planning instrument” that guides and informs all 
planning, management, and development decisions.405 It states further406 that it binds the 
municipality’s executive decisions. Express reference to “executive” means that the IDP does 
not bind the council in terms of its legislative acts.  
 
It was envisaged that the IDP would be the mechanism through which national priority 
programmes would be implemented, with municipalities playing a leading role therein. This 
was not only overambitious but it places municipalities with a burden, as it requires local 
government to direct the other spheres of government on the basis of a programme or project 
being located within its spatial area of jurisdiction. The IDP and community participation 
provisions in the Act need to be tested in practice in the light of considerable and increasing 
service delivery protests. Holistic and integrated planning jointly by municipalities and their 
communities will enable a municipal representative body to consolidate, co-ordinate, prioritise, 
communicate, and thereby articulate clearly the needs of the various local communities to 
decision-making bodies. This will facilitate a better fit between nationally formulated policies 
and priority programmes with the needs of people in the municipalities.  
 
Integrated development planning in the provincial and local spheres of government would now 
be based on the foundation, framework, and context of the Spatial Planning and Land Use 
Management Act.407 This enactment sets out a number of development principles, including: 
Spatial justice, that incorporates redressing past spatial and other developmental imbalances, 
the “inclusion of persons and areas that were previously excluded”, “redress in access to land 
by disadvantaged communities and persons”, access to secure tenure and incremental upgrading 
of informal areas; spatial sustainability; efficiency; good administration, including policies, 
legislation and procedures that “must be clearly set in order to inform and empower members 
                                                 
 404 Sections 9, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, and 33 of the Constitution. 
 405 Sections 35 and 36 of the Systems Act. 
 406 Section 35(1)(b) of the Systems Act. 
 407 16 of 2013 (SPLUMA). 
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of the public.”408 There are several provisions catering for public participation.409 They create 
opportunities for municipal and community representatives for restorative justice and human 
development, as depicted in recent Court judgments. 
 
 Chapter 6 of the Systems Act deals with performance management. Sections 38-49 detail what 
municipalities must do to establish, maintain, and monitor performance. Performance 
management is an innovation in the public sector, formulated to ensure systematic and 
sustainable delivery of services by benchmarking and measuring performance. Much of these 
prescriptions, however, have been borrowed from European private sector practices, many of 
which have still not been perfected. However, performance management systems (PMS) is an 
essential tool to measure initiatives in co-operative governance enabling planners to make 
adjustments and to minimise unintended consequences through measurement, processing of 
information and feedback through inputs from and outputs to the environment. Section 42 of 
the Systems Act provides for community involvement in the PMS. With respect to performance 
management, the Systems Act requires:    
 Establishment and development of performance management systems (PMS);410  
 Core components of community involvement in municipal PMS;411 
 Setting key performance indicators (KPIs) and audit of performance measurement;412 
and  
 Reports on PMS and the making of regulations and guidelines.413  
 
Section 47(1) of the Systems Act reads: “The MEC for local government must annually compile 
and submit to the provincial legislatures and the Minister a consolidated report on the 
performance of municipalities in the province.” The report must identify municipalities that 
have under-performed during the year and propose remedial action to be taken. The report must 
then be published in the Provincial Gazette.414 The MEC is also tasked to submit a copy of the 
report to the NCoP.415 It is unclear what this institution is expected to do with it. The Minister 
                                                 
 408 Sections 7(a)(i), (ii), (iii), and (v); 7(b), 7(c), 7(e), and 7(e)(v), respectively, of the SPLUMA.   
 409 Sections 12(1)(o), 13(1), 13(4)(b), 15(6)(b), 18(4)(b), 20(3)(b), 23(2), 24(1), 26(5)(a) and (b), 28(1), 
and 42(1)(c)(i) of the SPLUMA.  
 410 Sections 38(a)-(c) of the Systems Act.   
 411 Sections 41(1)(a)-(e) and 42 of the Systems Act.  
 412 Sections 43(1)(a) and (b); 43(2); 44; and 45 of the Systems Act.  
 413 Sections 46(1)(a)-(c) as substituted by the Local Government: Municipal Systems Amendment Act, 44 
of 2003, sections 6 and 46(2) of the Systems Act.  
 414 Sections 47(1)-(2) of the Systems Act.  
 415 Section 47(3) of the Systems Act. 
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is permitted to make regulations or to issue guidelines to provide [for] or regulate certain 
issues.416 When doing so, the Minister must distinguish between different kinds of 
municipalities.”417 
 
 The core components of a PMS are: KPI’s; measurable performance targets; monitoring; review 
at least annually; measures to improve performance; and regular reporting to the council and 
public. The PMS must be so designed as to serve as an early warning system.418 Meeting what 
appears to be onerous requirements needs competent leadership, administration, and 
municipal/community representatives. In this respect, Bekink (2006) states that: “The Skills 
Development Act419 requires a Sector Education Training Authority (SETA) to be established 
in every sector of the South African workforce in order to develop skills.”420 One serves local 
government, the LGSETA. 
 
 A performance management system is a useful tool to gauge individuals’ and the institutions’ 
achievements and failures. The latter is dependent and is the aggregate of councillors’ and 
technocrats’ performance. If not properly devised, the PMS would be little more than financial 
compliance, particularly spending the allocated capital and operating budgets. A system that 
measures or quantifies inputs and outputs is not an appropriate indicator of achievements in 
social and economic development through service delivery. What is needed is an outcomes-
based monitoring, evaluation, and impact assessment (MEIA) system with objective and 
measurable KPAs, KPIs, and sanctions for failure to show how and to what extent communities, 
especially the poor, benefited over a particular period. The local PMS is related to Chapter 10 
of the Systems Act, titled “provincial and national monitoring and standard setting. Section 105 
addresses provincial monitoring of municipalities, while section 106 deals with non-
performance by and maladministration within municipalities. Section 108 stipulates “essential 
national and minimum standards.” The Systems Act does not address the vexed issue of 
provincial intervention in municipalities authorised by section 139(1) of the Constitution. 
 
  
 
                                                 
 416 Sections 49(1)(a)-(k) of the Systems Act. 
 417 Sections 49(2)-(4) of the Systems Act. 
 418 Sections 41(1)(a)-(e) and 41(2) of the Systems Act.  
 419 97 of 1998.  
 420 Bekink (2006), op cit, 494.  
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 In Chapter 7 of the Systems Act dealing with local public administration and human resources,  
 section 50 provides that the basic values and principles governing local public administration 
is as depicted under section 195(1) of the Constitution. Section 51(a) reiterates that a 
municipality must “be responsive to the needs of the local community.”  
 
 Chapter 8 of the Systems Act defines and describes “municipal services”. Section 73(1) sets out 
a “general duty” whereby municipalities “must give effect to the provisions of the Constitution” 
and insofar as it concerns local communities, (a) give priority to their basic needs; (b) promote 
their development; and (c) “ensure that all members … have access to at least the minimum 
level of basic municipal services.” Section 74(c) stipulates that “poor households must have 
access to at least basic services” through various tariff mechanisms. Section 86A(1)(b) provides 
for the “subsidisation of tariffs for poor households” through several stipulations. 
 
 Schedule 1 of the Systems Act is a Code of Conduct for councillors and traditional leaders, while 
Schedule 2 is a Code of Conduct for municipal staff members. Section 3 of the latter is titled 
“Commitment to serving the public interest”; no such provision applies to councillors and 
traditional leaders. These instruments alongside the PMS are supply-side measures to ensure 
effective municipal functioning based on aggregated performance of councillors and 
technocrats. There is need to measure and report on socio-economic development or failure 
thereof. Secondly, communities and individuals therein could assist in development planning, 
budget preparation, oversight, monitoring, and report-back. This could be facilitated by ward 
councillors and community leaders. SALGA could devise strategies and programmes to engage 
with and draw resources from communities resident in municipalities. Most supply side 
measures such as the PMS relate largely to financial accounting and not to achievements in 
community and human development. 
 
The Systems Act provides an excellent foundation and framework to show that law can be used 
as an instrument for development. The statute, while faithful to the constitutional prescripts, is, 
on the whole, a ‘motherhood and apple pie’ type of legislation.421 It is considerably long and 
detailed on the ‘whats’ but short on the ‘hows’ and the resources to achieve its admirable, pro-
poor objectives. In practice, alongside other new legislation, it creates numerous onerous 
                                                 
 421 Note that chapters V and VI of the DFA were declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court – 
see City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Planning Tribunal 2010 (6) SA 182 (CC), 
paragraphs 1 and 70. The statute was repealed by the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act of 2013.  
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obligations on local government whilst not considering adequately their resource and capacity 
constraints. This is mentioned in passing in section 10A, but only on assigned powers and 
functions. 
 
The Structures Act reiterates that municipal councils must strive to achieve the objectives 
stipulated in section 152 of the Constitution.422 It furthermore stipulates that a municipal council 
must annually review, inter alia, community needs, priorities to meet those needs, processes 
for involving the community, organisational and delivery mechanisms for meeting community 
needs, and overall performance in meeting the constitutionally-prescribed objectives.423 A 
municipality is duty-bound to develop mechanisms for community consultation in performing 
its functions and exercising its powers.424 Section 74 depicts the functions and powers of ward 
committees. 
 
The numerous rights, duties, obligations, responsibilities, and accountabilities create 
challenges, but also opportunities for representation of local communities within municipalities 
and on institutions in the other spheres of government. To do justice, the quality and 
commitment of representatives should be of the highest order. To achieve this, capacitation of 
municipalities by qualified top management and their monitoring and evaluation are required. 
More than going “back to basics” is necessary, as it has been shown that both national and 
provincial governments have failed in their duty to support and strengthen municipalities in the 
past sixteen years. The problems emanating from an extended local government mandate in a 
context of limited resources is that the ‘lowest’ sphere has to compete with the other two spheres 
of government, that decentralisation may result in more powers and responsibilities devolving 
to them without guarantee of the accompanying resources.425 Hence, municipal leadership and 
representatives have to be alert to these challenges and be capable of negotiating in the best 
interest of their residents. Bekink (2006) adds that the new government system should “result 
in a more effective and efficient local sphere of governance” because the “entrenched legal 
nature and divided rights and duties of local government institutions significantly contributes 
to the system that is envisaged in the Constitution.”426  
 
                                                 
 422 Section 19(1) of the Structures Act.  
 423 Sections 19(2)(a)-(e) of the Structures Act.  
 424 Section 19(3) of the Structures Act.  
 425 See Bekink (2006), op cit, 62.  
 426 Ibid. 
196 
 
While the Constitution with its supplementary and complementary statutes with their 
regulations does establish the system and processes for democratic government, its efficiency 
and efficacy would be tested in their implementation. The results have not been inspiring. 
 
Bekink (2006) argues that “municipalities are often ignored when decisions are taken by the 
higher spheres of government and most lack the capacity to perform their functions.”427 
National and provincial governments are constitutionally duty-bound to address this challenge 
and municipal representatives should be able to quantify and articulate it clearly.  
 
The Systems Act articulates a new vision for local government that serves to create an essentially 
people-oriented public service in municipalities. This goal will be facilitated by the codes of 
conduct that will aid ensuring accountability and control. Bekink (2006) adds that the new legal 
framework lays a sound foundation for this purpose in the local government system.”428 
However, the extensive detail depicted in the Systems Act points to the level of complexity of 
the current local government system. Since councillors, administrators and municipal 
representatives are in most cases duty-bound to deliver on their mandates, education and 
training to develop competent persons are necessary. Bekink (2006) remarked that – 
Many commentators have in recent years suggested that both the two higher spheres of government are 
dragging their feet in completing the legal system for local government and that especially national 
government has failed timeously to fulfil its constitutional obligations.429 
 
Should this major shortcoming be resolved timeously, municipalities should be able to deliver 
on their constitutional-statutory duties provided support from the national and provincial 
spheres is provided as envisaged and promised in the Constitution. The importance of the 
constitutional prescripts on public participation in the law-making process430 was confirmed 
recently by the Constitutional Court431 which held: 
…South Africa’s democracy contains both representative and participatory elements. These elements are 
not mutually exclusive. Rather they support and buttress one another. This Court has rejected the argument 
that the public need not participate in the legislative process as its elected representatives are speaking on 
the public’s behalf.432 
                                                 
 427 Op cit, 214.  
 428 Op cit, 495-496.  
 429 At 526.  
 430 Sections 59 (National Assembly), 72(1)(a) NCoP) and 118 (1) and (2) (provincial legislatures).  
 431 In Land Access Movement of South Africa and Others v Chairperson of the National Council of 
Provinces and Others [2016] ZACC 22, (“Land Access Movement”) at paragraph 57.  
 432 Comments made by Madlanga J based on Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National 
Assembly and Others (CCT12/05) [2006] ZACC 11; 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC); 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) (17 
August 2006) at paragraph 115; Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others (2) [2006] ZACC 12; 2007 (6) SA 477 (CC); 2007 (1) BCLR 47 (CC), at paragraphs 59-60.   
197 
 
The Court held that the “NCoP public participation process was unreasonable and thus 
constitutionally invalid”; that its “failure to comply with a constitutional obligation amounts to 
failure by Parliament as a whole.”433  
 
4.6  ESTABLISHMENT OF MUNICIPALITIES 
  
 The Local Government: Municipal Structures Act (“Structures Act”)434, complying with 
constitutional directives435 provides for the establishment of municipalities covering the whole 
of South Africa. The Act prescribes different categories of municipalities;436 their 
establishment; the different types of municipal councils; internal structures and administrators; 
powers and functions; electoral systems; elections; method of allocating councillors; and a code 
of conduct for elected officials.437 Hence, there are two codes for councillors (the other is 
depicted in the Systems Act). This enactment is a guideline, regulation, and control mechanism. 
The Act, in accordance with section 155(1) of the Constitution, prescribes and limits the 
categories of municipalities to only three.438 This restriction inhibits innovation but there is 
room for creativity even within such a narrow framework,439 especially through powers 
delegated or assigned on the basis of municipal differentiation.  
 
 Although there is provision for consultation with organised local government and existing 
municipalities, it is clear that the Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for local government 
alone has the power to determine the types of and to establish municipalities.440 This derogates 
from the ‘autonomous’ status of local government. MECs are charged with establishing 
municipalities.441 Bekink (2006) contends that they should do so in a manner that would 
promote the development of local government capacity so as to “enable municipalities to 
perform their functions and manage their own affairs.”442 The large number and frequency of 
                                                 
 433 Land Access Movement, op cit, at paragraph 82.   
 434 Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, 117 of 1998.  
 435 Sections 151(1), 155(a), (b) and (c); and 155(2), (3), and (4) of the Constitution.   
 436 In sections 8-10 of the Structures Act.  
 437 In, respectively, Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5; Schedules 1-5 of the Structures Act.  
 438 Sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Structures Act. 
 439 For example by delegation and assignment of powers by national and provincial governments, in terms 
of section 156(4) as well as by the principle of subsidiarity in section 156(5) of the Constitution. 
 440 In terms of sections 11 and 12 of the Structures Act. 
 441 In accordance with sections 155(6)(b) and 155(7) of the Constitution, and in terms of section 12 of the 
Structures Act. 
 442 Op cit, 288. 
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community protests seems to indicate that the MECs working with the Municipal Demarcation 
Board (MDB) and in consultation with CoGTA and SALGA have been far from successful. 
  
 A further shortcoming is that, given three categories (rather than a single one) of local 
government, power allocation within each is symmetrical: there is ‘equality’ in responsibilities 
and competencies, notwithstanding different degrees of capacity, competency, size, financial 
status, history, and so on. This places a burden on weaker municipalities especially when 
considering that while CoGTA has been attempting to enhance capacities through several 
programmes, provincial government has done little in this field. The peremptory provision, that 
a municipality’s highest decision-making body, the council, must annually review the needs 
and priorities of its communities, as well as the structures and processes for involving them in 
the better delivery of services and monitoring its performance in achieving set objectives, is 
helpful.443 However, the potential impact of this stipulation is diluted as it is only for an annual 
review; neither the Constitution nor this Act goes beyond and compels municipalities to do 
something beyond ‘reviewing’. This incomplete directive has adverse implications for 
determining and meeting peoples’ needs and thus for a municipal representative organ being 
able to influence national policies and priority programmes, thereby diminishing local 
government’s contribution.  
 
 The Structures Act makes it obligatory for the mayor to take several steps to identify and meet 
priority needs of the community in an economically efficient manner, mostly through the 
municipality’s integrated development plan (IDP), to monitor progress with implementation, 
and to report annually thereon.444 Such requirements for performance management and 
engagement with local communities are echoed throughout the Structures Act and the Systems 
Act, but do not appear to be working well due to many objectives, outputs and outcomes not 
being precisely defined and thus difficult to quantify and measure.  
Although statutes promulgated by the post-apartheid government are reasonably clear and 
explicit, they have to some extent been ignored or circumvented following the 2000 local 
government elections when senior administrative appointments became based largely on 
political affiliations and connections, rather than on merit or competency (“cadre deployment”). 
This compounded the problem of capacity and commitment. 
                                                 
 443 Sections 19(2)(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) of the Structures Act. 
 444 In terms of sections 56(2) and (3) of the Structures Act. 
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The entrenchment of distinctive local government covering the entire spatial territory of South 
Africa is an innovation, more so in municipalities being recognised as part of government rather 
than as agencies of the state or its provinces. The Constitution provides for the establishment 
of three categories of municipalities.445 While a ‘standalone’ Category A local authority has 
both executive and legislative authority over its territory, categories B and C share such power 
inter se. A Category C or district municipality incorporates the local municipalities within its 
territorial jurisdiction. This in effect means a four-tier hierarchy in rural areas, making for a 
complex system. The situation is further complicated with the inclusion of traditional leadership 
and communal land to be serviced by municipalities.446 This has the potential for increased 
conflict and thus implications for co-operative governance. That the MEC has authority to 
“prescribe a role for traditional leaders in the affairs of a municipality”447 could be seen as a 
further limitation on the power of municipalities and intervention in local government 
autonomy. The powers and duties of the National House of Traditional Leaders are, inter alia, 
to co-operate with its provincial houses to “promote socio-economic development and service 
delivery.”448  
Knoetze (2014) points out that “...the institution of traditional leadership… do not constitute a 
separate level of government.” She adds that the Structures Act introduced the concept of a 
consultative role for them.449 This view could be attributed to the provisions that these 
institutions function according to customary law which is subject to the Constitution.450 
Knoetze (2014) asserts that the Constitution does not attribute developmental functions to 
traditional leadership. Furthermore, where a power is allocated to a particular sphere of 
government, the sphere so empowered cannot undertake that function or exercise the power 
concurrently with any traditional leadership institution.451  
Section 81 of the Structures Act provides for traditional leaders’ participation in municipal 
councils. Such persons will not have membership and therefore no right to vote. However, 
traditional leaders could stand for election as councillors and thereby protect customary law in 
                                                 
 445 In terms of sections 155(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Constitution. 
 446 In terms of section 81 of the Structures Act. 
 447 In terms of section 81(4)(b) of the Structures Act. 
 448 In terms of section 11(1)(a)(vi) of the National House of Traditional Leaders Act, 22 of 2009. 
 449 Knoetze, Elmarie (2014) ‘Legislative Regulation of the Developmental Functions of Traditional 
Leadership – In Conflict or Cohesion with Municipal Councils?’ 28(1) (2014) Speculum Juris, 161-195, 166. 
 450 Sections 211(1), (2) and (3) of the Constitution. 
 451 Knoetze (2014), op cit, 169. 
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their communities. No person may become a member of a House if he or she is a member of 
Parliament or the provincial or municipal legislatures.452 In such instances, the councillor will 
have to put the interests of the municipal council first. Knoetze (2014) states that “in 2011 there 
were 829 traditional leaders who were leading more than 830 traditional councils located across 
eight provinces.”453 This is an additional constituent that municipal representatives should work 
with and adds to the number of stakeholders to be consulted by district municipalities and local 
councils therein. 
The Structures Act makes provision for election of councillors in Schedules 1 and 2. The details 
are depicted in the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act.454 These two mechanisms serve 
to protect and develop local participatory and representative democracy. The Electoral Act 
contains many provisions to ensure free and fair elections so as to make the process as 
democratic as possible.455 Councillors and community leaders have to co-operate to make the 
system work.  
 
 4.7 CONCLUSION 
 
 This chapter set out the current approach and attitude of the state to development in the local 
sphere of government and the problems related thereto. Next, the constitutional-statutory 
foundation, framework, and context that established and empowered local government to 
function in a three-sphere governmental system was examined, followed by local government’s 
role as a party to co-operative governance and intergovernmental relations. The status and 
autonomy of local government as well as its powers and functions were analysed to ascertain 
how this sphere could function to serve its constitutional purpose. A review of the objects, rights 
and developmental duties were assessed, followed by an examination of service delivery related 
to the promotion and protection of human rights. The chapter concluded by assessing the 
establishment of municipalities. 
 
 The foregoing review and analysis was undertaken to ascertain the spaces and opportunities 
that are currently available for municipal representation on national policy and decision-making 
                                                 
 452 Section 5(a) of the National House of Traditional Leaders Act, 22 of 2009. 
 453 Knoetze (2014), op cit, 168. 
 454 27 of 2000. 
 455 Sections 51(1), (2), and (3), 59(1), 65(1) and the Electoral Code of Conduct in Schedule 1. 
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bodies. Therefrom, an analysis could be undertaken of gaps, weaknesses, successes, and 
shortcomings that need to be addressed. A call cannot be made for more opportunities for 
municipal representation until a review and analysis has been undertaken of achievements in 
this field using existing mechanisms and processes. This is undertaken in Chapter 5 where 
implementation of representation is assessed since the establishment of SALGA.
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CHAPTER 5 
MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES FACILITATING MUNICIPAL 
REPRESENTATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter analyses the structures and processes that have been developed to give effect to 
the constitutional and statutory prescripts, and then determine how they are supposed to or have 
functioned in the interests of residents in municipalities. One of the enabling or facilitating 
mechanisms is co-operative governance and through such modus operandi intergovernmental 
relations. The three-sphere governmental system has enabled the establishment of various 
mechanisms and processes to accommodate municipal representation. These opportunities are 
assessed from the point of view of local government.      
 
5.2 PARLIAMENT  
 
5.2.1 AN OVERVIEW 
Parliament consists of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces (NCoP).1 
Both participate in the legislative process.2 Section 42(3) of the Constitution reads: 
 
The National Assembly is elected to represent the people and to ensure government by the people under 
the Constitution. It does this by choosing the President, by providing a national forum for public 
consideration of issues, by passing legislation and by scrutinizing and overseeing executive action. 
 
This provision forms the basis of municipal representation by providing for democratic 
participatory governance and safeguarding the public interest through law-making and 
oversight over the executive.  The Constitution vests national legislative authority in 
Parliament.3 The NCoP “represents the provinces to ensure that provincial interests are taken 
into account in the national sphere of government. It does this mainly by participating in the 
national legislative process and by providing a national forum for public consideration of issues 
affecting the provinces.”4  
 
                                                 
1 Sections 42(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution.   
2 Section 42(2) of the Constitution.  
3 Section 44(1)(a) of the Constitution.  
4 Section 42(4) of the Constitution.  
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5.2.2 THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
The following are some of the key constitutional provisions defining the functions of the 
National Assembly that could be beneficial to co-operative governance and facilitate municipal 
representation:5 
i. law making, as the institution having legislative authority, in terms of section 43; 
ii. scrutinising and overseeing executive action, in terms of sections 42(3) and 55(2); 
iii. special oversight over the executive and any organ of state, particularly regarding 
implementation of legislation – sections 42(3) and 55(2)(b); 
iv. serve as a forum for public consideration of issues – section 42(3); 
v. ensuring that organs of state and independent constitutional institutions report and are 
accountable to it: sections 55(2)(a) and 181(5);  
vi. represent the people – section 42(3);  
vii. subpoena powers to compel appearance and presentation – sections 56(a)-(c); and   
viii. receiving and considering petitions – section 56(d); 
If Parliament were to concentrate more on being a forum for and representing the people,6 it 
may do much to enhance service delivery by addressing peoples’ grievances. This it now 
proposes doing. At this stage, apart from establishing some constituency offices, little has been 
achieved.7 However, since Parliament can play a major role in facilitating and promoting 
municipal representation, the opportunities and possibilities offered are examined below. 
 
5.2.3 ASSESSMENT OF PARLIAMENT 
In December 2006, the Speaker of Parliament and the Chairperson of the NCoP established an 
independent panel with the following terms of reference: 
To inquire into, report and make recommendations regarding the extent to which Parliament is evolving to 
meet the expectations outlined in the Constitution and also to assess the experience and role of Parliament 
in promoting and entrenching democracy. The assessment will focus specifically on the extent to which 
Parliament ensures that there is accountability, responsiveness and openness regarding the implementation 
of matters enshrined but not limited to Chapter 4 and 5 of the Constitution.8 
                                                 
5 Gutto, Shadrack, Rushiella Songca, Mpho Mothoagae and Motshamonyane Phasha (2007) A Study of 
Enhancing the Status, Role, Image and Positioning of the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Centre for 
African Renaissance Studies, Pretoria: Unisa, 4-5.  
6 In terms of section 42(3) of the Constitution. 
7 Mkhwanazi, Siyabonga ‘Growing service delivery protests lead to hearings’, Johannesburg: The Star, 
1/02/2009. 
8 Report of the Independent Panel Assessment of Parliament, 13 January 2009, with summary of 
recommendations, tabled 14 January 2009. www.parliament.gov.za, accessed 25/04/2016. (“Report on 
Assessment of Parliament” by the “Assessment Panel”). 
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Some of the recommendations that could have an impact on municipal representation are: 
 
i. Parliament’s legislative mandate 
The Assessment Panel suggested, inter alia, that Parliament develop skills and capacity to 
review the impact of legislation, before and after its adoption. The Panel recommended that an 
Impact Assessment Report by the Executive on the likely impact of each Bill should be attached 
when it is tabled in Parliament.9  This would require the development of an outcomes-based 
monitoring, evaluation and impact assessment (MEIA) system.  
 
Perhaps based on the Assessment Panel’s recommendations, Parliament’s Speakers’ Forum 
established the High-Level Panel on Assessment of Key Legislation and Acceleration of 
Fundamental Change. The Panel has eighteen months, commencing January 2016, to complete 
its work. The first hearings were on 16-17 August 201610 The Chairperson of the Panel said – 
[There] are more than 1 000 new laws aimed at supporting our democracy…It is all very well to pass laws 
and to have facilitated public participation in their making. But what effect have these laws had on our lives 
and our aim of building a new society?11  
 
The Speaker of Parliament said that “the legislative sector is mindful of its role” prescribed by 
the Constitution that called “for the building of a socially-cohesive and economically stable 
nation – united in diversity.”12  The laws referred to above are post-1994 legislation. It may be 
opportune to undertake a monitoring, evaluation, social cost-benefit and impact assessment two 
decades after the advent of democracy. Hopefully, the exercise would show up problems with 
the three-sphere co-operative governmental system, particularly the status and role of 
municipalities therein.  
 
The Assessment Panel also recommended that the criteria in terms of which any discretionary 
power is exercised should be set out. Any impact assessment should incorporate “unintended 
consequences of legislation, failure by the Executive or other organs of state to take required 
                                                 
 9 Report on Assessment of Parliament, (2009), op cit, Chapter 2: 28, 33. 
10 www.parliament.gov.za, accessed 29/08/2016. 
 11 Motlanthe, Kgalema ‘We’re pausing to assess the lawmaking of the past 2 decades’, Johannesburg: The 
Star 15/08/2016.  
12 Smith, Janet ‘We have plenty of new laws, but are these any good?’ Johannesburg: The Star 
17/08/2016; www polity.org.za, accessed 29/08/2016.  
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actions in response to legislation, and the extent to which the objectives and implementation 
targets of legislation is achieved.”13  
 
These recommendations, if implemented and monitored, would help improve the quality of 
statutes and regulations, making them more practical and implementable, and especially in the 
local government sphere, perhaps more developmental than regulatory. However, municipal 
representatives must have the requisite ability to analyse Bills and make inputs to ensure 
interests of the public and municipalities are protected and promoted, for example, by rejecting 
‘unfunded mandates’ imposed through assignment.14  In this context, the goal of “engaging 
with local government on legislation that could result in unfunded mandates” would help if 
implemented.15 This could be by design or default, considering the large number of Bills passed 
by Parliament: 1 238 between 1994 and 2014.16 It would appear that in 2015-2016 (to 6 May 
2016) there were 188 Bills before Parliament.17 
 
The Assessment Panel recommended that “outstanding constitutionally required legislation” 
should be identified and enacted urgently.18 Another recommendation was that the “scope of 
any law-making and other powers being delegated”, the necessity of such delegation, and the 
criteria “in terms of which any discretionary powers are to be exercised” should be reviewed.19 
This would help improve the quality of legislation and serve as a disincentive for delegating 
powers to local government by assignment. Among Parliament’s programmes is enhancing the 
quality of legislation by, inter alia, providing technical support to committees during law-
making.20 
 
Parliament acknowledged that “The courts recently declared legislation constitutionally invalid 
on various grounds,” and admitted that these judgments “provided clarity and direction” on its 
constitutional obligations.21 Given this situation, Parliament established a “fully-fledged unit to 
assist Members of both houses to initiate and draft Bills.”22 
                                                 
13 Report on Assessment of Parliament (2009), op cit, Chapter 2: 31. 
14 Such as through, for example, the Disaster Management Amendment Act, 16 of 2015.  
15 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa (2015) Strategic Plan for the 5th Democratic Parliament 
2014-2019, clause 1.7.2 p16.  www. parliament.gov.za, accessed 13/05/2016.  
16 Strategic Plan for the 5th Democratic Parliament 2014-2019, op cit, 13. 
17 www.parliament.gov.za, accessed 20/05/2016.  
18 Report on Assessment of Parliament (2009), op cit, Chapter 2: 31. 
19 Report on Assessment of Parliament (2009), op cit, Chapter 2: 25-26.  
20 Strategic Plan for the 5th Democratic Parliament 2014-2019, op cit, 26. 
21 Strategic Plan for the 5th Democratic Parliament 2014-2019, op cit, 15.  
22 Ibid.  
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ii. Parliament’s oversight mandate 
An Oversight Forum “focuses on the work of Parliament’s more than 50 committees.” These 
constitute oversight and citizen participation, incorporating parliamentary hearings and public 
oversight visits.23 While its preoccupation as a legislature is understandable, Gutto et al (2007) 
argue that Parliament should undertake its oversight function, and that of holding the executive 
accountable more vigorously.24 This will benefit good governance and enhance co-operative 
government. Mindful of the various problems besetting poor communities, Parliament 
established the Ad hoc Committee on Co-Ordinated Oversight on Service Delivery under the 
theme: ‘Working together to ensure the delivery of quality service to communities’. This brings 
the Legislature to the people, under the five priorities of the Fourth Parliament:25 
(a) strengthening the oversight function; 
(b) increasing public participation;  
(c) strengthening co-operative government; 
(d) widening the role of Parliament in international affairs; and 
(e) continuing to build an efficient, effective and powerful institution of democracy. 
 
While such an attitude and approach can have a positive impact on democratic co-operative 
governance, it is necessary to ensure that there is no encroachment or overlap in responsibilities 
with organs of state. Nevertheless, this action would better enable it to judge the performance 
of members of the executive who are accountable collectively and individually to Parliament 
in the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions, and to report regularly 
thereon.26 In the context of the ideal of increased oversight and lack of mention of local 
government, the following statement is illustrative: 
We seem to be oversubscribing and going to the same project or the same province so many times because 
there is no co-ordination. We shall have to work on that co-ordination so that as we increase our oversight, 
indeed we are able to address the stampeding that has been occurring.27 
 
The many problems associated with oversight visits are illustrated by the meeting of the Select 
Committee on Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs debating the reports on visits 
                                                 
23 From www.parliament.gov.za, accessed 12/04/2016.  
24 Gutto et al (2007), op cit, 17, 129. 
 25 Proceedings of the National Assembly 11/05/2010, reported in Hansard, 10. 
26 In terms of sections 92(2) and 92(3)(b) of the Constitution. 
27 Mr Obed Bapela, ANC MP, National Assembly debate, 11/05/2010, Hansard, 42-43. 
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to three local municipalities.28 Perusal of the report highlights certain shortcomings and 
challenges: 
(a) possible duplication of work of the NCoP by CoGTA, SALGA, national departments, 
and provincial legislatures, especially in respect of oversight visits; 
(b) three reports on different municipalities using the same format and subheadings, as if 
working to a template and predetermined search for challenges. The problem here 
seemed that the same or almost identical responses were ‘submitted’ by these 
municipalities; 
(c) reports are based on committee members’ (politicians’) observations and are thus vague 
and ambiguous, with performance and shortfalls not quantified;  
(d) reports appear to lack technical details; and 
(e) there seems to be no follow-up actions or mention of persons responsible therefor. 
 
The Select Committee stated that its members were not able to make much sense of the report 
and discussion thereon. If such a modus operandi is typical of the approach to oversight and 
intervention,29 it may cause more conflict than harmony due to neglect of the constitutionally-
imposed directive of capacitation of the errant municipality.30 It seems that the visits and 
debates thereafter focus on symptoms and not on root causes and technical solutions thereto. 
This undesirable situation creates opportunities for proportional representation and especially 
ward councillors to make practical and insightful inputs at such hearings and visits. Of course, 
these should be based on councillors’ engagement with communities and not on the 
representatives’ own perceptions, views, and opinions.  
 
The Assessment Panel recommended that an “extensive monitoring schedule” be developed 
and implemented for the oversight function, and further that Parliament should make better use 
of information emanating from State Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy. It 
further suggested that Parliament should engage with “recommendations of the report of the ad 
hoc Committee on the Review of Chapter 9 and Associated Institutions.”31 It is unclear which 
                                                 
28 Select Committee on Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs: Reports on Oversight Visits to 
Sundays River Valley, Thembisile Hani and Moses Kotane Local Municipalities, 2/06/2010, reported by the 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 7/06/2010. 
29 In terms of section 139 of the Constitution. 
30 Report on Assessment of Parliament (2009), op cit, Chapter 3: 45-46. 
31 In terms of the obligation imposed on national and provincial governments by section 154(1) of the 
Constitution. 
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(if any) of the Assessment Panel’s recommendations were implemented as the Strategic Plan 
does not deal specifically and in detail with these particular issues. 
 
Parliament has developed an Oversight and Accountability Model as well as a Sector Oversight 
model. These would provide guidance on oversight work.32  
 
iii. Parliament as a forum for public consideration of issues 
The National Assembly is mandated to “ensure government by the people ... by providing a 
national forum for public consideration of issues ... and by scrutinizing and overseeing 
executive action.”33 A welcome approach is for the institution to hold hearings in-situ.34 But in 
taking such action it should not replicate or do the work of the NCoP. Were Parliament to use 
its distinctive and shared powers effectively, it would certainly help improve and enhance co-
operative governance as well as socio-economic development through contribution to policy 
formulation and oversight over their implementation, alongside the executive. This will benefit 
good governance and enhance co-operative government.  
 
The Assessment Panel recommended, inter alia, that “Parliament should take steps to improve 
the quality and substance” of its debates and should debate current matters of public concern 
timeously.35   
 
iv. Public Participation 
The Assessment Panel recommended that “structures and processes around constituency work 
should be comprehensively reviewed and assessed.” Furthermore, the Public Participation 
Model being developed “must include detailed consideration of the constituency system, the 
responsibilities of constituency work, and how these structures and processes relate to the newly 
established Parliamentary Democracy Offices.”36 Parliament has an obligation to involve the 
                                                 
32 Carim, Yunus ‘Intergovernmental and Inter-Legislative relations in a democratic developmental state 
– Perspectives and Lessons’, Paper delivered at the Conference: Building strong Legislatures through 
collaboration: The role of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures in a Democratic Developmental State, Buffalo 
City, 3 October 2012, 1-18, 12.    
33 Section 42(3) of the Constitution. 
34 Mkhwanazi (2009), op cit. 
35 Report on Assessment of Parliament (2009), op cit, Chapter 4: 52. 
36 Report on Assessment of Parliament (2009), op cit, Chapter 5: 66. 
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public in its lawmaking processes and “failure to comply with this obligation rendered the 
resulting legislation constitutionally invalid.”37 This was confirmed by the Constitutional 
Court.38 To enhance public involvement and participation in parliamentary processes with the 
object of realising participatory democracy, Parliament intends implementing its public 
involvement model, incorporating eight strategic objectives, by 2019.39 During the 4th 
Parliament, the “legislative sector developed the Public Participation Framework for Parliament 
and Provincial Legislatures.”40 No mention is made in the Strategic Plan whether the 
Framework was implemented and monitored, nor how it would assist local government.   
 
It has been said that making the constitutional ideal of adults having an equal say in determining 
how and by whom they are governed a reality “requires effective and responsive representative 
institutions”. This is because representation is “not guaranteed by the act of voting” but is 
dependent upon the “strength of the relationship between voters and their elected 
representatives.” Voter turnout is also dependent on the “quality of representation.”41      
 
5.2.4 THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF PROVINCES42 
i. Background 
 Section 42(4) of the Constitution established the NCoP. It “opened its doors as a fully-fledged 
second House of Parliament on 6 February 1997, thereby replacing the old Senate.”43 On its 
15th anniversary, the chairperson said, “A hallmark of the work of the NCoP has always been 
                                                 
37 Strategic Plan for the 5th Democratic Parliament 2014-2019, op cit, 15. 
38 In Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others CCT12/05 [2006] 
ZACC 11; 2006(12) BCLR 1399 (CC); 2006 (6) SA416 (CC) (17 August 2006), paragraphs 209, 211, 213. See 
also Czapanskiy, Karen Syma and Rashida Manjoo (2008) The Right of Public Participation in the Law-Making 
Process and the Role of the Legislature in the Promotion of this Right, 19(1) (2008) Duke Journal of Comparative 
and International Law, 1-40, 2-6, 9; King and Others v Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of Control and Another 
(561/2004) [2005] ZASCA 96; [2006] 1 All SA 458 (SCA); 2006 (4) BCLR 462 (SCA) (29 September 2005), 
paragraphs 1-2, 9, 11-12, 17, and 22; Earthlife Africa Johannesburg and Another v Minister of Energy and Others 
(19529/2015) [2017] ZAWCHC 50 (26 April 2017), paragraphs 1, 18, 23, 28, 34, 58, 93, 98, and 142.  
39 Strategic Plan for the 5th Democratic Parliament 2014-2019, op cit, 16-17, 20-21, 28. 
 40 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa (2015): Orientation Towards Policy Priorities for the 5th 
Democratic Parliament 2014-2019, 7, 11. www.parliament.gov.za, accessed 15/04/2016. 
 41 Ben-Zeev, Keren (2012) Peoples Power: People’s Parliament, A Report of Proceedings and Issues at 
the People’s Power Conference – A Civil Society Conference on South Africa’s Legislatures, Cape Town: 13-15 
August 2012, 6-7. 
42 Refer sections 42(4); 44(1)(b); 44(2) and (3); 68; 146(6); 231(2) and (3) of the Constitution. 
43 Levy, Moira (2012) Editorial, In Session: Saluting the NCoP 15 Years On, Vol 12 Issue 1 Jan/Feb 
2012, 5, www.parliament.gov.za. 
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the extent to which it is prepared to engage ordinary citizens.’44 This is true only to a limited 
extent as shown by the views expressed above and below. The publication celebrating the NCoP 
is a self-congratulatory one, with most of the articles having no bearing on this institution’s 
work. After 15 years of existence (2012), it appears to have achieved little. An exception is the 
work of its 15-member ad hoc committee that visited 9 provinces in 4 weeks to debate the 
Protection of State Information Bill in 2012, particularly on the question of whether to include 
the public interest defence clause in the Bill.45 The Bill was adopted by the NCoP by 34 votes 
to 16,46 showing that it is still a rubber stamp of the National Assembly. Another controversial 
Bill that amalgamates the Scorpions with the police and promoted vigorously by government, 
was adopted in the NCoP by 29 votes to 9.47 During a debate on the South African Reserve 
Bank Amendment Bill on 26 August 2010, the chairperson of the NCoP went to great lengths 
to describe its role without outlining its contribution to the development of the country. In a 
short response, the Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan, pointed out that the second house is a 
“product of political negotiations and compromises” during the constitutional negotiations.48 
He added: 
 The question for us is whether the way in which co-operative governance and intergovernmental relations 
are structured today and the way the NCoP works enhances this kind of objective.49 
 
 The NCoP cannot be faulted for trying to assist in the country’s development. For example, to 
visit all nine provinces during Provincial Week, 7-11 September 2009, to gather information 
about service delivery.50 It is unclear what came of this exercise. It may be indicative of this 
institution not working on long-term plans but being reactive to service delivery crises arising 
frequently at many municipalities. This reinforces the criticism of duplication and 
“stampeding”, mentioned earlier. 
 
 De Vos (2010), referring to Co-operative Governance Minister, Sicelo Shiceka’s remarks on 
the relevance of the NCoP and the present constitutional arrangement for provincial 
government, arguing for a review, said that the “NCoP has not been a great success;” is not 
                                                 
44 In Session: Saluting the NCoP 15 Years On (2012), 6. 
45 In Session: Saluting the NCoP 15 Years On (2012), 11-14. 
46 Ferreira, Emsie (2012) ‘ANC pushes secrecy Bill through NCoP’ Mail & Guardian Online, 29/11/2012. 
47 Hamlyn, Michael ‘NCoP passes Scorpions Bills’, Mail & Guardian Online, 19/11/2008. 
48 Peoples Assembly 26/10/2012 www.pa.org.za, accessed 19/05/2016. 
49 Ibid. 
50 ‘NCoP to assess service delivery in provinces’, Mail & Guardian Online, 2/09/2009. 
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fulfilling its envisaged function; and thereby the “distinct voice and perspective of each 
province is lost.” He adds that despite its failures, the second house is likely to remain.51 Perhaps 
as a result of criticism since 1994, the ANC considered “doing away with provincial 
legislatures, as most had failed to perform their oversight functions.” However, it decided that 
their powers and functions be reviewed and strengthened.52 
 
 Southall (1998) contends that the idea of co-operative government is “embodied in the 
replacement of the Senate by the NCoP as the second chamber of Parliament.” He asks the 
pertinent question as to whether the new structures are “constraining or deepening 
democracy.”53 Friedman (1999) argues that there is a belief in the NCoP that it could become a 
dynamic part of our political process if parties relax their internal discipline and allow delegates 
to vote according to their perceived provincial interests rather than to toe the party line. Co-
operative governance could serve to suppress conflicts and to reduce provinces to “conveyor 
belts for the centre”.54  
 
ii. Powers, role and functions  
The NCoP has powers directly and indirectly related to the legislative function, including the 
provision of a forum for public debate on provincial matters, and the task of facilitating public 
participation in its processes,55 a function that it has up to now not lived-up to. While both 
houses have national legislative authority,56 that of the NCoP is less numerically than that of 
the National Assembly.57 With ten representatives each, the provinces appear to be adequately 
represented numerically in this institution,58 vis-à-vis local government that is allowed ten part-
time representatives who do not have voting rights.59 Hence, municipalities are factually 
                                                 
51 De Vos, Pierre, ‘Don’t say goodbye to the NCoP yet’, Constitutionally Speaking, 6/09/2010, 
www.constitutionallyspeaking.co.za, accessed 12/05/2016. 
52 Tabane, Rapule ‘Call for provinces to stay, but not in current form’, Mail & Guardian Online, 
9/03/2012.  
53 Southall, Roger ‘A deepening of democracy? Establishing provincial government in South Africa’ 28 
(1998) (1&2) Africa Insight, 5-18; 7. 
54 Friedman, Steven ‘Power to the Provinces’ 4 (1999) Siyaya! 45-46. 
55 Sections 72(1) and (2) of the Constitution. 
56 In terms of sections 44(1) -(4) of the Constitution.  
57 Section 60(1) of the Constitution. 
58 Sections 60(1) and (2) of the Constitution. 
59 Section 67 of the Constitution. 
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accorded a lower status than provinces. There is no obligation on the NCoP to incorporate any 
inputs from the provinces, or from local government through SALGA.  
 
The NCoP has a (theoretically) strategic function of initiating, preparing, considering, passing, 
amending or proposing changes to certain types of legislation.60 As such, it has the potential, 
directly, or indirectly through the provinces, of improving the status of local government and 
enhancing its role in lawmaking. The NCoP’s pre-eminent role is to pass bills affecting the 
provinces, and concomitantly, municipalities therein.61 This is significant. It has, in addition, 
authority to be involved in certain important legislative matters at the national sphere, such as 
participation in amending the Constitution, passing laws on Schedule 4 powers, and considering 
legislation passed by the National Assembly on Schedule 5 powers.62 The NCoP is permitted 
to participate in legislation that may not directly have a potential impact on provinces and 
thereby on municipalities.63 Since both the National Assembly and the NCoP have national 
legislative powers means that there could be potential for conflict, but more so where national 
and provincial governments have concurrent legislative competence.64 The legislative process 
is, however, geared towards conflict-avoidance through use of mediation, voting, and veto 
power.65 No conflict appears to have arisen, particularly because the NCoP operates as a ‘rubber 
stamp’. Thus, what the NCoP does in the legislative field has major consequences for and 
impact on local government. The indications thus far are that in following the dictates of 
lawmaking executives of the ruling party, the interests of local government, through their 
provincial representatives, have not been safeguarded or promoted.  
 
A second major role of the NCoP is to allow the public access to and involvement in the work 
of the Council.66  
                                                 
60 Sections 68(a) and (b) of the Constitution. 
61 In accordance with section 76 of the Constitution. 
62 Sections 74 and 44(1)(b)(i), (ii) and (iii), respectively, of the Constitution.  
63 In accordance with section 75 of the Constitution.  
64 Functions listed in Schedule 4 of the Constitution. 
65 Department of Provincial and Local Government (1999) Final Report on the Intergovernmental 
Relations Audit, 91-92. 
66 Sections 72(1) and (2) of the Constitution. 
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A third crucial function is in the field of intergovernmental relations: 
The NCoP is the institutionalisation of co-operative governance at the national level since it brings the 
national, provincial and local government spheres into a single structure …  being the eyes and ears of the 
public.67 
 
 This view may be incorrect insofar as it relates to local government since it has no vote in this 
institution. The NCoP does not currently appear to be appropriately structured to play the 
intergovernmental role meaningfully, that is, represent the people and the local sphere of 
government. Representation is limited and qualified. On the other hand, municipal 
representatives must be of the calibre that can make a positive difference on the few platforms 
available to them. 
 
iii. Legislative  
The NCoP’s legislative contribution thus far has been insubstantial, being “limited to the 
correction of textual errors and some fine tuning.”68 Furthermore, up to now there appears to 
have been no major conflict between it and the National Assembly. Judging from debates 
mentioned earlier, it appears that the NCoP adds little value to the legislative process and that 
the need for such an institution, especially in this field, is questionable. Understandably, only 
the NCoP defends its own position. In fairness, some of these earlier views of writers were 
based on observations covering only the first few years of the institution’s operations; however, 
it would seem that the situation has not changed much since. Given its poor performance, it was 
suggested that it was an opportune time to do “an ongoing revaluation of the work of 
Parliament”69 and particularly the NCoP. Actions suggested on the Second House were:70  
Conduct an assessment of what weaknesses may exist; what improvements can be effected; how are the 
delegates appointed; is the quality or calibre of representation up to standard; are numbers of the delegates 
sufficient to carry out the task or is the structure bloated; are the provinces effective and efficient in carrying 
out their responsibility; are the provinces too many and should the number be reduced (as the minister of 
Provincial and Local Government has alluded to); should the role of provinces be reconsidered, i.e., 
increase their powers or curtail them. 
 
The NCoP’s website does not indicate whether any of the above recommendations were 
considered, let alone implemented.  
                                                 
67 Gutto et al (2007), op cit, 60.  
68 Speech by the Minister of Defence and First Chairperson of the NCoP, Mosiuoa Lekota, on the NCoP 
Summit on Intergovernmental Relations and Co-operative Governance, Cape Town: 2/05/2007. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
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It was stated that in drafting the Constitution which “gave birth to the NCoP … two of the most 
important principles were participatory democracy and co-operative governance.”71 On the 
tenth anniversary of the NCoP in 2007, the President said: It is at a cutting edge of 
intergovernmental relations and serves to entrench co-operative governance across the three 
spheres … 
It is a vital bridge in our democracy, straddling and drawing together South African citizens on the one 
hand and the legislatures, the executive and administrative organs of the state on the other. … Accordingly, 
ten years after the inception of the House, the most logical thing to do is to ask ourselves whether the NCoP 
has achieved its key objectives and realised its strategic vision …72 
 
Some ten years after SALGA and the NCoP were established, the Minister of Finance in 
addressing the shortage and inappropriateness of skills bedevilling South Africa’s desire for 
rapid socio-economic development, indicated that there was need to re-evaluate the number of 
provinces as well as the assignment of powers and functions. He stated that in writing the 
Constitution “we imbued the NCoP with a custodial role over our provinces” and unprecedented 
responsibilities, adding that there is need to enforce its accountability for performance “more 
vigorously in the context of our intergovernmental system.”73  
 
It is clear that expectations of the NCoP have not been met to date. In fairness, it is not only 
this institution that has not delivered, and one needs to take cognisance of its unique but 
seemingly subordinate role to that of the National Assembly and the apparent lack of leadership 
and resources for its effective functioning in the legislative and representative roles. The 
NCoP’s failure may also be due to a lack of precise definition of the powers and functions of 
provinces and their general ineffectiveness, thus again prompting the question of their need and 
that of the NCoP.   
 
Research has shown that the institution’s limited efficiency and efficacy are due to:74 
i. the legislative system being too complex; 
ii. functional overload – with too much work for its too few permanent delegates; 
iii. limited human resources; 
                                                 
71 Ibid. 
72 Address of the President, Thabo Mbeki, at the 10th Anniversary of the NCoP, Cape Town: 4/05/2007. 
73 Manuel, Trevor (2007) Not enough skills in South Africa to run nine provinces, address by the Minister 
of Finance to the NCoP, Cape Town: 6/05/2007. 
74 Friedman, Steven ‘Power to the provinces’, (4) (1999) Siyaya! 45-46. 
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iv. its status as subordinate to the National Assembly, and the problem that bills reach it at 
the end of the legislative process; 
v. time constraints; 
vi. the intergovernmental relations processes having effectively eclipsed the function of the 
NCoP, in that specific inputs could more meaningfully be made in the MinMECs 
(Ministers and Members of Executive Councils) and other instruments of co-operative 
governance; and  
vii. limited time spent in and with the provinces. 
 
The Constitution75 provides that only ordinary bills affecting provinces and listed in Schedule 
4 may be introduced in the NCoP. Up to 2004, the second house had not used this provision 
since only three Bills successfully introduced since 1994 were by members of the National 
Assembly.76 In its defence, however, the Chairperson of the NCoP asserted in 2013 that his 
Council made “numerous technical and substantial amendments to the National Credit Act, 34 
of 2005, Consumer Protection Act, 68 of 2008, and the Protection of State Information Act, 41 
of 1913.77 However, it is a truism that the “significance of the NCoP is a contested issue” and 
one cannot make bold assertions about the Council because: 
Very little research has been conducted on the role of the NCoP even though it has been in existence since 
1997. Previous research also did not cover an entire parliamentary term of five years … The NCoP is a 
unique institution and hence there are no similar houses against which it can be assessed or benchmarked.78  
 
NCoP delegates do not vote in the National Assembly. In the Council, they vote as individuals 
or as a block, based on their mandates from their provincial legislatures.79 In the National 
Assembly decisions of the NCoP on section 76 Bills (those affecting provinces) may be 
defeated by a two-thirds majority, but only a simple majority is required to overturn the 
Council’s decision on other Bills.80 This shows the subordinate status of the NCoP vis-à-vis the 
National Assembly. In the legislative field, the Council’s power is limited to “consider, pass, 
amend, propose amendments to or reject any legislation” before it, and to “initiate or prepare 
                                                 
75 Section 76(3).  
76 Democracy Development Programme (2004) Members’ Legislative Proposals: A Guide for the 
National Council of Provinces and Provincial Legislatures, 28-29, ddp.org.za, accessed 9/04/2016.  
77 Mafilika, Vuyokazi Abegail (2013) The Impact of the National Council of Provinces on Legislation, 
mini-thesis for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Law, University of the Western Cape, 1.  
78 Mafilika (2013), op cit, 4.  
79 In terms of the Mandating Procedures of Provinces Act, 52 of 2008.  
80 Mugoya, BC (2010) ‘Evaluation of the Impact of the National Council of Provinces’, paper presented 
at the Democracy Development Programme’s 6th Annual Government Conference, Durban: 14-15 October 2010, 
4-5.  
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legislation falling within a functional area listed in Schedule 4 or other legislation referred to in 
section 76(3)” (ordinary bills affecting provinces).81 It is prohibited from initiating or preparing 
money Bills.82  
 
While this subordinate status is understandable because there cannot be two houses of 
Parliament with the same powers, it raises the question of the need for the second house. Its 
ability to promote and protect the interests of the provinces is largely dependent on the ability 
of provincial legislatures, and particularly on how they assimilate and process information from 
municipalities within their jurisdiction. In this respect, sound relations between municipal 
councils and provincial legislatures are necessary and within this context, the competency, and 
commitment of municipal representatives is key.  
 
Provision is made for participation by local government in provincial legislatures, either by 
organised local government or municipalities or both, as observers.83 Other structures provided 
for are provincial and district advisory forums, as well as provincial intergovernmental forums 
and premier’s co-ordinating forums.84 While structures and processes have been established, 
there is little to indicate their implementation and monitoring, including their successes and 
failures. There appears to be little concrete co-operative governance beyond that needed for 
integrated development plans of municipalities.85 Legislatures’ reports have little concrete 
evidence of provincial laws passed.86 There is also little substance in progress reports of 
parliamentary Bills. For example, that of Gauteng’s Legislature in 2013 had 30 section 75 Bills 
and 16 section 76 Bills, all but one “informally referred” by the National Assembly.87 
Notwithstanding the constitutional power of the NCoP on legislation affecting provinces, most 
of it “emanates from the National Assembly.”88 This may be due to the weakness of provincial 
legislatures to project and promote their perspectives into national policy.’89      
                                                 
81 Sections 68(a) and (b), respectively, of the Constitution.  
82 In terms of section 68(b) of the Constitution.  
83 Department of Provincial and Local Government (2006) A Guideline Document on Provincial-Local 
Intergovernmental Relations, Clause 3.7, p9.  
84 A Guideline Document on Provincial-Local Intergovernmental Relations 2006), op cit, 16-18. 
85 Such as in, for example, Gauteng Provincial Government (2010) Gauteng Intergovernmental Relations 
Framework.  
86 See, for example, Gauteng Legislature Annual Report 2013-2014, www.gautengonline.gov.za, 
accessed 17/05/2016, (336 pages).  
87 Gauteng Provincial Legislature: Progress Report of Parliamentary Bills, 11 October 2013, 
www.gautengonline.gov.za, accessed 17/06/2015.    
88 Mugoya (2010), op cit, 5.  
89 Comment by the President in The National Council of Provinces – Perspectives on the First Ten Years, 
(2008), 30, www.parliament.gov.za, accessed 17/05/2016.   
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Research has shown that insofar as its legislative role is concerned, the NCoP “plays a 
superficial role in Bills not affecting the provinces”; that the “electoral system has weakened 
the calibre” of its delegates; and that the Council may be “misguided about its role at times and 
not strategically situated to focus on matters of provincial competence.”90 Hence, its ability to 
promote and protect the interests of municipalities through their representative structures, the 
provincial legislatures, is dubious.    
 
Absent a track record in the legislative field, the NCoP could reconsider its role in lawmaking, 
perhaps leaving it to the National Assembly. Unfortunately, if it does not play a legislative role, 
its ability to further or enhance provincial interests at all times will be diminished. Therefore, it 
may not be the legislative role, per se, that is the problem, but how the NCoP participates in 
that function. Moreover, in a system that is no longer strictly hierarchical, it is not a foregone 
conclusion that local government will be better served if provincial interests are more efficiently 
represented. In view of the provinces’ shaky record and the unlikelihood of their performance 
improving in the near future, it would be preferable to have stronger direct representation for 
local government in the NCoP – even for the institution to become the ‘National Council of 
Provinces and Local Government’. Of course, making such provision is relatively easy, 
effective representation would still be a problem, mostly due to inadequate capacity of local 
government. 
 
iv. Review    
The NCoP has an important review function where, in specified instances, national and 
provincial executives may not act without its explicit consent. While this role may be limited 
in scope, it is “most significant in policing the relationship of interdependence between the 
spheres and to ensure that their distinctiveness is maintained as far as possible”.91 This function, 
if carried out efficiently, could indirectly affect local government beneficially in that the NCoP 
could veto national and provincial executives when they intervene in the integrity of a province 
or a municipality by taking up their responsibility for fulfilment of executive statutory duties. 
The NCoP’s constitutionally-explicit review and related functions, alongside the National 
Assembly, that could indirectly affect the health of municipalities and contribute to co-operative 
governance, are: 
                                                 
90 Mafilika (2013), op cit, ix.  
91 Department of Provincial and Local Government (1999) Final Report on the Intergovernmental 
Relations Audit (“Intergovernmental Relations Audit”) 95.  
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i. Review of delegated legislation;92 
ii. Review of the stopping of transfer of funds from Treasury to a province insofar as it 
may adversely affect municipalities therein;93 and  
iii. Review of provincial supervision of and intervention in municipalities.94 
 
The NCoP does not have a record of its actions, if any, in the above fields. However, the views 
of Mathenjwa (2013) are relevant: 
The Constitution confers the power on the national executive to intervene in local government, but is silent 
on the review of such intervention by the legislature. This is anomalous to the spirit of the Constitution, 
particularly where provision is made for the review of provincial government intervention in local 
government by the NCoP and the national Minister of Local Government.95 
 
Mugoya (2010) contends that “some of the review functions such as approving of national 
defence and national intervention in provinces have never been exercised in practice.”96 The 
subordinate status of the NCoP is also evident in that the national executive is accountable to 
the National Assembly only and not also to the second house.97 
 
v. Oversight   
 Section 42(3), read with section 55(2) of the Constitution, expressly authorises the National 
Assembly to scrutinize and oversee executive action. Section 42(3), which describes the role of 
the NCoP, is silent on this function. Section 66(2) provides that the NCoP may require a 
minister, etc, to attend a meeting or a committee meeting. This implies that the NCoP may call 
the executive to account in the same way as the National Assembly does. The overwhelming 
view appears to be that the NCoP since its inception had not carried out this responsibility 
competently in that the “quality of scrutiny is not good”; that the institution is “very 
disorganised”; lacks focus and capacity; has “no real understanding of its oversight role”; and 
that “members are poorly prepared”.98 Furthermore, there has been limited, if any, oversight 
                                                 
92 Sections 146(6)-(8) of the Constitution. 
93 Section 216(3) of the Constitution. 
94 In terms of section 139 of the Constitution. For definitions of the terms “supervision”, “monitoring” 
and “intervention”, see Mathenjwa (2013), op cit, 77-81. 
95 Mathenjwa (2013), op cit, 357. 
96 Mugoya (2010), op cit, 10. 
97 Sections 55(2)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. 
98 The Intergovernmental Relations Audit (1999), op cit, 97. 
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over the provinces, per se, particularly with respect to their responsibilities over municipalities 
and their relationships with SALGA.99 An increase in the number of interventions100 and site 
investigations thereon could overstretch the NCoP’s capacity, and such actions may encroach 
on a province’s executive authority. As part of its review functions, the NCoP is bound to be 
informed by the provincial executive within fourteen days of its intervention in a municipality; 
approve or disapprove it; review the intervention regularly; be notified of the dissolution of any 
municipal council; and if deemed appropriate, set aside such dissolution.101 In this context, the 
following view is enlightening:  
 However, the NCoP has in practice almost usurped the duties and responsibilities of the provinces in 
matters of intervention in local government. The NCoP is now immersed in management of the 
interventions and holding the provincial executive to account in the same manner as the PL.102  
  
 This approach is inimical to local government interest as well as those of provinces, duplication 
of functions, and a deviation from the Council’s core responsibilities. Again, the question arises 
as to the need and desirability of the NCoP. 
  
 In contributing to the Fourth Parliament’s five priority areas being implemented under the 
theme ‘Working together to ensure the delivery of quality services to communities’, the NCoP 
undertakes an annual programme called ‘Provincial Week’. For five days, the permanent 
representatives of a province visit their ‘constituency’ to ascertain problems relating to service 
delivery therein. While the political leadership and ‘key stakeholders’ in any province, as well 
as SALGA were consulted, it is not clear how the people were engaged with. The issue of 
duplication and reference to the “stampede” were echoed.103 Provincial Weeks were introduced 
                                                 
99 According to the Intergovernmental Relations Audit (1999), op cit, 94-95. 
100 In terms of section 139 of the Constitution. 
101 In terms of sections 139(2)(a)(ii); (b)(ii); (c); (3)(a)(ii) and (b), respectively, of the Constitution. 
102 Mugoya (2010) op cit, 12, basing his argument largely on De Visser, Jaap (2008) Developmental Local 
Government: A Case Study of South Africa, 189-190; Murray, C and Y Hoffman-Wanderer ‘The National Council 
of Provinces and Provincial Intervention in Local Government’ (2007) 18 Stellenbosch Law Review 7, 24-27. 
103 Proceedings of the National Council of Provinces, 5/11/2009, Hansard. 
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in 2001 and were generally welcomed as a mechanism for increasing participation. “However, 
the link between the NCoP and the provincial legislatures remain weak.”104 One of the reasons 
for this may be the Council’s limited capacity since only 54 of the 90 delegates are permanent 
and have to attend a multitude of committee meetings and undertake other tasks.105 The 
proceedings of the NCoP mentions a report covering its activities for the period 2004 to 2009, 
but no specific reference had been made and this document is nowhere to be found. It is also 
not clear whether a consolidated ‘Provincial Week’ report had been tabled and debated. It would 
appear that the same problems or challenges are faced by every poor rural community visited, 
but they do not seem to have been quantified or measured scientifically or objectively. Hence, 
an NCoP meeting recorded in 133 pages consists of little more than repetitive statements, many 
self-congratulatory. It seems that this approach has been going on since 2002, but there does 
not appear to be any record of actions and achievements. SALGA, a participant, has been at 
times singled out for criticism.106 It would seem that while the institutions have the resources 
and time to contribute to improved service delivery through co-operative governance, there is 
much talk, stampeding, duplication, and wasted effort, with local government bearing the brunt.  
 
vi. Municipal representation in the NCoP 
 The NCoP is a constitutionally-established body, organised local government at the national 
level is not, and need not be.107 Neither is SALGA a statutory institution in the conventional 
sense, as it is only ‘recognised’ by the Minister by way of notice in the Gazette. Steytler and 
De Visser (2014) assert that SALGA is a voluntary body but has “official status through the 
executive act of recognition.”108 Under the circumstances, representation of a province on the 
NCoP could be by the MEC for local government serving the interests of municipalities within 
the jurisdiction of that province, as a special or permanent delegate,109 supported by a technical 
                                                 
104 Mugoya (2010), op cit, 7. 
105 In terms of section 60(2) of the Constitution. 
106 Proceedings of the National Council of Provinces, 5/11/2009, Hansard.  
107 Organised local government is ‘recognised’ and not established by the Organised Local Government 
Act, 52 of 1997 or the Recognition of Organised Local Government: (Government Notice R175, GG 18645 dated 
30 January 1998. 
108 Steytler, Nico and Jaap de Visser ‘Local Government’ in Woolman, Stuart and Michael Bishop (2014) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa, Second Edition, Cape Town: Juta, Chapter 2, 22 – 1- 22 – 138, 22 – 128. 
 109 In terms of sections 60(2) and (3), respectively, of the Constitution. 
   
 
 
 
   
 
 
222 
 
team comprising provincial and local government professionals and experts. This, then, would 
be a statutory body, operating in a manner that does not duplicate work of any organ of state, 
and is formally approved by municipalities governed.  
 
 It would be impractical for all 257110 municipalities to individually engage directly with the 
other two spheres of government, the NCoP, or any other existing or proposed mechanisms of 
governance. Hence, an effective representative organ is an ideal that should be pursued, a role 
that SALGA is supposed to play. “It has a number of statutory and constitutional duties which 
it executes with varying degrees of success.”111 Pimstone (1998) contends that present 
institutional workings of co-operative government are unsatisfactory in that municipalities are, 
if not excluded, then inadequately represented by SALGA.112 While the larger urban areas may 
have no need for organised local government as presently constituted and operational, the co-
operative structure “may inadvertently be stifling the voice of weaker local authorities.”113  
 
 Any engagement with SALGA is further constrained by the discretion of the government organ 
by which it is called to consult. Furthermore, while the Constitution gives a voice to the 
associations in the NCoP, it does not oblige that their voice be heard as any inputs can be 
ignored. The provision for representation in the NCoP is well intentioned and a wonderful 
opportunity for local government to ‘state its case’.114 However, Steytler and de Visser (2014) 
argue that “local government’s participation in this body would appear to be an afterthought.”115 
Currently there are three practical problems with municipal representation on the NCoP that 
needs to be addressed: 
i. Representation is by “organized local government” – the assumption is that SALGA 
will be able to represent different or a wide range of local government (municipalities’) 
interests efficiently. However, membership of an association for local authorities is 
voluntary and as such these organisations cannot formally represent non-member 
                                                 
110 Reduced from 278 for the local government elections of 3 August 2016. Powerpoint presentation of 
SALGA’s Councillor Induction Programme, 2016 by Dr Thoahlane Thoahlane for incoming and returning 
councillors. See slide 15. 
111 Steytler and De Visser (2014), op cit, 22-128. 
112 Pimstone, Gideon (1998) ‘The Constitutional Basis of Local Government in South Africa’, Occasional 
Paper, Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 9. 
113 Singh, Anirood (2000) Co-operative Government and the Promotion of Economic Development by 
Local Government Associations: A First Exploration, unpublished LLM Dissertation, Pretoria: Unisa, 20. 
114 In terms of section 67 of the Constitution. 
115 Steytler and de Visser (2014), op cit, 22-128. 
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municipalities. Where the benefits of participation are not sufficient to justify joining, 
the association could well find itself not being fully representative, and acting for the 
minority, or only for the wealthier and more articulate municipalities. The voluntary 
nature of association membership is a factor that weakens the organisation, but it cannot 
be otherwise, without undermining the ‘autonomy’ of municipalities. Hence, status, 
capacity and representivity of organised local government are important, ultimately, for 
the association’s effective functioning in the NCoP.  
 
ii. A second problem is that participation occurs only “when necessary”. Therefore, it is a 
privilege, not a right. If the NCoP is not convinced as to the importance of local 
government representation on a particular issue, that matter would not be aired. This 
could occur frequently if, due to poor communications or lack of institutional capacity 
of municipalities and their representative organisation, the latter is unable to articulate 
their case clearly and forcefully. In addition, the de facto subordinate status of 
municipalities means that issues affecting them may be seen as unimportant. Perception 
could be reality; with such situation continuing, the view of subordination and low 
priority could become entrenched. 
 
iii. Thirdly, organised local government has no voting rights in the NCoP. This is indicative 
of both the de iure and factual low status of organised local government and 
municipalities. In the absence of an independent review of SALGA’s performance 
regarding municipal representation, would a vote really change anything? In this 
instance, a merely advisory role in the NCoP may be inadequate: there is need to 
influence decisions. The requisite status for SALGA could ensure this, but without 
adequate resources, the quality of inputs from local government would be poor, with 
adverse implications. Again, this is a reflection of capacity.  
 
Both status and capability, it seems, are inadequate to justify the existence of what has been 
seen by critics as a ‘Cinderella’ institution, the NCoP. This is because the primary role of the 
second house is to look after the interests of the provinces. How can it effectively do so where 
all but one is controlled by the ANC and when – 
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All the members are beholden to party bosses for their positions on the election lists and a 70% majority 
gives the president and party leadership massive control.116 
 
Perhaps the media will take the NCoP more seriously only when it assertively promotes the 
interests of the provinces through rejecting cabinet legislation approved by the National 
Assembly, in the “face of the wrath of party leaders.”117 The NCoP attempted this when it made 
a motion without notice that was approved but retracted a week later, in fear of upsetting the 
President himself.118 Under the circumstances, it is not clear what voting power to SALGA 
would mean in an institution that is ineffective and unlikely to promote local government. 
The Constitution provides the opportunity for local government and its representative 
organisations to influence legislation that may affect them by means of comment on draft 
enactments.119 These bodies, however, must themselves have the requisite intellectual capacity 
to make meaningful input and also to engage with their constituents to be able to gather 
sufficient intelligence from the ‘grassroots’. Such experiential knowledge can be invaluable in 
ensuring a better fit between need and aspirations, on the one hand, and the policies, 
programmes and projects designed to deliver them, on the other. The Constitution recognises 
the importance of local government and has made apparently adequate provision for its 
participation in important institutions and processes directly affecting it. It is imperative that 
the institutional capacity of municipalities and associations for local authorities is enhanced by 
the other two spheres of government, to enable these organs to play a meaningful role in their 
prescribed activities. A further mechanism to facilitate or foster provincial-local government 
relations is for SALGA to be accorded observer status in provincial legislatures. This would aid 
transparency of provincial decision-making; will keep provincial legislatures informed of local 
government developments within the province concerned; and help align policies, plans, and 
programmes between the two spheres of government. While the Gauteng Legislature has put 
this proposal into practice, it is unclear as to whether organised local government has to date 
been able to make much meaningful contribution. The question arises as to whether SALGA is 
to be strengthened to play this role or whether municipalities alone, or with the Premier’s 
Intergovernmental Forum (PIF), should be accorded observer status.  
                                                 
116 Hartley, Wyndham: ‘Cinderella house must assert itself to be noticed’, Johannesburg: Business Day, 
10/11/2004. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Notice without motion by the opposition Democratic Alliance against statements made by the 
President, adopted by the NCoP in the first week of November 2004, retracted a week later. Hartley (2004), op cit.  
119 Section 154(2) of the Constitution. 
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Although municipalities are not directly represented on the Budget Council,120 established for 
interaction between the national and provincial governments, they can have five representatives 
nominated by SALGA and one by each provincial association for local authorities.121 While 
such provision is laudable and a genuine attempt by the Treasury to incorporate the views of 
municipalities, the problem is that SALGA and her affiliates do not appear to have the capacity 
to effectively represent the country’s 257 municipalities. A strong voice is essential, as the 
forum deals with certain matters essential to the health and wellbeing of municipalities, 
especially the process of revenue sharing.122 
Even where there is strong municipal representation, the limited effectiveness of the NCoP may 
nullify gains or retard progress. Steytler and de Visser (2014) argue that since the NCoP looks 
after the interests of provinces as a sphere of government, then local government “should also 
be accorded such an opportunity.”123 They assert that the hierarchical nature of the spheres 
prevails in practice and that local government’s engagement in legislation is merely 
consultative.124 Under such circumstances, the provincial legislatures cannot, and will not, 
effectively represent the interests of municipalities within their jurisdictions. Steytler and de 
Visser (2014) add that “it is therefore not surprising that SALGA has put little effort into 
participating in the NCoP.”125 They argue that the limitation implied by the term ‘when 
necessary’ in section 67 of the Constitution should be “generously interpreted”, considering 
that “any legislation that affects local government triggers the participation right” of SALGA. 
This also applies to the review by the NCoP of a provincial intervention in a municipality, and 
to its oversight function.126  
Mathenjwa (2013) argues that one sphere of government (provincial) cannot represent another 
(local government) in the NCoP. He adds that interpretation of section 67 of the Constitution 
means representation of local government is “optional” and equivalent to “observer status”, 
                                                 
120 Section 2 of the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act, 97 of 1997. 
121 Section 5 of the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act. 
122 Section 8 of the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act. 
123 Steytler and de Visser (2014), op cit, 22 – 129. 
124 Ibid. 
 125 Ibid. 
126 Steytler and de Visser (2014), op cit, 22 – 130. 
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confirming the “inferior status of local government.” He calls for “more effective local 
government representation” on the NCoP.127 He adds that the shortcomings of the constitutional 
provision for local government representation on the NCoP can be resolved by constitutional 
amendment allowing permanent representatives from local government with full membership 
and thus with the right to vote.128 However, such status may not amount to much if the NCoP 
itself is largely ineffective. It needs to be dissolved or restructured to play its envisaged or 
revised role. 
vii. Current status of the NCoP  
The general consensus on the NCoP, based on its activities from 1997 to 1999 and as reviewed 
by the Intergovernmental Relations Audit but perhaps still holding true today, is that it “was 
not working”.129 It is contended that this is largely due to its ineffectiveness in applying itself 
to its main function: looking after provincial interests. Criticism is that in the process, there has 
been duplication of roles with the National Assembly; that the NCoP was unfocused; diffuse; 
that the component parts of the institution did not function optimally; and that it has not 
facilitated SALGA’s role in it.130 The last shortcoming may be more that of organised local 
government than of the NCoP itself. Municipal participation in the NCoP plenaries is qualified 
in that they may do so only “when necessary”; only when a matter affects them; and that there 
shall be only one representative from SALGA. These restrictions are not clearly defined, 
resulting in ambiguity and confusion.131 In fairness it should be noted that much of the criticism 
of the NCoP was made when it was a new institution, functioning without any close precedent 
(the German Bundesrat is not an equivalent but was used as a guide by the Constitutional 
Assembly), hence “reaching a full understanding of its role is difficult” as it is still a “work in 
progress.” While such views132 are based on an evaluation of only its first few years of 
operation, it would seem that the NCoP has since made little progress in identifying, affirming, 
                                                 
 127 Mathenjwa (2013), op cit, 339-341. 
 128 Mathenjwa (2013), op cit, 367. 
129 Report on Assessment of Parliament (2009), op cit, Chapter 4: 52. 
130 Intergovernmental Relations Audit, op cit, 98-100; Speech by the Minister of Defence and First 
Chairperson of the NCoP, Mosiuoa Lekota, at the NCoP Summit on Intergovernmental Relations and Co-operative 
Governance, Cape Town: 2/05/2007. 
 131 Rule 114 of the NCoP. 
 132 By Murray, Christina and Richard Simeon ‘From paper to practice: The National Council of Provinces 
after its first year’ 14(1) (1999) SAPR/PL  96-141, 96; and Pimstone (1998), op cit, 9. 
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and implementing its role. Hence, the criticism is valid even today, as can be confirmed by 
perusal of Hansard and the Report on the Assessment of Parliament. 
 
The Assessment Panel noted that the “topics of debate in the NCoP do not always reflect a 
specific focus on the challenges faced by citizens on provincial and local level.” It 
recommended that this institution should “adopt a more focused approach in terms of its specific 
mandate.” The Assessment Panel further recommended that Parliament should “strive to 
timeously debate current matters of public concern.”133 
 
The Assessment Panel met with the chairpersons of the NCoP who listed their concerns. This 
included their “lack of capacity with regard to their size, budget, oversight and even their 
researchers’ capability.” The chairpersons stated that the NCoP’s relationship with the National 
Assembly and provincial legislatures “could be viewed as strained.” It was noted that public 
hearings on section 76 legislation were not held in provinces and the NCoP “did not have the 
mandate to enforce such public hearings to be held.” It was further noted that the “involvement 
of the local government sphere in the law-making process was erratic and inconsistent.” 
Deliberations on Bills were short compared to that in the National Assembly. This situation 
“reinforced the view that the NCoP was merely a process that needed to be followed.”  It was 
stated that the NCoP’s engagement with provinces was problematic as it only did so on section 
76 matters. In its defence, the NCoP argued that it is the “only arena in which all three spheres 
of government could engage on matters” as it was the custodian of intergovernmental relations, 
but admitted that “this did not function well.”134        
 
The Assessment Panel questioned the necessity of the NCoP within Parliament as well as its 
representation. The representative function of this institution was also queried as was “whether 
the will of those represented were properly represented.” The Assessment Panel stated that the 
accountability of Ministers to the NCoP was part of its mandate since they were accountable to 
Parliament, of which the NCoP was a constituent part. The Assessment Panel stated that “99% 
of the Bills originated from the national departments” and asked, “why they could not originate 
from the provinces as well, or from the NCoP.” A further question asked by the Assessment 
Panel was whether the NCoP represented the view of the people or that of provincial 
                                                 
  133 Minutes of the meeting between Committee of Chairpersons of the NCoP and the Panel for Assessment 
of Parliament, dated 22 October 2007, www.pmg.org.za, accessed 25/04/2015. 
134 Ibid. 
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legislatures. In this regard, one needs to consider whether and how provincial legislatures take 
in the views of municipal councils’ legislatures that should be considering the views of their 
residents. The Chairperson of the Assessment Panel stated: 
The reach and impact of public participation initiatives such as “Taking Parliament to the People” and the 
Women’s Parliament should be carefully reviewed to ensure that such initiatives result in tangible 
outcomes, including feedback to participating individuals and communities. It is necessary to review the 
process whereby issues raised during these events are referred to relevant committees so that they may be 
incorporated into formal participatory processes.135  
 
It should be noted that the NCoP “is a political institution designed to represent the provincial 
legislatures and to articulate political positions.”136  
 
The Constitutional Court’s recent judgment highlights a major failure of the NCoP: 
The NCOP public participation process was unreasonable and thus constitutionally invalid. Failure by one 
of the houses of Parliament to comply with a constitutional obligation amounts to failure by Parliament. 
The deficient conduct of the NCOP in facilitating public participation in passing the Bill taints the entire 
legislative process and is a lapse by Parliament as a whole.137  
 
As the NCoP celebrates its 20th anniversary, its chairperson stated that it “is determined to forge 
its own identity and stop being seen as a rubber stamp for the National Assembly.”138 She stated 
that when it was established, the Council was supposed to play a “distinct” role, and that it 
“can’t repeat what the National Assembly has done.” She queried whether 54 members were 
sufficient for this body as delegates are “over-stretched”. She contradicted her statement on the 
‘distinctiveness’ by stating that, “We do exactly what the national Assembly is doing with fewer 
numbers”.139 This raises the question on the need and desirability of the NCoP. The chairperson 
of the Council did not indicate how this body could be ‘distinctive’ and why, and how many 
delegates would be sufficient. The interview was a manifestation of muddled thinking by the 
head of the NCoP and may be a reflecting of the Council as a whole. 
 
Absent a track record of achievements since its inauguration almost two decades ago, it is 
doubtful whether stronger and increased local government representation on the NCoP will 
achieve any useful purpose. The Council’s indirect representation of municipalities via their 
respective provincial legislatures does not disclose any benefits for local government. Whether 
there is a need for provinces and their representative organ in “one sovereign democratic 
                                                 
135 Ibid.  
136 Steytler and de Visser (2014), op cit, 22 – 130.  
137 Per Madlanga J in Land Access Movement of South Africa and Others v Chairperson of the National 
Council of Provinces and Others [2016] ZACC 22, at paragraph 82.  
138 Chairperson Ms Thandi Modise in an interview, Johannesburg: The New Age, 8/02/2017.  
139 Ibid.  
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state”140 has been asked since Union in 1910, but remains unanswered. In the event that the 
current three-sphere governmental system remains, there would be a need to ascertain how best 
all three spheres of government can perform co-operatively. Such research may provide 
answers as to how local government can best serve the people and how it can play a strategic 
role in policy formulation and implementation in a democratic, participatory developmental 
state. 
 
5.3 OTHER MECHANISMS FACILITATING MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION 
 
Numerous institutions, instruments, mechanisms, and processes for development of the country 
proposed by the Constitution have been established through subsequent statutes. Some of these 
that may influence and impact on local government in general and municipal representation in 
particular, are addressed briefly below.  
 
5.3.1      FINANCIAL AND FISCAL RELATIONS 
The Constitution makes detailed provision for financial and fiscal matters affecting provinces 
and local government.141 
 
i. The Financial and Fiscal Commission 
The Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) is an independent, objective, impartial and 
unbiased constitutional advisory institution. It is a permanent expert Commission with a 
constitutionally-defined structure, set of generic responsibilities and institutional processes.  
The Commission advises and makes recommendations to Parliament, provincial legislatures, 
organised local government, and other organs of State on financial and fiscal matters. Its 
primary role is to ensure the creation and maintenance of an effective, equitable and sustainable 
system of intergovernmental fiscal relations in South Africa.142  
 
Steytler and de Visser (2014) argue that – 
In contrast to local government’s ambiguous participation in the NCoP, the constitutional mandate for its 
participation in the FFC is more forthright.143 
                                                 
140 Section 1 of the Constitution.  
141 Chapter 13 of the Constitution, particularly section 214 (Equitable share and allocations of revenue). 
142 Summarised from www.ffc.co.za, accessed 15/05/2016.  
 143 Steytler and de Visser (2014), op cit, 22 – 130.   
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Representation by provinces on the FFC has been reduced from nine to three.144 Local 
government representation on the FFC is by “two persons selected after consulting organised 
local government”.145 Adequate provision is made in the Constitution for the financial health 
of municipalities by, inter alia, the following provisions: 
i. The equitable division of revenue raised nationally;146 
ii. Consultation by the FFC with organised local government;147 
iii. That the FFC must take into account: 
(a) the need to “ensure that provinces and municipalities are able to provide basic 
services and perform the functions allocated to them”148  
(b) the “fiscal capacity and efficiency of the provinces and municipalities”149 
(c) the “developmental and other needs of the provinces, local government and 
municipalities”150  
(d) economic disparities within and among the provinces151 
(e) obligations of provinces and municipalities to national legislation152 
iv. Revenue allocated to local government is a direct charge against the province’s Revenue 
Fund153 
v. Provincial and local governments’ entitlement to revenue raised nationally154 
vi. The power of municipalities to impose rates, taxes, and other levies155  
 
                                                 
 144 Sections 221(1)(c) of the Constitution, complied by section 5(1)(c) of the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission Act, 99 of 1997, as amended. 
 145 Section 5(1)(b) of the Financial and Fiscal Commission Act, 99 of 1997, as amended. 
 146 Section 214(1) of the Constitution. 
147 Section 214(2) of the Constitution. 
148 Section 214(2)(d) of the Constitution. 
149 Section 214(2)(e) of the Constitution. 
150 Section 214(2)(f) of the Constitution. 
151 Section 214(2)(g) of the Constitution. 
152 Section 214(2)(h) of the Constitution. 
153 Section 226(3) of the Constitution. 
154 Section 227(1) of the Constitution. 
155 Section 229(1) of the Constitution. 
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While some of these prescriptions accentuate a hierarchical relationship and therefore the 
possibility of conflicts and tensions, it nevertheless highlights the importance of provincial and 
local government, and make for clear and unambiguous provisions in co-operative 
governance.156 Hence, competent municipal representatives are required to protect and promote 
local government interests. 
 
ii. Division of Revenue Act157 
Another statute that is crucial to the financial well-being of municipalities is the (annual) 
Division of Revenue Act (DoRA). The purpose of this statute is “to provide for the equitable 
division of revenue raised nationally among the national, provincial and local spheres of 
government and the responsibilities of all three spheres pursuant to such division.” 
Municipalities have an unusually high level of financial autonomy, defined in terms of its access 
to revenue not being subject to the discretion of another sphere of government.158 A province 
does not dictate revenue and expenditure as the FFC has given local government sufficient 
autonomy in management of own revenue. Again, sound municipal representation is essential 
to promote local government interests. 
 
5.3.2 MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION IN NATIONAL – LOCAL RELATIONS 
The only constitutionally-mandated opportunity for municipalities to engage directly with 
national government is through participation in national development programmes,159 although 
how this would be undertaken is unclear. Another way of direct engagement is with certain 
ministries that do not have provincial counterparts. Some statutes require inter-departmental 
co-operation for them to function effectively,160 however, in all other cases contact is by remote 
control, through SALGA, a situation not ideal but practical, in the sense that not all 
municipalities can individually participate in structures at the national sphere.161 While the 
constitutional provisions are welcome, the health and well-being of local government depend 
largely on how its representative organ participates and makes the voice of municipalities heard. 
Thus far it is little more than a plaintive cry for help, which has been largely ignored. 
                                                 
 156 Respectively, sections 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 220, 226, 227, 228, 229 and 230 of the Constitution. 
157 The Division of Revenue Act is an annual statute. 
158 Discussion Document: Towards a National Policy on Intergovernmental Relations (2006), op cit, 4. 
159 Section 153(b) of the Constitution. 
160 Such as the National Environmental Management Act, 107 of 1998 and the Spatial Planning and Land 
Use Management Act, 16 of 2013. 
161 In the President’s Co-ordinating Council; NCoP; FFC; and Budget Council. 
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5.3.3 MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION IN PROVINCIAL – LOCAL RELATIONS 
Statutorily,162 engagement is supposed to be undertaken collectively, through the PLGAs, 
although most interaction is informal, as these institutions are largely dysfunctional. Hence, 
there is a clear void, which is disadvantageous to municipalities. 
It has been suggested that 
The role of provincial legislatures be refocused, and mechanisms to strengthen legislatures should be 
developed. Consideration should be given to municipal representation in legislatures to strengthen 
participatory democracy and representation.163  
 
Carim (2012) argues for a “definite role for legislatures” when a provincial government 
intervenes in a municipality. He further asserts that provincial government should be 
accountable to local communities where services are funded by the Provincial Equitable Share. 
He adds that the “interface between citizens and provinces also needs to be strengthened” so 
that residents can become involved in the “passing of provincial bills.”164    
 
5.3.4 MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION IN TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP 
Up to the coming into operation of the Local Government Transition Act165 in 1993, traditional 
authorities performed some local government functions in the former “homelands” or 
Bantustans.166 This role fell away with the advent of ‘wall-to-wall’ municipalities from 2000 
whereby all land would fall within the spatial and functional jurisdiction of municipalities.167 
Traditional leaders may attend municipal council meetings and participate in them, but their 
role would be limited as they are not democratically-elected councillors. As such, they have no 
right to vote.168 
 
The Constitution recognises the “institution, status and role of traditional leadership” as well as 
traditional authorities and customary law practised by them.169 The Constitution170 makes 
provision for legislation to give effect to the role of traditional leaders.171 This results in an 
                                                 
162 In terms of section 2(1) of the Organised Local Government Act, 52 of 1997. 
163 Carim (2012), op cit, 12. Emphasis in the original. 
164 Carim (2012), op cit, 14-15.  
 165 209 of 1993. 
166 Steytler and De Visser (2014), op cit, 22 – 41.  
167 Ibid. 
168 In terms of section 81(1) of the Structures Act; Steytler and De Visser (2014), op cit, 22 – 42. 
169 Sections 211 and 212 of the Constitution. 
170 Section 212 of the Constitution. 
171 Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act, 41 of 2003. 
 
 
 
233 
 
increase of the number of role players at the local government sphere in rural areas and thus the 
potential of increasing conflict. The de facto rural governance hierarchy is depicted in Figure 
5.1, showing how complex and confusing the local government operating environment is, 
especially in rural areas. While the Constitution and its supplementary and complementary 
statutes set out how the governmental system is structured and to be operated, the situation on 
the ground may be different and could be attested to by residents of rural areas under traditional 
leadership. This has implications for effective municipal representation.  
 
5.3.5 MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION AND COGTA 
CoGTA’s vision is stated thus: A functional and developmental local government system that 
delivers on the constitutional and legislative mandates within a system of cooperative 
governance.172 
 
From the foregoing, it would appear in its current form, CoGTA has no direct responsibility 
over provincial government. Its mission statement indicates that the department plays a 
supportive and promotional role, based on its mandate deriving from chapters 3, 5, 6 and 7 of 
the Constitution.173 CoGTA’s “primary mandate” is to:174 
 “Develop and monitor the implementation of national policy and legislation, seeking to 
transform and strengthen key institutions and mechanisms of governance to fulfil their 
developmental role; 
 Develop, promote and monitor mechanisms, systems and structures to enable integrated 
service delivery and implementation within government; and 
 Promote sustainable development by providing support to and exercising oversight over 
provincial and local government.”  
                                                 
 172 CoGTA Annual Performance Plan 2016/17, 6. 
 173 Ibid. 
 174 CoGTA Annual Performance Plan 2016/17, 7. 
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 Figure 5.1: Rural Governance Hierarchy 
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From consideration of the above, it appears that CoGTA plays a largely regulatory role to ensure 
compliance by municipalities. Furthermore, CoGTA is mostly process-oriented, rather than an 
institution contributing to development through capital projects. It also does not seem to have 
held provincial government to account, particularly with respect to its obligation to strengthen 
and support the capacitation of municipalities, in terms of section 144(1) of the Constitution.  
 
CoGTA has nine priority areas in its “performance environment”.175 These seem to be too 
many, appear to be vague and ambiguous, and more like statements of intent that specific, 
measurable, attainable, realistic, and time-bound (SMART) goals. Its current endeavour to 
strengthen local government is the “Back to Basics” Programme, based on five “pillars” that 
appear vague, as do its six programmes, seven goals, eleven strategic objectives, twelve outputs, 
and twenty-one performance indicators in its “Programme Performance Plans for the 2016/17 
financial year.”176 It is stated that “The Department does not manage any long-term 
infrastructure and capital plans.”177 CoGTA has three public entities reporting to it and to which 
it provides minimal funding.178 
 
From the foregoing, it appears that CoGTA is not a significant player in the development of 
South Africa. Hence, there appears to be no mechanisms or opportunities for municipal 
representation. However, one of its strategic objectives could be used to leverage it:  
Depending the relationship between citizens and local government through improved citizen engagements 
by March 2019.179 
 
To fulfil its constitutional duty to support local government180 in an environment with persistent 
and chronic challenges, CoGTA embarked on several “short-term deployment 
interventions”:181 
i. Project Consolidate; 
ii. Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA); 
iii. Siyenza Mange Project; 
iv. Municipal Finance Management Programme; 
                                                 
175 CoGTA Annual Performance Plan 2016/17, 9.  
176 CoGTA Annual Performance Plan 2016/17, 10, 13-50. 
177 CoGTA Annual Performance Plan 2016/17, 42.  
178 In the 2016/17 financial year: SALGA (R567 611), Municipal Infrastructure Support Agent 
(R349 889), and Municipal Demarcation Board (R58 720), CoGTA Annual Performance Plan 2016/17, 43.  
179 CoGTA Annual Performance Plan 2016/17, 13.  
180 In terms of section 154(1) of the Constitution.  
181 Ntliziywana, Phindile ‘Adding Injury to Insult: Intrusive Laws on Top of a Weak System” (2016) 
Constitutional Court Review Vol VI, 32-56, 36.   
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v. Local Government Leadership Academy and Municipal Leadership Development 
Programme; 
vi. Five-Year Local Government Strategic Agenda; 
vii. Local Government Turnaround Strategy; and the current 
viii. Back to Basics Strategy. 
 
It has been said that the above initiatives and “legislative interventions in human resource 
practices” results in over-regulation, “overreach and a lack of coordination” that “now threaten 
to stifle local government and threaten the rule of law.”182 Given overregulation of local 
government with attendant duplication, overlaps, and confusion, Ntliziywana (2016) suggests: 
The establishment of a special Cabinet Committee on provincial and local government whose aim will be 
to discuss and scrutinise all policy and legislation impacting on sub-national government before they go to 
Cabinet for decision.183  
 
This appears to be an ad hoc, piecemeal or partial solution. Government has been operational 
for over two decades. While a major overhaul of the governmental system is not recommended, 
there is need for a long term and sustainable approach to socio-economic development, guided 
by the National Development Plan, with local government playing a major role. At this 
juncture, a review of what plans and institutions are working, and what’s not. Institutional 
assessments are required, especially the efficiency, efficacy, and role of some ministries, as 
well as of the IRFA, CoGTA, the NCoP, and SALGA. It may be an opportune time to do this, 
in light of the 2019 national and provincial elections. 
 
5.3.6    MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION AND SUBMISSIONS 
A submission may be made when called for publicly by Parliament or a provincial legislature 
when a Bill is discussed therein. It is one way for a member of the public making his or her 
voice heard before a Bill becomes an Act of Parliament.184  
 
5.3.7    MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION AND PETITIONS 
The Constitution makes provision for the receipt of petitions by the National Assembly and the 
NCoP.185 A petition is a “formal request to Parliament for intervention in a matter” by way of 
either a “request for assistance with a specific issue or for the redress of a grievance.” It is a 
                                                 
182 Ibid.  
183 Ntliziywana (2016), op cit, 55.  
 184 From parliament.gov.za, accessed 18/05/2016. 
185 Sections 56(d) and 69(d), respectively.  
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way of making one’s voice heard after a bill has become law and thus may be a request for 
changing it.186 A national petitions act has been mooted,187 while the Gauteng Government has 
been proactive in passing one,188 as has the City of Johannesburg, within one of its standing 
committees, the Petitions and Public Participation Committee.189 
 
5.3.8    MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION AND ELECTORAL REFORM 
The Assessment Panel recommended that the “impact of the party list electoral system as it is 
currently structured” and “potential alternative systems” should be considered by Parliament.” 
It believed that the present model “should be replaced by a mixed system” which could “capture 
the benefits of both the constituency-based and proportional representation electoral 
systems.”190 
 
A mixed or hybrid electoral system is used for municipal elections. For metropolitan 
municipalities, there are two types of elections: ward and proportional representation (PR). In 
all other local municipalities, there are 3 types of elections in each ward: local council ward, 
local council PR, and district council PR.191 Much dissatisfaction has been expressed with this 
system by political parties and commentators. It has been argued that the PR system rewards 
loyalty to parties and their leaders. Such councillors cannot really be held accountable by the 
public, something the Van Zyl Slabbert Commission asked for in 2002. The chief electoral 
officer of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) countered by saying, “The truth must 
be told – elections and electoral system are complex issues.”192 The matter of accountability 
could be addressed if an open list PR system was used, instead of the closed one which creates 
a system of patronage.  
 
Chiroro (2008) cautions that “changing the electoral system alone might not enhance 
accountability,” arguing that “political reforms require much political skill in order to reconcile 
contradictory interests in a peaceful manner.”193  
 
                                                 
186 From www.parliament.gov.za, accessed 18/05/2016.  
187 ‘National Petitions Act mooted’, www.gov.za, 25 July 2012.  
188 Gauteng Petitions Act, 5 of 2002. 
189 From www.joburg.org.za, accessed 18/05/2016.  
190 Report on Assessment of Parliament (2009), op cit, Chapter 3: 45.  
191 Electoral Commission – www.elections.org.za, accessed 21/05/2016.  
192 Ibid.  
193 Chiroro, Bertha ‘Electoral System and Accountability: Options for electoral reform in South Africa’, 
Policy Paper, Issue No 3, January 2008, Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 20.   
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It has been said – 
The current closed PR system limits democracy and doesn’t encourage citizenship and citizen 
participation.... The current electoral system permits very little real participation by the public …194 
 
Fakir (2014) observed that in the 2014 national and provincial elections, nine parties shared 
6.5% of electoral support and 30 seats among them, a manifestation of “excessive proliferation 
and fragmentation amongst ‘opposition’.195 He argued that – 
Each electoral system has distinct advantages and disadvantages … Mixed systems may minimise 
disadvantages and maximise advantages, but depending on the mix used can potentially create such 
overwhelming systemic complexities that they are rendered indecipherable to citizens.196  
 
Although a single-member constituency system has many defects, the elected representative 
would be more accountable to his or her constituency than is possible in the present system. 
While a pure mixed system at local government has the potential for better accountability and 
responsiveness, it is no guarantee of success in South Africa. However, it has the benefits of 
inclusivity and fairness arising from the PR system.197 
 
On electoral reform, Fraser (2015) states that “no action has been taken in the last 10 years,” 
adding that the disadvantages of the PR system “in practice seem to outweigh the supposed 
benefits,” especially with respect to accountability.198 Moses (2012) argues that:199. 
The ETT assessed the PR system on four key values: fairness; inclusiveness; simplicity; and accountability. 
It found that the existing PR system was strong on principles of fairness, inclusiveness and simplicity, but 
the team remained doubtful whether this system satisfied the principle of accountability. 
 
While the majority of the Electoral Task Team (ETT) recommended that the existing structure 
be replaced by a mixed electoral system, the minority report “advocated that the PR system 
should be retained in its current form,” a position adopted by Cabinet.200 
 
 
 
                                                 
194 Khathwane, Ntombenhle ‘Why we need electoral reform’, Johannesburg: Mail & Guardian, 
14/08/2012. 
195 Fakir, Ebrahim ‘The electoral system: Is there vice or virtue in reform?’ Johannesburg: Daily 
Maverick, 22/05/2014. 
196 Ibid.  
197 Ibid.  
198 Fraser, Ashleigh ‘Electoral Reform – What Political Parties Have To Say’ Johannesburg: Helen 
Suzman Foundation, 25/04/2015.   
199 Moses, Meshay ‘Electoral Reform in South Africa’, Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference, 
Parliamentary Liaison Office (2012) Briefing Paper 285.  
200 Ibid.  
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5.4 MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
 
By way of illustration, the Council and committees of the City of Johannesburg are depicted 
below.201 The nature and composition of committees are mechanisms for local participatory 
and representative democracy. 
 
5.4.1        COUNCIL AND MAYORAL COMMITTEE 
The City of Johannesburg comprises a legislature (Council); an executive arm (comprising the 
executive mayor and the mayoral committee); and the administration. The Council focuses on 
legislative, oversight and participatory roles, principally as lawmaker and the processes 
underpinning this function. The Council delegates its executive function to the executive mayor 
and the mayoral committee. Council is made up of 260 councillors. It has the following 
structures: 
i. The Speaker (Chairperson of Council); 
ii. The Chief Whip; 
iii. Standing committees; and 
iv. Section 79 committees. 
5.4.2 STANDING COMMITTEES 
These are permanent committees dealing with Council matters. They have some decision-
making powers related to the legislature. 
i. Chairpersons; 
ii. Ethics/Disciplinary; 
iii. Municipal Public Accounts; 
iv. Petitions and Public Participation; 
v. Programming; 
vi. Rules; and 
vii. Audit. 
                                                 
201 From www.joburg.org.za, accessed 22/05/2016.  
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5.4.3 SECTION 79 COMMITTEES 
Section 79, or portfolio committees, monitor the delivery and outputs of the executive. Each 
one monitors a council portfolio and may call departments, municipal entities, and members of 
the mayoral committee to account. They have an oversight role but no delegated decision-
making powers. The current committees are: 
(a)   Corporate and Shared Services; 
(b)   Community Development; 
(c)   Development Planning; 
(d)   Economic Development; 
(e)   Environment, Infrastructure and Services; 
(f)   Finance; 
(g)   Health and Social Development; 
(h)   Housing; 
(i)    Transport; 
(j)    Public Safety; 
(k)   Oversight Committee on Gender, Youth and People with Disabilities; 
(l)    Oversight Committee on Governance; and 
(m)  Oversight Committee on the Legislature. 
The Systems Act empowers municipalities to establish private companies, service utilities, and 
multi-jurisdictional service utilities.202 Parent municipalities have prescribed duties and 
responsibilities over its entities, as well as governance requirements.203 Thus, municipal 
representatives’ roles and responsibilities may be wide-ranging and calling for different skills 
and competencies. 
 
5.4.4 WARD COMMITTEES 
Municipal councils must be accountable to their local communities. They can be more so if 
they use their constitutional right to participate in municipal matters.204 The structure 
facilitating this is the ward committee. The object of a ward committee is to enhance 
participatory democracy.205  
                                                 
202 Sections 86C, 86H, and 87, respectively.  
203 Sections 93A-J of the Systems Act.  
204 Sections 152(1)(a) and (e) of the Constitution. 
205 Section 73 of the Structures Act.  
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The eThekwini municipality sets out that such a committee:206 
i. Is an advisory body without any executive powers; 
ii. Is independent; 
iii. Represents the interests of the ward residents; and 
iv. Is impartial and performs its functions without fear, favour or prejudice. 
 
Proportional representation (PR) councillors are deployed by the Speaker of Council to serve 
in ex-officio capacity to assist and complement the work of the ward councillors and participate 
in, deliberate, but do not have a vote.207 Ward councillors are not remunerated, except for out 
of pocket expenses.208  
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter analysed the mechanisms and processes that make provision for municipal 
representation. It has shown that there are many opportunities for representing local 
government, that is, of people resident in the 257 municipalities. However, such representation 
is based on or contingent upon all three spheres of government functioning co-operatively. This 
relates largely to institutions and their processes that accommodate municipal representation. 
This representation is largely dependent on sound intergovernmental relations with the national 
and provincial spheres recognising the role of local government and providing space for their 
participation in the development of South Africa. However, it has been shown that government 
in practice still operate in tiers, with local government at the bottom of the hierarchy. This is 
shown starkly in local government representation in the NCoP and this institution’s modus 
operandi.  
 
Local government representation through SALGA is inadequate but the major flaw is in the 
design of the NCoP. It represents the interests of provinces and not those of the local 
government sphere. Furthermore, provincial legislatures cannot represent a ‘distinctive’ sphere 
of government. SALGA is ‘recognised’ but is not a statutory body in the conventional sense. 
Being a voluntary organisation, it cannot effectively represent government even where it has 
                                                 
206 eThekwini Municipality (2005) Rules Regulating the Establishment and Operation of Ward 
Committees, 1.   
207 Ibid, 2.  
208 Ibid, 6.  
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been given the space to do so. This is because the NCoP has not been designed, and does not 
function to promote and protect the interests of municipalities. If provinces and the NCoP are 
to be retained, the Council should be redesigned through constitutional amendment to 
incorporate representing the interests of local government. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK AND CONTEXT 
OF CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW 
 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The Constitution established “national, provincial and local spheres of government which are 
distinctive, interdependent and inter-related.”1 Section 41(1) further provides, inter alia, that 
“all spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must – 
(e) respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of government in the 
other spheres; 
(f) not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of the 
Constitution; 
(g) exercise their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not encroach on 
the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in the other spheres; 
and 
(h) co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith.” 
 
The Constitution stipulated that “an Act of Parliament must establish or provide for structures 
and institutions to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations.”2 In compliance with this 
directive, the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act3  was enacted. 
 
Given what appears, on paper, to be almost equivalent status to national and provincial 
government, it would seem that the Constitution provides only eight opportunities for national 
– local government and its communities’ interaction: 
i. Election of members of Parliament;4 
ii. By way of petitions, representations or submissions to the National Assembly;5 
iii. Public involvement in the legislative and other processes of the National Assembly;6 
                                                 
1 Section 40(1) of the Constitution. 
2 Section 41(2) of the Constitution. 
3 13 of 2005 (IRFA). 
4 In terms of section 46(1) of the Constitution.  
5 In terms of section 56(d) of the Constitution. 
6 In terms of section 59(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
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iv. Local government representation on the NCoP;7 
v. By way of petitions, representations or submissions to the NCoP;8 
vi. Public involvement in the legislative and other processes of the NCoP;9 
vii. Local government participation in national development programmes;10 and 
viii. Commenting on draft legislation.11 
The above indicates what appears to be limitations on local government’s participation in 
formulating national policies that would be implemented in its localities.12 Given that local 
authorities became an integral part of the three-sphere government, it is imperative that 
municipal representatives play their role in promoting and protecting the interests of their 
councils and residents. The co-operative governance and intergovernmental provisions enable 
and facilitate such participation. In the process, municipal representatives could engage in 
national policy formulation. However, being an emerging participatory democracy, the 
Republic does not enjoy the benefit of local government precedents within its unique 
governmental system. Additionally, it does not want to experiment with its new-found freedoms 
and powers as this could come at a price. Thornhill (2008) contends that since Union in 1910, 
the approximately 1 100 local authorities were agents of central government, functioning in 
accordance with provincial ordinances. The change in status to “government” from after 1994 
was a paradigm shift.13  
 
This chapter examines the background to and challenges faced by co-operative governance; its 
history, evolution nature, characteristics, and content. It reviews how the subject has been 
approached, managed, implemented, and reformed in certain countries that have engaged in it 
for a reasonably long time such that lessons of experience can be gleaned that could inform 
how best to design municipal representation. This would be informed by the nature of central, 
regional and local authorities and their relations inter se, with particular interest on the status 
of municipalities in such intergovernmental systems. From such overview, it is hoped that the 
need and desirability, nature, status, powers, role and functions of a local government 
                                                 
7 In terms of section 67 of the Constitution. 
8 In terms of section 69(d) of the Constitution. 
9 In terms of section 72(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
10 In terms of section 153(b) of the Constitution. 
11 In terms of section 154(2) of the Constitution. 
12 See Chapter 4 highlighting inadequate representation of local government in the NCoP. 
13 Thornhill, Chris ‘Local Government after Fifteen Years: Issues and Challenges’, in De Villiers, Bertus 
(2008) Review of provinces and local government in South Africa: Constitutional foundations and practice, 
occasional papers, Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 59-82, 60. See Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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association as municipal representative can be determined. In the process, it would evaluate 
whether the current system, with an external, politically-driven agency, the South African Local 
Government Association (SALGA), is the best vehicle for municipal representation. 
 
Co-operative governance is a wide, deep and complex field. This is because – 
The South African Constitution and IGR Act are by far the most elaborate and detailed intergovernmental 
legal framework in the world. The Constitution sets the philosophy and tone of IGR, while the IGR Act 
provides for structures and conflict-resolution mechanisms.14 
  
In issue is whether a detailed, formalised intergovernmental relations system is appropriate for 
an emerging democracy. Space limitations do not allow for detailed studies of any system. This 
is, firstly, because they may not, eventually, be found to be suitable. Rather, this study 
undertakes overviews of practical approaches that may enable one to draw from the best of 
many. This is facilitated greatly by South Africa’s constitutional and statutory provisions that 
provide the foundation, framework, context and guidelines that permit use of a combination of 
both formal and informal approaches in a flexible and accommodative manner. While 
proceeding from a tabula rasa could be daunting, some comfort may be gained from learning 
through successes and failures of municipal representation through co-operative government as 
applied in other countries. The overviews enable the question to be put and answered as to how 
co-operative governance can be designed, implemented and managed to best serve the interests 
of local government and whether there is a role for associations of local authorities generally, 
but particularly in post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
6.2 BACKGROUND TO AND CHALLENGES OF CO-OPERATIVE 
GOVERNANCE  
 
In most countries throughout the world local authorities had historically been viewed and 
accepted or acknowledged as the lowest tier of government in a hierarchical relationship. 
Hence, often their status was not formalised constitutionally or statutorily. As such, they 
operated mainly as service delivery agencies implementing policies of the centre, within their 
respective spatial jurisdictions for the communities resident therein, as in South Africa. This 
situation would not be problematical if central government itself was able to meet the 
                                                 
14 De Villiers, Bertus and Jabu Sindane (2011) Co-operative Government: The Oil of the Engine, Policy 
Paper No 6, Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 36.  
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reasonable needs of diverse and far-flung localities.15 The following quotation succinctly sets 
out the historically low status of municipalities:16 
The Constitution of the United States of 1786 was silent on local government, rendering local government 
a residual matter under the states’ jurisdiction. This was also the case with the Swiss Constitution of 1848. 
In the Canadian Constitution of 1867 local government was mentioned, but only to designate it as a field 
of provincial competence. The Brazilian Constitution of 1891 was silent on the matter, as was the Australian 
federal constitution of 1901. Exceptions to this practice before World War Two were the Weimar Republic 
of 1919 and the Austrian republican constitution of 1920, where the right of local self-government was 
recognised.17 
 
According to Tilkorn (2004), the historical evolution of local self-government can be traced, 
largely, from developments especially in Germany. “Even in the early Middle Ages, a process 
started where communes were given self-government rights by the rulers of the German states,” 
wherein citizens were allowed “honorary participation in matters of local community.” In 1835 
a guiding pattern for local self-government, including administration, in the economic, 
professions, cultural, and social fields was approved and implemented.18 Article 28(2) of the 
Grundgesetz (German Basic Law or Constitution) of 1949 gave communes the guaranteed right 
and responsibility to regulate all the affairs of the local community in compliance with legal 
provisions, as expected in a Rechtsstaat, a state governed by law. 
 
The European Charter of Local Self-Government19 clearly spelt out the status, role and other 
responsibilities and entitlements of local government, including its right to associate and co-
operate both within the Union and internationally, as well as for its legal protection. The 
Charter could have been the catalyst for a wave of reforms in European local government. 
 
 
 
                                                 
15  Except for Scandinavian countries and some in Europe, for example Germany, as shown in this study. 
See Chapter 3: 3.4.2: Early Assemblies in England; 3.4.3: Parliamentary Supremacy in Great Britain; and 3.5: 
Representation in South Africa, for a review of historical local authorities and representation.  
16 In this study the terms ‘local authorities’, ‘local government’, and ‘municipalities’ are used 
interchangeably, as are ‘co-operative governance’ and ‘intergovernmental relations’; all are to be understood to 
have an equivalent meaning. 
 17 Steytler, Nico ‘An international perspective on the constitutional recognition of local government’ in 
(2006) Outline of Grand Design for Protection for Local Self-Government II – Local Self-Government System 
Study Group Report, Tokyo, www.nga.grjp/English/nga/pdf20061211, 1-2. 
18 Tilkorn, Erich ‘Local Self-Government in Germany: An Outline’ in (2004) Reforming Public 
Administration: Efforts and Perspectives in South-East European Countries, Zagreb: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 7. 
19 Council of Europe (1985) European Charter of Local Self-Government, Strasbourg, 15 October 1985, 
European Treaty Series No 122. 
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It has been said that intergovernmental relations – 
…flows from the inevitable fact of interdependence among the constituent governments, a result of the 
complexities of the contemporary policy agenda and the impossibility, even when the inspiration was to 
create water-tight compartments of drawing clear and separate lines of responsibility.20  
 
Most of the literature on co-operative governance in foreign countries is on national-regional 
or federal-state relations, except, as in the Nordic states and some European countries, where 
interaction is with associations representing regional or county and local governments. Some 
of these are reviewed to identify good practices that could be adopted by South Africa. Co-
operative governance is analysed in its two constituent parts, namely: 
i. Intergovernmental relations within sovereign states, that is, nationally; and 
ii. International intergovernmental relations, largely through a municipality in one country 
entering into a relationship with a local government institution in another. 
 
This approach is dictated by South Africa being part of a globalising economy where rapid 
communication enables learning without much expense. In a knowledge-based society, the 
experiences of other countries could serve as lessons in planning and implementing approaches 
that have worked elsewhere. 
 
Literature in this field generally is limited, being a neglected area, particularly where legal 
instruments establishing the government’s predetermined relations and their operations and 
engagement or interaction are along prescribed lines. The reason for this dearth of information 
is that in almost all countries intergovernmental relations are not constitutionally and statutorily 
prescribed as inter-governmental co-operation would be a legitimate expectation of a state, be 
it unitary, federal, or whatever. This is also because the subject matter concerns human and 
largely political, rather than administrative relations and have thus tended to be informal, and 
often not recorded as minutes or otherwise documented. The paucity of knowledge, theory, and 
empirically-proven ‘good practices’ are particularly felt at the local level. According to 
Agranoff and McGuire (1988), the result is that generally and quite widely, there is little clear 
understanding of both the inter-organisational and the operational complexities faced by the 
local government practitioner, especially in a multi-organisational context.21  
                                                 
20 Chattopadhyay, Roopak (2016) Intergovernmental Relations: A Comparative Survey of Structures and 
Processes, Opening Address at the International Conference on Cooperative Federalism, New Delhi, India, 21 
January 2016, 1-20, 1.  
21 Agranoff, Robert and Michael McGuire ‘The Intergovernmental Context of Local Economic 
Development’ 30(3) (1998) State and Local Government Review, 150-164, 150.  
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In this study emphasis is placed on local authorities’ relations inter se and with other levels or 
tiers of government, as this is the main subject of analysis. The intention is to acquire a clear- 
enough picture of the nature, dynamics, scope, purpose, structures, and processes of 
intergovernmental relations in certain countries in order to determine how an effective approach 
could be formulated therefrom for use to benefit the local sphere of government in South Africa. 
The aim is a search for an appropriate model of municipal representation in both councils and 
particularly by an association representing local government, such as SALGA. 
 
 
6.3 NATURE AND CONTENT OF CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE 
 
6.3.1 ORIGINS OF CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE 
It is necessary to have a clear understanding of what co-operative governance or 
intergovernmental relations is and isn’t, as well as what it entails, so as to be able to ascertain 
what mechanisms and practices could be adapted for application in South Africa. Most of the 
available literature that is useful in any way is based on federal-state relations, especially as 
practised in the United States (US) and Germany. Although these countries’ systems and 
procedures are different from the Republic’s, their actual implementation of policies, legislation 
and service delivery activities could provide useful pointers of what may be good practices: 
These, with some modifications, could be attempted in South Africa on a pilot basis. On co-
operative governance in South Africa it has been said that: 
These principles are the most detailed and elaborate provisions relating to intergovernmental relations and 
co-operative government of any existing constitution in the world.22 
 
This unprecedented approach may have been based on the constitutional drafters’ rejection of 
coercive or competitive federalism and believing in the existence of or desiring a culture similar 
to the German “Bundestreue,” determined that the spheres of government should conduct their 
“affairs in a constructive and integrated way.”23 Again, based to some extent on the German 
system, South Africa opted for decentralisation using the principle of subsidiarity and the 
promotion of local participatory democracy. 
 
 
                                                 
22 Werner Bohler in the Foreword to De Villiers and Sindane (2011), op cit, 1. 
23 Ibid 
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There isn’t much literature on co-operative governance perhaps because –  
Intergovernmental cooperation is implicit in any system where powers have been allocated concurrently to 
different levels of government.24 
 
Whatever the system, government cannot function without each level engaging each other 
horizontally and vertically, but no constitutional or statutory provision may be necessary for 
human interaction. It goes without saying that co-operation is a necessity, for competitive or 
antagonistic or coercive approaches could see the collapse of the state. Steytler (2006) asserts 
that there has been no explicit mention of intergovernmental relations in most constitutions 
even in the Swiss Constitution as recently as 1999.25  
 
The German constitution establishing the federation and the Länder in 1949 made provision for 
these two levels of government to practise co-operative governance through regular 
conferences. This became a feature only from 1969.26 Article 79 of the Grundgesetz prescribes 
inter-communal co-operation. Article 10 of the European Charter of Local Self-Government 
provides for local authorities to co-operate in and form consortia or associations to carry out 
tasks of common interest. They may also co-operate with counterparts in other countries. In a 
report on implementation of the European Charter of Local Self-Government in Germany, the 
Monitoring Committee recommended that the state “strengthen and institutionalise the 
participatory rights of associations of local authorities both at federal and regional or provincial 
(Land) level.”27 In Germany, an association of local authorities is two or more of them uniting 
to enjoy the benefits of agglomeration or economies of scale, undertaking joint planning, 
service delivery, etc.28 It is not a separate institution, like SALGA.  
 
Specific constitutional provision on co-operative governance for South Africa’s hybrid system 
appears to have been followed by Kenya. Its Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act29  
                                                 
24 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the RSA, 1996, 1996 10 BCLR 1 253 (CC), 1996 4 SA 744 
(CC) paragraph 290. 
25 Steytler (2006), op cit, 13. See, generally, Mbondenyi, Morris Kiwinda and Tom Ojienda (2013) 
Constitutionalism and Democratic Governance in Africa: Contemporary Perspectives from Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, 26. 
26 De Villiers and Sindane (2011), op cit, 13. 
27 Council of Europe (2012) Local and regional democracy in Germany, Report of the Monitoring 
Committee to the 22nd Session, 14 March 2012, https://wcd.coe.int, accessed 10/06/2015.  
28 Ibid. 
29 2 of 2012. 
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establishes “a framework for consultation and co-operation between the national and county 
governments and amongst county governments ... and for the resolution of intergovernmental 
disputes.”30 This statute does not mention local authorities. However, decentralisation and IGR 
in Kenya are discussed further below.31  
 
Writers contend that in the United Kingdom (UK) local and regional governments are ruled 
from Whitehall and Westminster. The government has for centuries been communicating with 
the country’s devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland by way of 
memoranda of understanding (MoUs), agreements, concordats, and other instruments, guided 
by conventions, and mostly undertaken informally. To date there does not appear to have been 
any ‘inter-governmental’ disputes that have come to public notice.32 Swenden and McEwen 
(2014) point out that in the UK, asymmetric devolution was implemented in 1999. Such a model 
was “conducive to bilateral and weakly institutionalised IGR.” It is not surprising that this was 
followed from 2007 with “widespread occurrence of party incongruence”. Devolution (unlike 
federalism) “implies a constitutional hierarchy between levels”, but UK governments have used 
their powers with some restraint. This may be partly for fear of losing electoral support and 
legitimacy among their voters and in the “absence of wide-scale intergovernmental conflict.”33  
McDowell (1997) argue that in the US, the concept of intergovernmental relations arose with 
the establishment of the temporary Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1953. Upon 
completion of its final report, this body was replaced by the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) in 1959.34 The need for such a body grew out of the large 
number of decentralised federal programmes on social and economic development which 
required a certain level of harmonisation and co-ordination amongst federal, state and local 
                                                 
30 In the Preamble. 
31In 6.4.11. 
32 Trench, Alan (2010) Devolution: Coordination between UK and Devolved Governments, 
www.devolution.ac.uk/final%20conf/devolution%20relations.pdf, accessed 15/09/2015; Bolleyer, Nicole, Nicola 
McEwen and Wilfred Swenden (2010) The Dynamics of Intergovernmental Relations in the UK, paper presented 
at the Public Service and Administration Conference, Edinburgh, 1/04/2015. 
33 Swenden, Wilfried and Nicola McEwen ‘UK devolution in the shadow of hierarchy,’ Comparative 
European Politics, (2014) 12, 488-509, 488. See also Trench, Alan ‘Challenges of Welsh devolution,’ The Law 
Society Gazette (2016) 8 February 2016, www.lawgazette.co.uk, accessed 6/06/2016. 
34 Public Law 83-109; 67 Stat 145 and Public Law 86-380; 73 Stat 703, www.library.unt.edu/govinfo, 
accessed 12/09/2015. 
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governments. The complexity of management both of the relationships and the programmes 
necessitated division into a political and an administrative component.35  
 
The ACIR was dissolved on 30 September 1996 when Congress under the Clinton 
administration felt it had become irrelevant to the issues facing it. The primary reason for its 
demise was the Commission’s handling of unfunded federal mandates, passing costs to local 
authorities.36 Markell (1994) and McDowell (1997) state that the Superfund Reform Act of 1994 
was established by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to address abandoned 
waste sites. The ten EPA regional offices worked with states and communities and was a 
practical example of intergovernmental relations and civic engagement. Although successful, 
the Act never became law.37  
 
6.3.2 NATURE OF CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE 
According to Agranoff and McGuire (1998), co-operative governance mainly involves the 
addressing of issues on a routine, day-to-day basis, rather than analysing and resolving 
problems of a nature that requires fundamental changes or transformation in structures and 
processes, or a substantial realignment to fit in with national systems of governance. It is not of 
a nature amenable to the development and implementation of a strategic five-year plan reviewed 
annually. Furthermore, intergovernmental relations are not something that concerns or can be 
managed by formal, rigid, legalistic, standardised mechanisms and procedures; nor is it a one-
time or occasional occurrence, capable of fitting into a framework that could subsequently 
become a straightjacket. It lacks that kind of precision where decisions or actions can be reduced 
to writing and formally ratified subsequently. The vertical context, engagement by local 
authorities with provincial and national tiers of government, while, on the one hand, often being 
unclear and unsophisticated and requiring bargaining, cajoling, lobbying, networking, 
caucusing, advocacy and pleading, has, on the other, necessarily to be “patterned, purposive, 
and persistent”.38  
                                                 
35 McDowell, Bruce D ‘Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1996: The End of an 
Era’, 27(2) (1997) Publius, 111-127, 111. 
36 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 1995, www.library.unt.edu/govinfo, accessed 12/09/2015. 
37 www.epa.gov/superfund/about.htm; www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?ill=h103-3800&tab; 
McDowell (1997), op cit; Markell, David L ‘“Reinventing Government”: A Conceptual Framework for Evaluating 
the Proposed Superfund Reform Act of 1994’s Approach to Intergovernmental Relations’ (24) (1994) 
Environmental Law, 1055-1095, 1055. 
38 Agranoff and McGuire (1998), op cit, 158. 
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The vertical and horizontal or inter-local context of co-operative governance is complex, 
involving, as it does, a multitude of role players, and several operational barriers related to time, 
costs, incompatibilities, conflicts, complexities, opposition, and so on. Moreover, a local 
authority should develop internal capacity and political and business support to be able to 
surmount or break down internal and external barriers. This is particularly important where 
interdependencies are essential rather than accessorial, especially in the context of limited 
resources and the need to optimise economies of scale or agglomeration. The collaborative 
approach is possible and easier today with sophisticated information and communications 
technology because local authorities in a country and across the world suffer similar challenges. 
Hence, co-operation and collaboration, more so where mutual needs and concerns are involved, 
is a cost-efficient way of undertaking complex tasks through the sharing of knowledge and 
tasks. However, one cannot disregard or ignore the barriers and complications, both internal 
and external, and competitiveness, which can thwart the best of intentions and plans.     
 
Schaller (2001) contends that intergovernmental relationships are characterised, inter alia, by:39 
(a) being both vertical and horizontal; 
(b) dealing explicitly or largely with politics rather than the administrative; 
(c) encompassing a variety of mechanisms and processes, from formal agreements to loose 
co-operative affiliations; 
(d) a high level of frequent, informal engagements and communication, mostly bilateral; 
(e) building on interdependence among stakeholders; 
(f) engaging non-profit and private sector organisations alongside government agencies;  
(g) encouraging and involving greater public participation; 
(h) leveraging complementary strengths and resources; 
(i) acknowledging interdependence as a lynchpin for intergovernmental co-operation;  
(j) striving for mutual benefits not normally achievable by one role player or a municipality 
acting solo, working in a closed or insular fashion; 
(k) financial autonomy, as agreed by the spheres of government;  
(l) trust and goodwill, which can be easily lost; and  
(m) respect for boundaries of competence that exist or are prescribed constitutionally or by 
statute.  
                                                 
39 Schaller, Bruce ‘Building Effective Relationships Between Cities and Regional, State and Federal 
Agencies,’ (2001) National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) – Synthesis 297: A Synthesis of 
Highway Practice, National Research Council: Transportation Research Board, 7. 
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6.3.3 APPROACHES TO CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE 
Intergovernmental relations, in theory, can occur through at least two polar approaches: where 
policy and legislation define formal modus operandi, as does the IRFA for South Africa; or 
through an informal collaborative model. The formal and informal approaches could be loosely 
termed coercive and co-operative methodologies, respectively, but both could be used together. 
 
May and Burby (1996) argue that where, as in the US, the federal government uses state and 
local authorities in carrying out what is termed federal regulatory mandates, the latter are 
burdened with additional planning and regulatory responsibilities. While the demand and trend 
or preference may be towards flexible and informal intergovernmental relations, the question 
arises as to what happens when such strategies do not work. The problem is doubled if coercive 
or incentive approaches are also dysfunctional. This may occur when central government, as in 
the UK, impose substantive or procedural or both requirements on subordinate authorities, 
either as conditions tied to assistance, or as direct orders. In such instances, sub-national 
authorities function as regulatory agents that follow rules prescribed by central government. 
Since these mandates set out detailed standards and procedures for achieving policy goals, they 
limit regional and local government discretion, and additionally, impose penalties for non-
compliance and deviation.40 Fortunately, this approach is not prescribed by the IRFA.   
 
May and Burby (1996) contend that while coercive mandates do consider capacity-building 
within lower levels of government to facilitate compliance, this is a secondary consideration to 
establishing and embedding monitoring systems and penalties. Coercive mandates are generally 
more paternalistic than co-operative or collaborative ones, and there are many variants of the 
two types of approaches, with the main aim being to achieve higher order objectives, that is, 
substantive compliance. While coercive methodologies require adherence to well-defined 
prescriptions, backed up by sanctions for non-compliance with substantive objectives, co-
operative approaches seek adherence to the intent of policies or strategies, or legislation, by 
relying on incentives and shared values to reach substantive compliance. Unfortunately, 
evaluation of compliance in collaborative strategies is more problematical than coercive 
approaches because there is less clear, detailed prescription of both substantive and procedural 
requirements. The relative effectiveness of both approaches depends on the level of 
commitment of the subordinate authorities. Co-operative approaches encourage and enhance a 
                                                 
40 May, Peter J and Raymond J Burby ‘Coercive v Cooperative Policies: Comparing Intergovernmental 
Mandate Performance’ 15(2) (1996) Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 171-201, 171, 173. 
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facilitative planning and implementation style, while coercive mandates foster a more formal 
and legalistic approach. The coercive mode could be termed one that uses law as an instrument 
of control and regulation, in contradistinction to the collaborative method where law could 
partly be used to facilitate development. However, each could be used individually to ensure 
policy adherence. Both prescribe planning and process elements to be followed, but the co-
operative approach does not set out the particular means and details thereof, in achieving 
desired outcomes. The wide latitude granted in the co-operative mode is encouraged and 
enhanced by financial and technical assistance to lower-tier governments, but failure to comply 
would still entail sanction. Hence, desired or required outcomes are achieved ultimately.41  
 
Markell (1994) contends that these two differentiated intergovernmental approaches each have 
their own strengths and weaknesses. He argues for a third, better modus operandi would be 
where the two are consolidated, using the essentialia and strengths of each. This would yield 
desired outcomes more economically and efficiently. Intergovernmental relations are too 
complex and dynamic to be managed and monitored by policies backed up by statutes and 
regulations only. Therefore, law can be used as an instrument for development, but not simply 
as a stick – it must also be facilitative, permissive, flexible, developmental, and broad enough 
to incorporate innovation and informality.42 
 
6.3.4 INTERGOVERNMENTAL MANAGEMENT 
Intergovernmental management refers to: 
The array of problem solving activities, procedures, techniques, and forms of steering, guidance and 
control, which persons deploy, which operate at the interfaces of the different government agencies. They 
operate within the given intergovernmental constitutional and relational framework of the 
intergovernmental system.43 
 
Toonen et al (2007) argue that intergovernmental management may be divided into statutory 
control, on the one hand, and administrative control on the other. The former is characterised 
by administrative reform, and recognition of authority, while the latter exhibits administrative 
regulation and bargaining. In between these extremes can be a system that manifests a 
combination of statutory regulation and joint decision-making by persuasion.44  
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 Markell (1994) op cit, 1057. 
43 Toonen, Theo, Trui Steen and Frits van de Meer (2007) Local Government Finance and 
Intergovernmental Relations: Comparative Institutional Analysis, research essay submitted to the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, Netherlands: Leiden University, 13. 
44 Ibid. 
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According to Toonen et al (2007), the Scandinavian countries and the UK undertake 
intergovernmental relations using general norms, statutes, regulations, and criteria that must be 
observed by all authorities involved. France, Italy, and Spain, in contrast, manage more by 
administrative regulation through direct and detailed guidance. Hence, many decisions of local 
authorities require the involvement or intervention of central government officials in individual 
cases. In some states of northern Europe, management by statutory regulation is undertaken in 
the name of decentralisation, while in Southern Europe both the voice of local government as 
a whole and of individual municipalities are heard at the centre, thus influencing national 
policy-making.45 This is not so in South Africa where SALGA has no vote in the NCoP. 
 
6.3.5 COMPARISON OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS 
A country’s governmental system underlies and informs the nature, structures, and processes 
of intergovernmental relations and consequently, municipal representation. Table 6.1 
undertakes a comparison but it should be noted that this is a generalised and brief overview and 
comments therein cannot be seen as watertight. It is used to facilitate the discussion that follows, 
on how co-operative governance is practised in selected foreign countries. 
 
6.4 OVERVIEW OF CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE IN PRACTICE  
6.4.1 MECHANISMS FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
i. A framework for comparative analysis 
Given the dearth of literature on intergovernmental relations at the local level throughout the 
world, attention is paid here to those countries where information has been documented and 
where co-operative governance has been practised for a sufficiently long time to show successes 
and failures. Unfortunately, most of such is confined to countries having the federal system of 
governance where most relationships are between the national government and the states (or 
provinces or regions). Such models are not directly comparable with “one, sovereign 
democratic state”46 with a ‘three-sphere governmental system’47 that is South Africa. However, 
the nature of the governmental system is unimportant as co-operation, consultation, co-
ordination, consolidation, mutuality, harmonisation, and integration are necessary in today’s 
globally-competitive environment, whatever the governmental system. Neither can powers and 
functions in a multi-level system be absolute and watertight. 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 
46 Section 1 of the Constitution. 
47 Section 40(1) of the Constitution. 
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CRITERIA UK GERMANY FRANCE SCANDINAVIA S. AFRICA 
Establishment Evolutionary, 
legal 
Constitutional, 
legal 
Legal Legal Constitutional, 
legal 
Establishment by 
charter 
Yes No No No Yes48 
LG predates state49 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LG a creature of 
statute 
Yes Constitutionally 
established 
No  Yes No. Established 
by 
Constitution 
Development Evolutionary, 
legal 
Evolutionary Evolutionary Evolutionary Legislation 
System Hierarchy Democratic 
hierarchy 
Integrated 
hierarchy 
Hierarchy with 
local autonomy 
Constitutional 
democracy, LG 
autonomous 
‘sphere’  
Status Unclear, low50 Clear, high Unclear, low Clear, high Clear, high 
Power/functions Unclear Clear Unclear Clear Unclear  
Allocation of 
responsibilities 
Asymmetrical Asymmetrical Asymmetrical Asymmetrical Symmetrical 
(same for all) 
Decentralisation 
with devolution of 
power to LA 
No Yes No Yes Yes 
Legislative 
competency 
No Yes No Yes Yes 
Own revenue Limited Own + transfers Transfers Own + transfers High 
Community diverse, affluent Homogeneous, 
affluent 
Homogeneous, 
affluent 
Homogeneous, 
affluent 
Mixed, mostly 
poor 
Franchise Yes Yes Yes Yes Only from 1994 
Local economy Integrated Integrated Integrated Integrated Dual 
Landownership as 
devel. mechanism 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No, only from 
1991 
Local democracy Yes Yes Yes Yes Only from 1994 
Law for control and 
regulation  
Limited No No No Yes 
Developmental LG  Limited Yes No Yes, limited Yes, but only 
after 1996  
Political/admin 
dichotomy 
Yes Yes No/Yes Yes Blurred 
Role of regional 
authorities 
Minimal High, important Minimal Minimal High 1910-94,  
then uncertain  
Size of local 
authorities 
Small Small Small Small Medium, large 
after 2000 
Tiers of government Centralised, with 
devolved powers 
to 3 countries 
3, with parallel, 
interlinked roles 
3, interlinked Dual (national-
local)  
3 ‘spheres’ 
Formal IGR No No No No Yes 
 
Table 6.1: Comparison of foreign and South African local government systems          
(Compiled from literature)             
 
                                                 
48 Referring to Natal and the Cape Colony initially, and then by provincial ordinances, and finally by the 
Constitution and the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act. 
49 In the sense of early settlements that were ‘self-governing’ until consolidated later and divided into 
different categories, possibly based on spatial and population size. 
50 British local authorities are generally agents of the (central) state that have devolved powers. Reform 
underway may enhance their status. 
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In analysing local government taxation and intergovernmental financial relationships, Toonen 
et al (2007) prepared an international comparative institutional framework that has been useful 
in reviewing intergovernmental relations in Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and France. They 
argue that in intergovernmental relations the well-known distinction between autonomy and co-
governance cannot be seen as a zero-sum contradiction or management dilemma.     Autonomy 
relates to a balance between the “organisational ability to act with a fair degree of independence 
and a minimum of transaction costs.”51 Co-governance requires the need and potential to affect 
and co-operate with other interests and power holders so as to participate and influence joint 
decision-making as well as agenda-setting. There may be trade-offs between autonomy and 
influence or co-determination, the volume often determined by trust.52 Toonen et al (2007)53 
analyse intergovernmental relations using a set of components, namely: 
 
(a) intergovernmental constitution, under which for comparative purposes, they distinguish 
between federalism, unitarism, legislated reform, and institutional transformation; 
(b) intergovernmental relations, which incorporates field organisation, inter-wovenness, 
and interdependency; and  
(c) intergovernmental management. 
 
ii. Intergovernmental constitution 
For comparative purposes, the distinction between federal and unitary states is seen as a formal 
legal one as “Indeed, only God knows what the unitary principle is and he has been remarkably 
reluctant to let mere mortals into the secret.”54 Toonen et al (2007) argue that it would be useful 
to distinguish, firstly, between federal and unitary states, and secondly between federal and 
unitary systems of governance and public administration. It should be noted that from a 
sociological, political or administrative viewpoint, unitary states may function as federalised 
systems or that federal-type of implementation may operate in a unitary state. This approach 
may be evident in Scandinavia where local authorities implement and administer national 
agreed-upon policies and, as such, whether formally or de facto, they do influence national 
                                                 
51 Toonen et al (2007), op cit, 2. 
52 Toonen et al (2007), op cit, 5-6. 
53 Toonen et al (2007), 7-13. 
54 Bulpitt, J ‘Walking Back to Happiness? Conservative party governments and elected local authorities 
in the 1980s’ in Crouch C and D Marquand (Eds) (1989) The New Centralism: Britain out of step in Europe? 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, quoted by Toonen et al (2007), op cit, 7. 
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policy formulation.55 For comparative purposes, Toonen et al (2007) identify four classical 
types of intergovernmental constitution:  
(a) federalism or dual federalism, characterised by authority;  
(b) co-operative federalism;  
(c) consensus unitarism, with both (a) and (b) characterised by interdependency; and  
(d) unitarism, with Westminster and Jacobin (France) as examples, characterised by 
hierarchy.56  
 
iii. Federalism 
In an analysis of intergovernmental systems, it would be useful to distinguish between (i) co-
operative or horizontal federalism (for example, Germany) and (ii) dual or vertical federalism 
(for example, the US). In the latter, with respect to legislation and administration, different 
policy areas, tasks and competencies are assigned to each layer of government. In co-operative 
or horizontal federalism, one level sets the rule while another implements. Both require the 
formulation and implementation of complex intergovernmental relations the basic nature of 
which may differ.57 
 
iv. Unitarism and legislated reform 
Toonen et al (2007) assert that unitary states should not be treated as an undifferentiated 
category. Since the 1980s, the archetypal Jacobin French and British Westminster varieties 
cannot be juxtaposed as ‘centralised’ and ‘decentralised’. These inclusive authority models will 
encounter problems in administrative adaptation and modernisation processes. The application 
of clearly circumscribed powers and competencies (the ultra vires doctrine) means that 
intergovernmental reform can only be done through parliamentary legislation. They argue that 
the Dutch ‘decentralised unitary state’ is a concept that theoretically cannot exist as 
decentralised centralisation is self-contradictory. They add, however, that from an historical 
perspective, “this principle of a ‘decentralised unitary state’ reveals characteristics which reflect 
the constitution of what can more appropriately be called a ‘consensus state’.”58 
 
 
                                                 
55 Toonen et al (2007), 7-8. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Toonen et al (2007), op cit, 9. 
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v. Institutional transformation 
In consensual systems, the intergovernmental constitution and other parts of the co-operative 
governance system would most likely be conducted in an organic manner with “framework 
legislation very often following pragmatic and step-by-step transformation of the system.” In 
the organic systems of both federal (Germany) and unitary (the Netherlands and Sweden) there 
is room for ‘reform bargaining’ and for institutional transformation without (legislated) 
reform.59 
 
vi. Field organisation 
According to Toonen et al (2007), intergovernmental relations in France are characterised by 
the principle of verticality or administrative deconcentration whereby the centre sets the rules 
but also undertakes their implementation by means of field agencies in the regions. While the 
(former) Prefectorial system in France is the most notable example, a similar model is followed 
in Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Belgium. In the decentralisation and reform processes of 
the 1980s and 1990s, the territorial boundaries of the French system have now become more 
political than administrative/bureaucratic. The Departments were granted democratic 
legitimisation by substituting the Prefect for a democratically-elected mayor and council for 
executive action at sub-national and local level. These reforms were workable because of the 
flexibility created in enhancing and politicising territoriality in the administration and control 
of service delivery. Field administrations execute or implement functions that have been 
assigned to them by central government. Germany, in contrast to the French model, applies the 
principle of local self-administration in the relations among the Bund (federal) and Länder 
(provinces) and among the Länder inter se and municipalities therein.60 
 
vii. Interwovenness and interdependency 
Comparison of intergovernmental relations is also facilitated by the degree of political and 
administrative interwovenness of the different levels of government, according to Toonen et al 
(2007). The dual British system, using the doctrine of ultra vires, is characterised by statutory 
regulation with a rigid and high degree of separation of the different layers of government. This 
approach has been termed “steering from a distance.”61  
                                                 
59 Toonen et al (2007), op cit, 10. 
60 Toonen et al (2007), op cit, 11-12. 
61 Ibid. 
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Toonen et al (2007) argue that by contrast, in Germany, joint decision making is done among 
the various levels of government where the horizontality principle creates a “fundamental 
interdependency relationship.” In such systems, local authorities are an integral part of the 
overall state structure often taking a larger share of governmental expenditures and of the 
overall budget than national and regional or county governments. In any system, there must be 
a need for “complementarity, co-ordination, and reduction of duplication and overlap in central-
local relations.” Also required is the need to disentangle intergovernmental relations on behalf 
of the ‘lower’ governments.62 
 
According to Toonen et al (2007), in the UK it was only after post-Thatcher reforms that 
national administration become involved in local issues and more recent experiences have 
contributed to a “considerable modification of this conventional wisdom.” In contrast, the 
archaic French municipal government system is being reformed by osmosis – the development 
of a complex interplay of forces with a high level of interwovenness and interdependency. This 
works with a non-executant role of central government coupled with local self-administration 
and recognition of the importance of local economies to the state.63  
 
In reviewing the approach to intergovernmental relations in Canada and Spain with the aim of 
formulating a comparative framework, Mazzarella (2009) distinguishes between 
vertical/horizontal, and multilateral/bilateral relations, as well as relations by acts (written 
agreements) and by organs (such as forums). Issues to be considered in the development of an 
analytical framework include consideration of the level of formalisation, that is, the legal status 
of co-operation and of its results; the legal and political procedural framework; compulsory or 
voluntary use of co-operation tools; legal or merely political effect of decisions; judicial 
protection of the parties engaging in intergovernmental relations; and the concrete impact of 
co-operation outcomes on the enforced policies.64  
 
viii. Intergovernmental management 
This component has been addressed under section 6.3.4 above. Table 6.1 may assist in 
understanding the comparisons below. 
                                                 
62 Ibid. 
63 Toonen et al (2007), op cit, 12. 
64 Mazzarella, Marco (2009) Towards a comparative framework for intergovernmental relations: 
gleanings from two experiences, Research Paper No 9/2009, Sant’Anna Legal Studies, http://stals.ssup.it, 7-8, 
accessed 12/11/2015. 
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The above review shows the complexity of co-operative governance and intergovernmental 
relations. Notwithstanding this situation, most countries have not seen fit to regulate the matter.  
This raises the question of whether prescribing legislation to regulate intergovernmental 
relations was necessary. However, the IRFA is a framework type of statute that serves as a 
guideline. 
 
6.4.2 CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
i. Background 
Although England may have the closest analogy to South Africa, a former colony, the unequal 
nature of central-local relations; the low status of local authorities;65 and the fact that 
municipalities are service delivery agencies, alongside non-governmental organisations and the 
private sector, points to a situation where inter-local relations may be non-existent or 
unnecessary in that country. Local authorities function under powers laid down under various 
Acts of Parliament and thus have no general competencies. This means that the principle of 
subsidiarity does not apply. Parliament defines the ‘powers beyond which’ (ultra vires) local 
authorities cannot go. Central government grants and equalisation schemes make up the bulk 
of sub-national government budgets.66 The UK’s Westminster parliamentary system is 
characterised as being “adversarial, competitive, majoritarian and winner-take-all politics”,67 
as system adopted by the apartheid regime but alien to the co-operative governance models of 
Germany and South Africa. 
 
According to Loughlin (2001) and Bolleyer et al (2010), local authorities’ powers and functions 
declined from about the 1930s, with the post WW II welfare state resulting in greater 
centralisation of policy-making. Centralising accelerated in 1979 when Margaret Thatcher 
became Prime Minister. ‘Reforms’ resulted in transfer of functions to central government 
agencies, reducing the discretion of local authorities. Their powers were further eroded when 
service delivery became largely outsourced through privatisation, compulsory competitive 
                                                 
65 The UK is ruled from Whitehall and Westminster and has four devolved units of government (England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland). The Thatcher ‘reforms’ reduced local governments to agencies of the state, 
until reforms in 2002 and 2007. Bolleyer et al (2010), op cit. See also Loughlin, John (2001) ‘The United Kingdom: 
From Hypercentralization to Devolution’ in Loughlin, John (ed) Subnational Democracy in the European Union: 
Challenges and Opportunities, Oxford: University Press, 37-60; Compared to most Scandinavian and European 
states, South Africa, and countries assessed in this study, local governments in the UK were found to be ‘weak’. 
66 See Loughlin (2001), Bolleyer et al (2010), op cit. 
67 Chattopadhyay (2016), op cit, 11.  
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bidding, and best value tendering.68 In 1997 the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of 
Europe (CLRAE) denoted the UK as a country “with serious deficiencies in the practice of local 
democracy” due, inter alia, to considerable reduction in their power, the amalgamation of many 
of them into a single level (symmetry) and the disestablishment of others, creation of quasi non-
governmental organisations (QUANGOs), limits on expenditure, and reducing revenue to them. 
Much concern was raised about the state of local government. Engagement between the Local 
Government Association and the Department for Communities and Local Government has 
resulted in a lowering of tensions. The state’s policy to devolve power commenced with the 
Greater London Authority. The government’s White Paper of 2006 recommended that counties 
become stronger as they “represent the best alternative for local power.”69 
 
ii. Informal intergovernmental relations 
The centre’s relationship with devolved territories, that is, the UK government’s engagement 
with those in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, may provide some lessons for inter-sphere 
co-operative governance. Notwithstanding the absence of directly comparable systems and 
processes, it would be useful to study documented intergovernmental relations so as to derive 
lessons of experience for use in South Africa. This is because developed countries have a much 
longer history of democratic, multi-tiered government than do developing states. In most 
nations, however, local authorities have been neglected or even ignored in the design and 
practice of co-operative governance. Within sub-national units there is a lack of structures and 
processes to involve municipalities in policy formulation. This section examines the subject 
more broadly first, and then focuses on particulars. The functioning of a country is to a large 
extent shaped, influenced, and impacted on by its history, governance system, constitutional-
legal prescripts, settlement patterns, religion, culture, allocation of powers and functions, status 
of sub-national governments, and other factors. These contribute to determining the nature of 
the relationships between organs of state and their officials. Table 6.1 may aid in explaining the 
rationale for the approach adopted. 
 
The devolution statutes: Northern Ireland Act, Scotland Act, and the Government of Wales Act, 
all promulgated in 1998, created various devolved bodies and established the framework within 
which they exercised their powers. But they did not set out how the centre will practise 
                                                 
68 See Loughlin (2001), Bolleyer et al (2010), op cit. 
69 Ibid. 
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intergovernmental relations with them or how they engage each other and with England. 
Notwithstanding the existence of four governments following the devolved elections of 2007:70 
Relations between the UK Government and the devolved administrations have been remarkably 
harmonious since 1999. There has been no intergovernmental litigation before the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council; no disputes have been referred to the Joint Ministerial Committee; and even behind the 
scenes there have been relatively few spats.71 
 
One reason for this harmonious situation is the structure of the UK’s intergovernmental system, 
which incorporates the following features:72 
(a) Asymmetry: Different powers are devolved to the four governments; 
(b) Dual role: The UK Government is responsible for non-devolved or reserved functions 
as well as for the governance of England; 
(c) Devolved units: Having only four devolved units make for easier and smoother 
intergovernmental relations; and 
(d) Bilateral relations: Rather than having multilateral engagement across the UK, the 
government can engage with a devolved unit through bilateral relations. 
Given that the “powers of the regions are very limited and there are no directly elected regional 
governments except for London” makes for relatively dispute-free relations.73 This situation is 
also due to there being little ideological differences between the various parts of the UK, 
generous increases in public spending, flexibility built into devolution arrangements, ingrained 
habits of co-operation between officials and departments, and a single, stable and non-
politically aligned public service.74 However, Trench (2010), op cit, argues that: “These factors 
are each likely to be short-lived.”75 
 
iii. Move toward a more ‘formalised’ informal system 
In acknowledging that intergovernmental disputes will come, the House of Lords Constitutional 
Committee Report on devolution in 2002 said: 
We recommend that further use should be made of the formal mechanism for intergovernmental relations, 
even if they seem to many of those presently involved as excessive. Formal mechanisms, such as the Joint 
Ministerial Committee, are not intended to serve as a substitute for good relations in other respects, or for 
good and frequent informal contacts, but rather to serve as a framework for such relations and to act as a 
fall-back in case informal personal relations cease to be sufficient. Such mechanisms are likely to become 
increasingly important when governments of different political persuasions have to deal with each other.76 
                                                 
70 Bolleyer et al (2010), op cit, 2. 
71 Trench (2010), op cit, 1. 
72 Ibid.  
73 Toonen et al (2007), op cit, 12.  
74 Ibid.  
75 Trench (2010), op cit, 1. 
76 Trench (2010), op cit, 3.   
264 
 
Following on the House of Lords recommendation, suggestions have been made on the 
mechanisms for sound intergovernmental relations.77 
(a) Accept disputes as a necessary and proper part of intergovernmental relations; 
(b) Transparency to be a key element in the working of government; 
(c) Ensure that the general machinery of co-operative governance functions; 
(d) Review the intergovernmental relations machinery to ascertain what works and what 
does not; 
(e) Establish an independent standing committee of technical experts to provide well-
informed advice; 
(f) Acknowledge that certain issues, particularly financial, are complicated and that 
workable solutions involve both technical and political considerations; and 
(g) Legal issues should be aired publicly, adjudicated by the UK Supreme Court. 
 
Harmonious intergovernmental relations have existed up to now despite traditional British 
Parliamentary democracy being adversarial in character and political debate dominated by 
competition between government and the opposition, due to party incongruence. This situation 
is more likely in a multilevel system of government if composed of different parties and in the 
UK is likely to increase after the 2007 elections and devolution. Party political incongruence 
affects intergovernmental relations in an organisational and a programmatic sense, and in both 
vertical and horizontal engagements.78 
 
The assessment of the impact of party congruence or incongruence on intergovernmental 
relations requires consideration of two dimensions: (i) the degree of formalisation or 
institutionalisation of the processes of intergovernmental engagement; and (ii) the nature of 
intergovernmental interaction and policy co-ordination. The degree of formalisation or 
institutionalisation can range from irregular and ad hoc arrangements, such as in Spain and 
Canada, to very organised, as in Scandinavian countries, Germany, Switzerland, and the US. 
Party congruence or incongruence affects the nature of intergovernmental relations. 
Congruence, as in South Africa, contributes to co-operation and collaboration while the 
opposite occurs when parties are incongruent. It should be noted that intergovernmental 
interaction, per se, does not guarantee intergovernmental agreement.79  
                                                 
77 Trench 2010), op cit, 3-4. 
78 Bolleyer et al (2010), op cit, 2-3. 
79 Bolleyer et al (2010), op cit, 4-5. 
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In a unitary state, even with decentralised and regionalised units, the central level has the final 
say in allocation of powers and competencies, thus creating ‘a shadow of hierarchy’. This may 
be used to resolve intergovernmental co-ordination challenges or sub-national units may co-
operate to maximise their influence.80  
 
Symmetry makes multilateral engagement, regular co-decision making, and institutionalisation 
of intergovernmental relations easier than asymmetry, the latter putting a strong premium on 
bilateralism and flexibility, as shown in the UK. Shared and exclusive powers and functions or 
competencies can also influence the design and implementation of intergovernmental structures 
and processes.81 
 
The processes of intergovernmental relations “in the first eight years of devolution were 
scarcely formalised” in Scotland and Wales.82 The low level of institutionalisation of 
intergovernmental relations is due to several practices evolving over a long period, including 
party political congruence, asymmetrical systems, bilateral relations, uniformity of policy 
standards, the formal legal structure being non-federal, the devolved units in a ‘union state’ 
exercising a degree of administrative autonomy, and the UK Parliament not legislating on 
devolved matters without the express consent of the governments of these territories.83 
 
The flexible, non-formalised nature of intergovernmental relations in the UK has been 
workable, being based on several agreements, which are similar to those used in many other 
countries. The base or foundational document is the memorandum of understanding (MoU), 
with supplementary and complementary agreements such as concordats used mostly for 
bilateral relations between government departments, and arrangements for meetings between 
governments, with the highest importance accorded the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC). 
The MoU sets out the key principles for intergovernmental engagement and in practice these 
have been found to be communication between administrations; co-operation; sharing of 
information, statistics, and research; and respect for the confidentiality of information shared. 
Some of the instruments, such as concordats, Legislative Consent Motions, standard operating 
procedures, Devolution Guidance Notes, based on convention, have no constitutional or legal 
                                                 
80 Bolleyer et al (2010), op cit, 5 
 81 Bolleyer et al (2010), op cit, 5-6. 
82 Bolleyer et al (2010), op cit, 10, 12. 
83 Bolleyer et al (2010), op cit, 10-11. 
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basis, being ‘soft law’; are relatively limited in scope; and far less formal compared with 
countries such as Spain and Canada.84  
 
The formality is even less in practice than what the existing mechanisms suggest, given the high 
level of interaction between governments and the inability of a rigid, formulaic system to cope 
with such intensity of engagement, mostly confined to the executive branch of government. It 
has been said that the formal aspects account for only 20 per cent of inter-administration 
relationships, while 80 per cent is informal, given the personal chemistry and goodwill of actors 
involved.85  
 
iv. Move toward greater formality in intergovernmental relations 
The House of Lords acknowledged the need for goodwill and that it is necessary for and 
explains the high level of informality. It, however, expressed concern that “goodwill appears to 
have been elevated into a principle” of intergovernmental relations, as its present levels may 
diminish over time, especially with a change of government. Informality based on goodwill has 
worked to date largely because senior politicians of different parties have known each other as 
Members of Parliament (MPs) for a long time and the differences they deal with are currently 
limited, but there is need to make more use of the existing formal instruments.86  
 
Given the consensual nature of intergovernmental relations, the following mechanisms for 
dispute resolution are available, but have not yet been tested:87 
(a) the Joint Ministerial Committee for political disputes; 
(b) the courts, for legal disputes; and 
(c) the Chief Secretary to the Treasury and the UK Cabinet, for financial disputes. 
 
The UK has had a long history of constitutionality and democracy with the ruling party taking 
cognisance of the will of the people and the views of the strong Opposition. This applies to 
most countries of the developed world. There has thus developed a culture of goodwill and trust 
amongst politicians and even civil servants, a situation not prevailing in South Africa, nor is 
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likely to in a long time. The House of Lords Committee said that “it would be dangerous to 
assume that future crises affecting devolved functions will be capable of being solved in the 
same [informal, bilateral] way.”88 Whilst not advocating the constitutionalisation or statutory 
prescription of intergovernmental relations, the House of Lords recommended that existing 
instruments be used as guiding mechanisms as they can, with periodic amendments, cater for 
changing circumstances. It has also been said that informal mechanisms would work better 
within a formal framework, for in the absence or abandonment of such a mechanism, “the 
informal approach will become increasingly ad hoc and reactive, rather than integral to 
government. ... The value of the JMC is that it spurs other meetings to take place within the 
structure of formal meetings.” The House of Commons Justice Committee commenting on the 
current intergovernmental machinery said that it was “not fit for purpose.”89 These views 
vindicate South Africa’s approach to co-operative governance through the constitutional-
statutory framework, supplemented and complemented by informal relations. 
 
v. Reform of local government 
Graham Allan MP, Chairman of the House of Commons Political and Institutional Reform 
Select Committee said: 
While debates about devolution and independence rage, local government has been reduced over recent 
decades to little more than an agent of central government. We need to have the ambition and leadership to 
set ourselves free from the chains of Whitehall, become an equal partner, and enjoy the same independence 
as it has in most western democracies.90 
 
The Committee proposed a “Code entrenching independent local government” and the relations 
between central and local government.91 The Code in its Preamble states that “Parliament 
recognises free and independent local councils in England accountable to local citizens.” The 
Code provides for independence in both powers and finance, within the law enacted by the 
House of Commons and the House of Lords sitting jointly. The Code does not apply to devolved 
territories but is, nevertheless, a radical move away from centuries of central rule.92 
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The British system of government with Parliament being the supreme lawmaker applied to 
South Africa in colonial and apartheid times when local authorities were governed by provincial 
ordinances. The Thatcher ‘reforms’ that centralised power and largely outsourced service 
delivery has been acknowledged as an error. This is being rectified through recent reforms. 
However, British local authorities are still not comparable with South Africa’s local 
government. With nearly a thousand years of democratic practice, representation is in the House 
of Commons and House of Lords wherein local authorities have no say. Complete democracy 
only came in the 20th century for the UK. 
 
6.4.3 CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE IN GERMANY 
i. Background 
Germany is a relatively young constitutional democracy, rising from the ashes of World War II 
with a sense of urgency.93 Du Plessis argues that – 
The Basic Law perceives fundamental rights as anterior to the state and ‘the state’s law’ as subject to the 
objective order of values enshrined in the Basic Law. Law and morality (and law and politics) can therefore 
not ‘neatly be separated.94 
 
South Africa borrowed heavily from the Basic Law; for example, section 1 of the Republic’s 
Constitution reflects largely the German provision that, “All state authority emanates from the 
people…and is exercise by the people…”95 
   
Germany’s co-operative federalism is characterised by a systematic, almost ‘constitutional’ 
separation of policy-making and its execution by various levels of government. This results in 
a high degree of political and administrative interwoven governance through participation by 
the various levels. Intergovernmental management is organic, being a process of co-operative, 
joint decision-making in a Rechtsstaat (state governed by law).96 
 
ii. Constitutionally-prescribed local government autonomy 
Government in Germany comprises the Bund (federal authority), Länder (plural: provinces), of 
which there are currently 16, Kreise (‘counties’), and Gemeinden (local authorities). The federal 
                                                 
93 D Plessis, L (2005) Learned Staatsrecht From the Heartland of the Rechtsstaat, 8(1) (2005) PER/PELJ 
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94 Du Plessis (2005), op cit, 85.   
95 Article 20(2) of the Basic Law.  
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structure is constitutionally protected.97 Articles 20(1) and 28(1) of the Grundgesetz98 stipulate 
that Germany is a republican, democratic nation conforming to the Sozialstaatsprinzip and 
Rechtsstaatprinzip, that is, the principles of a social federal state functioning under the rule of 
law and constitutionalism. Hence, the nation’s exercise of a democratically legitimised political 
power is limited by civil rights.99 
  
The idea of strong government as the guarantor of a successfully-functioning polity dates from 
the early nineteenth century.100 Article 20(2) prescribes that today’s German Federal Republic 
utilises the principle of people’s sovereignty, signifying that all state authority emanates from 
the people in a model where representative parliamentary democracy predominates. The same 
principles of a social state governed by the rule of law also apply to its provincial governments. 
Local authorities are guaranteed the right to democratic local self-government, both by Article 
28 and by the constitution of the Land they fall under. 
 
iii. Functional and spatial division of powers  
Since the Länder were precursors of the nation state, the specifically-federal view of how tasks 
should be divided among the various political levels emerged early in German constitutional 
theory. The Bundestag (from Bund, meaning federation and tagen, to confer), the lower House 
of Parliament, and the Bundesrat (rat meaning council), the upper House of Parliament, are the 
principal legislative levels with most laws centralised. The Bundestag sets out the boundaries 
of a Land’s legislative power. Local government structures and powers are not uniform 
throughout Germany as each Land has its own Gemeindeordnung (local authorities’ ordinance) 
that can make specific differentiation among municipalities. Gemeinde play an important role 
in the execution of both Land and Bund law. The Länder presume specific responsibilities 
unless the Constitution explicitly states that the competence for a particular matter lies at a 
higher level. Hence, administration is a direct function of the Länder, which enforce federal 
laws within their respective spatial jurisdictions. Each Land has to be involved in the 
formulation of federal legislation through the second chamber, the Bundesrat.101  
                                                 
 97 Constitution or Basic Law, of 1949. 
 98 Bullmann, Udo (2001) ‘Germany: Federalism under Strain’ in Loughlin, John (ed) Subnational 
Democracy in the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities, op cit, 83-85; www.bundestag.de, accessed 
6/06/2016. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid; Toonen et al (2007), op cit, 22. 
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The Bundesrat, a powerful body, is composed of the executive of the Land governments. Thus, 
executive federalism is inserted into the federal legislative process where the Bundesrat speaks 
directly on Länder interests. Hence, it is not a forum such as South Africa’s NCoP where 
delegates vote according to the mandates from their provincial legislatures and where party 
interests predominate.102   
 
The German parliamentary system has been described as shared and integrated federalism. The 
emphasis is not on status and role differentiation, but of collective responsibility for both 
formulation and implementation of legislation. Under such a system, it is necessary to 
constitutionally and statutorily establish a set of institutions and rules to govern how they will 
operate in order to manage the complex system. IGR in Germany is thus institutionalised and 
formalised,103 an approach to a large extent followed by South Africa. 
 
Since Länder operate according to the subsidiarity principle, local authorities have, through 
long German tradition, a high degree of autonomy and responsibility. They have a dual role: 
functioning as independent governments competent to take any necessary action in their 
community’s interest, and operating as agents of both federal and state governments. Recently 
there has been pressure to provide a more consistent approach to matters of national policy and 
consequently the autonomy of the Länder has subsequently been reduced. At the same time, 
powers have devolved from the Land to the local level where authorities are encouraged to see 
their role as part of a comprehensive national network of public administration and service 
provision. The ‘modernisation’ of local government in Germany commenced only in the early 
1990s.104  
 
Reform of federalism, starting in 2006, was aimed largely at restructuring the power balance 
and to ease the decision-making process of the Bund and the Länder, with an emphasis on 
clarifying accountability and enhancing efficiency. Germany has a comprehensive and detailed 
legal framework for budgetary processes for the different levels of government, all of which 
are responsible for taxation and redistribution. Equalisation, based on solidarity, is a complex 
process with the aim of spreading finances to guarantee an equal standard of living throughout 
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the country. Germany’s legal tradition is reflected in the way oversight is organised, by the 
courts. New Public Management is the model used for administrative reform. It is highly 
political, with a co-operative system that will still be “strongly law oriented.”105 Länder 
representatives serve their regional interests through the Bundesrat and through other kinds of 
interactions with the federal government. They participate in the preparation and formulation 
of new federal initiatives. Their more crucial role is the reactive function of either accepting or 
rejecting them. Such an approach is possible due to the veto power of the Bundesrat and to the 
requirement of unanimity on ‘joint tasks’.106 
 
iv. Nature of local authorities 
In terms of the Grundgesetz, local authorities are public bodies falling within the competence 
or rule of the Land and a constituent part of it. However, in the constitutional understanding of 
democracy and in political practice, they are seen as an independent third level of the political 
and administrative system. Current functions of municipalities are varied while counties have 
a supra-local responsibility.107  
 
Municipal statutes are structured within the framework of the Basic Law under Land legislation 
and all Länder provide for the direct election of mayors to head the local administration.108  
 
Some Land local government constitutions prohibit municipalities from engaging in economic 
activity, save in exceptional circumstances. This arrangement is to protect the private sector 
and to minimise the local authority’s exposure to risk.109  Where a power is assigned or 
delegated to a local authority on the basis of subsidiarity, it is usually, but not always, 
accompanied by the requisite resources.110 Therefore, the problem of ‘unfunded mandates’ does 
not usually arise. Other local government operations that work well in Germany and which are 
stipulated unambiguously in provincial constitutions are:111  
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(a) annual financial audits; 
(b) state executive’s supervision of municipalities’ right to local autonomy; 
(c) state executive legal supervision of the municipality’s performance of its tasks and its 
administrative activities; and 
(d) expert supervision of delegated tasks for lawfulness and appropriateness. 
 
v. Co-operative governance 
Unlike the federal system in the US, Canada, Australia, and India (and also dissimilar to the 
situation in apartheid South Africa), the German model avoided a dual political structure with 
state systems working in parallel, preferring a model of interlinked competences, with a specific 
division of labour and responsibilities between the two levels of government. The relationships 
of the national authority with the provinces and between the regions themselves are “central to 
the functioning of the political system, permeating all aspects of German political life.”112 Such 
detailed prescriptions have the advantage of providing certainty and protection of the various 
role players. Germany follows a dual approach to local government.113 The federal constitution, 
on the one hand, establishes and protects local authorities as the third tier of government,114 
while details of its organisation, powers and functions are determined by the respective Länder 
as one of their ‘exclusive’ powers, subject to adherence to any conditions imposed by the 
Grundgesetz. Local authorities function under the constitution of the particular Land which 
clearly sets out their responsibilities. Therefore, there is no ambiguity as with South Africa’s 
concurrent powers. Furthermore, their effective functioning is facilitated by good local-state 
relations promoted and managed by the Bundesrat itself. There was, therefore, no need to 
formalise intergovernmental relations by means of a statute.  
 
Du Plessis describes the German IGR system as not competitive but co-operative federalism, a 
system that counteracts fragmentation and impels co-operation through the principle of 
Bundestreue. This was essential to achieving the Basic Law giving “foundational prominence” 
to human dignity, equality and the promotion of human rights,115 as followed by the drafters of 
the South African Constitution, particularly section 1 and the Bill of Rights. 
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The strong position of the Land through constitutionally-endowed authority over its constituent 
municipalities and its representation in the Bundesrat functions well to serve the interests of the 
localities. This is particularly so since Länder have considerable influence over national 
legislation, especially because of the trend in the Bundesrat towards joint policy-making, unlike 
the case of South Africa’s NCoP. The German intergovernmental system is seen as ‘quasi-
federalist’ rather than purely federalist, as its federal structures and processes lay more emphasis 
on vertical and horizontal sharing of powers, responsibilities and resources, than their rigid 
separation, as in Canada. This approach gave rise to a constitutional practice called the 
Verbundsystem, resulting in collaboration, co-operation and co-ordination in all stages of the 
policy-making process becoming a central characteristic of the federal system. Such policy-
interlocking mode of operation is a decision-making mechanism that served to institutionalise 
the need for broad consensus and thus entrenched intergovernmental relations. This democratic, 
inclusive, and facilitative practice has, in turn, enabled a high degree of legal standardisation.116  
 
The Länder are the implementing agencies of the federal government, and they generally have 
greater administrative capacity than the centre to do so. Hence, vertical linkages both politically 
and technically are highly developed, as are networks within the province incorporating local 
authorities, to the extent that implementation practices have become harmonised among the 
Länder.117 Intergovernmental relations and all it entails are the almost exclusive powers of the 
executive, with the legislature playing a minimal role. A vast network, as well as structures and 
processes within and between both the political and administrative spheres, have been 
established to harmonise and synchronise the development, formulation and implementation of 
public policy. The political decision-making body in a city or town is its council, the Stadtrat 
or the Gemeinderat. Most income of local authorities derives from grants by the federal and 
Land governments.118  
 
The Teutonic level of efficiency, supplemented and complemented by the practice of 
Bundestreue, have consolidated to provide Germany with a very workable intergovernmental 
relations system and practice, one that is internationally unique, and thus serves as a model for 
other countries to emulate. It is worth noting that Bundestreue in German constitutional theory 
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and practice: Entails a legal obligation which rests on the federation and Länder governments 
to assist each other, to integrate efforts to serve the people and to share capacity and information 
where and when required.119 
 
It is a reflection of the same founding values and spirit expressed in the Preamble to the South 
African Constitution and supposed to be underlying the notion of co-operative governance, but 
is unambiguous and universally accepted in Germany. It has through time become 
institutionalised, unlike the concept of ubuntu/batho pele in South Africa.  Bundestreue is a 
guiding light for co-operative federalism in modern federal theory and has been recognised as 
a binding legal principle by the German Constitutional Court.120 
 
In balancing co-operation and conflict inevitable in intergovernmental relations: 
The German model is predicated on the idea that the centre and the Länder act together. Hence co-operative 
governance and loyalty to the federation, Bundestreue, lie at the heart of the system. Decision-making at 
all levels stresses the need for cooperation and consensus. Most intergovernmental mechanisms require 
unanimity, and then become binding.121  
 
Consensus-based, binding, formal decision-making and the Bundesrat’s unique integration of 
parliamentary and executive federalism itself constitutes a dispute resolution mechanism. This 
is different from IGR that functions through forums for discussion, exchange of ideas and 
information and where executives remain accountable to their legislatures,122 for example, as 
in South Africa and Canada. Co-operative federalism “promotes the functioning, performance 
and stability of the German Republic”. 123    
 
vi. Provincial-local government interaction 
There is no formal assembly or forum or similar such equivalent to the federal Bundesrat in the 
Land where the latter meets with local authorities. However, various mechanisms have evolved 
for this purpose through convention and more recently by means of statute. In the German 
intergovernmental system, organised local government in the form of Kreisetag (league of 
counties), and Staedtebund and Gemeindebund (league of towns and local authorities, 
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respectively) facilitate and manage relations between municipalities, the Land, and the federal 
government. Mitwirkungsrecht or right of co-operation ensures that local authorities are 
informed by the federal and Länder governments on matters affecting them.124 An equivalent 
right in South Africa may help to improve intergovernmental relations if section 5 of the IRFA 
is properly interpreted and applied. 
 
vii. Local government at sub-provincial level 
Sub-provincial or secondary levels of local government co-ordinate activities of local 
authorities and facilitate their initiation of policy and administration of legislation. 
Municipalities are consolidated into sub-Land units called Kreise, organised under Länder 
legislation, and recognised by the federal constitution. Although the Kreise have their own 
institutions and functions, they are not a fourth tier, being a part of local government. The role 
of these ‘regional’ institutions is essentially to co-ordinate those functions between 
municipalities which, due to their nature, cannot be managed by them individually. Such 
activities can best be explained by the principle of subsidiarity, that is, they administer matters 
which require wider areas of control and larger resources than what the Gemeinde possess. All 
Länder have legislation enabling municipalities to co-operate with each other in areas of 
mutual concern, while the national constitution protects the rights of local authorities to form 
Gemeindeverbaende (associations). These provisions create a legal basis for local government 
to establish ad hoc associations (Zweckverbaende) or to conclude agreements to render services 
on a joint basis. Such institutions can be constituted as separate public law organisations or 
within the framework of common law companies or associations. Various forms of inter-
municipal bodies, such as planning associations, have been established to deal with specific or 
sectoral issues.125 While Kreise (sub-Land geographical unit or ‘county’) are territorially fixed 
and have permanent members, these associations are functionally driven, meaning that 
membership may change and one municipality may be a member of several such organisations. 
Due to pooling of resources and a common or shared vision, inter-municipal co-operation often 
obtains better results than where a local authority goes it alone.126 
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viii. Local government cross-border co-operation 
No constitutional or other legal provision is made for local government to create formal 
structures across Land boundaries since the province’s jurisdictional competence is territorially 
limited. While no cross-border public law institution can be created and no Kreis can cut across 
a Land boundary, there is nothing precluding municipalities in different, particularly adjoining, 
Länder from co-operating on a voluntary and informal basis.127 
 
ix. International interaction between local governments 
Germany has made no provision for municipalities to co-operate with governments in other 
countries. While a Land may itself engage in cross-border activities with an adjoining province 
or one that is not contiguous, it may make no legal provision for international links. A Land 
could permit a local authority within its jurisdiction to enter into a relationship with one or more 
municipalities in other German states. A Land has the right to conclude treaties with other 
countries and provinces; this privilege does not extend to municipalities.128  
 
Sub-national governments in Germany and in the European Community participate in national 
policy formulation and in their implementation. Joint decision-making in Germany is a general 
feature of its political system, given the powerful position of the Bundesrat. Where the federal 
and Land governments engage in joint planning and financing in particular policy areas, these 
‘joint tasks’ require unanimity. Since 1992 the Bundesrat has the constitutional right to 
participate in legislation and administration concerning European Union matters.129  
 
From the foregoing, one can ascertain that democratic local self-government is guaranteed both 
by Article 28 of the Grundgesetz and the constitution of the Land it falls within. Germany is 
characterised by co-operative and joint decision-making in the Bundesrat by the federal and the 
Länder governments. Veto power vested in the Bundesrat gives it a strategic role in lawmaking, 
unlike the NCoP. The Länder have considerable power in the Bundesrat where it effectively 
represents the interests of its constituent municipalities. Government functions in accordance 
with the subsidiarity principle and this gives local authorities a high degree of autonomy.  
                                                 
 127 De Villiers (1997), op cit, 16. 
128 De Villiers (1997), op cit, 17. 
129 Blom-Hansen (1999), op cit, 37-39. 
 
 
277 
 
However, what makes the German governmental system workable is Bundestreue, a legal 
obligation on the federation and Länder governments to assist each other. Section 154(1) of the 
South African Constitution imposes a similar obligation on national and provincial 
governments to support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities. Alas, this duty appears 
to have been largely neglected. The German governmental system is currently undergoing 
reform. It is a model worth researching for possible amendments to the powers of provinces, 
the NCoP, and local government. 
 
6.4.4 CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE IN AUSTRIA 
i. Responsibility for organisation of local government 
Austria is divided into 9 Länder incorporating 2 102 gemeinden (local authorities).130 The 
federal constitution establishes and defines the powers and functions and protects the institution 
of Gemeinden. It also defines the institutions of the lowest tier (unlike in Germany, where this 
is the responsibility of the Land) as Gemeinderat (council of a local community), Stadtrat 
(assembly of a city), and Burgermeister (mayor with executive authority). Any provisions in a 
constitution or statute of the Land relating to local authorities must comply with that of the 
federal constitution. The powers and functions of local self-administration are defined in terms 
of the principle of subsidiarity, meaning that functions are only transferred to a higher tier of 
government if the lower level cannot exercise them effectively.131 Municipalities, therefore, 
have the sole responsibility of dealing with all matters within their domain, if they have the 
capacity. Each Land has a statute depicting the organisation of local government, with its 
functions managed by a department of local government affairs.132  
 
Municipal law is set out in articles 115-120 of the Austrian constitution and these do not require 
statutory elaboration or confirmation. Where the jurisdiction of the Federal Government 
pertaining to local authorities is not explicitly stated, Land legislation stipulates the manner of 
implementation, in keeping with constitutional principles. Länder comprise communities, the 
lowest level of a territorial state structure, grouped to form municipalities, which, in turn may 
be consolidated or amalgamated into regional municipalities, not into associations of local 
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authorities, as in Germany. ‘Uniform municipalities’ refer to the symmetrical allocation of 
powers and functions. Towns may formulate their own constitutions. As legal persona, 
municipalities have the right to self-administration, freedom of association, and freedom from 
intervention by higher level government, unless done in accordance with the constitution. The 
principle of subsidiarity is supplemented by devolution of powers by assignment. However, 
where the municipality is unable to exercise such powers, they may be reassigned to the Land. 
Hence, provision is also made for the asymmetrical allocation of powers and functions. The 
Fiscal Equalisation Law of 1948 is an example of a “sunset law”, in that it is in force only for 
a few years, like South Africa’s annual Division of Revenue Act. In the case of discrimination 
or unfair treatment, a municipality has the right to sue in the Constitutional Court. To avoid 
financial burdens, the Fiscal Equalisation Law allows inter-government contracts justiciable in 
the Constitutional Court. However, it must be objectively shown that there was full exchange 
of information and sound communication by the parties, and that they have consulted and been 
advised by experts in the particular financial and fiscal fields.133   
 
It is stated that – 
The Federal Government of Austria is committed to a lasting consolidation of public budgets in order to 
reduce the tax burden on households and businesses and the obligations of future generations.134 
 
The Austrian Internal Stability Pact 2001135 and subsequent agreements set out clearly the 
obligations of each level of government in financial and fiscal matters through sound 
intergovernmental co-operation and budgetary co-ordination.136 
 
ii. Provincial-local government interaction 
No formal forums exist, but there is considerable informal consultation between the different 
levels of government. The right of municipalities to Stellungname (a hearing) is entrenched in 
both the federal and Land constitutions in matters affecting them before legislation is passed. 
Although local authorities are consulted, their inputs are, however, not binding. Local 
government also has a Volksbegerens (right to initiative), that is, they can by popular demand 
initiate legislation, which must be submitted to and debated by the Land legislature. 
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Municipalities cannot engage with the federal and Länder governments individually on matters 
of mutual concern, given the large number of institutions involved and the expertise required. 
Two bodies have been established in terms of private law as non-profit companies to deal with 
such matters, namely the Gemeindeverband (local government association for villages and 
small towns) and for cities, the Staedtebund, of which most local authorities are members. 
These bodies are recognised by the Länder constitutions as voluntary, non-political 
representative organs of local government, and are directly represented on the EU’s Committee 
for Regions set up to accommodate views of regional and local governments.137 While the local 
government associations are constitutionally “recognised”, as is the case with SALGA, these 
institutions are constituted by the local authorities themselves, consolidated or amalgamated to 
work jointly on matters of mutual interest, and are not separate bodies as SALGA is. Austria 
follows the German model of Kreisetag (league of counties), Staedtebund (league of towns) 
and Gemeindebund (league of local authorities). 
 
iii. Local government at sub-provincial level 
The federal constitution provides for the formal establishment of inter-municipal co-operative 
structures. A Gemeindeverband can be created (as opposed to “recognised” by the South 
African Constitution) by federal or Land legislation. Whilst membership is voluntary, a Land 
enactment may also compel a municipality to formally be a participant of a particular 
association. Two or more municipalities may also create an association, subject to acquiring 
Land permission, as in Germany. In terms of their rights as legal personae, they may conclude 
a contract to co-operate on certain matters, such as joint administration or the delivery of 
services. Gemeindeverbaende have their own statutes by which they are established and their 
aims defined. Unlike the erstwhile Regional Services Councils in South Africa, they may not 
be general-purpose co-operative associations in any area of local government, but must be 
constituted for co-operation in a specific field of government. Hence, a municipality may be a 
member of various associations simultaneously. The life span of an association may be limited 
by function or time. Gemeindeverbaende are not a fourth tier of government but a horizontal 
extension of the local level. Provision also exists for municipal co-operation in 
Verwaltungsgemeinschaften or administrative associations, where local governments share 
administrative responsibilities concerning particular functions.138  
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iv. Local government cross-border co-operation 
The Austrian constitution makes no theoretical or practical provision for cross- Länder co-
operation between local authorities. This may be so because the Land enjoys jurisdiction only 
over its own territory and the municipalities located therein; and secondly, the 
Gemeindeverbaende are partly responsible only for administration of federal and territory-
specific Land legislation.139 
 
v. International interaction between local governments 
The situation is the same as in most countries and in Germany.140  
 
vi. The Austrian Association of Cities and Towns  
Der Österreichische Städtebund (The Austrian Association of Cities and Towns) currently 
represents 248 members, including settlements of more than a thousand residents and all towns 
with more than 10 000 inhabitants. The association was founded in 1915. Its primary 
responsibility is to represent the interests of local government in negotiations over the sharing 
of budgetary funds and taxing rights between the federal government, the provinces, and local 
authorities. It also assists with the preparation of legislation and serves as advisors on some 
environmental and welfare bodies. The association is assisted by approximately 40 technical 
committees.141 
 
The Austrian Association of Municipalities (AAM), represents the interests collectively of 99 
per cent of Austrian local authorities by way of associations of its Länder. Membership is 
voluntary. The AAM was one of the first members of the Council of European Municipalities 
and Regions (CEMR) established in 1951. Strong representation is facilitated by a stability pact 
and use of milestones in the consultation mechanism. Within the scope of the European Council, 
the Permanent Conference of the Municipalities and Regions in Europe was constituted in 1957 
as an advisory body, succeeded by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe 
(CLRAE) as a counselling organisation. Both municipalities and regions of member states have 
a seat and a vote. The more recent Committee of Regions (CoR) is an advisory body to the 
European Union operating through the European Commission and the European Council, using 
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specialist committees. The CoR may be heard by the European Parliament and bring a case 
before the European Court of Justice, particularly to maintain the principle of subsidiarity. The 
AAM initiated the International Communal Network to facilitate municipal international 
relations generally and a unified Europe in particular.142  
 
The Austrian Municipal Book of Statutes (1962) contributed to the development in the 1980s 
of the European Charter of Local Administration of the European Council. The federal 
parliaments of Luxembourg and Austria resolved in 1987 to be bound to the Charter. The 
principle of self- administration gained international law status for the first time with this 
charter, thus strengthening the de jure status of municipalities.143 
 
The position of sub-national governments was strengthened by the Austrian Stability Pact, an 
agreement between the federal government, the Länder, and municipalities on financial 
management co-ordination, the consolidation of public funds, and fulfilment of the Maastricht 
criteria. This pact incorporates a consultation mechanism which ensures that regional 
authorities by means of laws and directives may not burden municipalities financially without 
the latter’s consent. It has resulted in greater budgetary discipline by Länder and 
municipalities.144  
 
Of interest in the Austrian governmental model especially insofar as it relates to local authorities 
is Stellungname and Volksbegerens, which gives them considerable power in the legislative 
field. Also of interest is the Gemeindeverband and Staedtebund, voluntary, non-political local 
government associations, which could be a workable model as alternative to SALGA. 
 
6.4.5 CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE IN BELGIUM 
i. Responsibility for organisation of local government 
Belgium has over three decades, starting in the 1970s, transformed from a unitary to a federal 
state whence constitutionalism within a federal context established very strong Geweste 
(provinces), incorporating Gemeentes (communes or municipalities). There are several 
Intercommunales (associations) where local authorities interact in functional areas to co-
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ordinate and harmonise their activities. Belgian ‘provinces’ are the equivalent of the German 
and Austrian Kreise (counties) and have similar powers and functions.145  
 
ii. Provincial-local government interaction 
No formal institutions exist where provincial and local governments meet, but there are forums 
for informal interaction. These have no legal basis, and engagement is ad hoc and sporadic. 
Members of municipalities may serve on Geweste assemblies, thus enhancing close co-
operation and understanding, but at the same time also leading to heightened conflict of 
interests. As in Germany and Austria, each Gewest has an association of towns and cities of 
which membership is voluntary, but in which most local authorities participate because it is 
beneficial.146 
 
iii. Local government at sub-provincial level 
Belgium’s constitution provides that local authorities and provinces may create 
Intercommunales with directly-elected governing councils. They are distinctive legal persona 
with own organs and budgets. Nevertheless, they are not a separate tier of government but a 
horizontal extension of municipalities. Local authorities are not obliged to belong to an 
association, nor are they precluded from membership of several at the same time, since 
participation is determined by functional rather than spatial considerations. Intercommunales 
and similar such public law associations can be established between municipalities on a 
voluntary basis, with the objective of facilitating co-operation in a particular field of common 
concern. Federal legislation provides that municipalities and Intercommunales have the right to 
engage each other in any matter of mutual interest. The precise nature and purpose of each 
Intercommunale is determined by its member local authorities, but in essence it strives towards 
solidarity and co-operation between municipalities. Sometimes such co-operation is limited to 
a single function while in others there are multifunctional Intercommunales. Membership is 
voluntary and not restricted to formal local authorities, as private sector organisations, such as 
service providers, may also participate. However, all members in an Intercommunale, as a 
distinctive legal entity, are bound by its decisions, even where they disagree: This heightens 
conflict.147  
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iv. Local government cross-border co-operation 
No provision is made for formal co-operation between Geweste. Cross-border co-operation is 
limited also because of the country’s language differences. While mayors of adjacent local 
authorities do meet informally to discuss issues of mutual concern, there is no constitutional or 
legal basis for doing so, and such interaction is scarce, complicated, sporadic, and ad hoc.148  
 
v. International interaction between local governments 
The situation is the same as in most countries and in Germany.149 
 
6.4.6 CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE IN FRANCE 
The French believed in the motto ‘unity in diversity’, one that South Africa could profitably 
follow. During the historical formal policy of centralisation, a parallel system of negotiation 
between the state and notables (local politicians) existed. There was also a preference for the 
concept of a local politico-administration system, a term highlighting the sociological aspects 
of the relationship between central and local authorities, to that of ‘local government’. It also 
incorporated the notion that rules and their enforcement, as well as the policies that affected 
sub-national governments, were subject to an ongoing process of negotiation. This arrangement 
was based on a simple political exchange which guaranteed central government the capacity to 
maintain and extend social and political consensus, while permitting elected representatives to 
obtain a greater share of resources from the state, as well as both the legitimacy and respect of 
the local populace. Furthermore, it allowed notables to have an influence and also facilitated 
the resolution of internal communications problems between state administrative services. This 
combination of a hierarchy of problems or challenges and the informal resolution of 
bureaucratic blockages was named ‘cross-regulation’.150  
 
The politico-administrative system did not simply destroy the ‘local’ or the ‘periphery’, but 
incorporated them into the centre through the notabiliaire system with its cumul des mandats 
(holding of multiple offices) and representation of localities in the Senate, a system dubbed le 
pouvoir peripherique. As a result of the cumul des mandats, local government had a significant 
influence at the national level, and there was a high degree of interdependence and co-operation 
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among the various tiers of local governments and the central authority. There was also 
considerable co-operation between local government and the private sector, with many 
municipalities and communes contracting out services to commercial firms.151 The cumul des 
mandats enabled many mayors to hold other positions at Prefectoral, regional and national 
levels, and some were members of the government; while usually the president and the prime 
minister were sometimes mayors of tiny villages. Additionally, many national political figures 
have been, and are, identified as mayors of large cities.152  
 
Several attempts had been made to reduce the number of offices that any one politician may 
hold but these have been unsuccessful. This type of political network and connectivity ensured 
that local needs were quickly communicated to and rapidly addressed at the highest level. The 
system was so effective that there was no need to formalise intergovernmental relations. 
Nevertheless, a problem arose from the ‘eparpillement communale’, the fragmentation resulting 
from the large number of communes,153 but the French system proved resilient and manageable 
such that rationalisation and consolidation of the communities was not necessary, as in South 
Africa and many other countries.  
 
France represents what is called the Napoleonic system of intergovernmental relations applied 
in southern Europe and characterised by strong central rule and often highly politicised 
administrative interrelationship. It also exhibits a tradition of individualised, formal, and fairly 
‘hands on’ intergovernmental management system with direct involvement of higher authority 
in local affairs.154 Recent reform appears to be toward decentralisation, but is in reality a transfer 
of tasks rather than powers. Devolution since the 1980s have seen many functions delegated to 
the lowest tiers but the central state has still retained executive machinery at local level. The 
subsidiarity principle is not practised in the conventional sense as sub-national authorities have 
the power to make local regulations, but this entitlement excludes the right of initiative and is 
therefore derivative, residual, and subordinate. “The field of local authority action is wide, 
vague and often the source of conflicts.”155 
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While there is extensive and varied co-operation between the various local government levels 
with a continuous loop of engagement and co-decision, there is also “frequent interference by 
the State in local prerogatives.”156 However, there exist various forms of co-operation: inter-
communal, inter-regional, and mixed, with the Establissements Publics de Co-operation 
Intercommunale (EPCIS) being an important inter-local co-operation mechanism that is 
empowered to levy local taxes. Tasks may be transferred to a variety of formal organisational 
structures while municipalities contract with or outsource service delivery to departments. 
Channels exist for linking regional and local authorities to central government and 
representatives in Parliament. An additional resource for this purpose is the Prefect. Co-
operation between the state and sub-national governments is formalised by a contract de plan 
which details the requirements and manner of intergovernmental relations and the principle 
objectives of the plan. Notwithstanding such instruments, the complexity of co-operative 
governance and particularly the local financial system is enormous. Fortunately, transfer of 
funds accompanied devolution, with sub-national governments having legal provision for equal 
distribution with equality between territorial authorities guaranteed. Additionally, shares of 
national tax yields are now regarded as own sources of income.157  
 
According to Blom-Hansen (1999), in France, the classic unitary state, intergovernmental 
relations are not as centrally controlled as commonly understood. Joint-decision traps “seem to 
be at work” here because local institutional interests have veto rights over public policy. 
Relations between central and local governments are managed through two channels, political 
and administrative. Both “operate in a subtle, informal and fragmented way.” A crucial political 
role is played by the notables who due to their cumul des mandats operate at several levels in 
the public sector at the same time. Without their consent public policy is difficult to develop 
and if enacted, not easily implemented. Given that most national politicians are simultaneously 
important local politicians, means that the locale has an informal institutionalised representation 
on policy formulation in Parliament. The joint-decision trap is explained thus:158  
Because French mayors have successfully resisted every effort to reorganize what is now clearly an archaic 
and inefficient system, France is left with one of Europe’s most fragmented municipal structures numbering 
36 000 entities, of which 80 percent have less than 1 000 inhabitants. Similarly, the numerous attempts in 
the post-war period to reorganize regional levels have been largely unsuccessful because it has not been 
possible to obtain the consent of local notables.  
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Central-local relations in the administrative channel are unique, due to the political role played 
by the Prefect and by field officers of the central ministries. Different levels of administration 
in France, unlike most countries, have not traditionally had their own administrative services. 
The Prefect co-ordinates local field offices and supervises municipalities. Despite an extremely 
centralised administrative organisation, the relationship between the Prefect, the field services 
of the central ministries, and the local authorities have “in reality been a complex symbiotic 
system of bargaining and mutual dependence.”159 Such an arrangement is highly dependent on 
the maintenance of good relations with local notables who in turn are allies of the local offices 
in their dealings with the Prefect. As policy changes have to be based on consensus, the most 
pressing problems of French local government have been neglected. Local veto rights and the 
intricate, mostly informal, workings of the central-local relations result in policy-making 
becoming inefficient and difficult, with policy programmes being expensive. If local authorities 
reject a central government policy proposal, that initiative is dead. Despite the complexity and 
apparent inefficiency, the “workings of the French intergovernmental relations have proven 
extremely robust.”160 
 
The efficiency and efficacy of the French system of local government may need to be examined 
further as it is alien to South Africa, but one that seems to work and has stood the test of time. 
The majority of local authorities would today be too small to be viable in terms of economies 
of scale and efficient service delivery. The existence of both the department and the region 
could mean one layer of government too much, as may be the case in South Africa with the 
unanswered question being the need for and role of provinces. Hence, the French governmental 
system cannot be incorporated under the South African Constitution. 
 
6.4.7 CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE IN SCANDINAVIA 
Since the state and its intergovernmental relations systems are somewhat similar in Norway, 
Denmark and Sweden, one country is analysed and where differences are significant they are 
mentioned in passing.  
 
i. Sweden 
The country is currently divided into 290 municipalities, 21 counties, and two regions, but there 
is no hierarchical relation among their governments. This is because, as in Germany, all these 
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territories have their own self-governing local authorities empowered for different activities. 
Municipalities are responsible for a larger share of public services in comparison with most 
other countries. Practical application of the principle of subsidiarity has enabled a broad 
mandate for local government, but this approach has not given rise to ambiguity or concurrency 
and similar such problems, even when stipulated thus:161 
(a) Municipalities are responsible for matters relating to inhabitants of the municipality 
and their immediate environment; and 
(b) The main task of the county councils and regions is health care. 
The Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) is the supreme political decision-making body. According 
to the principle of representative democracy, there was a demarcation line between political and 
administrative functions. A fundamental principle of Swedish local administration was that it 
is supervised by directly-elected representatives, the council of the local authority, as the 
highest executive body. Hence, there was need for them to be fully informed of activities in the 
communes and sub-communes through their representative executive organs. Each commune 
is statutorily bound to establish special committees for particular tasks.162 
 
Unlike in South Africa, 
Local government in Sweden is distinguished by the fact that the elected representatives participate directly 
in the handling of a matter at all levels, from drafting to decision-making and implementation, which means 
that their tasks include those which in the national administration are the sole concern of salaried officials.163 
 
This indicates that municipalities have changed from administration by laypersons to 
management by professionals, both politicians and officials, and increased bureaucratisation. 
In having two tiers of government, local politicians represented their constituencies directly in 
the national assembly. With the quality of local government thus enhanced, municipalities have 
become significant players in the process of policy formulation. This convergence is not 
applicable to South Africa where, although the political-administrative line, more blurred now 
than in the apartheid past, is nevertheless still to be maintained, as in the English model. The 
Swedish situation highlights the relations, on the one hand, between political control and 
responsibility, and, on the other, administrative autonomy. In several communes a new structure 
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of formal relationship between the political and executive structure, called ‘ordering and 
performing organisations’, have been introduced and have since become established. Like in 
the German and French systems, the strength and autonomy of local authorities in the Swedish 
model is to some extent reliant on direct representation in and connectivity with central 
government.164 This is, sadly, lacking in South Africa.   
 
In 1988 Sharpf argued that the quality of public service deteriorates when lower levels of 
governments have a decisive say in national policy-making, and that if sub-national authorities 
have “acquired veto positions, then sclerosis is likely to set in.” Sharpf’s main contribution lies 
in studying the institutional effects on public policy through highlighting the importance of 
analysing relations between different tiers of government, rather than concentrating only on the 
central level.165 Blom-Hansen acknowledges that intergovernmental relations are “critical” to 
central government’s policy-making capacity, but agrees that “joint-decision traps are not 
inherent to joint-decision systems.” However, the functioning of the system could be adversely 
affected if central government threatens to exit, but this scenario has limited likelihood. The 
exit option lies in central government choosing to pursue policy goals via “intergovernmental 
corporatism,” that is, by co-operating with the associations of sub-national governments. 
Alternatively, they may be bypassed by going straight to Parliament. Blom-Hansen suggests 
that the existence of these institutional mechanisms is likely to increase the quality of public 
policy. He points out that in central government’s financial control of sub-national 
governments, the system in Denmark is most effective, although it has none of the “impressive 
formal control instruments” available to Sweden and Norway. The Danish central government 
is successful because it “consciously uses parliamentarism and intergovernmental corporatism 
as interchangeable arenas for policy-making.”166   
 
Blom-Hansen (1999) argues that the numerous threads of policy interdependence mean that 
central governments can proceed only interdependently, making intergovernmental co-
operation a necessity.  “Federal systems seem to be moving closer to the joint-decision model, 
the extreme version of which is found in Germany.” In unitary states, central governments do 
not need to take the views of sub-national authorities into consideration as all that is required 
to enact policy is a parliamentary majority. It should be noted that informal institutional 
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structures and processes may be involved in policy formulation as do the formal mechanisms 
in federal states.167 Politically strong sub-national governments have influenced and impacted 
upon the nature and processes of intergovernmental relations in Scandinavia. A strong role is 
played by associations for local and regional authorities which organise all municipalities and 
counties in Norway, Denmark and Sweden, even though membership is voluntary. The 
associations hold a strategic position due to local government being responsible for a larger 
share of the public sector than in other countries. Most importantly, the associations 
traditionally participate in the formulation of legislation and administrative regulation that 
affect their members. Hence, they play a similar political role to Germany’s Länder without 
having the formidable formal powers of the latter. Such status may be unnecessary as post- 
World War II Scandinavian intergovernmental relations have shown “none of the rigidities and 
stalemates found in Germany and France.”168 
 
Unlike in France, Scandinavian governments addressed the problem of a large number of small 
local authorities by amalgamation. Such consolidation was followed by a massive transfer of 
powers, with the accompanying financial resources, to municipalities and counties. Local 
authorities account for 60-70 per cent of total public consumption and are the most important 
service delivery and policy implementation agencies of the welfare state. “A bewildering array 
of special grants and reimburse systems have been abolished in favour of block grants, which 
together with local income tax give local authorities considerable economic latitude.”  Local 
government associations have played a major role in such reforms.169 
 
The two arenas, represented by the corporatist sector and Parliament, are part of the institutional 
environment facing central governments and are often complementary. They may also represent 
alternative ways of pursuing policy objectives. An example of the corporatist approach is 
central government engaging both trade unions and employers’ associations “to make 
‘moderate’ collective agreements as an alternative to legislating tough fiscal policy measures.” 
Alternatively, government could negotiate with organised interests before tabling its policy in 
Parliament, possibly only for ratification. Hence, corporatist decision-making becomes ‘co-
operation in the shadow of parliamentarism’. Likewise, parliamentary decision-making may be 
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in the shadow of corporatism. These alternatives may result in more effective intergovernmental 
relations and hence better public policies, at the same time giving central government both 
‘voice’ and ‘exit’ options.170  
 
The mere availability to central government of an exit option serves as an incentive to local 
government representatives for entering into constructive co-operation and also consider 
compromises. Such engagement and support serve to increase the state’s information and 
knowledge of sub-national affairs, thereby contributing to more effective and practical policies. 
Associations could be seen as ‘private interest governments’ if members delegate their powers 
to them. They would then assume public responsibilities through self-regulation. The danger of 
them ‘capturing’ central government makes the state’s use of the exit option crucial. 
Constructive co-operation could increase state capacity on a given set of issues addressed 
through a joint problem-solving style.171  
 
While in some areas, such as policy on the labour market, corporatist solutions may carry 
greater legitimacy and effectiveness, there is need for caution if central government is weak 
and open for exploitation by the associations. However, the raison d’être of these organisations 
is not to pursue party political gains, but rather the institutional interests of their member sub-
national governments. While party political and institutional interests may overlap, they are not 
identical. The availability of two arenas capable of being used interchangeably makes it difficult 
for actors to veto policy proposals. “Thus, a skilful manipulation of the arenas as voice and exit 
options may give the whole system a dynamic trait.”172 Insofar as financial and fiscal relations 
are concerned; the following quote is informative: 
Effective fiscal policy in Scandinavia is simply not possible without some kind of co-ordination between 
national and sub-national expenditure and revenue policies. At the same time, local self-government is a 
widely cherished value in all three countries.173  
 
Apart from the conventional functions of municipalities, Scandinavian sub-national 
governments in a welfare state are also responsible for social affairs, education, health care, 
culture, public transportation, administration, and other functions. According to Blom-Hansen 
(1999), subnational governments’ share of total public consumption currently is approximately 
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70 per cent in Sweden, 69 per cent in Denmark and 60 per cent in Norway. Notwithstanding 
such high expenditure at local level, all three countries have, “with few exceptions, refrained 
from pursuing control through simply legislating spending limits.” Rather, they have relied on 
financial incentives, that is, control through manipulation of the economic incentive structure 
available to sub-national decision-makers. This approach is also informed by the value placed 
on local self-government, a political fact of life. Other macro-economic controls have been 
pursued in an indirect way, using policies reached through consensus and heavily reliant on 
sound intergovernmental relations and co-operation.174  
 
While intergovernmental relations in Scandinavia do have its problems, it appears to be working 
reasonably well in today’s complex globalised local government environment. In conclusion, it 
could be said that – 
Political systems characterised by institutional pluralism where public policy is made by partly overlapping 
and partly competing institutions may be more effective than systems where public policy is made by 
monopoly institutions.175 
 
The Swedish model of systemic, organised, decentralised, strong, and highly autonomous local 
authorities working on a consensual basis in a unitary state is alien to both pre-and post- 
apartheid South Africa. However, the attractiveness of the Scandinavian model justifies a 
further look into the system, especially in the following areas:176  
(a) a clear dividing line between the political and administrative functions; 
(b) use of professionally-qualified politicians as administrators;   
(c) laws regulating the relationship between central and local governments; 
(d) absence or very limited role of regional authorities;  
(e) local politicians representing municipalities directly in the national assembly rather than 
indirectly through an unelected body like SALGA; and 
(f) direct democracy through use of referenda on major issues. 
 
ii. Denmark 
Denmark is a unitary state with a “long-standing tradition of a decentralised public sector where 
the majority of welfare tasks are dealt with by local government.”177 Reforms commencing in 
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2007 fundamentally changed the country’s local government structure by strengthening them 
through mergers and task redistribution. Thirteen counties were replaced by five regions and 
271 municipalities were amalgamated into 98, of which only seven have less than 20 000 
inhabitants. Through co-operation agreements with neighbouring municipalities, the now 
enlarged ones have taken over several tasks hitherto carried out by counties, as is contemplated 
in the Gauteng Global City Region. The reforms resulted in a decrease in the level of 
responsibility of mid-level administration and a concomitant increase in municipalities’ 
responsibilities to handle most of the citizen-related functions. Local authorities have a general 
competence laid down by law but most of the tasks they perform are mandatory. Regions have 
a limited scope of responsibilities. The Constitution empowers local authorities to take 
independent control of their own affairs, subject to supervision by central government, although 
they still retain a considerable degree of autonomy. Since tax-levying was traditionally 
extensively decentralised, Danish local authorities rely heavily on local sources of income. 
Reforms gave additional revenue sources to municipalities, previously held by counties. Now 
local government also receives substantial grants, distributed according to population size.178 
 
Central – local government relationship is a mixture of “control, negotiation and autonomy, but 
detailed involvement is being avoided.” The National Association of Local Authorities and the 
Association of County Councils have an annual economic agreement with central government. 
These organisations are involved in national policy-making at an early stage. Local authorities 
have recently moved towards greater co-operation with each other. Denmark uses a 
combination of formal and informal structures with the latter recently changing shape from 
centrist-corporatist arrangements to a more network-based pattern.179   
 
6.4.8 CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE IN CANADA 
i. Allocation of powers and functions 
Canada’s federalism functions alongside a Westminster style parliamentary system in terms of 
which executives are accountable to their legislatures. There is relative ‘equality between 
federal and provincial governments largely because of the extensive powers, resources, and 
political clout of the latter. Provinces use a well-developed network of IGR mechanisms for 
engagement, on the understanding that executives at forums cannot make binding decisions.180  
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According to Beaudoin (2012), intergovernmental relations especially with respect to local 
authorities have to be seen within the context of their position vis-à-vis the federal and 
provincial governments. Their respective legislative powers were set out in the Constitution Act 
of 1867. Hence, their permanence and autonomous jurisdiction are constitutionally guaranteed. 
Executive power is theoretically similarly distributed. From 1949, judicial power resided with 
the Supreme Court. Jurisdiction over matters of national interest is vested in Parliament, while 
those of particular interest in provinces. All matters not assigned exclusively to the legislatures 
of the provinces reside with federal government. Provincial legislatures have exclusive 
jurisdiction over local governments, including municipalities, as provided for in the 
Constitution. The province has the right to change municipal boundaries, to alter their financial 
resources, to withdraw old powers, and to grant new ones. “The power to spend money remains 
an extremely vague and contentious area.”181 The Constitution recognises federal and 
provincial governments as fairly independent entities with jurisdiction over their respective 
spatial and functional areas. Such powers and functions cannot be altered without their 
consent.182 
 
ii. Local government 
“Canada’s first uniform municipal system was established in 1849”.183 The approximately 
3 700 municipalities do not cover the entire country, but where they do exist, community 
participation is a priority. They raise more than eighty per cent of revenue from own sources.184 
 
Magnusson (2012) states that local authorities in Canada are creatures of statute, applicable to 
all municipalities within each province. Such an enactment can be changed by majority vote of 
the provincial legislature. Municipalities can usually exercise only those powers delegated to 
them by a Municipal Act, Local Government Act, Cities and Towns Act, or similar such 
statutes. Some powers and functions are mandatory while others are permissive. The raison 
d’être of municipalities is to provide services that can be more effectively handled under local 
control. A municipality acts ultra vires if it undertakes work outside of those explicitly set out 
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in the Act or permitted by the province. Municipal governments are empowered to make policy, 
raise revenue, and ensure the implementation of policy. Administration is handled by the 
municipal public service.  Local government is constituted by municipalities, local 
administrative bodies, public utilities commissions, parks boards, and other special-purpose 
agencies, all chosen by and held accountable to the local community that elects these bodies. 
Hence, the municipal council is not the only elective local government in most Canadian 
communities. This situation is further complicated by the existence of local administration 
offices established by the provinces and many more or less autonomous local agencies such as 
harbour commissions, library boards, and police commissions. Toronto, for example, has more 
than 100 authorities that could be classified as ‘local governments’.185 
 
Chattopadhyay186 asserts that “provinces have tenaciously guarded their jurisdiction over local 
government, and have strongly discouraged the development of direct federal-local linkages.” 
 
Municipalities, however, are the only general-purpose governments at the local level and the 
municipal council is usually the focus of attention in local politics. They are the repositories for 
local government functions not assigned to other agencies. There are many different classes of 
municipalities, the most important distinction being urban and rural, the latter having the most 
limited functions. Urban areas are classified by size as villages, towns, and cities, the largest 
designated metropolitan areas. Municipal councils and other elective local authorities are small 
(5–15 members) and since most councillors are, theoretically, nonpartisan, collegial decision- 
making is possible. Their delegation of duties to semi-autonomous agencies further reduces the 
scope of municipal accountability. The dispersal of municipal responsibilities and the problem 
of lay participation in administration have recently led to efforts in professionalisation (as in 
Sweden) and to centralise managerial control. However, municipalities are still viewed as mere 
administrative agencies of the province and subjected by them to tight controls. This occurs 
even when they act independently, using self-generated revenues for their own purposes. While 
critics have argued that local government could be strengthened by consolidating existing 
authorities into larger units with wider responsibilities, the provinces have little incentive to 
allow this as they could then be rivalled for power and prestige. Thus, ‘reform’ has been limited 
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to minor adjustments. Traditionally, county councils provided services over larger, consolidated 
rural areas. A double-tiering of municipal government and joint action for urban areas was 
adopted in 1953, with the establishment of metropolitan Toronto, in effect a county council. 
Additional powers were delegated to the city and its success led to other similar initiatives, 
resulting in most major cities becoming metropolitan or regional governments, with recent 
enlargement of the scale of local administration. However, there are still some 5 600 
municipalities in Canada, with new ones continuing to be formed. Thus, fragmentation due to 
the still large number of small local governments and numerous special-purpose bodies remain 
a cause for concern.187 
 
iii. Federal-provincial relations 
Federal-provincial relations are the “complex and multi-faceted networks of influence”188 
which have developed in the engagements between the two top levels of government. The 
characteristic Canadian interdependence of these governments is defined by a pattern of “shared 
and overlapping responsibilities, shared authority, and shared funding in many if not most areas 
of public policy.”189 National objectives can often only be achieved with provincial co-
operation and conversely, the achievement of provincial goals usually requires federal 
assistance, hence ‘co-operative federalism’. Federal-provincial engagement takes place in many 
arenas, from a multitude of informal day-to-day contacts between bureaucrats, to more formal 
‘set-piece meetings’ between federal and provincial ministers. Most attention is focused on 
multilateral meetings of representatives from all eleven governments, but there are also smaller, 
bilateral meetings. The exchanges among ministers and bureaucrats have been termed 
“executive federalism,” with “no complete inventory” of such interactions, and the “intensity 
and subject matter has varied over time.”190 In the 1960s and 1970s intergovernmental forums 
were seen “less as an arena for harmony and co-operation and more as one for exacerbating 
disagreement.”191 The Liberal Party of 1980-1984 attempted to govern without going through 
the intermediary of the provinces. The most important federal-provincial forum is the First 
Minister’s Conference chaired by the Prime Minister although much of the hard bargaining 
takes place in closed sessions and in back-room meetings. Reporting to the First Minister’s 
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Conference are many ministerial conferences, some held regularly while others meet on an ad 
hoc basis, with varying degrees of success.192   
 
Although annual meetings of premiers have been held since 1960, co-operation on many issues 
is “limited by divergent political orientations and regional interests.”193 Provinces have 
established several interprovincial ministerial bodies. Whilst important and essential for joint 
public policy-making, the federal-provincial and inter-provincial relations are not mentioned in 
the Constitution and most meetings are informal and ad hoc. Many have been criticised as 
forums that exacerbate conflict as they compete for resources and public support. It has been 
said that too great an emphasis on intergovernmental consensus leads to “excessive delay and 
a subordination of policy to the lowest common denominator.”194 While some supporters of 
strong federal government believe provincial participation undermines federal authority, others 
argue that secrecy and closed-door federal-provincial engagement diminishes citizen 
participation and reduces the ability to consult effectively with interest groups representing non-
territorial interests. Intergovernmental relations are thus seen as a process that undermines 
responsible government and legislative sovereignty as well as governmental accountability. The 
contrary view is for placing less stress on extensive intergovernmental co-operation with more 
emphasis on each government acting independently within its area of jurisdiction. This model 
of ‘competitive federalism’ argues that government responsiveness and policy effectiveness 
may be enhanced through competition rather than in intergovernmental relations for its own 
sake.195  
 
“Intergovernmental relations in Canada focus on the relations among federal and 
provincial/territorial executives”.196 Intergovernmental structures and processes are informal 
and as such not incorporated in the Constitution. Neither do they have a basis in law or any 
statutes. They develop on an ad hoc basis in response to needs of the time and are “forums for 
the exchange of information, and for negotiation and persuasion.”197  
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The contrary view, of collaboration and partnerships, emphasises the cost of competition, 
holding that with two powerful and equal orders of government, co-operation is seen as 
essential. Both sides agree on the importance of federal-provincial relations, but are unsure 
whether it should be elevated to a third order of government with real decision-making power, 
or that it should be seen merely as opportunities for consultation and debate.198 In conclusion, 
the comment below may be illustrative:  
Those advocating a more competitive model call for “disentanglement” and a clarification of powers of 
each level and argue for reforms in the central government which will make it more regionally responsive, 
and therefore more able to bypass provinces. Advocates of collaborative federalism call for a more 
formalised network of intergovernmental machinery designed to make co-operation more effective.199 
 
iv. Provincial-municipal relations 
According to O’Brien (2012), relations between provinces and municipalities are shaped by the 
stronger position of the former. The autonomy of municipalities is severely restricted. For 
example, municipal by-laws require provincial approval; municipal borrowing for capital 
projects are strictly controlled by the provincial Department of Municipal Affairs or by a 
municipal board appointed by the province; planning decisions can be appealed to a provincial 
agency; and many local powers apply only to a shared provincial-municipal jurisdiction, for 
example, the environment. Limited autonomy raises questions about the democratic 
accountability of local authorities. Municipalities may co-operate with others in voluntary 
associations to support their interest in provincial policymaking. A major concern of these 
(voluntary) associations is to improve the financial arrangement of municipalities. Local 
revenue derives from property taxes and provincial grants, of which eighty per cent are 
conditional. The conditions are such as to induce municipalities to make choices that meet 
provincial policy goals at the expense of municipal priorities. In some provinces delegating or 
downloading of functions and financial burdens to municipalities became rampant in the 1990s. 
“The relationship between municipalities and their respective provincial governments is not an 
easy one.”200 
 
The relationship between a province and its municipalities is one of superior and subordinates 
and not of equals; that between municipalities and the federal government is ‘relatively 
unimportant’. Federal programmes that affect municipalities are generally handled through 
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federal-provincial agreements. Small, separate or freestanding local government jurisdictions 
make for inefficient service delivery. To cater for a larger area taking advantage of economies 
of scale requires amalgamation or consolidation into a single entity, the decision on which rests 
solely with the provincial government.201 
 
Provincial governments have recently acknowledged the benefits of amalgamation into 
“regional governments” which saw the establishment of the Greater Vancouver Regional 
District comprising 21 municipalities, and of “county governments” in rural areas, such as in 
Atlantic Canada, Ontario, Quebec, and Alberta.202 
 
The Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) represents 2 000 voluntary members from 
all of Canada’s provinces and territories, representing 90 per cent of the country’s population. 
It has a 75-member Board of Directors, operating through its Annual Conference, committees, 
policy forums, and programmes. It seeks to influence public policy and programmes at the 
federal level through policy statements on priority areas and through advocacy. It shares 
experiences with local governments abroad.203 The FCM does not have the status of municipal 
associations in Scandinavia and Europe and little information is available of achievements since 
establishment in 1976. The adversarial style of intergovernmental relations practised in Canada 
is in contrast with the collaborative mode of co-operative governance in Germany.  
 
The Canadian constitution established a framework wherein “different kinds of working rules 
apply in particular areas of joint action”.204 Hence, the principles underlying the division of 
powers are based on functional distinctions instead of spatial jurisdictions. This results in 
parallel rather than interlocking governments. In such a system, each authority would assert its 
right to separate action in its own jurisdictional area. This approach heightens conflict and 
competition, to the detriment of benefits that could arise from co-operation. Whilst 
interdependencies and joint action between federal and provincial governments may be many, 
the advantages of practice in Germany are absent. With institutional arrangements being rigid 
and legalistic, bilateral co-operation would be restrained further if such approaches were foisted 
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on intergovernmental relations. Competitive federalism employed in Canada will have to be 
reformed through constitutional provisions that consider the need for sound intergovernmental 
relations through collaborative federalism as undertaken in Germany, but mindful of the 
realities in Canada.205 The FCM is an external agency, similar to SALGA and the UK’s Local 
Government Association. 
 
Canada has a “highly developed system of intergovernmental relations” and engagement 
between governments accorded considerable importance, with the federal government playing 
a dominant role. Intergovernmental relations “appear to be highly formal and formalised, at 
least compared with the UK,” using a proliferation of agreements of two main types, bilateral 
and multilateral. Such instruments and structures for facilitating co-operation, as in the UK, 
have no constitutional and legal basis. Forums are used for information exchange, bargaining, 
persuasion, negotiation and consensus-building.206 
 
Canada’s First Ministers’ Conference succeeded the Dominion-Provincial Conference which 
first met in 1867. Since 1991 the long-standing ceremonious conferences have been replaced 
by simpler First Ministers’ Meetings, less formal and transparent and sometimes without any 
public agenda circulated. Below this is the family of ministerial meetings (of which twenty have 
been institutionalised), deputy minister committees, assistant deputy minister committees, and 
technical subcommittees. The outcome of the numerous dialogues would ideally be 
intergovernmental agreements, vertical and horizontal, of which there were 1 000 to 1 500 in 
force as at 2004. The objective of such agreements is to “reach some general and indispensable 
aims, recognisable as harmonising policy, solving problems that require joint initiative, and 
minimising duplication and overlapping in order to achieve greater efficiency and cost saving.” 
Another type of written consensus is partnership agreements depicting shared objectives, 
decision-making, and costs in shared policy areas.207 
 
In issue may be the juridical status of intergovernmental agreements, accords, and declarations 
as these are deemed by the contracting parties as not legally-binding instruments but merely 
political accommodation of interests which are not legally binding and as such frequently 
breached. A legally- binding contract would have to be presented to both the federal and 
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provincial legislatures which can amend the agreement partially or in whole. Such formality 
has been deemed undesirable as the instrument is not an ordinary contract but an agreement 
between governments, based on its binding effect or mutuality. However, the Supreme Court 
ruled in Finlay v Canada (Minister of Finance) in 1986 and 1993 that in federal, territorial and 
provincial relations questions usually involve matters not appropriate for judicial adjudication. 
However, provincial non-compliance are questions of law and therefore justiciable. Up to this 
stage the vertical separation of powers was not a reason to apply the pacta sunt servanda 
principle. The Supreme Court confirmed this position in 1991 when it declared that the 
“Federation can legitimately breach an intergovernmental agreement in force by deciding 
unilaterally because Parliamentary sovereignty cannot be bound” by any previous compact 
signed among the Executive branch.208 
 
The Annual Premiers’ Conference founded in 1960 turned itself into the Council of the 
Federation (CoF), in 2003 becoming a somewhat more permanent and more institutionalised 
version of the old forum, with a Secretariat for Information and Co-operation on Fiscal 
Imbalance. This institution was more inclined to allocating itself some decision-making rules 
‘authority’. Horizontal relations are maintained to search for solutions capable of avoiding 
federal intervention. Intergovernmental negotiation, supplemented by multilateral and bilateral 
agreements, is used extensively to help resolve political differences and thus obviate unilateral 
federal initiative.209  
 
The Canadian system of IGR manifests numerous informal vertical and horizontal relations 
with the latter an instrument to the former, in a both ways. This approach is characterised by a 
strong institutional path dependency, resulting in a low level of general innovation and some 
unsatisfactory performance, with the CoF being an exception in this context. The outcome is a 
large number of multilateral and bilateral agreements, which, being informal, falls far short of 
what may have been appropriate for a country functioning under a (written) constitution. This 
long-standing practice has shown the impossibility of modifying political accommodation 
techniques which have held it up in good stead and been the pillar of the evolution of the 
Canadian Federal fiscal system. The growing fiscal strength of the Federation may be seen as 
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a shift from a co-determination pattern to a more coercive form of intergovernmental 
relations.210  
 
In the financial and fiscal sphere, especially, the lack of formalisation of the negotiating process 
and the absence of any legal status of the intergovernmental agreements, as accepted by the 
Supreme Court, leave parties freer to use their “respective political autonomies to build a more 
and more efficient network of Politikverflechtung.”211 The public cannot tolerate “such an 
incoherent configuration of the Parliament” whose “formal centrality of its sovereignty is 
solemnly reaffirmed, as a legal limit to intergovernmental omnipotence.” The situation is 
exacerbated by the tendency to leave out the Assemblies from concrete decision forums. This 
attitude is a consequence of political incentives arising from both the Federal and 
provincial/territorial forms of government. There is also a low level of formalisation of relations 
between government and citizens who have limited legal guarantees.212 
 
Intergovernmental relations are not provided for nor protected by the Constitution, with 
Parliament as the final source of empowerment for co-operative governance mechanisms in the 
Executive realm. The intergovernmental agreement is the only instrument known to Canadian 
negotiators. The state has not given consideration to a Second Chamber213 for territorial 
representation. This is because much of the intergovernmental interactions are “non-vertically 
oriented horizontal relations”; secondly, many political decisions would escape the Second 
Chamber; thirdly, Second Chambers tend to work on the basis of the majority principle and 
thus would not be suitable for ensuring strong guarantees to each single province or territory; 
fourthly, the nationalisation of the approach to any issue by Parliament would lead to 
politicisation within the Second Chamber, overshadowing territorial issues; and finally, a 
Second Chamber would ideally bring territorial interests within the central legislative process, 
whereas the objective of intergovernmental relations is to co-ordinate powers assigned to 
different levels, a task that can only indirectly and minimally be undertaken by a Second 
Chamber.214 These arguments against a second chamber could apply equally to the NCoP. 
                                                 
210 Mazzarella (2009), op cit, 47-50; Trench (2003), op cit, 11-14. 
211 Politikverflechtung focuses on the institutional analysis of vertical and horizontal policy integration, 
as well as on their effects on the policy process, on policy design, implementation and outcomes, 
www.linguee.com, accessed 16/12/2015; Mazzarella (2009), op cit, 50. 
212 Mazzarella (2009), op cit, 50-51. 
213 Such as South Africa’s National Council of Provinces. 
214 Mazzarella (2009), op cit, 54-57. 
 
302 
 
 The Canadian governmental model is reminiscent of that of the UK and of South Africa’s 
colonial and apartheid era systems. Emulating it would be a step backwards.  
 
6.4.9 CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Most literature here is again on federal-state relations, although there are some case studies 
detailing practical examples of inter-local co-operation. What may be of interest are the types 
of agreements entered into by governments for joint exercise of an undertaking or project. 
While it has been stated that development of local government in South Africa has been based 
largely on British Commonwealth models and as such distinctive from the American system, 
policies and implementation thereof, particularly those relating to joint planning and municipal 
service delivery in the US, may hold valuable lessons for the Republic, especially insofar as 
intergovernmental relations are concerned. In the US at the local sphere, quite unlike the 
situation in South Africa, governmental role players are counties, municipalities, townships, 
independent school districts, and special districts. By 1997 all states had granted local 
governments the type of broad latitude and authority to make mutual intergovernmental 
agreements with peers and other entities attractive and efficient. A large variety and number 
have since been concluded so as to provide sufficient practical information to formulate good 
practices. The approach here is based on the philosophy of a burden shared is one lessened, 
using the benefits of agglomeration or economies of scale. Hence, state authorities have used 
law as an instrument for development and regulation in a way that facilitates innovation without 
being overly prescriptive. It sees the following benefits deriving from intergovernmental 
agreements:215 
(a) distribution or sharing of costs, especially where one local authority would not have 
been able to bear such expenditure on its own; 
(b) notwithstanding a joint operation, individual authorities have local control and direct 
oversight in their respective jurisdictions; 
(c) can address a single purpose, especially a functional one spread over more than one 
spatial jurisdiction; 
(d) allows a wide range of flexibilities, such as role-players or partners, subject matter, 
duration of undertaking, cost, and so on; 
(e) can deal with extraterritorial needs impacting on a particular jurisdiction; and 
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(f) does not require time-consuming institutional restructuring, that is, each local authority 
remains intact.  
Since the legislation promulgated by the state is broad and enabling, the regional authority does 
not itself get involved in detail and allows for much informality among the contracting parties. 
A heavy involvement by the state would be counterproductive, especially since it would not 
have the requisite knowledge of local intricacies and idiosyncrasies to negotiate and manage a 
joint legal agreement. Moreover, inter-local co-operative actions are varied, happen frequently, 
and are a grassroots phenomenon. As such, they are not amenable to rigid and legalistic 
provisions and excessive high-level supervision. Their variety, and therefore the complexity, 
also do not allow for standardisation even within a state, let alone at federal level. Such 
agreements, therefore, have moved from recording and implementing merely what is 
permissible, to allowing for the incorporation of innovation and expansiveness.216 An 
intergovernmental agreement has been defined as: 
A legal pact authorised by state law between two or more units of government, in which the parties contract 
for or agree on the performance of a specific activity through either mutual or delegated provision. In their 
most common forms, these agreements are often called ‘joint exercise of service agreements’, ‘joint powers 
agreements’, or ‘mutual aid agreements’.217 
 
Based on the above definition, and from among a diversity of arrangements, two categories of 
contracts may emerge, namely: 
i. intergovernmental agreement – that is, formal local co-operation in terms of a legal 
agreement sanctioned by a statute of the state; or 
ii. co-operative intergovernmental venture, or effort, or endeavour, and so on, not 
constituting a legal agreement, but based on bona fide of the contracting parties and 
reflected in a memorandum of understanding or similar such instrument. 
 
One must be mindful that unlike in South Africa, local authorities in the US acquire the power 
to enter into intergovernmental agreements from state constitutions, supplemented by statutes 
that vary widely across the country. However, most are permissive in that they allow 
jurisdictions to undertake any activity jointly that they were empowered to do individually.  
 
There are generally only two types of enabling legislation:218 
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(a) those that are broad, covering any power, function or responsibility that the individual 
municipality may have, and allows it to undertake them jointly; and 
(b) those that set state constitutional and statutory requirements which any 
intergovernmental agreement must comply with. 
In any case, intergovernmental co-operation falls within and support the concept of shared rule, 
a cornerstone of the US federal system. Within such wide parameters, state ground rules vary 
but all allow ‘joint powers agreements’, wherein two local authorities permit each other 
concurrent powers in parts of each other’s spatial jurisdiction or for a specific period. Such 
arrangements are also called ‘mutual aid agreements’. Most states also authorise ‘inter-local 
service agreements’ and contractual intergovernmental service agreements with the private 
sector.219 The various types of arrangements are depicted in Table 6.2 below.  
 
From the 1960s the federal government mandated states to participate in its programmes. These 
imposed numerous rules, many with cost implications that had adverse impact on the states (the 
‘unfunded mandate’). This is an instance where law was used as a regulatory or ‘coercive’ 
mechanism rather than as a developmental one. Finding the situation untenable, the federal 
government enacted a statute to provide funding to states where federal laws impose duties on 
them and their constituent local authorities. The Unfunded Mandate Reform Act defines a 
federal intergovernmental mandate, in part, as: Any [involuntary] provision in legislation, 
statute, or regulation that … would impose an enforceable duty upon State, local, or tribal 
governments or that would reduce funding for a previously imposed mandate.220 
 
Federal agencies are required to consult with state and local authorities before implementing 
any such mandate, while the Congress Budget Office must evaluate any bill that incorporates 
intergovernmental or private sector mandates to determine their cost. Section 2(1) of the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 states that the purposes of this Act are, inter alia, to 
strengthen the partnership between the Federal Government and State, local, and tribal 
governments.221 Here one sees law as an instrument for development, not only in easing the 
financial burden of provincial and local authorities, but also in encouraging intergovernmental 
co-operation. A positive, practical example of law facilitating development is state legislation 
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enabling counties and local authorities to take “more control over their destiny by planning 
together for development and conservation of resources”.222 
 
Such instruments permit the joint planning and implementation of initiatives affecting an entire 
county or two or more contiguous municipalities within a county or counties, such that the 
outcomes are consistent and harmonised ordinances and actions. Previously, a municipal 
planning code required local authorities to provide for all uses within their respective spatial 
jurisdictions, unless they established a joint planning commission and adopted a joint zoning 
ordinance in order to distribute uses over a broader region. Now, an amended municipal 
planning commission (MPC) allows a multi-municipal approach to formulating joint 
comprehensive plans regionally, while retaining local control to ensure consistent 
implementation, through its own administrative structures, as well as governing and advisory 
bodies.223 This consolidated, co-ordinated and integrated approach holds many advantages, 
especially in being more economically efficient. In the process, integrated development plans 
produced by each municipality could be consolidated within a state or even across state 
boundaries. This approach would minimise conflict between local authorities and states, for 
ultimate resolution by a court of law. This happens when the two work independently, with the 
state overriding provisions of a city’s spatial development framework.224 
In 1996, the American Council on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) was established as a 
federalism clearing house, a nonpartisan research entity, and a policy forum. The Council’s 
primary focus was on relations between federal, state and local governments in the US, with its 
mission accomplished through four programmes:225 
i. monitoring of intergovernmental relations and partnerships between organs of 
government; 
ii. tracking emerging and ongoing issues; 
iii. conducting targeted investigations into means of improving intergovernmental 
relations; and  
iv. fostering education on federalism among the public and in schools. 
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NAME OF 
AGREEMENT 
TYPE WHAT AGREEMENT ENTAILS 
Standard Legal Specific activity; mutual/delegated service provision 
 
Joint exercise of 
services or joint powers  
Legal Mutually exercise a specific power or mutually deliver 
a specific service or activity 
 
Delegated services Legal Permits the payment to another authority or some 
other organisation for delivery of a service or activity 
 
Transfer of functions Legal Permanently transfers one or more activities from one 
local authority to another 
 
Special purpose 
services district or 
authority 
Legal Single purpose district or authority established by two 
or more municipalities to handle one activity – not 
restricted to boundaries of one authority 
 
Regional services 
authority 
Legal Multipurpose district or authority handling a variety of 
specified, often interrelated activities 
  
City/county 
consolidation 
Legal All functions of two or more local authorities merged 
under one administration 
 
Mutual aid  Informal Resource sharing, usually in an emergency; could be 
unwritten agreement 
 
 
Table 6.2: Types of intergovernmental inter-local agreements                                                          
(Adapted from Atkins, 1997, op cit.) 
 
Programme activities are organised into projects, each with a white paper framing general 
issues.226  
 
The American Political Science Association (APSA) has a section called ‘Federalism and 
Intergovernmental Relations’, which plans, develops and implements professional activities for 
the Association’s members.227 In 1974 President Gerald Ford formalised the Office of Public 
Liaison, charged with the task of communicating and interacting with various interest groups. 
In 2009, President Obama changed its name to the Office of Public Engagement, mandated to 
allow the views of ordinary American citizens to be more readily heard within the 
administration, mostly through presidential ‘town hall’ meetings and having administrators 
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make more and better contact with members of the public. This unit functions alongside the 
Office of Intergovernmental Affairs that plans, co-ordinates and monitors work of elected 
officials in federal, state and local governments.228 
 
The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) working under the motto ‘United 
We Serve’, engages in international trade promotion. It incorporates the Office of 
Intergovernmental Affairs and Public Engagement (IGPE) that leads a public outreach 
programme for state and local governments as well as both small and large businesses, 
agricultural communities, labour, environmental, and consumer groups, The USTR functions 
under the guidance of eight advisory committees.229 
 
In the US, intergovernmental relations and several legal and informal agreements have been 
used to develop small impoverished communities by listening to and acting on their complaints. 
There are 107 federally-recognised Native American tribes in California, more than any other 
state. They have a current total population of approximately 40 000. Since 1999, some 20 new 
and renegotiated compacts have been strengthened by becoming local agreements capable of 
being judicially enforced and also subject to binding arbitration, mostly relating to crime, 
traffic, environment, public services, and income from gaming establishments.230 While the US 
has the resources to establish and maintain several organisations for intergovernmental 
relations, there is need for such resources more so in a federal system. The importance of co-
operative governance is such that it is located in the Office of the President, with the incumbent 
taking a direct interest and urging his staff to also do so. The various mechanisms, both formal 
and informal, can be used for the betterment of the poor in South Africa, such as rural 
communities under traditional leadership.   
 
The federal-based US governmental system is different from that of Germany’s. It is a model 
foreign to South Africa and incapable of implementation here. 
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6.4.10 CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
Whatever little information is available on intergovernmental relations in developing states 
again is mostly confined to federations, as the study undertaken to inform South Africa on this 
subject for its White Paper on Local Government revealed.231 In analysing Argentina, Brazil, 
India, Mexico and Spain, it became clear that there is a dearth of literature on the practice and 
processes in this field at the local government level or has not been implemented sufficiently 
long enough to draw lessons of experience. Furthermore, South Africa’s co-operative 
governance system is different from those is available, it often relates to relationships between 
the centre and the states or regions.232 in almost all other countries. Where information 
 
The study of co-operative governance in more countries would make this research large and 
possibly also too generalised to be of much assistance for informing municipal representation. 
Most of the case studies were descriptive and dealt largely with the constitutional structure and 
general context for intergovernmental relations in the specific country. There was little 
discussion on intergovernmental practice, and the informal structures and processes employed 
in these countries. Insofar as research on co-operative governance in these states is concerned, 
the study revealed the following: 
i. importance of the political aspect;  
ii. national governments have used their strong overriding powers to impose co-ordinated 
solutions; and 
iii. the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Court has ultimately played a role in defining 
the constitutional context of intergovernmental relations and in conflict resolution.233 
 
Steytler (2006) shows that a process similar to the local government reforms prescribed in the 
German Basic Law of 1949 and in the Spanish Constitution of 1978 was adopted in the 
Brazilian Constitution of 1988, Argentina’s revised Constitution of 1994, and Mexico’s 
amended Constitution of 1999. Nigeria’s Federal Constitution of 1999, returning the country to 
civilian rule, reasserted the role of local government in the federal structure.234 Kenya’s 
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2 of 2012, makes no mention of local 
government. Notwithstanding this, it may be useful to review the approach to co-operative 
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governance and intergovernmental relations in some African countries for comparative 
purposes. 
 
6.4.11 CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 
This section briefly reviews the approach to co-operative governance and intergovernmental 
relations in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, Zimbabwe, 
Nigeria, and Kenya, as a means to compare with the South African approach. 
 
(a) Southern African Development Community 
Chikulo (2010) argues that Since the 1990s, a critical objective of governance reform has been 
the strengthening of local government by the decentralisation of powers, resources and 
responsibilities to local authorities and other locally administered bodies.235  
 
Although well-intentioned and with considerable progress attained, the devolution of power 
and its implementation have encountered many challenges over two decades. The following 
emerging issues and challenges, inter alia, were identified: 236 
 “Lack of political will or authority; 
 Absence of a holistic developmental framework; 
 Ineffective institutionalisation of local participation committees; 
 Management capacity constraints and deficits; 
 Fiscal crisis; 
 Role of traditional authorities; 
 Weak links [with] civil society organisations; and 
 Undemocratic behaviour by ruling regimes.” 
A major and common problem in most SADC countries is “foot-dragging or a lack of co-
operation from central ministries”. There is reluctance to devolve sufficient powers and 
functions and powers to local government because this would reduce their own power. Local 
authorities lack the political power to overcome such obstruction, which results in “misdirected 
or incomplete implementation of decentralisation policies”.237 This leaves them as little more 
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than mere local agents of the centre, thus stifling local participatory democracy and limiting 
socio-economic development.   
 
Generally, there is a “lack of holistic, integrated planning and management at district level”, a 
situation exacerbated by local authorities having no direct control in its co-ordination. This may 
be due to decentralised sector ministries providing local services reporting upwardly to their 
parent ministries, given that political and institutional power, policy responsibilities, and 
resources reside at the centre. This problem is also experienced with South Africa’s integrated 
development plans (IDPs) of municipalities which are “supposed to be a “bottom-up” 
participatory process”. Because such plans must align with those of national and provincial 
governments, it means that they would be approved only if they comply. Given that planning 
is a “top-down” process, there is little transfer of skills and resources to municipalities, and 
“token community participation”.238  
 
In most countries studied, community committees have not been effectively institutionalised. 
Although in South Africa wards have been formally created for community engagement with 
municipalities, many communities, according to Atkinson (2007), still choose to take their 
grievances to the streets in protests, some of which turn violent.239  In many countries, most 
community development committees are not active, and “in some cases, exist only on paper”, 
resulting in limited public participation in development management. In most cases there is 
“insufficient human resources capacity to cope with the multiplicity of mandates which have to 
be carried out more or less simultaneously”. The scarcity, especially professional and technical 
staff, has been a “major constraint for most of the local authorities in the region”. Lack of 
capacity has been exacerbated by appointments based on political patronage rather than skills 
and expertise. The situation was “exacerbated by appointments based on political patronage 
rather than skills and expertise”.240  
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Another fundamental and common problem has been the “gap between financial resources and 
municipal expenditure needs”. Even if adequate financial resources were provided, the situation 
would be worsened by poor financial management systems of most local authorities.241 
 
In the SADC region, the participation of CBOs and NGOs in local governance remains minimal. 
They still find it difficult to engage and partner with local government and are “unable to 
influence local governance in a manner that would effectively benefit their communities.” On 
the other hand, most local authorities are reluctant to “embrace and engage civil society, NGOs 
and CBOs and to give effect to principles of participatory governance”.242 Development at the 
local level will continue to suffer given that recently many of them would be neglected by the 
elites who give priority to pursuing their party-political agenda.243 The following quotation 
sums up the status quo in the SADC region: 
However, although significant progress has been made in establishing the institutional structure and policy 
framework to facilitate and anchor effective delivery of public services and socio-economic development, 
key issues and challenges persist that are unlikely to be resolved in the near future.244  
 
 
(b) Zimbabwe 
The Monomotapa domain rose around 1200 and fell in the 1600s. It established Great 
Zimbabwe, and introduced agriculture, gold mining and international trade. In the 1830s, 
Ndebele people fled Zulu violence and Boer migration in South Africa to settle in Matabeleland. 
In 1889, Cecil John Rhodes of the British South Africa (BSA) Company was mandated to 
colonise what came to be known as Southern Rhodesia. At the end of the BSA administration 
in 1922, the white minority opted for self-government.245 
 
Before independence, most of Zimbabwe’s wealth was owned by the white minority. The 
colonial period was characterised, inter alia, by: 
 White occupation of land owned by locals and the relocation of black people to 
unproductive outlying communal land. ‘Expropriation’ was without compensation;  
 Blacks were excluded from the political process; and 
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 Black Zimbabweans were forbidden from the best schools and residential areas in 
Rhodesia.246  
In 1930, the Land Apportionment Act restricted black access to land, whereafter many were 
forced into wage labour. In 1953, Britain created the Central African Federation, constituted by 
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), and Nyasaland (Malawi). 
Between 1930 and 1960, black opposition to colonial rule grew, leading to the emergence in 
the 1960s of nationalist groups, Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe 
African National Union (ZANU). The federation was dissolved in 1963 when Zambia and 
Malawi gained independence.247 In 1965, the UK adopted a policy of “No Independence Before 
Majority Rule (NIBMAR”. The Rhodesian Front rejected this and in that year Prime Minister, 
Ian Smith, unilaterally declared independence under white minority rule. This action was 
declared illegal by the United Nations (UN) and sparked international outrage, resulting in 
economic sanctions being imposed. The first war by black Zimbabweans against white rule, the 
Chimurenga, in 1896-1897, was lost by the locals. The second Chimurenga, the “Rhodesian 
Bush War”, from 1964 to 1979, was the struggle for liberation.248 From 1972, the guerrilla war 
by ZANU and ZAPU intensified, leading to the British-brokered all-party talks at Lancaster 
House in London culminating in a peace agreement, a new constitution, and guarantee of 
minority rights.249     
 
On 18 April 1980, Zimbabwe gained independence that was internationally recognised. Robert 
Mugabe was named Prime Minister. In the first decade following independence, the new 
government’s command economy introduced programmes focused on building the health and 
education sectors, with the state playing a major role in the country’s economic and social 
development, based on its “Growth with Equity” policy. “Zimbabwe’s growth rate during the 
eighties was higher than that of sub-Saharan Africa as a whole,” strongly boosted by farming 
output, but in the 1980s, drought began to have a devastating impact on the economy.250 It 
began failing rapidly, as indicated by the “rise in total debt from US$786 million at 
                                                 
246 Munangagwa, Chidochashe L (2009) The Economic Decline of Zimbabwe, 3 (2009) Gettysburg 
Economic Review, 108-129, 111.   
247 BBC Zimbabwe Profile 2017, op cit.  
248 BBC Zimbabwe Profile 2017, op cit; Munangagwa (2009), op cit, 111-112. 
249 Ibid.  
250 Munangagwa (2009), op cit, 112.  
313 
 
independence to 2.3 billion in 1983”. Unemployment and population grew substantially from 
the time of independence.251  
 
Since independence, Mugabe established and maintained a one-party state, holding control of 
the main governing bodies, including the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. The country’s economic 
decline since 1997 led to a hyperinflationary environment.252 
   
In 1987, the two political parties merged to form ZANU-PF; Mugabe changed the constitution 
and makes himself Executive President. This was the beginning of Zimbabwe’s demise.253  
 
From 1990, Zimbabwe sought to liberalise its economic system through the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP); however, under this new macroeconomic policy in 
the 1990s, “growth was a disaster” and had an adverse effect on the manufacturing industry. 
ESAP became impossible to implement due largely to the “government’s failure to control 
public expenditure and financing of the programme through borrowing from domestic banks”. 
The next phase of economic recovery, the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social 
Transformation (ZIMPREST), from 1996 to 2000, also ended in failure, as did the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Structural Adjust Programmes, with the result that 
“by 2003, Zimbabwe’s economy was the fastest shrinking in the world, at 18 per cent per 
year”.254 
 
Land occupations had been taking place since the 1980s. Vusani (2015) asserts – 
At independence about 6 000 white commercial farmers owned 15 million hectares of land while 8 500 
small-scale African farmers had 1.4 million. The rest, an estimated 700 000 communal farming households, 
subsisted on 16.4 million hectares…less than 50 per cent of all agricultural land, of which 75 per cent was 
in the drier, less fertile agro-ecological regions.255 
 
In 2000, squatters seized hundreds of white-owned farms, starting a violent and ongoing 
campaign to reclaim what was “stolen” by settlers. Zimbabwe for the first time publicly 
acknowledges an economic crisis when foreign reserves have run out, and warning of serious 
food shortages. The World Bank and the IMF as well as most western donors have cut aid 
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because of Mugabe’s land seizure programme. On 13 February 2000, the new constitution was 
rejected by 55 per cent of Zimbabwe’s voting population, a first major ‘defeat’ of the ruling 
party. Following worsening food crises that threatened famine, in April 2002 a state of disaster 
was declared. A land acquisition law passed in May saw the departure of 2 900 white 
commercial farmers. A widely-observed strike in 2003 resulted in arrests and beatings. 
Zimbabwe pulled out of the British Commonwealth.256  
 
In 2005, tens of thousands of shanty dwellings and illegal street stalls in urban areas were 
destroyed as part of a “clean up” programme. The United Nations (UK) estimated that such 
action left 700 000 people homeless. In May 2006, year-on-year inflation exceeded 1 000 per 
cent. Rallies, protests, and demonstrations become a familiar sight, as does police brutality. In 
2006, the Zimbabwean economy “spiralled rapidly into a world record decline …[when] GDP 
per capita was 47 per cent lower than it was in 1980”.257 One of Zimbabwe’s major economic 
errors was its land ‘reform’ which involved large-scale transfer of land. A shortcoming was the 
absence of skills transfer in farm management. Failure of local farmers may have contributed 
to the growth of the informal sector, accounting, in 2007, for eighty per cent of the country’s 
economic activity, eighty per cent of which used foreign currency. In this year the annual 
inflation rate, at 1 729.9 per cent, was the highest in the world.258 By the end of 2008, 
hyperinflation reached an ‘official’ level of 230 million per cent, with catastrophic effect on 
incomes and savings.259 
 
In 2010, a new “indigenisation” law forced foreign-owned businesses to sell majority 
shareholding to locals. In 2011, Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai said that the unity 
government has been rendered “impotent” by ZANU-PF violence and disregard of the power-
sharing agreement. In March 2013, a new constitution was approved by an overwhelming 
majority in a referendum, a significant provision was that future presidents would be limited to 
two five-year terms. In the July presidential and parliamentary elections, NANU-PF ‘won’ 
three-quarters of the seats in parliament and Mugabe gained a seventh term in office. The 
opposition leader dismissed the polls as a “fraud”. Demonstrations calling for Mugabe to stand 
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down increased in 2016, but were dealt with brutally by the police. The next elections are 
scheduled for 2018.260 
  
Although the Zimbabwean Constitution261 established a three-tier governmental system with 
each sphere having its powers and functions prescribed, there was no “clear regulatory 
framework for management” of IGR. Furthermore, any legal basis for this lacked clarity, 
transparency, and consistency, while being “subject to political manipulation”.262 Within this 
vague, confusing, and ambivalent milieu, the “predatory” centre had hijacked authority to 
“advance political and personal interests”. The concentration of discretionary power at the 
centre negatively affected sub-national governments.263 Chakunda argues that:264 
There is lack of comprehensive policy commitment to developing regulatory effective diffusion of authority 
to enhance not only autonomy of different levels of government but also limit notable problems such as 
how central government, local government and strategic actors and institutional arrangements interact. 
 
Differences in political ideologies and philosophies and biases in their favour puts into question 
the “objectivity of central government intervention in local government affairs” as happens 
quite often. While such actions undermine local authorities, it may be that they have limited 
capacity to undertake their functions effectively, especially where they are based on the 
principle of subsidiarity. With Zimbabwe being a unitary state, there is “only one source of state 
authority, with local government being mere agents of the centre. The local power drain is 
evident from “an increased propensity towards recentralisation”. This is possible because local 
authorities are creatures of statute with no constitutional protection. 265  
 
Chakunda asserts:266 The Minister retains the overall supervisory, coordination and control 
authority on the behaviour of local authorities. However, local authorities at provincial and 
district levels are accountable to the Minister via the Provincial Administrator (PA) and District 
Administrator (DA) respectively. 
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As creatures of statute, local government exercises delegated authority only. The Minister has 
extensive powers, including, inter alia, that of supervision, intervention, appointment and 
suspension of officials, limiting sources of revenue, and nullifying decisions of local 
government. The Rural District Council Act lists more than 250 instances where the Minister 
can intervene in the day-to-day running of such councils. The Minister has been quoted as 
saying in public that since “local councils enjoyed delegated authority and thus should follow 
government, and by extension, ZANU-PF policies”.267 
 
Vusani (2015) argues that during the first decade following independence, Zimbabwe made 
“real and positive” progress with free health care and education increasing standards of living. 
However, its focus was then a moral and political issue, but “not an economically wise thing to 
do. This socialist concept was unsustainable, especially in the absence of means to generate 
income. The situation was worsened since the introduction of ESAP.268 Manangagwa (2009) 
asserts that Zimbabwe’s policies were ineffective as these “target the effects and not the 
causes”. Although formulated for the public good, while ignoring the associated social costs. 
Furthermore, policies were not implemented in the “most efficient, transparent manner. He is 
of the opinion that the state’s first priority is to reassess its political condition before any long-
term “stabilisation effort can be put in place”.269 
 
(c) Nigeria 
Regionalism was introduced to Nigeria from the beginning of formal British Indirect Rule in 
1901. This was done to maintain a “continued manipulation of the system” by keeping the 
centre strong and the states weak and divided so that the country could be governed effectively 
from the centre.270 Olaiya (2016) quotes Rothermund who pointed out that the British colonial 
power was short of sincerity when putting down the structure of federalism, ab initio.271 Bello 
(2014) asserts that, “Although intergovernmental relations  originated from the United States 
of America in the 1930s, it was the British colonial masters who brought the idea to Nigeria.”272 
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It has been said that the “festering crisis of contentious intergovernmental relations in Nigeria” 
could be attributed to policies adopted during the colonisation period. During this period, 
regions functioned as “administrative and political constituencies and mobilisation of 
resources”. The effects of centralisation resulting from both colonisation and long period of 
military rule that followed “still linger on”.273 Of the 1999 constitution, it has been said that – 
One is the legacy of centralisation imported into the Nigerian political life by the advent of military rule, 
its longevity, and most importantly, its involvement in the drafting of the Nigerian Constitutions 
successively from 1979.274  
 
The Nigerian constitution of 1979 was the “first in modern history to expressly prescribe the 
existence and functioning of local government”.275 It provided for a three-tiered federal 
structure in which each would have a considerable measure of independence, although the 
balance of power was tilted in favour of the centre.276 While the exclusive powers held by the 
centre in a federation is quite clear, the “concurrent legislative list is a minefield of potential 
conflicts” where each tier of government is given power over the same subjects. This situation 
is exacerbated in federations since they do not appear to have “definitive” and “necessary 
inherent values”.277 
 
Section 7(6) of the 1999 constitution provides: 
(a) The National Assembly shall make provision for statutory allocation of the public revenue to local 
government councils in the federation; and 
(b) The House of Assembly of a State shall make provisions for statutory allocation of public revenue to 
local government councils within the state. 
 
These provisions appear ambiguous and contradictory and have not yet been amended. They 
make local authorities dependent on the federal and state governments for their financial 
survival.  
 
Section 2(2) provides that “Nigeria shall be a federation consisting of States and the federal 
Capital Territory. This means there are only two constitutionally-established levels of 
government. However, section 7(1) guaranteed a “system of Local Government by 
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democratically elected Local Government Councils.” It goes on to say that the “Government of 
every state shall …ensure their existence under a Law which provides for the establishment, 
structure, composition, finance and functions of such Councils.” These provisions appear 
contradictory. On the one hand, it is unclear what is to be made of the constitutional ‘guarantee’ 
of local councils, and on the other, that they are creatures of statute promulgated by the states. 
 
Olaiya (2016) identifies further problem in that any state law inconsistent with validly passed 
national assembly laws would be declared invalid, although on the Concurrent List, the 
“compliant requirement was not made as a condition precedent or subsequent”.278 The federal 
government has the power to “intervene in any matter of public importance if it chooses to do 
so”.279 Both the National Assembly and the State House of Assemblies have legislative powers 
over local government. Where a function is specifically allocated to any level of government it 
must be executed by that authority. This implies that local authorities are “supposedly 
autonomous with respect to their functional competence as enunciated in the Fourth Schedule 
of the Constitution”. In practice, this is not so as local authorities are seen “much more as an 
agent rather than a tier of government. This is due to the tendency in federal states of 
centralisation and overdominance in the centre, in Nigeria, a result of long military rule and its 
role in the drafting of the country’s constitutions. This results in states’ and local governments’ 
dependency, with promotion of a principal/agent or master/servant relationship.280 
 
Another issue of concern is the allocation or assignment by the federal and state governments 
to local authorities of centrally-allocated functions, especially those of social development 
responsibilities.281 Adedire (2014) states that intergovernmental relations in the Fourth 
Republic (1999-2014) was in “disarray due to conflicts over issues of tax jurisdiction, revenue 
allocation, fund transfers…and illegal removal of local government officials”, unhealthy rivalry 
among governments, and “reluctant co-operation and competition”. There appears to be a 
“seemingly universal tension between tiers of government” in Nigeria.282 This resulted in some 
states taking the federal government to Court to challenge its constitutional jurisdiction.283 
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Inyang (2014) argues that the Nigerian democratic dispensation is a quasi-federation, the 
equivalent of a constitutional dictatorship, a “unitary country in a federal disguise”.284 Some of 
the problems were created by the 1999 constitution which “had some confusion, lapses, 
loopholes, ambiguities and intrigues which directly and indirectly affect the performance of 
local government”.285 
 
The following quote succinctly sums up the situation regarding Nigeria’s constitutional 
democracy and intergovernmental relations therein: 
If the administration of the Nigerian government in the recent past had been a failure, the blame does not 
belong to the local un-regenerated, crude politicians, whose main goals and aspirations are to control power 
and authority at all cost; nor does the blame belong to the innocent, uneducated, uninformed citizens who 
do not know their left from right and position in the society. The blame and failure belong to the educated, 
political and social elites, who have been carried away by their own egocentric ideas and have turned their 
backs on their obligations as leaders.286 
 
(c) Kenya 
Kempe (2014)287 argues that “during the colonial era, local governments in Kenya were 
considered fairly autonomous and had significant sources of revenue”. After attaining 
independence on 12 December 1963,288 “local authorities were weakened and simultaneously 
developed a bad reputation for incompetence”.289 Political leaders began a process of 
recentralisation that, unfortunately, undermined the link and relationship between local 
authorities and the people. A dual central-local administrative structure evolved, with the latter 
enjoying a strong revenue base and support from national government through grants. However, 
local authorities provided only a small number of services and essential programmes.290   
 
The state contemplating devolution, formulated two programme to facilitate it: The Kenya 
Local Government Reform Programme (KLGRP) was established in 1998 to spearhead local 
government reforms for good governance, efficient service delivery and local economic 
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development.291 The second was the Local Government Reform Strategy (2008-2012) aimed to 
put in place ‘a democratic and responsive system of Local Government that delivers quality, 
effective and efficient services to Kenyans.292 The KLGRP in 2010 identified the following 
challenges to participatory local governance at local level: 
 Weak local authorities incapable of delivering effective and efficient services; 
 Lack of capacity (human and financial) to effectively undertake reforms; and 
 Licences used as revenue source rather than for regulation. 
 
Commenting on the Kenya government’s 2010 initiatives, the World Bank stated that – 
Kenya’s devolution is to a very large extent a response to distributional grievances, which in turn have 
contributed to the political strife. Thus it is absolutely critical that devolution delivers on the promises of 
a more equitable distribution of public resources in the first instance, as well as developmental 
outcomes.293 
The World Bank cautioned further that Kenya’s decentralisation “is a massive 
undertaking…and the transition will inevitably encounter teething problems. Since 
independence, Kenya’s leaders have held diverging views about devolution…”294 
 
Post-election riots rocked Kenya in 2007-2008, giving rise to the development of a new 
Constitution, adopted in 2010.295 The Constitution is wide-ranging, detailed, and liberal, 
perhaps fashioned on the South African Constitution. Article 1 of the Kenya Constitution 
provides (quote) – 
(1) All sovereign power belongs to the people of Kenya and shall be exercised only in accordance with this 
Constitution. 
(2) The people may exercise their sovereign power either directly or through their democratically elected 
representatives. 
(3) Sovereign power under this Constitution is delegated to the following state organs which shall perform 
their functions in accordance with this Constitution – 
(a) Parliament and the legislative assemblies of the county governments; 
(b) The national executive and the executive structures of the county governments… 
(4) The sovereign power of the people is exercised at –  
(a) the national level; and 
(b) the county level.  
 
                                                 
291 Kenya Participatory Local Democracy, (KLGRP, 2010 – Promoting Regulatory Reform at Local 
Government Level in Kenya) https://local democracy.net/countries/Africa-east/kenya, accessed 15/05/2017. 
292 Ibid.  
293 World Bank (2010) Decentralisation in Kenya: Background Note, https://local 
democracy.net/countries/Africa-east/kenya, accessed 15/05/2017. 
294 World Bank (2012) Devolution Without Disruption – Pathways to a Successful New Kenya, 
https://local democracy.net/countries/Africa-east/kenya, accessed 15/05/2017. 
295 Aboum, Agnes (2014) Kenya: The new tier of government, https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/kenyas-
new-counties-give-people-more-say, accessed 15/05/2017.  
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The following articles of the Constitution provide the foundation and framework for devolution 
of power to county governments that incorporate local authorities, urban development, funding 
of subnational governments and socio-economic development, intergovernmental relations, 
local participatory democracy and have particular significance for this thesis: 
 Article 2(1) reads: “This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic and binds all 
persons and all State organs at both levels of government”; 
 Article 10 is headed “National values and principles of government”; 
 Chapter 4 is the Bill of Rights (articles 19-57); 
 Section 59 establishes the Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission; 
 Chapter 11 is headed “Devolved Government”; 
 Article 174: “Objects of devolution”; 
 Article 175: “Principles of devolved government”; 
 Articles 176-188 deals with devolution, and allocation of power to county governments; 
 Articles 189-200 is fall under the heading “Cooperation between national and county 
governments”; 
 Article 232: “Values and principles of public service”; and 
 Articles 233-236 establishes and provides for the operation of the Public Service 
Commission. 
 
In terms of Article 174 of the Constitution, the Objectives of Devolution are: 
(a) To promote democratic and accountable exercise of power; 
(b) To foster national unity by recognising diversity; 
(c) To give powers of self-governance to the people and enhance the participation of the 
people in the exercise of the powers of the State and in making decisions affecting them; 
(d) To recognise the right of communities to manage their own affairs and to further their 
development; 
(e) To protect and promote the interests and rights of minorities and marginalised 
communities;  
(f) To promote social and economic development and the provision of proximate, easily 
accessible services throughout Kenya; 
(g) To ensure equitable sharing of national and local resources throughout Kenya; 
(h) To facilitate the decentralisation of State organs, their functions and services, from the 
capital of Kenya; and 
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(i) To enhance checks and balances and the separation of powers. 
A major feature is devolution of power and local participatory democracy. It prescribed that 
statutes be developed to give effect to its provisions, a number of which of relevance to the 
thesis topic, is briefly reviewed below. 
 
i. Urban Areas and Cities Act, 13 of 2011  
This enactment to establish a legislative framework for: 
 Classification of areas as urban areas or cities; 
 Governance and management of urban areas and cities; and 
 Participation by residents in the governance of urban areas and cities. 
 
ii. Transition to Devolved Government Act, 1 of 2012 
This statute was passed, inter alia, to provide for: 
 a legal and institutional framework for a coordinated transition to the devolved 
system of government, while ensuring continued delivery of services to citizens; 
 the transfer of powers and functions to the National and County governments; 
 mechanisms to ensure that the Commission for the Implementation of the 
Constitution performs its role in monitoring and overseeing the effective 
implementation of the devolved system of government; and 
 a mechanism for capacity building requirements of the National government and 
County governments, and make proposals for the gaps to be addressed. 
 
iii. The County Government Act, 17 of 2012  
This Act came into operation upon the final announcement of the March 4th general election. Its 
purpose and objectives are among others to: 
 Give effect to devolution under Chapter 11 of the Constitution…; 
 Provide for public participation in the conduct of the activities of the County 
Assembly as required by Article 196 of the Constitution; and 
 Prescribe mechanisms to protect minorities within counties pursuant to Article 197 
of the Constitution. 
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iv. Intergovernmental Relations Act, 2 of 2012 
This statute appears to be informed largely by South Africa’s IRFA by attempting to formalise 
co-operative governance and intergovernmental relations. Section 3 sets out the objects of the 
Act, section 4 depicts the principles of IGR, and section 5 the objects of intergovernmental 
structures. Part II relates to the establishment of IGR structures. Unlike the IRFA, the IRA in 
Part III provides for the “transfer and delegation of powers, functions, and competencies”. 
Perhaps the Kenyan government learned some lessons from South Africa’s experiences with 
delegated authority and assignment of powers and functions, particularly the dangers of 
unfunded mandates. It may be too soon to tell whether harmonious and mutually-beneficial 
IGR has been successfully practiced and become institutionalised in Kenya after the 
Constitution mandated it in 2010. 
 
v. Public Finance Management Act, 18 of 2012 
This is similar to South Africa’s PFMA. 
 
vi. National Government Co-ordination Act, 1 of 2013  
This statute was passed, inter alia, to: 
 Facilitate the exercise of Executive authority; 
 Provide for the effective co-ordination and administration of the National 
government functions prescribed in the Constitution, this Act, or any other written 
law; and 
 Provide for the establishment of an administrative and institutional framework at the 
National, County and decentralised units to ensure access to National government 
services to all parts of the Republic. 
 
vii. Transition County Appropriation Act, 7 of 2013  
This statute authorises the issue of funds out of the relevant County Revenue Funds, and 
application of those funds towards the service of a particular financial period for 
specified public services (salaries and other expenses). 
 
viii. Constituencies Development Fund Act, 30 of 2013  
This enactment seeks to ensure, inter alia, that a specific portion of the national annual 
budget is devoted to Constituencies for infrastructural development, wealth creation and 
in the fight against poverty at the Constituency level. 
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ix. Devolution Handbook, 2014 
This manual, by Transparency International, Kenya, interprets in detail the Constitution 
and its devolution provisions. Some issues pertinent to this thesis are reviewed briefly: 
 
i. The devolved system of governance allows for the citizens to exercise their sovereign 
power. It has also allowed for transfer of powers to the 47 county governments. (p5) 
 
ii. Article 176 of the Constitution provides that County governments are allowed to 
decentralise their functions to the extent that is feasible. (p13) 
 
iii. A city must have institutionalised active participation by residents in management of its 
affairs. (p22) 
 
iv. Each County Assembly must enact legislation that provides for the division and 
establishment of villages. Article 50 of the County Government Act establishes and sets 
out the functions of the sub-county administrator. (p24)  
 
v. One of the roles of the sub-county administrator is the facilitation and coordination of 
citizen participation in the development of policies and plans and the delivery of 
services. It is stipulated that wards shall be run by a ward administrator who has the 
proper professional qualifications and technical knowledge in administration. The ward 
administrator answers to the sub-county administrator. One of the duties of the ward 
administrator is the coordination and facilitation of citizen participation in the 
development of policies and plans and the delivery of services. (p25) 
 
vi. The office of the village administrator has been set up for the coordination, management 
and supervision of general administrative functions in the village, which includes: 
a. Ensuring and coordinating participation of the village unit in governance; and 
b. Assisting the village to develop the administrative capacity for the effective 
exercise of the functions and powers and participation in government at the local 
level. 
Each village shall have a council which shall consist of the village administrator as the 
chairperson and not less than three and not more than five village elders who have been 
competitively admitted. (p25) This is similar to the panchayat (five-person council) in 
small Indian villages. 
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vii. According to Article 187 of the Constitution and notwithstanding Schedule Four, a 
function or power of government at one level may be transferred to another if the other 
could perform it more effectively and it isn’t prohibited by legislation. Upon transfer of 
a function, arrangements shall be put in place to ensure there are necessary resources 
for performance. (p27) This is provision for assignment and safeguard against 
‘unfunded mandates’, as South African municipal practitioners understand it. 
 
viii. Section 87 of the County Government Act provides for citizen participation in County 
governments, based on seven principles. (p40) 
 
ix. The government has set up a toll-free number and four Advocacy and Legal Advisory 
Centres for advice and reporting on corruption. (p44) 
 
Less than five years after the coming into operation of the Intergovernmental Relations 
Framework Act, it would appear that problems are surfacing in its implementation. The 
Ministry of Devolution and Planning has called for a review. The State Department of 
Devolution stated that notwithstanding the Constitution and the Intergovernmental Relations 
Framework Act establishing a legal framework, the relationship among institutions 
implementing devolution “remains strained”.296 The Ministry’s problem statement reads – 
…consultative mechanisms set out to address intergovernmental issues lack the force of law; legal 
provisions for settlement of intergovernmental [disputes?] are deliberately ignored; the provision for the 
communication, implementation, monitoring and reporting of Summit decisions is ineffective and prone to 
conflicting interpretations.297 
  
The objectives of the assignment are to: 
i. “Harmonise the IGRA 2012 with the Constitution and all other statutes; 
ii. Review the IRGA 2012 to identify and address gaps, ambiguities, inconsistencies, 
overlaps and duplicity [duplication] of functions of institutions created under the Act; 
and 
iii. Apply lessons learned by the pioneer implementers of devolution to enhance and 
harmonise intergovernmental relations.” 
                                                 
296 Ministry of Devolution and Planning: state Department of Devolution (2017) Terms of Reference: 
Consultancy Review of Intergovernmental Relations Act, 2 of 2012, closing date 30 January 2017.  
297 Ibid.  
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It would appear that having followed South Africa’s example in formalising and prescribing 
for co-operative governance and IGR, the Kenyan government may have found that it was not 
working as contemplated. While it is relatively easy on paper to use law to guide and regulate, 
one is dealing with people’s behaviours, something not readily amenable to command. The state 
is to be congratulated, though, in identifying problems and challenges in a short time and taking 
rapid action to resolve them.   
 
Aboum (2014) argues that the initial experience of devolution was generally positive, but 
serious challenges remain. A major devolution advantage is that county administrations are 
politically accountable to the new electorate. This had not been the case before when the central 
government retained excessive power and controlled resources. Another innovation is that  
minority parties have been given an opportunity to exercise influence at the local level where 
previously they had been basically marginalised from policy development. Furthermore, 
devolution has improved the governance framework for pro-poor policies. She adds that the 
new sense of competition reduces opportunities for bribery and rent seeking, while stimulating 
innovation. However, despite many achievements, county governance is still struggling with 
several challenges.298 
 
The Kenyan Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission conducted a survey after media reports 
suggested corruption and unethical practices were spreading alongside that of devolved local 
services, particularly in procurement. One of the reasons for Kenya’s political and fiscal 
devolution was the expectation that “localism would remedy the inefficiency, economic 
stagnation and corruption inflicting the central government”. Corruption at county level was 
“moderately high”.299  
 
Acknowledging some of the challenges surfacing from the implementation of devolution, the 
Ministry of Devolution and Panning has developed a policy to address them. The Cabinet 
Secretary stated that “Devolution is one of the most transformative changes to Kenya’s 
governance brought about by the Constitution of Kenya, 2010”. He said that the intention of 
Article 174 is to promote social and economic development and provide proximate, easily 
                                                 
298 Aboum (2014), op cit.  
299 Churchill, Francis (2016) ‘Corruption in Kenyan local government “moderately high”’: Ethics, Law 
Procurement, Public sector, 1 September 2016, https://www.cips.org/supply-management/news/2016, accessed 
15/05/2017.  
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accessible services throughout Kenya”.300 He added that during the first three years of 
implementation of the devolved system, several successes were achieved while a number of 
problems were identified. They largely related institutional, intergovernmental and resource 
related challenges. The policy aims to address these emerging issues with a view to improving 
the implementation of the devolved system of government and to achieve optimal service 
delivery. An intention is that both levels of government align their respective devolution 
policies of the devolved system of government. This policy introduces the “next phase of 
consolidating devolution, clarifying and strengthening roles and responsibilities of both the 
National and County Governments…”301 
 
The Policy requires counties to decentralise to the smallest feasible units. A problem in many 
counties is that the decentralisation process has not been fully operationalised because of 
“inadequate resources, capacity infrastructure and system of delegation from county 
government to the decentralised units”. The absence of a mechanism to harmonise national-
county operations within the decentralised units causes problems, as does implementation of 
the Urban Areas and Cities Act.302 The Policy has identified and articulated several IGR 
challenges and has developed twelve objectives to address them.303 It has also developed an 
IGR Implementation Framework that includes a monitoring and evaluation system.304 
 
Kenya appears to have ‘copied’ the South African system of co-operative governance and IGR 
by formalising them and establishing the requisite structures and processes for their 
implementation. Whether prescribing for and regulating what is largely human engagement and 
relationships is debateable. What is required also is a willingness and commitment to 
decentralisation by the ruling elites, that is, inclusive socio-economic development through pro-
poor policies. The Kenyan system may have learned from that of South Africa and appear to be 
addressing gaps and shortcomings rapidly. The government is to be commended on its 
devolution developmental intentions that may be a model for other African countries to emulate.   
 
                                                 
300 Ministry of Devolution and Planning, Kenya (2016) Foreword to the Policy on Devolved System of 
Government, iii.  
301 Ibid.  
302 Ministry of Devolution and Planning, Kenya (2016) Policy on Devolved System of Government, 12.  
303 Kenya (2016) Policy on Devolved System of Government, op cit, 17-24. 
304
 Kenya (2016) Policy on Devolved System of Government, op cit, 24-25. 
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6.5 LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE FROM COUNTRIES RESEARCHED 
 
In Germany, Austria and Belgium, local authorities are protected as a separate level of 
government. Federalism restricts the powers and functions of provincial governments to its own 
demarcated spatial territory and to local authorities situated therein. Hence, municipalities are 
subjected to the rule of provincial authorities in a hierarchical relationship that affects their 
power and functions, that is, their status. Given the dynamic and process-related nature, wide 
range of problems, and differing political cultures, it is difficult to legislate for formulaic or 
standardised frameworks for intergovernmental co-operation. 
 
In Germany, more concentrated efforts are being made to increasingly and more effectively 
involve municipalities in federal and Land policy formulation. This change of heart is 
predicated upon the acknowledgement that governmental processes have become so complex 
that it is almost impossible to adhere to rigid structures and procedures or watertight division 
of powers and functions. At the same time, complete informality based on goodwill and trust 
institutionalised through centuries of interaction by politicians from different parties, as in the 
UK, may not be able to cope or continue effectively in a globally-competitive environment. 
Hence, formal co-operation is becoming increasingly important. Such an approach, particularly 
local government participation in national policy development, is sadly lacking in South Africa. 
 
In Austria, a political accord has been concluded to involve municipalities closely, particularly 
where their resources are affected through delegation of federal and Land responsibilities. This 
arrangement is premised on it being mandatory for both federal and Land governments having 
to consult with municipalities. The trend in Germany, Austria and Belgium is for associations 
of local government to represent the interests of municipalities on the Land and federal levels, 
as they individually lack the capacity and resources, especially to comment on new policy 
initiatives. Thus, the municipalities act jointly in their individual and aggregated interests, a 
system perhaps better than that in South Africa where SALGA, as an external agent, provides 
indirect representation that is weaker than desired. This may not be a structural or system 
problem as the constitutional-statutory framework enables use of both formal and informal, 
internal and external structures and processes. However, SALGA, not being the equivalent of 
Scandinavian associations for local authorities, does not have their corporate strength and 
ability to directly contract with the national government as agent for its members. A further 
problem is one of capacity and capability: In all three countries, provision is made for 
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municipalities to co-operate with each other in areas of mutual concern, by means of three 
models within an enabling statutory framework: 
i. establishment of sub-provincial counties wherein local authorities in a specific spatial 
area co-operate on certain matters;  
ii. creation of local government forums in the domain of public law for municipalities to 
co-operate on functional matters; and 
iii. as legal personae, local authorities may conclude contracts under private law to co-
operate in certain fields. 
 
It is of interest to note that attention is being paid to formalise relationships between Länder 
and local authorities so as to provide a firmer basis for co-operation, as is the case with the UK 
with its too-high level of informality. South Africa may already have taken a lead in such 
formalisation through the provisions of the Constitution. However, making prescriptions is one 
thing, having the “Bundestreue” to implement them is quite another. 
 
South Africa could consider the above approaches, noting the equivalent of Kreise or ‘counties’ 
do not constitute a separate sphere of government.  In all three countries, little attention has 
been paid to co-operation between municipalities situated in different provinces, whereas there 
is statutory provision for regions to engage with their cross-border counterparts and with those 
in other countries. Theoretically or in principle, there is no reason why local authorities cannot 
do so. Municipalities are, however, informally linking with counterparts in other countries.305 
 
It has been acknowledged, as in Germany and in the UK, that with “relationships becoming 
more complex,” and a trend towards trilateral and multilateral ties with long term relations 
becoming more desirable, there was a “need for appropriate and enabling legislation”.306  
 
In most European states, a local government representative organisation is an institution 
whereby municipalities agree with others to work jointly to achieve goals that may be difficult 
to undertake individually. Hence, such an organisation is more like a co-operative, with no 
constitutional or legal basis, but permitted under the state’s laws. Therefore, their status and 
functions are very different from that of SALGA’s. 
                                                 
305 De Villiers (1997), op cit, 19-20.  
306 Ortengren, Johan (2006) International cooperation between local authorities, paper presented at the 
Nordic and Baltic States’ Conference 12/06/2006: Laulasmaa, Estonia. 
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In Sweden, a country with a two-tier government, professionally-qualified mayors and 
councillors are responsible for city administration and they represent their localities directly in 
Parliament. This cannot be considered in South Africa’s present governmental system. 
 
In the African countries studied, including South Africa, the status, powers and functions as 
well as intergovernmental relations were largely shaped by the British colonial model of 
administration. This is to pursue the ideal of centralisation as a means of wealth accumulation 
and the divide and rule philosophy of ensuring people are not united to form a threat and for 
controlling a large country. While most countries welcomed the No Independence Before 
Majority Rule, after independence many resorted to old British practices of centralisation and 
later re-centralisation. Many countries did not have the requisite commitment to inclusive socio-
economic development and wealth-sharing but to accumulate wealth and power among the few 
ruling political elites, as evinced in Zimbabwe and currently in South Africa. It is, therefore, 
questionable whether or harmonious and cordial IGR would be possible in Africa – it does not 
seem to be a question of ‘when’. 
    
Some broad and general statements could be made on lessons derived from countries 
researched. It should be noted that co-operative governance and intergovernmental relations is 
a wide field and the systems of only a few countries have been reviewed. This is for the purpose 
of locating municipal representation in a wider foundation and context. The choice may appear 
arbitrary but serves to provide some lessons gained from experience in these states. It has not 
been possible to make in-depth analyses and therefore precise suggestions or recommendations 
cannot be made in this study. 
(a) Democracy is essential for local participatory self-governance, as propounded by the 
European Union, practised in Scandinavia and Germany, and recently acknowledged by 
the UK House of Commons.  
 
(b) The Anglo-Saxon incremental, non-constitutional governmental system evolved over 
centuries, with friendly relations among bureaucrats employing a high level of 
informality, but this may not work in the present political environment, and a framework 
together with more use of formal instruments has been recommended by the House of 
Lords, perhaps taking its cue from South Africa’s approach. 
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(c) Local government for largely homogeneous communities developed organically over a 
long period, with changing and increasing status and responsibilities, but their generally 
small size makes efficient service delivery and governance problematical. 
 
(d) The Germanic and Scandinavian traditions are characterised by a system that is 
organised, systematic, professional, co-ordinated, consensual, co-operative, integrated, 
and an organic whole, with local authorities having a high degree of autonomy. 
 
(e) The French model is highly centralised and authoritarian, but politically and 
administratively integrated to an extent that local views are acted upon at the highest 
level, but unworkable in South Africa at present.  
 
(f) Using the principle of subsidiarity, allocation of powers and functions is more 
asymmetrical or differentiated in states where co-operative governance works 
reasonably well, with the state providing the requisite resources. 
 
(g) Land ownership was an important determinant of a person’s standing and development 
in the local community. 
 
(h) Local government was linked to a system of land law, where property taxes were used 
for development. 
 
(i) Law, without excessive prescription and regulation, is used as a basis for the 
establishment of local authorities and the allocation of powers and functions thereto. 
 
(j) Governmental systems are hierarchical but with clear demarcation of powers and 
functions making for a system that operates effectively. 
 
(k) Service provision and economic development is on an equitable basis. 
 
(l) Local government revenue, where inadequate, is supplemented by government grants. 
 
(m) Local authorities are comparatively small in many countries such as France and Spain, 
although it is acknowledged that many have been amalgamated and consolidated to 
form large cities or metropolitan and county governments, such as Mexico City, 
Mumbai, Delhi, New York City, London, Berlin, Paris, Madrid, and many others. 
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(n) Lack of the strategic role for regional authorities, with them becoming service delivery 
agencies without legislative powers. 
 
(o) Systems that work better maintain a political/administrative dichotomy. 
 
(p) In most countries, co-operative government is practiced largely informally, but reforms 
are underway to formally recognise autonomous self-governing local authorities with 
some level of formality in intergovernmental relations. 
 
(q) Associations for local authorities are sub-national governments formally or informally 
agreeing to work co-operatively generally or for specific purposes; they are not 
represented by a separate organisation, like SALGA, although in Scandinavia they are 
professional organisations that can enter into contracts with central government. 
 
(r) While in Germany, Austria, and Belgium as well as in Scandinavia, association of local 
authorities are a consolidation or amalgamation of local authorities, of the countries 
researched only those in the UK (Local Government Association), the Netherlands 
(International Co-operation Agency of Netherlands Municipalities – VNG), Canada, 
Botswana, and South Africa are external agencies funded by membership subscriptions.  
 
Apart from the VNG, none of the external bodies appear to have a track record of 
significant achievements, perhaps indicating their low status, commensurate with local 
authorities in these countries. 
 
(s) There can be no single or ideal model for co-operative governance/IGR. The system 
would be designed on the basis of the country’s history and respond to its particular 
circumstances that face each country. It is not prudent to slavishly follow or adopt a 
country’s model as the system should be based on several design variables peculiar to a 
country. Hence, there cannot and should not be a template. 
 
Having reviewed national intergovernmental relations, that is, co-operative governance within 
a state, the study now turns to local government cross-border or municipal international 
relations. 
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6.6 MUNICIPAL INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION  
 
6.6.1 BACKGROUND 
In 1971, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly stated, inter alia, that: 
International co-operation among communities is a natural complement to the co-operation of states … The 
General Assembly … invites the Secretary-General … to study … the means by which the United Nations 
and its specialized agencies can contribute effectively to the development of international co-operation 
between municipalities.307  
 
Unfortunately, over the subsequent three decades the above resolution led to many ceremonial 
ties, most of which achieved little, beyond the numerous junkets undertaken at ratepayers’ 
expense.308 Belatedly in 2000, the UN indicated that it will – 
Pursue, in collaboration with interested bilateral and multilateral donor colleagues, ways and means to 
support the growth of linking and help ensure that the challenges of linking are met.309 
 
This pronouncement, again, did not result in many resources being put into development 
through municipal international relations.310 The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) acknowledged that if one couples the global trend to decentralise and empower with 
substantial levels of urbanisation and the need for cities and towns to address the crucial issue 
of poverty in their localities, then it has to support city-to-city (‘C2C’) and community-to-
community co-operation as a development modality. It stated that municipal international co-
operative relationships are a means to build bridges across ethnic, religious, cultural, racial, 
material, and other divides, indicating that this form of partnership has joined the mainstream 
of development and makes an important contribution to greater understanding and peace. The 
UNDP is of the view that C2C partnerships that are well-thought through, are systematic and 
managed sensitively, can effectively address issues commonly arising and thereby deepen 
cross-cultural understanding.311  
 
                                                 
307 Resolution 2861, dated 20 December 1971. 
308 Singh, Anirood (2002) ‘Municipal International Relations: Promoting Good Governance and Socio-
Economic Development’ in 18(2) Unisa Latin American Report, 15-23. 
 309 United Nations Development Programme (2000) The Challenge of Linking, 24. 
310 Chapisa, Faral G (2011) Transnational City-to-City Partnerships as Strategic Tools for Sustainable 
Urban Development – Case of the Haarlem-Mutare City Link, MSc Dissertation, Erasmus School of Economics, 
Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 23-24, 66-68; Breeman, Iris Christine (2012) Municipal International Cooperation 
in Botswana: Development Strategy of Social Activity, Master of Economic dissertation, Universitet Utrecht, The 
Netherlands, 18-19, 25-26, 68-69. 
311 The Challenges of Linking (2000), op cit, 27-30. 
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The UN Resolution and a municipality’s priorities and policy on international relations provide 
the mandate and prescription for a municipality engaging in international relationships.  
International linking took on new dimensions and urgency as a developmental modality after 
the 1996 Istanbul Conference where the UN’s Habitat Agenda was adopted. Cities have been 
increasingly recognised as strategic players in a globalising world economy where 
decentralisation has heightened their profile and importance. 
These trends are changing approaches to national and international cooperation which now include the 
adoption of broad-based participatory planning and management, networking and the horizontal exchange 
of knowledge, expertise and experience.312 
 
While municipal international relations can incorporate any role players in the partner cities 
and is thus wider than intergovernmental relations, it may still be narrower in scope than 
decentralised co-operation but need not be so, provided it is practical, focused, project or 
knowledge exchange-based, driven and managed by the respective partners.313  
 
“Strengthening the capacity of cities to deal with their own problems is now acknowledged as 
an international policy goal.” With adequate capacity municipalities are now accepted as direct 
participants in international programmes addressing global challenges.314  
 
6.6.2 DEFINITION OF MUNICIPAL INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 
International local government relations is simply ‘strategic’ (to use a cliché) alliances, 
collaborations, partnerships or merely links between the communities of two or more cities or 
towns or villages, and such-like settlements, or provinces or regions in different countries. The 
ideal is that people of such defined spatial areas, particularly the poor or disadvantaged resident 
therein, gain benefits. Although governments may be the signatories to an arrangement or 
agreement, any organised group or institution that can add value to the relationship should be 
welcome to join. However, an international relation or ‘friendship’ agreement should not be 
entered into without an objective conviction that it would be truly beneficial to the people living 
in the jurisdiction of the contracting parties. Hence, a preliminary assessment should precede 
formal conclusion of any international relations agreement.315 
 
                                                 
312 UN-HABITAT (2002) ‘City to City Cooperation’ 8(3) Habitat Debate: 1, 3. 
313 City of Johannesburg (2001) Municipal International Relations Policy. 
314 UN-HABITAT (2002) ‘City to City Cooperation’, op cit. 
315 Singh (2002) op cit. 
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6.6.3 RATIONALE FOR MUNICIPAL INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 
Globalisation and rapid urbanisation, coupled with unprecedented advances in information and 
communications technology (ICT), as well as in medical and other sciences, create an 
environment where common challenges throughout the world can be tackled on a joint and 
consolidated basis. Politicians, bureaucrats, experts and communities from different countries, 
cultures and backgrounds can combine their diverse knowledge and ‘sweat equity’ to address 
shared problems, using local, indigenous, and ‘best practice’ technologies and approaches. 
What would have appeared to be daunting challenges to sub-national governments if tackled 
on their own could be resolved in a cost-efficient manner using municipal international 
relations. Hence, domestic and international partnerships through intergovernmental co-
operation could be the answer. Several developments affecting sub-national governance have 
taken place over the past four decades. Rather than going it alone or ‘reinventing the wheel’, 
knowledge-sharing through international relations could be a way to address a variety of 
common challenges manifest where resources are limited. However, for its success, municipal 
representatives and administrators must have the requisite diplomatic and technical skills. 
Municipal international relations can be based on one or many reasons, best debated and 
prioritised jointly by the parties contemplating a sisterhood or similar such agreement. Sub-
national governments can contribute to shared developmental objectives by exchanging 
knowledge through establishing partnerships with both developing and developed provinces 
and cities, without being paternalistic or authoritarian.316 Here one needs to be mindful of two 
statements of wisdom: 
(a) Local knowledge provides a foundation for global understanding (National Geographic 
Society slogan); and 
(b) Never underestimate the importance of local knowledge (Hong Kong Shanghai Banking 
Corporation slogan). 
 
Municipal international relations are about partnerships or links between communities. When 
one understands and appreciates the problems or challenges confronting people in a locality, 
there will be a better design fit between the need and the solution. Globalisation, information 
and communications technology, and other innovations have made communications easier, 
faster and cheaper. After 1994, the Republic became part of the global economy, no longer a 
laager at the southern tip of Africa. The young democracy has much to offer and to learn from 
                                                 
316 City of Johannesburg (2001) Municipal International Relations Policy, op cit; Singh (2002) op cit.  
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the world. Poverty and the lack of resources necessitate sharing and co-operation. A problem 
shared is a burden lessened; hence governmental co-operation should be a development 
modality, not something done unwillingly because it is a statutory imposition.317  
 
6.7 MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The above discussion has shown South Africa’s need for a unique model for intergovernmental 
relations designed from the strengths of the approaches used in the countries studied. This 
would be based largely on the prescripts in Chapter 3 of the Constitution and designed on the 
unique three-sphere governmental system. Absent co-operation and commitment thereto by all 
spheres, the model would fail. Of course, workable ‘best practices’ have evolved over 
considerable time in mature democracies, by leaders committed to the ideals espoused. In “one 
sovereign democratic state”, such as South Africa, where the governing political party controls 
eight of the nine provinces, there would, prima facie, appear to be little use for legislation to 
prescribe and monitor co-operative governance. Relations between central and regional 
authorities are and will continue to be established and managed informally, by leading 
politicians and civil servants, behind the scenes. Hence, there would be no need to resort to the 
courts for dispute resolution. Any ‘mischief’ or maladministration would most likely be 
identified and publicised by the media, and articulated as well as manipulated by the opposition 
political parties. These may give rise to some healthy and unhealthy debates, resulting in 
corrective and/or remedial actions. For the moment that may be adequate. In such a context, 
without debating the need and desirability of regional governments, provincial constitutions 
would be superfluous. This would be particularly so where the provinces see themselves as 
regional agencies of the state, or where the sole subject matter is so mundane as 
intergovernmental relations.  
 
A strategy that harnesses and consolidates the strengths and essential resources of both 
provincial and local actors would be best. A good example of this unity in diversity approach 
could be the Gauteng Global City Region.318  This would be a concrete case of a province, some 
                                                 
317 Singh (2002) op cit. 
318 Gauteng Global City Region Comparative Studies, First Draft Report, 3 September 2004, 
Johannesburg: Gauteng Provincial Government; Building Gauteng as a globally competitive city region, 
PowerPoint presentation to and adopted by the Gauteng Premier’s Co-ordinating Forum, 2008; Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (2011) Territorial Review of the Gauteng City-Region), 
www.joburg.org.za, accessed 7/06/2016. 
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of its constituent municipalities, and an organisation promoting co-operative governance among 
municipalities forming an alliance to jointly and severally develop an entire provincial spatial 
area.319 The idea is not unique, as it has been practised by regions that have grown and reached 
large global city status (determined by select criteria and measured over the last three 
decades).320 
 
The democratic government in South Africa, while often falling back on its ‘big brother’ 
attitude, nevertheless has given municipalities a comparatively high level of ‘autonomy’ 
amongst local authorities in the world. It has also created the space for them to be innovative, 
without requiring excessive guidance from national or provincial governments, or statutory 
approval for its plans and contemplated actions. In this sense, therefore, there are no 
constitutional and legislative barriers to innovation or to co-operation between provinces inter 
se; among local authorities within a province; or with municipalities in other regions. Chapter 
3 of the Constitution and the IRFA provide the foundation and framework for sound co-
operative governance using both formal and informal structures and processes. This approach 
has been advocated by the UK’s House of Lords and has been followed in the Draft Code for 
central and local government for England and in Kenya’s Intergovernmental Relations Act, 2 
of 2012. These initiatives appear to vindicate South Africa’s approach.  
 
From a summary of the literature several approaches to beneficial intergovernmental relations 
may be formulated for use in South Africa from the following observations: 
 
In the German, Austrian and Belgian federal systems local authorities have consolidated to form 
associations to undertake work that an individual municipality may not be capable of. Such an 
organisation is not a tier of government but having been instituted according to legal provision 
they may be able to ‘directly’, that is not through a third-party equivalent like SALGA, contract 
with central government on behalf of members. In Scandinavia, professional associations also 
serve to facilitate relations between national, regional or provincial and local governments. 
These structures could be strengthened by the existence and operation of certain entrenched 
concepts, such as Mitwirkungsrecht (German: right of co-operation); Stellungname (Austrian: 
                                                 
319 Such as the South African Cities Network.  
320 Such as, for example, Greater London, Ile de France, Greater Los Angeles, the Dutch Randstad, Rhine-
Ruhr, Istanbul, Pearl River Delta, Metro Manila, New York City, Mexico City, Sao Paulo, and the Delhi city-state. 
Allen J. Scott, John Agnew, Edward W. Soja, and Michael Storper (2001) Global City-Regions: An Overview, 
www.lse.ac.uk, accessed 7/06/2016.   
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right to a hearing); Volksbegerens (Austrian: right to initiative); and perhaps, the referendum 
on strategic, clear, specific issues. It should be borne in mind that the German model is 
somewhat unique and bonded together by the glue that is Bundestreue. Without such an 
essential ingredient, that is, a deeply embedded and internalised or institutionalised sense of 
values and commitment in the Republic, emulating such an approach may well result in 
frustration and failure. Whilst the South African Constitution has set out the values underlying 
our democracy, how it will be operationalised to function effectively may take some time. 
However, it should be noted that South Africa is an emerging democracy. Furthermore, the 
country at this stage lacks experience and in the progress of time, the system and processes set 
out in Chapter 3 of the Constitution and in the IRFA may settle to work efficiently. Co-operative 
governance is not an event; it is a process. It is one that facilitates municipal representation, but 
alas, the mechanisms and processes do not appear to be working in a manner envisaged in the 
Constitution.  
 
The South African co-operative governance framework and system is flexible and 
accommodative enough to adapt the various instruments used in the Scandinavian countries, 
European states, the US, and the UK. One that may be helpful is an expert and independent 
advisory board for co-operative governance that would also co-ordinate, monitor, and report on 
intergovernmental relations being fully informed on international good practices. Such a 
permanent commission cannot be located in CoGTA or in SALGA. This suggestion is also 
endorsed by recent research.321 
 
The need and desirability of provinces and the NCoP should be seriously debated urgently, as 
elimination of regional government, or amending their role to be administrative organs ought 
to simplify intergovernmental relations whilst saving much cost and reducing pain. 
Alternatively, Germany’s Bundesrat ought to be studied more closely to determine how the 
NCoP could be restructured to operate more efficiently in representing both provincial and local 
government interests. 
 
6.8 CONCLUSION 
The change from co-operative governance being based on rigid, legalistic and formulaic 
prescriptions and practices, as prescribed by the IRFA, to one that is – 
                                                 
321 De Villiers and Sindane (2011), op cit, 15. 
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…more negotiated, contextually defined system of institutional exchange changes to some extent the zero-
sum game of intergovernmental relationships,322  
 
may be preferred. However, as shown in the context of England, both formal and informal 
systems and processes can work alongside each other. 
 
The zero-sum metaphor was characteristic of competitive behaviour where the gain of one was 
at the expense of another. The drafters of the South African Constitution must have been 
mindful of such problems, especially in an unequal society with serious resource scarcities.  
 
In many countries, sub-national authorities and particularly local governments generally have 
low status and esteem.323 This is more so because the latter’s level of autonomy, functions, and 
health are determined almost exclusively by the provincial or regional or county government 
wherein they are located. However, the role of local governments and cities are being 
recognised, and in many countries reviewed hereunder, reforms are underway to decentralise 
and to strengthen municipalities. 
 
At the local sphere, horizontal institutional capacity could be built, strengthened and maintained 
by co-operation and sharing. This would facilitate democratic municipal representation and 
public participation. The country’s cultural diversity could in itself enhance capacity where 
various strengths of different communities are harnessed and used collectively. In South Africa 
particularly, notwithstanding constitutional and statutory prescriptions, co-operative 
governance was perhaps an inevitable consequence of decentralisation and the move to 
participatory democracy. The relative autonomy granted local government combined with the 
‘hollowing out’ of the state created unique challenges, enabling municipalities to be more 
innovative.  
 
In a society deeply divided for over three centuries, it is still early days yet insofar as co-
operative governance goes. However, the state has created the framework for such approach 
and it is up to the various role players to commit and dedicate themselves to work truly in a 
spirit of co-operation and camaraderie, for the common good.  
                                                 
322 Peters, B Guy and Jon Pierre (2001) ‘Developments in intergovernmental relations: Towards multi-
level governance’ 29(2) Policy and Politics, 131, 133. 
323 Examples from countries reviewed are the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, and France. 
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The UK has been advised to shift towards greater formality while still using existing, non-legal 
instruments, Sweden in looking to the future may also legalise intergovernmental relations, 
most likely to only a limited extent. In a sense, the current and proposed approach to 
intergovernmental relations in Germany both vindicates the stance of the South African 
government and perhaps acknowledges that this country was on the correct path when 
prescribing Chapter 3 of the Constitution. One needs to be mindful of the difficulty of predicting 
the future in a complex and rapidly-changing local and global environment. Chapter 3 of the 
Constitution supplemented and complemented by the IRFA as well as sections of a number of 
other statutes collectively provide the necessary foundation, framework and guidelines that are 
flexible enough to accommodate many foreign and local innovative approaches. 
Intergovernmental relations by their very nature are dynamic and there is no way to plan it for 
a medium term or prescribe its modus operandi in minutiae. Furthermore, South Africa is a 
fledgling democracy, with much to learn through practical implementation and monitoring of 
intergovernmental relations, as well as from the successes and failures of other countries. The 
co-operative governance process may have to endure several growing pains before it can 
function with reasonable efficiency. 
 
In a globalising and rapidly urbanising world, municipalities can grow to become metropolises. 
As such, they can become leaders in innovation, which alongside national governments, can 
co-operate to build a better world for future generations. Within such a milieu, it is essential 
that municipal representatives be professional and well-versed in municipal governance and 
administration, as in Sweden. They would thus be effective in provincial, national and 
international policy debates and better able to serve their councils and communities.324 
However, there does not appear in most of the literature an outcomes-based monitoring, 
evaluation and impact assessment or social cost-benefit and risk analyses to show that overall 
municipal international relations are beneficial. 
 
The following statement succinctly encapsulates the idea of co-operative governance:  
‘The oil in the engine’ describes the role of intergovernmental relations within a multi-tiered system... It is 
the lubricant that allows friction to be channelled into positive energy and movement; it is the unseen layer 
that allows the various parts of government to operate, to reach their potential and to serve the interests of 
the whole.325 
 
                                                 
324 City of Johannesburg: Strategy and Relations Unit (2016) Presentation on International Relations, 12 
February 2016. 
 325 De Villiers and Sindane (2011), op cit, 15. 
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This chapter reviewed and compared the approach to co-operative governance and 
intergovernmental relations as well as the nature of municipal representation by associations 
for local authorities in certain select countries. Given their longer history of democratic 
development, this provides the necessary background and context to examine municipal 
representation within the framework and context of co-operative governance by an association 
for local authorities, namely SALGA. This is done in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter reviews the constitutional-statutory provisions forming the foundation and 
framework for municipal representation in South Africa, through organised local government 
being represented by the South African local Government Association (SALGA). It then 
examines this institution’s establishment mandate, role, structures, and processes. Having been 
operational for almost two decades, it is possible to review its achievements insofar as it relates 
to municipal representation. However, there is little literature on this subject. SALGA has 
acknowledged its challenges and has made plans to address them. Hence, an analysis of its new 
objectives and strategies is undertaken. SALGA’s role in in the context of ‘developmental’ local 
government is assessed. As a summarised case study, SALGA’S role in commenting on draft 
legislation is examined. Finally, the need and desirability of a local government association is 
analysed. The above is in the search for an effective model for municipal representation in 
South Africa. 
 
7.2 FORMAL FRAMEWORK FOR ‘ORGANISED LOCAL GOVERNMENT’ IN 
SOUTH AFRICA  
 
A general discussion of ‘organised local government’ is followed by an analysis of SALGA. 
 
7.2.1 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Constitution provides for the recognition, not the establishment by statute, of a national 
and nine provincial organisations representing municipalities, and prescribes that an Act of 
Parliament must determine the procedure by which local government may consult with the other 
two spheres, designate representatives to participate in the National Council of Provinces 
(NCoP); and nominate persons to the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC).1 As such, the 
constitutional provisions are of limited scope and application. The issue of capacity of a 
representative body could be appreciated when the prescriptions of the Constitution on 
organised local government are considered: 
                                                 
1 Sections 163(a) and (b)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the Constitution. 
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(a) commenting on draft national and provincial legislation that affects the status, 
institutions, powers or functions of local authorities (legal expertise);2 
(b) participation in the NCoP (albeit at present with a plaintive voice and no vote). This 
requires knowledge of the three-sphere governmental system and particularly of local 
government; legal expertise, advocacy and lobbying ability);3 
(c) participation in the FFC (financial expertise, advocacy and lobbying ability);4 
(d) discussion on equitable shares of national income (financial expertise, advocacy and 
lobbying ability);5 
(e) discussion on national legislation affecting municipal fiscal powers and functions before 
any statutes thereon are enacted (legal and financial expertise as well as advocacy and 
lobbying ability);6 and  
(f) discussion on specific local government parliamentary legislation before their 
finalisation (law-making expertise, advocacy, and lobbying ability);7 and for 
undertaking the role and functions SALGA has identified for itself and for its provincial 
local government associations (PLGAs).8  
 
To make meaningful input that will be given serious consideration by policy-makers, local 
government representatives must at least have legal and financial skills as well as the ability to 
advocate and lobby the position of municipalities. Representation is meaningless unless local 
government delegates have persuasive authority. Management and administrative skills would 
also be helpful to effective representation. 
 
The Constitution makes a peremptory provision for the recognition of national and provincial 
associations representing municipalities, but is silent on local organisation. Hence, SALGA is 
a self-regulating institution that develops organically and not in accordance with a statute which 
                                                 
2 Section 154(2) of the Constitution. 
3 Section 163, read with section 67 of the Constitution. 
4 Section 163, read with section 221 of the Constitution. 
5 Sections 214(1) and (2) of the Constitution. 
6 Section 229(5) of the Constitution.  
7 Section 163 of the Constitution. 
8 SALGA Strategic Plan 2012-2017, adopted at its National Executive Committee meeting on 11 
September 2012.  
 
 
 
 
345 
 
may have resulted in better accountability.9  It should further be demonstrated that the body has 
been chosen democratically at least, by fifty per cent plus one of municipalities in the province, 
and that it is a balanced selection, meaning it caters for the diversity or range of municipalities, 
such as metros, cities, towns, district as well as traditional authorities, where applicable. 
Moreover, the views of communities within the spatial jurisdiction of the municipalities must 
have been canvassed.10  
 
The term ‘recognise’ is not defined in the Constitution or in the Organised Local Government 
Act (OLGA).11 It means to identify something already known or acknowledge the existence of 
something. Hence, the national and provincial bodies wanting to become associations 
representing municipalities must establish themselves in the absence of any prescribed 
framework, guidelines or criteria for subsequent recognition as legitimate organisations. In the 
absence of such requirements, SALGA ‘national’12 has determined and undertaken to give 
meaning to the term ‘recognition’. The process does not appear to be democratic and gives rise 
to the following questions: 
(a) The definition of ‘recognition’, that is, whether a recognised body has any legal status 
that protects it from, say, some provincial affiliates being dissolved by MECs. 
(b) The entitlement or power given to organised local government by ‘recognition. 
(c) What is an association for local authorities precluded from doing, given that it is merely 
‘recognised’ without its status, role, and functions being stipulated in legislation. 
 
7.2.2 STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, provision was made for ‘recognition’13 by the Minister 
of Co-operative Government and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA) of a national and one 
organisation in each province representing the majority of municipalities therein, as institutions 
of ‘organised local government’.14 The statute and the accompanying notice complied strictly 
with the constitutional prescripts, that is, they merely ‘recognised’ the local government 
                                                 
9 Section 163(a) of the Constitution. 
10 See section 152(i) of the Constitution on the objects of local government and sections 16-21A of the 
Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 32 of 2000 (“Systems Act”) on community participation. 
11 Organized Local Government Act, 52 of 1997 (“OLGA”); Organized Local Government Act: 
Recognition of Organized Local Government, Government Notice R175, Government Gazette 19465, dated 30 
January 1998. 
12 SALGA has affiliates in all nine provinces. 
13 This term is not defined in the Constitution or in subsequent relevant statutes. 
14 Sections 2(1)(a) and (b), respectively of OLGA. Thus, SALGA and its nine affiliates were recognised 
by the Executive and not in accordance with a statute establishing them. 
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representative institutions, and made provisions for the national organ to participate in the 
NCoP and the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC). The enactment did not prescribe the 
structures and processes, as well as the funding of organised local government. This is because 
the representative organ established, SALGA, is a voluntary association, not reliant on an 
equitable share of revenue collected nationally by the state. Hence, these bodies exist ‘at the 
pleasure’ of the Minister or the MEC for local government,15 if established in terms of the 
OLGA and not set up outside of legislation, like the South African Cities Network (SACN). The 
nature, design and processes of SALGA are decided by its membership, that is, the political 
leadership. The shortcomings of the OLGA may be one of the root causes of inadequate 
representation of local government in the NCoP.16 Steytler and De Visser (2014) add: 
SALGA is not a statutory body, but has official status through the executive act of recognition. It has a 
number of statutory and constitutional duties which it executes with varying degrees of success.17  
 
The potential for sound municipal representation is weakened further by the Intergovernmental 
Relations Framework Act18 and by amendments to representation on the FFC.19 The OLGA 
provides that each PLGA may nominate not more than six persons20 from which 10 out of the 
maximum 54 will be selected by SALGA to participate in the NCoP.  
 
‘Participate’ means to take part in something. The role of any organised government 
representative on the NCoP and the FFC has not been explicitly spelt out, thus placing 
municipalities in an uncertain position and therefore unable to hold SALGA to account. Since 
they do not have voting rights and only observer status unless permitted to voice their opinions, 
all that is required of organised local government, both in the NCoP and the FFC, is mere 
attendance.  
 
                                                 
15 Section 2(2)(a) of OLGA. 
16 See Chapter 5 of this thesis: Municipal representation on the NCoP. 
 17 Steytler, Nico and Jaap de Visser ‘Local Government’ in Woolman, Stuart and Michael Bishop (2014) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa, Second Edition, Cape Town: Juta, 22 – 128. 
18 13 of 2005 (IRFA). In terms of this enactment, for example, Organised Local Government can 
participate in the work of intergovernmental structures only by invitation or by it being a member of a particular 
intergovernmental structure. See Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
19 Refer section 5(1)(c) of the Financial and Fiscal Commission Amendment Act, 25 of 2003 and Chapter 
5:5.3.1.i of this thesis.  
20 OLGA, sections 4(1)-(5).  
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The dictionary definition of the noun “procedure” is ‘an established or official way of doing 
something or a series of actions conducted in a certain order or manner.’ The OLGA simply 
states that the “consultation procedure” consists in the national organisation and a national and 
a provincial government taking place at a meeting convened by the Minister.21 “Consultation” 
is not defined.22 The Minister may invite any provincial organisation to such meeting, and that 
SALGA national “may” consult any Minister at any time.23 Furthermore, a PLGA may only 
consult a provincial government through a meeting convened by the MEC for local 
government.24 These provisions imply a subordinate status of local government and its 
representative organ. Whether the Minister or a MEC will agree to a meeting or the agenda 
thereof is not up to SALGA.  
 
While one can surmise that the onus on consultation lies with a local government representative 
body, the Act is silent on the procedure. Hence, national and provincial governments could be 
little more than passive hosts or ‘visitors’, not having to initiate dialogue or consultation, or 
being proactive and making any recommendations. Nor do they have to undertake any follow 
up action. Local government representatives have therefore need to plan carefully if they seek 
any approvals from the other two spheres of government, or else any meeting may be nothing 
more than a chat.  
 
After setting down the strict requirements for consultation, the OLGA nullifies them by stating 
that the (undefined) organised local government may consult with any organ of state,25 without 
setting down how this can be done. Whether any organ of state would consult with SALGA is 
not determined by the latter. 
 
The OLGA is an unsatisfactory enactment, inter alia, because it – 
 
…contained no description of the roles and responsibilities for organised local government. Rather, this 
information on roles and responsibilities has been spread across a wide range of legislation…26 
 
The IRFA has ‘compensated’ for OLGA’s shortcomings, although in so doing made the process 
for efficient municipal representation even less effective. The IRFA states that where an 
                                                 
21 Section 3(1) of OLGA. 
22 For a discussion of the definition in the IRFA, see Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
 23 Section 4(1) of OLGA. 
24 Sections 4(2) and (3) of OLGA.  
25 Section 4(8) of OLGA. 
26 SALGA (2015) 15 Years Review of Local Government: Celebrating Achievements Whilst 
Acknowledging Challenges, 38. 
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obligation, not a need, for consultation with SALGA is required, this must be “through an 
appropriate intergovernmental structure,” and not directly.27 The Review of IGR28 highlighted 
many shortcomings and may have motivated the need for a statute to regulate and guide co-
operative governance. It has been shown that the constitutional-statutory framework provides 
ample opportunity for municipal representation. The question may be SALGA’s ability to do 
so effectively or in conjunction with other organisations, such as the SACN. 
 
Each provincial local government association (PLGA) may designate one person to the FFC. 
The nomination of two persons for appointment by the President takes place after a meeting of 
SALGA’s national executive.29 The Financial and Fiscal Commission Act has been amended 
such that the national organised local government body no longer nominates two delegates, but 
that the FFC selects them after consultation with SALGA.30 This provision appears more 
obscure than the previous, and may be open to easier political manipulation.  
 
For the above consultative purposes and operational responsibilities, SALGA and the PLGAs 
must have the requisite skills to submit quality and objective inputs, derived from municipalities 
which must, in turn, have the capacity to provide primary intelligence in digestible format. 
There is, therefore, need to forge strategic alliances, collaborations and partnerships with the 
private sector, non-governmental-organisations (NGOs), community-based-organisations 
(CBOs), foreign governments, banks, and donor/grant agencies to attain a better level of 
capacity. SALGA’s inputs may only be considered after it has objectively been shown that the 
association – 
(a) can add value to development and co-operative governance at the local sphere; 
(b) would not duplicate work of any organ of state, including municipalities; and 
(c) will aid, rather than frustrate, intergovernmental relations. 
The question of status and consideration of recommendations are strongly influenced by the 
proper establishment; recognition based on some norms and standards; operations that are 
transparent and actions measurable; accountability to Parliament at least annually; and the 
                                                 
27 Section 31(1) of the IRFA. 
28 See generally Department of Provincial and Local Government (2008) 15 Year Review Report on the 
State of Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa.   
29 Section 5(1) of OLGA. 
30 Section 5(1)(c) of the Financial and Fiscal Commission Amendment Act, 25 of 2003. 
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quality of inputs. Most of these requirements have a direct correlation with SALGA’s capacity. 
Therefore, an objectively-proven track record of strategic achievements measured against 
objectives and outcomes endorsed by CoGTA may be necessary. 
 
7.3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION 
7.3.1 BACKGROUND 
No mention was made of organised local government or associations for local authorities in the 
Local Government Transition Act31 and amendments thereto. The motivation for the 
establishment of a national body representing local government may have been the provision 
in the Interim Constitution,32 that “proposed legislation that materially affects the status, powers 
or functions of local governments or the boundaries of their jurisdictional areas, shall not be 
introduced in Parliament or a provincial legislature unless ... organised local government ... has 
been given a reasonable opportunity to make written representations in regard thereto.”33 The 
Interim Constitution did not define or make any provision for organised local government. 
Neither the Constitution (nor OLGA) prescribes the establishment, nature, role, powers and 
functions, processes, source and application of funds, management, accountability, 
responsibility, monitoring and evaluation, as well as other essentialia and incidentialia of 
organised local government or any institution undertaking this function. SALGA therefore has 
a wide and ‘open’ mandate (see below) wherein it could determine its own mechanisms and 
style of operations. SALGA was launched at a summit of local government councillors and 
administrators, as well as national ministers, MECs, and other prominent politicians, in 
November 1996. What was said at the conference encapsulates the rationale for the institution: 
Local government in South Africa is currently undergoing a crucial transformation process … This new 
vision for development brings with it enormous challenges for municipalities. It enhances the role of 
municipalities in policy making and implementation within the framework of co-operative governance. 
Municipalities now must focus on maximising economic growth and the social development of the local 
community; integrate and co-ordinate activities of various agents within municipal boundaries; and ensure 
community participation. … These new challenges come at a time when local government is still grappling 
to find solutions to complex and intractable problems affecting communities in the aftermath of the 
apartheid regime. They must function within the context of shrinking resources, rising unemployment and 
greater demand for municipal services. … SALGA should therefore be seen as the only organisation that 
can truly represent the interest of local government in the new post-apartheid South Africa. … SALGA’s 
role in the development of local government goes beyond that of its predecessors and counterparts 
elsewhere in the world.34 
                                                 
31 209 of 1993, repealed by the (1996) Constitution. 
32 Act 200 of 1993, repealed by the (1996) Constitution. 
33 Section 174(5) of Act 200 of 1993.  
34 Foreword by the first chairperson of SALGA, Councillor Collin Matjila, in Khoza, Vusi F (1998): 
Completing the Circle of Democracy, Durban: Butterworths, v-vi (a collection of papers presented at the launch 
of SALGA in Durban, November 1996). 
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At that time, South Africa had approximately 1 100 local authorities,35 later consolidated into 
843. It was obvious that they could not ‘speak with one voice’: This is what SALGA was 
required to do. Further consolidation resulted in reduction to 284 municipalities.36 It has been 
said that the “local government transformative processes have been lengthy and with 
unpredictable teething issues.”37 
 
7.3.3 SALGA’S MANDATE, ROLE, STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES 
The information below has been gleaned largely from the SALGA Constitution (2012), SALGA 
Strategic Plan 2012-2017 and its Annual Report 2014-2015. For the purpose of comparison, to 
show how the institution has changed its approach, its Annual Performance Plan 2012-2013 
(APP) is also briefly reviewed. It should be noted that these documents serve to provide 
information and are not any analytical or critical review of work done by the institution. 
Moreover, they are largely inward-focused and written more in the nature of description that 
reads like advertorial and promotional material. Only certain activities relating to co-operative 
governance and of relevance to municipal representation are addressed, and where appropriate 
comments made largely to highlight shortcomings, omissions and incongruities. 
 
(a) Mandate 
SALGA’s Constitution38 prescribes fifteen functions and responsibilities making up its “role 
and mandate”. Being a constitution, the list is somewhat vague and ambiguous; however, it is 
up to the institution to transcribe these into practical and implementable actions. This it does by 
interpreting its mission as to “Transform local government to enable it to fulfil its 
developmental mandate” by undertaking the following activities:39 
i. Lobby, Advocate and Represent; 
ii. Employer Body; 
iii. Capacity Building; 
iv. Support and Advice; 
                                                 
35 Thornhill, Chris ‘Local Government after Fifteen Years: Issues and Challenges’, in De Villiers, Bertus 
(2008) Review of provinces and local government in South Africa: Constitutional foundations and practice, 
occasional papers, Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 59-82, 60. 
36 SALGA (2015) 15 Years Review of Local Government: Celebrating the Achievements Whilst 
Acknowledging the Challenges, 13.     
37 15 Years Review of Local Government (2015), op cit, 14. 
 38 Adopted 11 September 2012, clauses 3.1 – 3.15.  
39 SALGA Annual Report 2014/15, 17. 
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v. Strategic Profiling; and 
vi. Knowledge and Information Sharing. 
The above objectives have been consolidated into six focus areas:40  
(a) Represent, promote and protect the interests of local government; 
(b) Transform local government to enable it to fulfil its developmental role; 
(c) Raise the profile of local government; 
(d) Perform its role as employer body; 
(e) Develop capacity within municipalities; and 
(f) Provide legal assistance to its members. 
According to its Strategic Plan 2012-2017, SALGA has four main functions: 
(g) Strategic profiling – building the profile and image of local government locally, 
regionally and internationally; 
(h) Support and advice – including policy analysis, research, monitoring, knowledge 
sharing, and support to members; 
(i) Representation – stakeholder engagement, lobbying on behalf of local government in 
relation to national policies and legislation; and 
(j) Act as an employer body – collective bargaining on behalf of members; capacity 
building, and municipal human resource management. 
 
In accordance with its Strategic Plan 2012-2017, SALGA provides “hands-on support to 
municipalities”: In its day-to-day operations, the organisation initiates and participates in 
several practical exercises to enhance the capabilities of municipalities. These, inter alia, are: 
1) provide legal advice and opinions; 
2) convene and facilitate workshops and seminars; 
3) facilitate and participate in learning networks; and 
4) serve on the Legislative Review Committee of CoGTA. 
 
SALGA was an active partner with CoGTA in the implementation of the Local Government 
Turnaround Strategy (LGTAS), undertaking or promoting the following:41 
a. professionalisation of local government;  
                                                 
 40 SALGA Strategic Plan 2012-2017, adopted 11 September 2012.  
41 SALGA Annual Report 2013/14, 23. 
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b. review of public participation mechanisms; 
c. guidelines on roles and responsibilities on political/administrative interface; 
d. separation of powers at local government level; 
e. councillor support and remuneration; and 
f. develop methodology to support restructuring of municipalities. 
The above lists show a wide range of activities some of which may be difficult to fulfil. They 
indicate a lack of focus and absence of prioritisation. 
 
(b) Status and governance 
According to its Constitution, SALGA is an association not for gain, a juristic person recognised 
(not established) in terms of section 2(1)(4) of the OLGA.42 SALGA has been described as a 
Schedule 3A public entity in terms of the PFMA, reporting to the Minister of CoGTA.43 Such 
reference is not made in its new (2012) Constitution. This definition, notwithstanding the new 
Constitution, was repeated in 2015 where it was said that the definition [of a national public 
entity] “does not include voluntary associations, the current nature and form of SALGA… 
[which is] presently considering de-listing as a public entity and to report directly to 
Parliament.”44 It is not clear what the advantages of this move would be. Hence, it may be of 
assistance for SALGA to study recent Court judgments. 
 
Finn (2016) in commenting on a recent Constitutional Court judgment,45 said: 
When an entity – even a private one – performs a function that is fundamentally public in nature, it can be 
regarded as an organ of state and thus is unable to ‘walk away’ from its constitutional duties. The Court 
thus affirmed a broad understanding of organs of state based on the definition is section 239.46  
 
The above unanimous judgement confirms that by a broad interpretation of section 239, an 
organ of state could include “entities other than those strictly in government” and thus 
“accountable to the public”.47  It would appear that SALGA is desirous of attaining more 
freedom in financial compliance, a situation that could be detrimental to its member 
                                                 
42 SALGA (2012) Constitution, clause 2.2. 
43 In its pre-2012 Constitution and in the SALGA Strategic Plan 2012 – 2017, adopted by the NEC on 11 
September 2012. 
44 In 15 Years Review of Local Government (2015), op cit, 41. 
45 AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pt) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer, South African 
Social Security Agency and Others (No 2) [2014] ZACC 12, 2014 SA 179 (CC), 2014 (6) BCLR 641 (CC). 
46 Finn, Meghan ‘AllPay Remedy: Dissecting the Constitutional Court’s Approach to Organs of State’ 
(2016) Constitutional Court Review Vol VI, 258-272, 258. 
47 Finn (2016), op cit, 264, 266. 
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municipalities.  SALGA exists to support municipalities and not being an organ of state, in the 
conventional sense, does not have any authority over them. There is no indication that the 
institution’s designed was based on any researched model or existing organisation. 
 
SALGA is a politically-led and driven institution. Its leadership, the national and provincial 
executive committees, are elected during their respective conferences, which take place after 
every local government election. Thirteen members at national level and one from each 
province make up the National Executive Committee (NEC) of twenty-two. The organisation 
has nine working groups. These structures are duplicated in the provincial sphere.48 
 
(c) Operations 
SALGA’s work is undertaken by 7 directorates:49 
i. Governance, Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) and International Relations; 
ii. Municipal Institutional Development; 
iii. Municipal Infrastructure and Services; 
iv. Community Development; 
v. Economic Development and Management Planning; 
vi. Corporate Strategy and Research; and 
vii. Finance and Corporate Services. 
 
(d) Funding 
SALGA is funded by a combination of sources: membership fees (making up 88 per cent of 
total revenue in 2014-2015); national government grant; and donor grants for projects.50 
Municipalities pay membership fees to the national body and not to PLGAs.51 It has been said: 
SALGA is increasingly becoming dependent on membership levies as its core source of revenue with 
approximately 90% from this source in the 2011/12 financial year. Given the voluntary nature of the 
organisation and the financial challenges faced by many municipalities, this places SALGA at a significant 
financial risk.52 
 
                                                 
48 SALGA Annual Report 2014/15, 22-23. 
49 SALGA Annual Report 2014/15, 19. 
50 SALGA Annual Report 2014/15, 118. 
51 SALGA Annual Performance Plan and Strategic Plan, op cit.  
52 15 Years Review of Local Government (2015), op cit, 41. 
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SALGA has asked that it and the National Treasury jointly evaluate the current financial model 
for Organised Local Government in South Africa. This is because there is need to “build 
certainty into the financial model to ensure the long term financial sustainability of the 
organisation.”53 
 
By contrast, the Netherlands Association for Local Authorities (VNG), “sources the majority 
of its revenue (more than 70%) from: funding by municipalities, subsidies, membership fees 
and other revenue.”54 
 
7.3.3 SALGA’s CHALLENGES 
Reflecting on the 15-year period from 2000 when democratic local government was established, 
SALGA states that while several local government challenges have been overcome, “many 
municipalities are struggling to get the basics right.” Further, that “democratising local 
government has been an extremely challenging process.”55 One of the major obstacles and 
frustrations has been the speed at which legislative drafting has taken place, requiring many 
amendments to “stabilise the legal framework, structures and system at the local level.”56 Much 
legislation is aimed largely at regulation of and compliance by local government. 
 
Capacity-building has been a top priority of SALGA and as a result thereof, some 17 000 
officials benefited from training up to the 2011/12 financial year. Notwithstanding this 
achievement, “questions remain as to whether the training programmes are delivering the 
desired outcomes.”57 This situation arises because the nature, location, duration, and specifics 
of training vary considerably across the country and various municipalities therein, taking into 
account their previous roles and functions under the apartheid regime, and the availability of 
skilled and experienced staff. SALGA sometimes has to tailor-make its training programmes. 
For example, it recently implemented a skills development programme for district councillors 
Xhariep, in collaboration with the University of Fort Hare.58 An exacerbating factor for skills 
                                                 
 53 Ibid. 
 54 Response by VNG by email dated 12/07/2016 to an email query by the writer. 
 55 15 Years Review of Local Government (2015), op cit, 5, 17.  
56 15 Years Review of Local Government (2015), op cit, 25. 
57 15 Years Review of Local Government (2015), op cit, 40, 42. 
58 Bolowana, Grace (2017) ‘Project aims at developing councillors skills’, Johannesburg: The New Age, 
17/05/2017. 
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development is high turnover and growth in the number of political office bearers after every 
election. Given such a complex scenario, 59 
Capacity building and training needs to be differentiated in nature and some of which needs to be based on 
a cyclical ‘must know’ principle… it is necessary for the organisation to re-evaluate current approaches to 
capacity building programmes in the sector and to drive a more coherent high impact programme whose 
outcomes are measurable over time.  
 
SALGA points out that the absence of a clear articulation of its mandate has the result that 
municipalities have expectations of the institution that go beyond its role and responsibilities. 
In the absence of a statute establishing it, OLGA is largely to blame as it does not specify to an 
acceptable level such an organisations status, role, powers and functions, especially vis-à-vis 
local government as a collective and municipalities as distinct organs of state. A consequence 
of this lack of clarity has led to “members’ expectations of SALGA conflating with those of the 
National Department of Co-operative Governance.”60 
 
SALGA has “argued for some time that rolling extension of its responsibilities has also not 
been coupled with a review of the funding model adopted” for it.61 It is unclear how SALGA’s 
responsibilities have increased, unless it assumes to be concomitant with that of local 
government itself. Government grants and subsidies, by CoGTA, constitutes only 5.8 per cent 
of SALGA’s revenue.62 In its 2016/17 financial year, CoGTA has budgeted R567 611 for the 
following outputs from SALGA:63 
 “Access to sustainable infrastructure and services; 
 Effective IGR support and international relations; and 
 Strengthening community participation in municipal governance.” 
Increased government financial support may constitute double funding as, being a membership-
based institution, it could get additional funding through municipalities. This could be possible 
if members see SALGA’s services being substantially beneficial. The institution may be wrong 
in requesting additional resources from CoGTA when “responsibilities have increased without 
any concomitant increase for the resourcing of activities.”64 These would be reference to 
municipalities, and not SALGA itself. 
                                                 
59 15 Years Review of Local Government (2015), op cit. 
60 15 Years Review of Local Government (2015), op cit, 40. 
61 Ibid. 
62 SALGA Annual Report 2014/15, 233. 
 63 CoGTA Annual Performance Plan 2016/17, 43. 
64 15 Years Review of Local Government (2015), op cit, 40. 
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Another challenge SALGA says it faces is that “municipal membership remains voluntary” and 
such a situation poses financial risk. It calls for “an investigation into the implications of a 
mandatory affiliation” to it and thereafter amending its governing legislation.65 Such an 
amendment may be unconstitutional as municipalities have autonomy as a sphere of 
government and national cannot dictate to local government. Secondly, municipalities would 
not accept mandatory (compulsory) membership if dissatisfied with SALGA’s performance 
over two decades. The question arises as to whether an institution of such a nature can do more 
insofar as the core responsibilities of local government is concerned. 
 
Unclear and onerous legislation on local government has resulted in municipal structures 
experiencing “a degree of instability, particularly due to the settling of powers and functions 
between all spheres of government,”66 according to SALGA. It says that provinces have added 
to the complexity of governance in the local sphere by not delineating specifically the respective 
roles and responsibilities of provincial and local governments. The situation has been 
exacerbated by – 
the historical division of powers and functions between local authorities that serviced formerly all white 
communities and a process of mandate assignments without supporting resources that has generally ignored 
subsidiarity and consultation.67 
 
The designers of the three-sphere governmental system may not have anticipated the challenges 
and unintended consequences arising from implementation of such an unprecedented model 
when powers and functions have not been clearly delineated. SALGA argues that this has 
allowed for a “number of distortions or problems to creep into the system.”68  It is questionable 
whether strict or rigid functional and spatial demarcation of powers and functions is possible, 
or even desirable, particularly within the context of co-operative governance.  
 
Another problem has been the inability of provinces to “provincialise” or regionalise “many of 
these functions.” The consequence is that municipalities cross-subsidise provinces by inevitably 
assuming their functions. In some instances, this is by design in that notwithstanding the 
constitutional status of local government, in practice the hierarchical system is still operational. 
An example of this phenomenon is where use is made of assignment by legislation, particularly 
                                                 
65 15 Years Review of Local Government (2015), op cit, 41. 
66 15 Years Review of Local Government (2015), op cit, 44. 
67 Ibid. 
68 15 Years Review of Local Government (2015), op cit, 49-50. 
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where it is ‘imposed’, that is, undertaken on an ad hoc basis, without consultation, and the 
adequate resources.69 
 
SALGA asserts that – 
the clustering of functions indicate the extent to which it is commonplace for municipalities to be 
performing functions for which they do not have constitutional responsibility and how, in many instances, 
it has been difficult to undo the historical legacy of practice.70 
 
Given that some “functions span all three spheres of government”, there inevitably are 
“overlaps and duplication in service provision” due to lack of clarity on functional and spatial 
responsibilities. This situation is exacerbated by some powers and functions, such as housing, 
that are allocated to national and provincial government but should be located in the local 
sphere, especially to large cities and metropolitan municipalities. This situation prevails 
because the principle of subsidiarity is not being practised as it should.71 It again raises the 
question of need and desirability of provinces, and that they “should be replaced by metros and 
stronger district municipalities.”72  
 
7.3.4 ACKNOWLEDGING AND MEETING THE CHALLENGES 
SALGA proposes dealing with the following acknowledged challenges:73 
i. Role of rural municipalities; 
ii. Question of municipal viability; 
iii. Growing concerns with respect to corruption; 
iv. Need to rethink powers and functions; 
v. Need to review local government legislation; 
vi. The role of traditional authorities; and 
vii. Considering municipal differentiation. 
In response to the challenge posed by hastily-promulgated legislation and compliance 
therewith, SALGA sought to “influence the legislation and policy review process for local 
government” by lobbying against those that have an undesirable impact on municipalities, and 
making concrete proposals which will contribute to a functional local government. It has 
                                                 
69 15 Years Review of Local Government (2015), op cit, 51.  
70 Ibid.  
71 15 Years Review of Local Government (2015), op cit, 52. 
72 Molatlhwa, Olebogeng, ‘Replace provinces with big metros,’ Johannesburg: The Times, 4/07/2016, 
comments by the then current Chairperson of SALGA. 
73 15 Years Review of Local Government (2015), op cit, 110-116. 
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deployed additional part-time representatives to the NCoP to advocate and lobby for local 
government interests. It says, “Accountability within local government is a key success 
factor.”74 
 
Another of SALGA’s (many) priorities to meet its challenges was professionalisation of the 
Local Government sector: This approach was incorporated in the Local Government 
Turnaround Strategy (LGTAS) in 2009 as one of the key strategic objectives to improve 
performance and professionalisation in municipalities. SALGA and CoGTA resolved in 2010 
to “embark on active measures to contribute to the professionalisation of the sector” and 
adopted The Professionalisation Framework for Local Government in 2013.75  
 
It has been said that the pillars of Professionalisation “pertain to service orientation, leadership 
and management, technical and institutional professionalisation”, including the roles of 
professional bodies and institutions of learning.76 
 
Another body that will advise and assist SALGA is the National Municipal Managers Forum.77 
A further initiative is the establishment of the SALGA Centre for Leadership and Governance.78 
 
It is unclear as to what has been achieved by such initiatives since 2010 as SALGA’s documents 
make no mention of a monitoring and evaluation system to record and report on progress. 
 
7.4 REVIEW OF SALGA’S MANDATE, STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The review below is based on documents in the public domain, SALGA’s Constitution, 15 
Years Review of Local Government (2015), SALGA Annual Report 2013-2014, SALGA Annual 
Report 2014/15, and on SALGA’s website. Hence, this section is largely descriptive. 
 
                                                 
74 Foreword in the SALGA Annual Report 2014/15 by Chairperson, Cllr Thabo Manyoni, 6. 
75 SALGA ‘Professionalisation of the local government sector’, in in.KNOW.vation, March 2015, 31-35, 
31. 
76 ‘Professionalisation of the local government sector’ (2015), op cit, 34. 
77 Kemp, Charne ‘NMMF gives insight into achievements and challenges’, SALGA Voice of Local 
Government 15 (2015), 52-53.  
78 Gqubule, Duma ‘Launch of SALGA Centre for Leadership and Governance’, SALGA Voice of Local 
Government 15 (2015), 54-55.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
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The objectives and functions are informed by the “recently developed Five-Year Strategic 
Agenda” formulated by CoGTA as the central policy thrust for local government. This 
document does not appear to be in the public domain but this may be due to change in name of 
the department and its political leadership. What is available is the erstwhile DPLG’s Strategic 
Plan 2007-2012. This, most likely, in turn gave rise to SALGA’s five key performance areas 
(KPAs), which cover almost a third of the organisation’s five-year Strategic Plan. These KPAs 
relate largely to internal workings of the association which when completed would enable it to 
better serve its members. However, SALGA has been on annual restructuring since inception 
and it is not clear whether the time, effort and money spent on these exercises really benefit 
municipalities. There is need for more quantitative information, perhaps through an external, 
objective agency, as much of the strategic plan, annual reports, conference reports, and other 
publications contain numerous statements of intent that are somewhat philosophical, 
aspirational, not easily quantifiable, and much of these exhibit an internal focus. This is evinced 
by SALGA having:79 
i. Five ‘core’ areas, each having several components; 
ii. Five objectives in its (internal) change agenda;  
iii. Six broad revised strategic objectives;  
iv. Five ‘key imperatives’ where it will play a representative, advisory and support role; 
v. Five aims in its municipal support programme; 
vi. Ten (internal) organisational functions; 
vii. Five key issues for the National Executive Committee during its term of office; and 
viii. Six working groups to address key areas. 
 
Some of the very broad and open-ended objectives and the difficulty of translating or 
interpreting them into concrete, measurable activities and beneficial outcomes are reflected in 
the KPAs. It is indicative of an organisation trying to be involved in too many fields and 
attempting to do something at least in each. This shows a lack of focus and prioritisation.  
 
There appears to be some duplication in roles with CoGTA and possibly those that should be 
or are undertaken by municipalities, whilst some are too broad and vague. SALGA is not the 
sole organisation undertaking some of the tasks depicted and not being an organ of state in the 
conventional sense, should preface its functions with words such as ‘to assist …’, as does most 
                                                 
79 Strategic Plan 2007-2012, 11-12, 16, 18-19. 
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associations for local authorities in the developed world. It is not up to SALGA, nor can it alone, 
“transform local government.” 
 
Since the annual National Conference reviews, the business and approach set out in the five-
year Strategic Plan, it is understandable that the association has undergone numerous 
restructuring and organisational transformation exercises since its inception. The fruit of these 
piecemeal, supposedly beneficial changes, have not been disclosed in a manner that enables 
one to undertake a social cost-benefit analysis. One of the most serious challenges of 
municipalities, and consequently of their representative bodies, is capacity: technical, 
intellectual, and leadership. Associations for local authorities draw their funding and expertise 
from member municipalities, most of which, as it is, have very limited capability. Both these 
bodies are also institutionally too weak or divided to lobby successfully other spheres of 
government and the private sector for resources to fund demonstrably innovative projects that 
would fulfil a specific purpose or to demand their equitable share of national revenue. This is 
also an issue of status and ability. 
 
The Constitution provides for freedom of association. Membership of organised local 
government is voluntary. It cannot be compulsory, unless a statute compels affiliation. Such a 
situation cannot be envisaged now or in the future. This is because municipalities collectively 
constitute a sphere of government which is autonomous. Municipal councils would join if the 
benefits of membership far outweigh the cost. This cannot be said to be the current situation, 
given that most municipalities, apparently, themselves do not have the capacity for sustained 
participation and meaningful contribution. It is essential to enhance the status and contribution 
to municipal development by provincial associations. This, in turn would be dependent on the 
formalisation of the role and functions of SALGA, and its acceptance by national government 
departments and the NCoP as a major actor in the field of local participatory democracy and 
socio-economic development. SALGA’s status and its efficacy and efficiency, as well as the 
respect it could command, in turn, depend on the status and efficiency of the NCoP. Hence, the 
lobbying and advocacy roles, especially, of local government, SALGA and the NCoP, which 
are ‘status-dependent’, is crucial because both national and provincial governments, all things 
considered, have not done enough to capacitate municipalities and indirectly strengthen 
SALGA.  
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While municipal support and capacitation is constitutionally prescribed,80 there is no 
constitutional, statutory, or moral obligation to do so in the case of local government 
associations. The counter argument, by national and provincial authorities, could be: 
‘Capacitate for what?’ This implies that municipalities, and concomitantly, organised local 
government, must have clear and unambiguous initiatives, plans, programmes and projects that 
demonstrate their ability to enhance and promote institutional and socio-economic development 
by municipalities through co-operative governance. This is because the state, as well as donor 
and grant agencies, are unlikely to fund capacitation where this relates largely to increasing the 
size of the bureaucracy, that is, sponsoring of operational costs. This is a ‘chicken and egg’ 
situation that can be resolved by providing at least minimal capacitation to ensure basic service 
delivery and incremental capacity building municipalities mature. 
 
The present-day position of SALGA can be gleaned from its policy deliberations on migration, 
gender, legislature and governance, municipal infrastructure services, climate change, labour 
relations, and local economic development.81 The 123 proposals, suggestions and 
recommendations indicate that SALGA has or is or wants to be involved in all manner of 
activities, without adequate focus and prioritisation, using logical sequencing and the critical 
path approach. This does not augur well for municipalities, as clearer and firmer 
recommendations are required and formally submitted to CoGTA and thereafter followed up. 
However, the Strategic Plan 2012-2017 (compared with the one for the period 2007-2012) 
appears to have consolidated and integrated several fragmented and diverse objectives, showing 
that the organisation has been using experience and lessons learned over the past years to 
consolidate, integrate, and focus its tasks. This is a positive approach for the future, but a joint 
co-operative effort is required, alongside CoGTA, the Planning Commission, the FFC, the 
SACN, government departments, and other organisations to minimise duplication and use 
resources more effectively. The SALGA Communications Strategy may now need review. 
 
7.5 REVIEW OF SALGA’S PERFORMANCE 
 
Apart from its Annual Report and performance contracts of key personnel, SALGA has not 
shown progressive achievement of predetermined objectives articulated at its launch. Little 
                                                 
80 In terms of section 154(1) of the Constitution.  
81 Summarised in a document titled ‘Outcomes of the SALGA NEC Policy Workshop, held 23-24 August 
2010, www.salga.org.za, accessed 20/10/2015. 
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empirical evidence is available on the performance of local government associations throughout 
the world. This may be because most are informal institutions, funded minimally by central 
governments, to the end that many do not function with strict business plans, key performance 
areas (KPAs) and key performance indicators (KPIs), or management systems, and such-like 
to account to higher authority or donors. The performance of SALGA has been assessed by 
itself and found to be wanting. This has been confirmed by The Intergovernmental Relations 
Audit.82 In fairness, at this stage SALGA had been operational for a short time. 
 
The perception and insider’s views of SALGA appear to contradict the impressive information 
on its website. It has “highlighted” its performance in respect of the following goals:83 
i. Local government delivering equitable and sustainable services; 
ii. Safe and healthy environments and communities; 
iii. Planning and economic development at a local level; 
iv. Effective, responsive and accountable local government for communities; 
v. Human capital development in local government; 
vi. Financially and organisationally capacitated municipalities; and 
vii. Effective and efficient administration. 
 
The performance report is based on KPAs, KPIs, and outcomes on predetermined objectives. 
That SALGA has such a high achievement level either indicates that it is an extremely efficient 
organisation or that its objectives were easy to attain. It achieved, coincidentally, 84 of 86 of its 
mandate objectives; 84 of 86 of its three “apex” priorities; and 84 out of 86 of its strategic 
goals.84 However, the reality may be different, also when seen through the eyes of provincial 
and local government practitioners who have been involved with the organisation and its 
affiliates. The list of roles and functions, programmes, initiatives, and so on, do not correlate 
with what has been achieved. In fairness, it should be remembered that the perceptions of 
someone in a well-functioning municipality that does not have much need for an organisation 
like SALGA would be different from those of a functionary in a weak municipality that would 
benefit from that institution’s intervention and assistance. In other words, SALGA has 
undoubtedly achieved much over the past years, especially when comparing the ‘before’ and 
                                                 
82 Department of Provincial and Local Government (1999) Final Report on the Intergovernmental 
Relations Audit.  
83 SALGA Annual Report 2014/15, 52-103.  
84 SALGA Annual Report 2014/15, 51. 
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‘after’ situation of smaller or less well-endowed municipalities. Under such circumstances, it 
would definitely have added value in that the particular municipality may have improved its 
efficiency and thereby benefiting its communities.   
 
It is unfortunate that little or no social cost-benefit analyses or comprehensive and in-depth 
reviews have been done by or on organs of state at the local sphere. Performance management 
systems tell one story, the integrated development plan, another. What is required is a tool to 
measure efficiency of an institution, with its achievements (outcomes) over the medium term 
measured against costs, predetermined objectives, KPA, KPIs, and so on. Hence, a monitoring, 
evaluation and impact assessment (MEIA) system proposed by national government in 2010 
needs to be established by SALGA, perhaps in line with that undertaken by the SACN.85 Such 
a mechanism could objectively indicate whether an organisation is functioning or not, and why. 
A detailed evaluation or audit has not been done on SALGA, not even by the Intergovernmental 
Relations Audit and subsequent reviews. An independent, objective review and analysis by an 
external expert, perhaps commissioned by member municipalities or CoGTA, given that 
SALGA has been operational for two decades, may present a truer picture of its achievements 
and the cost thereof. It is also necessary to distinguish between SALGA’s claimed achievements 
and those of capacitated municipalities and to what extent their status has been attained through 
the intervention and assistance of the institution.  
 
In a parliamentary debate on local government it was said that hundreds of millions (R132 
million in 2009) in membership contributions to SALGA could “rather be used for much needed 
service delivery.”86 On the same occasion, it was stated that: 
The term ‘lack of capacity’ has become an excuse for inefficiency and laziness in various municipalities. 
… [and, later] The role of SALGA must be reviewed to ensure implementation of national programmes.87 
 
On several occasions, it has been mentioned by parliamentary committees that SALGA does 
not attend their meetings, or its chairperson delegates responsibility, and that its reports do not 
give a clear indication of what the organisation does. At SALGA’s Budget Review, the 
Chairperson (Minister of CoGTA) expressed concern on the organisation’s absence. In 
                                                 
85 The Strategic Plan 2011-2016 of the SACN was designed on an outcomes-based approach where a 
monitoring, evaluation and impact assessment system (formulated by the author and a colleague) will measure 
organisational and programme/project performance, alongside a performance management system for employees. 
This mechanism would be used as a marketing tool and for reporting to CoGTA, members, and donors. 
86 Marti Wenger, member of the opposition Democratic Alliance, 20/08/2009, from polity.org.za.   
87 Joe Mcgluwa, of the opposition Independent Democrats, 20/08/2009, from polity.org.za. 
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addition, a member stated that there “was a tendency for SALGA to undermine the work of the 
Committee” as it had “not appeared in front of the Committee for four years.” Another 
Committee member said that “SALGA was an embarrassment”, and that “they should get their 
house in order.”88 Similar views were repeated by several other Committee members. The 
Chairperson of the Finance Select Committee at a meeting to discuss SALGA expressed 
“general concern that an entity which was supposed to assist distressed municipalities was itself 
in a poor financial position.” There was consensus that this body should appear before the 
Committee and that research be done to ascertain the organisation’s true “state of affairs.”89 
These views sum up the status of SALGA seven to eight years ago, and are still valid today. 
However, this organisation is not the only one to be blamed for the present situation regarding 
service delivery by the three spheres of government. Given that one third of municipalities are 
currently not functioning, one questions SALGA’s role in this situation or ask whether it could 
have done better sixteen years after the establishment of municipalities in a democratic state.90   
 
Comments made at the National Assembly and NCoP meetings91 indicate that the organisation 
is reactionary rather than proactive; agrees to do things it should not be doing; is largely 
politically-driven; and may be duplicating work of the CoGTA. At this juncture, some searching 
questions need to be asked, perhaps by an independent organisation undertaking an audit of 
accomplishments balanced against the cost, to determine what structures post-IRFA should be 
strengthened or dissolved. In such study, a need and desirability analysis of a local government 
association may be necessary.  
 
The current state of local government may be an indirect indicator of SALGA’s status and 
effectiveness. While CoGTA sees the merger of some municipalities as a means to enhance 
financial viability,92 local government and its representative organ sometimes disagree or 
appear confused with respect to national government’s ‘interference’ in the (relatively) 
                                                 
88 Views of Mr A Manyosi and Mr F le Roux, at the (SALGA) Budget Review Meeting of 25/06/2008. 
89 Minutes of the meeting of the Finance Select Committee: Discussion on South African Local 
Government Association, held on 16 April 2010. 
90 Ndenze, Babalo: ‘Municipalities: one third not functioning,’ Johannesburg: The Star, 3/03/2015 
91 Indicated in various places in this study, particularly in Chapter 4. 
92 Ndaba, Baldwin: ‘More municipalities to merge into metros,’ Johannesburg: The Star, 2/02/2015; 
Molatlhwa, Olebogeng: ‘Mayors rubbish Zuma’s blueprint.’ Johannesburg: The Times, 30/03/2015; Molatlhwa, 
Olebogeng: ‘Merging municipalities a financial burden,’ Johannesburg: The Times, 17/06/2015; Thakali, Thabiso: 
‘Municipal mergers will change the landscape,’ Johannesburg: The Star, 6/06/2015.  
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autonomous local government sphere.93 SALGA could do better in establishing and 
maintaining sound national-local government relations. 
 
In response to recent, more frequent and often violent service delivery protests at many 
municipalities, SALGA is currently developing a smart communication tool that will enable 
councillors and ratepayers to access information “at the click of a button”. This would allow 
councillors to respond quickly to issues raised by residents.94 
  
7.6 SALGA IN CONTEXT OF ‘DEVELOPMENTAL’ LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
 
The above review and analysis indicates that SALGA has a wide, deep, and complex mandate, 
much of which it has set for itself. Consequently, it is a relatively large structure, especially 
when the provincial local government associations are included. A concern for SALGA is that 
its funding is not guaranteed; this is a problem particularly where it sets out to do more than it 
practically can achieve. It was evident in the Intergovernmental Relations Audit that all is not 
well with SALGA.95 Hence, this organisation has had to undertake several restructuring 
exercises. Being aware that it has undergone frequent changes, one need to be mindful that: 
Probably the most difficult tasks in the creation of socially integrated democracy in South Africa are those 
which must be undertaken by local government, for it is over the local allocation of resources that the 
material conflicts between South Africa’s different communities are most evident.96 
 
Modernisation theories have been flawed by their over-emphasis on economic aspects, by the 
false dichotomy between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ societies, and by what has been called the 
“unreconstructed notions of evolutionism.”97  
 
The importation and uncritical implementation of foreign, developed-world models at the local 
sphere may set back social development rather than advance it. However, certain foreign 
approaches could be studied and adapted for domestic use, under the guidance of experts, 
                                                 
 93 Molatlhwa, Olebogeng: ‘Council’s wings clipped,’ Johannesburg: The Times 13/06/2016; Molatlhwa, 
Olebogeng: ‘Municipalities wary of government meddling,’ Johannesburg: The Times 28/06/2016; Molatlhwa, 
Olebogeng: ‘Salga head calls for review of municipal mergers,’ Johannesburg: The Star 14/07/2016. 
94 Molatlhwa, Olebogeng (2016) ‘SALGA developing a smart communication tool’, Johannesburg: The 
Times, 6/09/2016. 
95 Department of Provincial and Local Government (1999) Final Report on the Intergovernmental 
Relations Audit. 
96 Lodge, Tom (1999) South African Politics Since 1994, Cape Town: David Philip, 40. 
97 Ibid. 
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through municipal international relations. There is greater need for endogenous strategies, with 
the intended beneficiaries as main protagonists. For this, SALGA must know more about 
community organisation and mobilisation.   Local government associations can and have played 
a useful role in promoting co-operative governance, including national-provincial and local 
intergovernmental relations. However, where deemed successful, their contribution to 
development at the local sphere is not significant, when judged holistically. This is partly 
because associations are not statutory bodies with guaranteed resources; rather, they may have 
been operating as advisory and co-ordinating organisations, without usurping the functions of 
state organs. With limited resources, they have generally been good value for money, and, 
where tolerated by central and local authorities, have been given space to show their worth. 
They have, wisely, not been confrontational, a style that has allowed some to survive for a 
comparatively long time. Given the advances in information and communications technology, 
it is today comparatively easy for reasonably-endowed municipalities to co-operate among 
themselves locally, regionally and internationally: They do not need associations for local 
authorities to fulfil their core responsibilities; rather organised local government can coexist 
and thrive where they have a role that is unique, in the sense that they can assist municipalities 
and not do their work.98 A local example of such an institution is the SACN. The SALGA 
chairperson’s articulation of its lofty ideals and intentions are a constant refrain ever since the 
establishment of the institution. Such statements are made annually and in most of its 
publications. These are often not translated into concrete programmes and projects. Campaigns 
may have some uses, but the questions are whether they really contribute to sustainable socio-
economic development that is measurable. 
 
The vague and ambiguous statements on several contemplated actions do not indicate that 
SALGA practised any introspection to determine its unique role in development and co-
operative government; they belie an organisation that is largely inward-focused and conflictual; 
still struggling to find its real identity and purpose, while events are passing it by. This 
association has had its opportunity and failed; it is doubtful that any restructuring will set it on 
its correct path. This view is reinforced by SALGA’s Cape Town Declaration.99 It contains 
eighteen ambiguous resolutions that again would be difficult to quantify and monitor, let alone 
implement, even if it were sufficiently capacitated, managed, and led. Under the circumstances, 
                                                 
98 See Chapter 6 of this thesis 
99 Emanating from the Conference, and dated 30 September 2004, depicted in the SALGA Newsletter.  
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objective empirical research should be undertaken on co-operative governance and associations 
for local authorities in this function, and in promoting socio-economic development. 
 
From the study of foreign associations for local authorities,100 there is a definite need for local 
government to be represented by a professional organisation. The current constitutional-
statutory framework allows SALGA to do this. Recently, this institution has perhaps recognised 
certain shortcomings and has therefore resolved to lobby for a review of local government 
powers which may influence it to assess its ability to better serve its members. Following the 
outcomes-based approach advocated by the President and the 2011 local government elections, 
SALGA has updated its strategy to be in line with the country’s challenges and local 
government’s approach thereto.101 Thus, this institution may be on its way to working more 
smartly than in the past. Whether SALGA will undergo yet another major restructuring and 
change of approach following the 2016 local government elections, only time and senior 
councillors can tell. 
 
Poor municipal representation – a case study 
A major shortcoming of SALGA evinced recently is its lack of ability to challenge legislation 
by national government, and in this instance, the Disaster Management Amendment Bill of 
2015 (DMAB), amending the Disaster Management Act, 57 of 2002 (DMA).102 The DMA was 
one of a plethora of legislation passed by Parliament with what appears unseemly haste but 
understandably so, given the constitutional objective of establishing a democratic society. Law, 
per se, cannot achieve this – it should be implemented by competent and committed officials. 
The need for speed in promulgating legislation has resulted in several of them, or parts thereof, 
not being fit for purpose. Almost all statutes, regulations, assignments, authorisations, and 
directives influence and impact on local government. Municipalities are seen and appear to 
operate as the de facto lowest tier in a hierarchy. It is unclear, to what extent they can influence 
national policies affecting them. This relates to capacity and competency, but more importantly 
to whether lawmakers pay heed to their inputs and consult them adequately through SALGA, 
as envisaged in section 154 of the Constitution. 
                                                 
 100 In Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
101 SALGA Strategic Plan 2012-2017. 
102 The writer was appointed as Policy/Legal Advisor to the Community Development Directorate of 
SALGA on 15 September 2015. His first assignment was to provide legal opinion on the Disaster Management 
Amendment Bill and the Disaster Management Act, 57 of 2002. What follows above is a summary of his inputs 
to SALGA. 
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There were many ambiguities, gaps, and other consistencies in the DMA and the amending Bill. 
Some of these may potentially have disastrous consequences for and adverse impacts on 
municipalities. The problem is that South Africa, a developing country, has signed several 
international treaties and thereafter copied some of the (foreign) statutes for application in the 
Republic. Two problems arise from this action: firstly, the legislation may have been formulated 
mechanistically as a set of generic rules that may not be appropriate domestically. Secondly, 
law should be formulated on the (social) problem-solving basis. This means the real problem 
or challenge must be identified and broken down to its (related) constituent parts.  
 
The DMA may have borrowed extensively from foreign, disaster-prone countries, which have 
of necessity to take serious measures to reduce disasters and the risks thereof. National 
government must make adequate budgetary provision. It is unclear to what extent municipalities 
in South Africa were engaged with103 for the assessment of disaster risks, capacity of the 
municipality to manage them (alongside their numerous core responsibilities) through having 
the requisite expertise, budgets, etc. This entails institutional assessments of the entire 
municipality and its capability in service delivery and sound management. In 2002 
municipalities were (and still are) a ‘work-in-progress’ as was SALGA. Under the 
circumstances the question is whether they were adequately consulted, but more importantly, 
could they have made sound, practical inputs in the development of a law that will affect them. 
 
The problem is that South Africa, a developing country, has signed several international treaties 
and thereafter copied some of the (foreign) statutes for application in the Republic. Two 
problems arise from this action: firstly, the legislation may have been formulated 
mechanistically as a set of generic rules that may not be appropriate domestically. Secondly, 
law should be formulated on the (social) problem-solving basis. This means the real problem 
or challenge should be identified and broken down to its (related) constituent parts. 
 
In perusing A Policy Framework for Disaster Management (2005), again several shortcomings, 
ambiguities, and uncertainties become apparent. These will, particularly, affect municipalities, 
mostly adversely. It is unclear what the national Disaster Management Centre (NDMC) has 
achieved over the past decade and whether it has analysed, with CoGTA, the achievements of 
municipalities, particularly those that have in the past suffered disasters. Form follows function. 
                                                 
103 In terms of section 154(2) of the Constitution.  
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It is essential to identify and then define the functions of role-players in disaster management 
and disaster risk reduction. While a framework type of legislation would serve as a guide, each 
municipality is somewhat unique, as would be its plan and the size of the department 
responsible for this function. The DMA proposed “uniformity” but whether this is appropriate 
in the formulation of plans and establishment of capacity is moot. The plan of Mangaung would 
be vastly different from that of eThekwini municipality which would not look like that of 
Tshwane. 
 
The Disaster Management Amendment Bill 2015 (DMAB) has significantly expanded the role 
of local government rather than provided clarity and covered gaps in the DMA of 2002. The 
Preamble list ten objectives which if they are to be implemented adequately places considerable 
burdens on municipalities in the mapping, design, implementation, management, monitoring 
and reporting on disaster management which now incorporates disaster risk reduction. While it 
is relatively easy to set down the principles, procedures and structures to be established, there 
is need for assessment of how existing forums, advisory bodies have performed over the past 
five years before allocating them additional work. 
 
Disaster management is not one of the many constitutionally-entrenched and prescribed 
(original) powers of local government. It is a Schedule 4, Part A function, of concurrent national 
and provincial legislative competence. Where this function is statutorily assigned to 
municipalities, it must be done in strict compliance with section 156(4) of the Constitution. This 
reads: “The national government and provincial governments must assign to a municipality, by 
agreement…”  A prerequisite would be the capacitation of the municipality by provincial and 
national government, in accordance with section 154(1) of the Constitution. Use of the modal 
verb “must” signifies that national and provincial government are duty-bound to assign a 
function only if it “necessarily relates to local government” and that there is compliance with 
section 156(4) of the Constitution. 
 
The above sections appear to assume that prior institutional assessment had been completed 
confirming a particular municipality’s capacity, competency or capability of administering 
disaster management effectively. A study was done in 2011 but this assessment is generic and 
somewhat technical.104  Rather, each metropolitan and district municipality must do extensive 
                                                 
104 Botha, Doret et al (2011) Disaster Risk Management Status Assessment at Municipalities in South 
Africa, African Centre for Disaster Studies, North West University.   
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research and studies of its geographical area to inform its planning. A further one, from a 
reading of section 156(4) is that these stipulations are for a particular municipality and not for 
classes of municipalities. The assignment would be based on an agreement with the 
municipality concerned. However, there is no problem in the passing of a framework-type 
statute to serve as a guideline. But thereafter, each metropolitan and district municipality should 
undergo the assessments to determine capacity before the assignment is confirmed. 
 
Reference to “a municipality” implies that a blanket or generic assignment is not allowed by 
the Constitution. Hence, the constitutionality of the DMA and the Bill is questioned. This 
requires further research and analysis. Based on this interpretation, the constitutionality of 
section 9(1) of the Municipal Systems Act is also questioned since it, in contradistinction, refers 
to “municipalities in general, or any category of municipalities…” 
 
The DMA and the DMAB may have been based largely on models formulated by foreign 
disaster-prone countries. As such these enactments may not be appropriate for South Africa 
which is generally of moderate risk with identified types of disasters. The Act and the Bill 
appear to be concentrating on (foreign) good practices, requiring several structures, much 
planning and assuming that co-operative governance mechanisms would be able to manage 
disasters and disaster risk management. A major concern with the nature and tone of the DMA 
and the DMAB with its ‘framework’ and “generic” type approach, as opposed to agreements 
with specific municipalities, is that they dump this power/function on local government. 
Consequently, municipalities would have to implement often in the absence of support and 
guidance. There may be an opportunity cost if this function is not financed by Treasury. A 
major concern was the limited time SALGA allowed for the consultant to review the draft Bill 
and for the public to submit comments and engage with Parliament, particularly the NCoP. 
Hence the question of constitutionality of the Act based on recent Court judgments.105  
 
                                                 
105 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others CCT12/05 [2006] ZACC 
11; 2006(12) BCLR 1399 (CC); 2006 (6) SA416 (CC) (17 August 2006), paragraphs 209, 211, 213. See also 
Czapanskiy, Karen Syma and Rashida Manjoo (2008) The Right of Public Participation in the Law-Making 
Process and the Role of the Legislature in the Promotion of this Right, 19(1) (2008) Duke Journal of Comparative 
and International Law, 1-40, 2-6, 9; King and Others v Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of Control and Another 
(561/2004) [2005] ZASCA 96; [2006] 1 All SA 458 (SCA); 2006 (4) BCLR 462 (SCA) (29 September 2005), 
paragraphs 1-2, 9, 11-12, 17, and 22; Earthlife Africa Johannesburg and Another v Minister of Energy and Others 
(19529/2015) [2017] ZAWCHC 50 (26 April 2017), paragraphs 1, 18, 23, 28, 34, 58, 93, 98, and 142. Refer 
Chapter 5 of this thesis – 5.2.3(iv) Public Participation, and 5.2.4 The NCoP. 
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There is need for clarity or roles, funding, capacity-building, etc, on a differentiated basis. 
Municipalities should not be funding this function because the opportunity cost may have a 
negative effect on their (numerous) other responsibilities. The Disaster Management 
Amendment Act should not set a precedent for the dumping of national and provincial 
government functions on a blanket or generic approach to municipalities.       
 
The DMA, the DMAB, and the consequent Disaster Management Amendment Act (DMAA) may 
have been based largely on models formulated by foreign disaster-prone countries. As such 
these enactments may not be appropriate for South Africa which is generally of moderate risk 
with identified types of disasters. Both statutes (2002 and 2015) and the Bill appear to be 
concentrating on (foreign) good practices, requiring several structures, much planning and 
assuming that co-operative governance mechanisms would be able to manage disasters and 
risks associated therewith. A major concern with the nature and tone of the DMA, the DMAB, 
and the resultant Amendment Act with their ‘framework’ and “generic” type approach, as 
opposed to agreements with specific municipalities, is that they dump this power/function on 
local government. Consequently, municipalities would have to implement often in the absence 
of support and guidance. There may be an opportunity cost if this function is not financed by 
Treasury. A major concern is the constitutionality of the Amendment Act and parts of the 
Systems Act pertaining to disaster management. This is despite CoGTA and SALGA, amongst 
others, undertaking a clause-by-clause analysis of the DMAB.106  
 
Notwithstanding the writer’s reservations, it would appear that SALGA and CoGTA have 
accepted that the Bill will be signed into law shortly and therefore there is need to ascertain 
how the new Act will be implemented. This was the subject of a circular by SALGA to all 
municipalities despite the lack of clarity on roles, funding, capacity-building, etc on a 
differentiated basis. Municipalities should not be funding this function because the opportunity 
cost and that of unintended consequences may have a negative effect on their (numerous) other 
responsibilities. 
 
While it may be prudent to establish structures and processes for the implementation of the 
DMAA, a second, parallel, exercise should be research and analyses of it should be undertaken 
to make it clear, and to determine its constitutionality. This could be done through an 
                                                 
106 National Disaster Management Centre (2015) Disaster Management Amendment Bill 2015: Clause-
by-Clause response on the provincial negotiating mandate presented to the National Council of Provinces.  
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amendment of the Act and to ensure that it is not a precedent for the dumping of national and 
provincial government functions on a blanket or generic approach. In the process, SALGA has 
failed to act in the interests of municipalities. When the DMA was promulgated in 2002, 
SALGA was a fledgling institution and may not have been able to represent local government 
effectively, given that democratic municipalities were established in 2000. However, SALGA 
has been operational for twenty years and it should take its role seriously, as advised by many 
court judgements on local participatory democracy and the role of parliament therein.  
 
7.7 NEED AND DESIRABILITY OF ORGANISED LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
 
i. Generally 
No independent and objective analysis has to date been done on the need and desirability of a 
local government association in South Africa, particularly an institution like SALGA. Studies 
have shown that an advisory and co-ordinating body could well work alongside the three 
spheres of government, particularly with municipalities, without conflict or confrontation or 
duplication, as have associations in other countries. South Africa’s constitutional-statutory 
framework for co-operative governance is flexible enough for SALGA, or some other, perhaps 
permanent commission of experts, to undertake this. Properly structured, organised, and 
managed, such an institution, operating like the reconstituted Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), the International City/County Management Association 
(ICMA), and the SACN, could add value at little cost, while working co-operatively with 
municipalities. Hence, fundamental questions and introspection is required by and about 
SALGA – one does not need be a slave to the constitutional and legislative provisions: If an 
organisation is dysfunctional or moribund, disestablish it – this body may not be missed and 
therefore forgotten after a (short) while. 
 
There may be two issues involved here. The one is the constitutional requirement contained in 
section 163 for organised local government, read with section 67 (participation in the NCoP); 
the other is the way this has been given effect to. What could be needed is that the latter be 
reconsidered in some detail and a more nuanced approach be developed, considering the 
evolving nature of local government in South Africa.  
 
Effective representation of municipalities would also require amendments to certain statutes, 
particularly the IRFA. However, legislative provisions, per se, are a necessary but insufficient 
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approach.  Some of the projects that SALGA has been engaged in have been the review of local 
government powers, with a view towards asymmetrical allocation and the development of a 
methodology for restructuring of municipalities. Moreover, the issue of provinces and their 
capacitation of municipalities must take priority. Finally, the approach to municipal and 
community representation and mechanisms to achieve this needs review.  
 
SALGA may not be on its own when criticised for poor performance. Like 165 out of 256 
organs of state, it also failed to get a clean audit in 2009, when more complex institutions like 
the City of Johannesburg and the City of Ekurhuleni, did. However, with the revenue and 
financial inefficiencies of these cities being a matter of public knowledge and a source of much 
irritation to ratepayers and residents, one questions the basis of auditing.107  
 
There is need for a system that goes beyond the purely financial and incorporates review of 
accountability, the fulfilment of statutory obligations, commitments made to communities, 
penalties for non-compliance, and so on, as are available in Sweden. Moreover, the need and 
desirability of SALGA should be assessed against existing local government associations, both 
to determine its unique function or niche, and to ensure that it does not duplicate work of 
existing representative bodies and municipalities themselves.  
 
ii. The South African Cities Network 
Unlike SALGA, established pursuant to constitutional and legislative prescripts before 
(perhaps) there was sufficient clarity on its role and functions, the South African Cities Network 
(SACN), for example, was set up without fanfare and not in accordance with a policy or 
legislative mandate. The creation of this organisation was motivated by the then Minister of 
Provincial and Local Government due to certain gaps in support to local government that 
SALGA did not cover or did not cater for adequately or cost-efficiently. Whilst the SACN was 
registered on 9 December 2002 as an association incorporated under section 21 of the South 
African Companies Act, 1973, it was established for a trial period of three years. It has done 
well enough to be still operating today, achieving much in just under ten years at comparatively 
                                                 
107  Boyle, Brendan (2010) ‘Audit disaster’, Johannesburg: The Times, 27/01/2010; ‘Joburg finances given 
thumbs up’, Johannesburg: The Star, 28/01/2010; Maphumulo, Solly (2010) ‘Soweto delivery protest turns 
violent’, Johannesburg: The Star, 28/01/2010; ‘Ekurhuleni gets first clean bill of health’, Johannesburg: The Star, 
29/01/2010; Mkhwanazi, Siyabonga (2010) ‘Growing service delivery protests lead to hearings’, Johannesburg: 
The Star, 1/02/2010.  
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lower cost than SALGA.108 Herein lies a lesson for ‘organised local government’. The network 
or association was created because of the commonality of challenges faced by the nine largest 
cities in this country, and an acknowledgement that partners can and should work co-
operatively, so that the achievement of the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. This 
organisation is not operating with huge financial resources; rather the sharing of workloads 
among the nine participating cities lowers overall costs. Donors to a large extent fund research, 
publications, conferences, workshops, and training programmes. The SACN is a non-profit 
company headed by a board of directors which includes the Deputy Minister of the CoGTA, a 
representative of SALGA, and mayors of the member cities. Its Strategic Plan 2011-2016 is 
underpinned by an outcomes-based monitoring and evaluation system used to measure 
performance against clear objectives set, and serves as a marketing tool to acquire funding 
based on results achieved. Person-cost per project is benchmarked and tracked to enhance 
efficiency and donors’ value for money.109 Common and unique challenges faced by 
municipalities, as well as certain themes critical to local government, are published as case 
studies and made available to cities within the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). Were SALGA or any institution seeking to promote local government interests 
modelled on that of the SACN, much progress could be made in relatively short time, and lower 
cost. Almost without exception, where they exist, associations for local authorities in most 
countries are voluntary, part time organisations; often minimally funded by government and to 
a lesser extent by the donor community; and are informal.110 They have not operated in a 
conflictual or confrontational environment, nor duplicated work of statutory councils. With 
comparatively meagre means, they have made limited though positive contributions to local 
government development generally, and to improved intergovernmental relations in particular. 
 
7.8 CONCLUSION 
 
The Constitution is the fons et origo from which should flow the structures and procedures 
necessary to plan, implement, and monitor transformation and transition. It provides adequately 
for the substantive requirements and, quite correctly, for details to be set out in individual 
                                                 
108 Singh, Anirood and Mary Cole (2012) Formative Evaluation of the South African Cities Network, 
www.sacities.net. 
109 Ibid. 
 110 The external local government agency, such as that in the UK and Canada, should be distinguished 
from associations established by the municipalities themselves for working co-operatively. They provide the 
requisite expertise or the personnel are expert volunteers. See Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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statutes. Where the latter are required, they must be practical and implementable, as well as in 
keeping with contemporary reality.  
 
Co-operative governance is the conditio sine qua non for sound socio-economic development: 
It is a means, not an end, a process to the attainment of clear development objectives. An 
examination of associations for local authorities in developed countries highlighted that 
organised local government in South Africa and SALGA as the national representative have 
been placed by the Constitution and the applicable legislation in a unique position. 
Notwithstanding this unprecedented and elevated status, the instrument of organised local 
government appears to have failed to fulfil its envisaged mandate adequately or innovatively, 
given the shortcomings of its governing statute. OLGA merely “recognises” a national and nine 
provincial associations to represent the interests of local government. Unlike most statutes of 
the democratic era, it does not prescribe in detail how these organs should be constituted or 
established, their roles, powers or functions, management, financing, accountability, 
monitoring, and reporting. Perhaps this is a shortcoming, or the drafters may have prudently let 
this institution evolve and develop organically, with any modifications or amendments being 
introduced only after a sufficiently long period and bedding down of operations. 
 
However, unlike intergovernmental relations which has to do with human interaction and as 
such may not amenable to rigidity and prescription, the organisation and representation of local 
government can be undertaken with a prescriptive type of plan for its systemisation, a term 
meaning ‘to give an orderly structure to’. The nature and functions of associations for local 
authorities in other countries may suggest that SALGA should work alongside role players in 
the three spheres, but undertaking a unique function. A less ambitious approach and an 
institution that operates differently from that functioning currently can add value by co-
operating with organisations both within and outside government thus making for better co-
operative governance and thereby more rapid and sustainable development. 
 
In fairness, SALGA is not the only institution that has not operated per expectations; many 
others are known more for their pronouncements than their achievements. SALGA needs to 
take cognisance of the National Planning Commission and the Department of Performance 
Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME), not only to be guided by them but also to ensure there is 
no duplication and wastage. SALGA and CoGTA need to compare their objectives and business 
plans to ensure complementarity and minimise duplication. The national department should 
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also move towards a pragmatic and measured approach, rather than being reactive and thereby 
attempting to do too much and in the process losing focus.  
 
SALGA should also reduce campaigning and posturing and become more firm and decisive 
and ensure sustainability of its programmes, projects, and other initiatives. It should complete 
its work on powers and functions as well as that on provinces and their cost. A leaner, more 
simplified governance system may be required – the political fallout resulting must be accepted 
as good for the country, if not for the ruling party also. Given current lack of leadership in South 
Africa,111 the difficulty of implementing several complex national policies without clear 
direction, especially on the nature and responsibilities of the envisaged or putative 
developmental state, limited resources, lack of or inappropriate skills,112 and a clear 
understanding of the root causes of service delivery protests, SALGA should not embark on yet 
another ‘restructuring’ at this stage but implement and monitor its Strategic Plan 2012-2017. 
The following media statement by the Executive Mayor of the City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan municipality, Herman Mashaba, regarding its intention to withdraw membership 
fees, could reflect many of SALGA’s members’ views: 
Over the years, SALGA has, in my view, strayed from its mandate. It has become bloated and top-heavy. 
It has spent too much money on nice-to-haves and on projects of dubious utility.113 
 
SALGA was quick to defend itself and its work. 
 
It would assist SALGA to develop and use an outcomes-based monitoring, evaluation and 
impact assessment system to show its effectiveness. This approach could be informed by an 
independent review of its functioning and achievements since establishment, including a 
strengths, weakness, opportunities and threats (SWOT), social cost-benefit, risk, and gap 
analyses. Such a study could provide some indicators as to how best municipal representation 
could be undertaken in South Africa, an issue addressed in the next chapter. 
 
 
                                                 
111 Refer to quotes and comments in Chapter 1: 1.1 of this thesis. 
112 MPs demand training to tackle new law (referring to the new Money Bills Amendment Act), 
Polity.org.za, 27/01/2010. 
113 Media statement on 13/10/2016, with SALGA’s response posted on its website, www.salga.org.za. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In South Africa, local authorities ‘evolved’ since the establishment of the first one in the 
seventeenth century, to functioning as the lowest tier under provincial ordinances from Union 
in 1910 as agents of the state, providing basic municipal services based on race and 
affordability, to democratically-elected municipalities from 2000. Municipalities’ long history 
of deliberate underdevelopment manifests itself today in the form of community protests 
against poor service delivery. 
 
Local government is established and given powers and functions by the Constitution and 
subsequent statutes. It today works as a sphere of government alongside the national and 
provincial spheres in a distinctive, non-hierarchical governmental system operating co-
operatively. This was the constitutional ideal. 
 
Local authorities have moved from about 1 100 in the apartheid area serving select localities, 
to the present 257 “wall-to-wall” municipalities, thereby ensuring that every resident falls 
within the jurisdiction of one. Such consolidation has resulted in spatially and demographically 
large municipalities. With its constitutionally-prescribed powers, functions, status and 
autonomy, it was expected that local government would be a participant in national policy-
making. However, given their high number, municipalities cannot engage in such exercise. This 
necessitated the establishment of organised local government, a representative institution, 
comprising a national organisation, the South African Local Government Association 
(SALGA) and its nine provincial affiliates. 
 
This thesis analyses municipal representation as a mechanism for socio-economic development 
through service delivery. It examines such representation, particularly by SALGA, to determine 
whether this organisation, operational since 1996, has been effective. It compares the South 
African approach to those in select countries to identify good practices. These are largely based 
on municipal powers and functions, with the institution working co-operatively with provinces 
or states and the national government, in any governmental system. Findings and 
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recommendations are made on key issues of municipal representation, with the aim of finding 
a suitable model for consideration in South Africa. 
 
8.2 FINDINGS 
 
8.2.1 Local administration preceded national governments. Traditional societies in Europe 
lived in villages similar to the Zulu kraal. A typical Greek city-state like Athens between 
508 BC and 338 BC did not have any special class of people whose work was 
government. Civics was defined then as the rights and duties of human beings in a 
political society, such as a city, province or state.1 
 
8.2.2 South Africa’s first ‘formal’ local authority was established in 1682 at Eerste River, an 
area later incorporated into Cape Town. Subsequent history was confined almost wholly 
to the Cape of Good Hope until the Natal Ordinance of 1845, whereafter Dutch 
placaaten were repealed by the Statute Law of the Cape of Good Hope in 1862. Similar 
laws were followed by the Transvaal and Orange Free State provinces, until Union in 
1910.2 
 
8.2.3 Government in South Africa was characterised by a high level of centralisation of 
decision-making since Union, continued in the 1961 constitution, with attempted 
‘reform’ in the 1983 constitution. This failed and led to community protests largely 
against local authorities, leading to the Congress for a Democratic South Africa 
(CODESA) deliberations, and the Local Government Transition Act, 1993. 
 
8.2.4 The present governmental system is not operating optimally, notwithstanding its 
constitutional basis. This is because constitutions that are not already deeply rooted are 
no guarantee of democracy. Such an enactment has to be sustained by a democratic 
culture with a supportive political, social and economic environment. South Africa has 
not yet reached this status. 
 
                                                 
1 Hall, RJJ (1928) An Historical Introduction to Civics, London: Longmans, 41-44.  
2 Green, LP (1957) History of local government in South Africa: An introduction, Cape Town: Juta, 1; 
Cloete, JNN (1982) Central, provincial and Municipal Institutions in South Africa, Pretoria: Van Schaik, 1-2.  
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8.2.5 Local authorities’ limited capacity has been a problem since historical times, when they 
were implementing agencies of national policies and programmes, dealing with ‘bricks 
and mortar’ issues. Notwithstanding the obligation in section 154(1) of the Constitution 
on national and provincial governments to strengthen and support the capacity of 
municipalities, this has not been filled adequately over the last two decades. This is a 
conditio sine qua non for municipalities to carry out their extensive and daunting service 
delivery and socio-economic developmental mandates effectively. 
 
8.2.6 A contributory factor to systemic failure is the capabilities, competences, and 
commitment of municipalities, with councillors and administrators at the coal face.            
The human dimension in the governmental machinery does not appear to have been 
given sufficient attention in attempts to improve the quality of municipal management 
and administration. 
 
8.2.7 Government’s approach to development is the five-year State of the Nation (SoNA) 
with promises, repeated annually, to entice and reward voters, rather than following a 
long-term and sustainable socio-economic development strategy under the guidance of 
the National Development Plan (NDP). This is a piecemeal, partial, reactionary, and 
political approach, consisting in restatements of intent, not based on empirical evidence 
of the real and actual needs, demands and challenges.  Such policy uncertainty and lack 
of continuity are inimical to development and sustainability of local government. 
Promises in the SoNA of capacitation of and support to local government have not 
materialised and SALGA has been unable to leverage this on behalf of deserving 
municipalities 
 
8.2.8 The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, (IRFA), was enacted over ten years 
after the Bill was gazetted. The wisdom of codifying what is essentially human relations 
and engagement is questioned. The IRFA mandates the establishment of several 
structures and processes without prescribing how the role-players in several institutions 
would use them efficiently. Excessive statutory regulation indicates that the state used 
a hybrid approach incorporating the democratic, constitutional, financial, normative 
operational, and regulatory dimensions in the conceptualisation and design of the 
governmental system. This may have been necessary given the need to move away from 
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the apartheid system rapidly. However, the result is a governmental system that may be 
more readily usable by a country with a long constitutional and democratic history. 
 
8.2.9 Many of the numerous constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions pertaining to 
local government have not been fully and appropriately implemented. The extent and 
cost of failure is unknown given that many municipalities’ performance management 
systems are not based on outcomes-based monitoring and evaluation, and no impact 
assessments appear to have been done and reported on. 
 
8.2.10 Municipal demarcation and consolidation based on (largely financial) capacity 
assessments by the Municipal Demarcation Board appear not to have been helpful in 
making municipalities more efficient. 
 
8.2.11 Apart from the reports of the Auditor-General, there are few sources available for 
residents and communities to measure municipal performance objectively. It is not 
known on what basis a mayor or a committee undertakes and reports on annually from 
an assessment of communities’ needs. 
 
8.2.12 Government has chosen law as an instrument of development but more for regulation 
of and compliance by local government. Some of them, such as the Municipal Systems 
Act (Systems Act) and the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) are overly-
prescriptive and not developmental. It is unclear how Treasury and CoGTA measures 
municipal performance and what follow-up actions are taken. Punitive actions could be 
seen as interference in a sphere of government.  
 
8.2.13 The NDP did not undertake a full analysis of the governmental system, especially 
insofar as it relates to the provinces, perhaps due to political sensitivity.  
 
8.2.14 South Africa does not have an urban and/or rural development ministry. CoGTA is not 
the answer. Each Minister appears to have different ideas of the challenges faced by 
local government and answers thereto, despite the problems being deep-rooted and 
multifaceted. The current governmental system is innovative and without precedent, as 
with the role-players therein. Hence, it is experimental, as is participatory and 
representative democracy.    
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8.2.15 The Constitution went beyond the norm in most developed countries by provision for 
the recognition of organised local government as well as its participation in the NCoP 
and the Financial and Fiscal Commission. It is questioned whether this requirement and 
the Organised Local Government Act was necessary, or municipal representation should 
have been allowed to develop organically. 
 
8.2.16 Municipalities are obliged to deliver on the Bill of Rights. The Systems Act gives effect 
to many of the recommendations in the White Paper on Local Government, requiring 
them to be developmental. While residents can enforce their rights against a 
municipality, they also have civic duties. In such engagement and interaction, municipal 
representatives can play a leadership and facilitation role. 
 
8.2.17 Provinces are quick to intervene in failing or apparently dysfunctional municipalities 
without first taking positive or proactive measures to capacitate them, as they are 
constitutionally-bound to do. Neither municipal councillors nor SALGA has taken 
national and provincial government to task for non-fulfilment of their constitutional 
duties to support and strengthen the capacity of municipalities. 
 
8.2.18 Formalism is defined as ‘excessive adherence to prescribed forms; excessive concern 
with form rather than content’. South Africa has followed this approach, alongside the 
SoNA, using law more for regulation and compliance than being developmental. Form 
follows function: The overly prescriptive formal approach can at best be part of a more 
comprehensive development strategy and form of government. A case in point is the 
numerous structures and processes established by the IRFA, without estimate of 
resources and monitoring of progress. Formalism incorporates technocratic 
managerialism, as practised particularly by CoGTA and the Treasury. Thus, the 
treatment is meted out without adequate diagnosis and prognosis of the malaise, and 
possible preventive measures. The formal technocratic managerialism approach comes 
at high opportunity cost. The result is persistent and chronic service delivery problems 
with attendant community protests measured only from around 2004. Regarding the 
viability of many municipalities, CoGTA’s approach is two-pronged: A persistent drive 
to continuously tighten the legislative framework of municipalities, and secondly, a 
series of support programmes. This is based on CoGTA’s erroneous belief that systemic 
problems could be legislated out of existence. This is no solution as over-regulation 
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leads to greater lawlessness. This approach, over two decades, have not left any 
development footprint nor capacitated municipalities. 
 
8.2.19 Sound co-operative governance and intergovernmental relations are necessary 
preconditions for efficient municipal representation. This is based, inter alia, on section 
41(1)(h)(ii) which states: “All spheres of government and all organs of state within each 
sphere must co-operate in mutual trust and good faith by assisting and supporting one 
another.” However, as with the trend in African countries, centralisation would be 
resorted to given local government’s lack of capacity. The prescribed solution is 
capacitation by the other two spheres of government. Municipalities need the support 
of civil society organisations and residents to build and maintain state-society synergy. 
This requires a high level of social capital, governmental capacity, and a supportive 
political regime. 
 
8.2.20 Another condition sine qua non of efficient municipal representation is local 
government’s constitutionally-prescribed powers, functions, ‘autonomy’, and status. 
The Constitutional Court affirmed that local government is as important a tier of public 
administration as any. In this sense, the term “distinctive” in section 40(1) of the 
Constitution has been interpreted to refer to autonomy. This means that each sphere is 
a final decision-maker in a matter falling within its own area of competence. This 
implies that one sphere’s decision is not subject to the discretion of another’s. 
 
8.2.21 Section 3(3) of the Systems Act on co-operative governance requires organised local 
government to: “(a) develop common approaches for local government as a distinct 
sphere of government; (b) enhance co-operation, mutual assistance and sharing of 
resources among municipalities; find solutions to problems relating to local government 
generally; and (d) facilitate compliance with the principles of co-operative government 
and intergovernmental relations.” This is a broad and generic mandate. It is not clear 
who will assist in developing programmes and projects therefor and monitor SALGA’s 
compliance therewith. 
 
8.2.22 SALGA has complained that often much time and energy go into drafting of new 
constitutionally-prescribed legislation without considering their practicalities as well as 
how they would be implemented by all three spheres of government working co-
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operatively, harmoniously, and in an integrated fashion. The implication is that 
legislative drafting is done in a rush and as a result thereof, implementation by local 
government is difficult. 
 
8.2.23 Section 42(1)(b) of the Constitution provides for participation by “not more than ten 
part-time representatives designated by organised local government…to represent the 
different categories of municipalities.” These representatives participate “when 
necessary” and “may not vote.” This constitutional provision that local government 
“may designate representatives to participate” in the NCoP, has been watered down by 
the IRFA. It is not clear when a Premier’s “obligation … to consult organised local 
government on any matter” arises and how this duty will be met in the Premier’s 
Intergovernmental Committee. If there is such lack of clarity, SALGA may effectively 
be marginalised through non-consultation. A qualifier or delimiting factor is that such 
interaction must be “conducted [only] through an appropriate intergovernmental 
structure” and not directly. This is cumbersome and may delay development, especially 
if a matter is urgent. However, there are many opportunities, particularly within the 
political realm, for an executive mayor or MEC to bring important and urgent matters 
to the attention of decision makers either through an intergovernmental relations (IGR) 
structure or by appropriate communication outside of formal mechanisms. A further 
limitation is that if SALGA or one of its provincial affiliates is not a member of a forum, 
a representative may only have “full speaking rights.” There is no guarantee that 
organised local government is or will be a member of any intergovernmental structure. 
Furthermore, a ‘speaking right’ amounts to nothing of substance. Although the Act 
provides inadequate opportunities for representation, the onus is on SALGA to make 
best use of these structures to advance the interests of local government. By proving its 
effectiveness, albeit on a limited number of forums, it can request greater representation. 
However, most of the structures established by the IRFA are forums with no decision-
making mechanisms that can influence law-making in the National Assembly or the 
NCoP. These structures lack powers to enforce ‘decisions’ 
 
8.2.24 Municipal autonomy in its clearest sense is depicted in the allocation of powers and 
functions in Schedule 4B and Schedule 5B of the Constitution, with legal personality 
bestowed upon municipalities by the Systems Act. 
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8.2.25 Local government’s legislative and executive powers, as well the “right” to govern on 
its “own initiative” is conditional in the sense that its powers and functions are “subject 
to national and provincial legislation.” Hence, local government has ‘relative’ or limited 
autonomy. However, these spheres “may (not ‘must’) compromise or impede” local 
government’s ability or right to function effectively. Local government autonomy is not 
comparable with that of the national and provincial spheres because a municipality is 
subject to intervention by them. The Constitutional Court ruled otherwise. 
 
8.2.26 National government departments, that is, the executive, almost exclusively formulate 
policies impacting on municipalities without allowing much participation by them, at 
least through SALGA. This confirms a perceived low status of local government and its 
representative organ. 
 
8.2.27 “On its own initiative” indicates autonomy in that municipalities do not have to await 
instructions from national and provincial spheres before using their legislative, 
executive, and administrative authority. The (original) powers listed in Schedule 4B and 
Schedule 5B of the Constitution cannot be changed or repealed by national or provincial 
legislation, but only by constitutional amendment. A municipality’s original powers 
have been confirmed in several High Court and Constitutional Court cases. The 
judiciary would likely use a purposive approach to interpret local government powers 
and functions broadly to give as much scope as possible to them. 
 
8.2.28 Statutes, regulations, directives, and rules aimed at compliance make for compliance 
fatigue with concomitant lawlessness. Furthermore, they threaten to undermine 
municipalities’ constitutionally-entrenched independence and authority over their own 
affairs. 
 
8.2.29 The comparatively large size of many municipalities both spatially and demographically 
make governance and representation difficult. 
 
8.2.30 Assigned powers refer to authority over matters delegated to municipalities by national 
and provincial governments, most often on the basis of subsidiarity. However, it is 
necessary to ensure that in such assignment all legal provisions are complied with 
strictly to obviate unfunded mandates. SALGA should be equipped with the requisite 
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expertise or else municipalities would be saddled with additional responsibilities as in 
the case with the Disaster Management Act and the Disaster Management Amendment 
Act where SALGA was unable to make forceful representations through CoGTA to the 
NCoP and the Act was passed in haste. 
 
8.2.31 Local government functions as currently constituted do not enable municipalities to 
effectively promote socio-economic development. Hence, there is a mismatch between 
the objective of ‘developmental’ local government and its powers and functions to be 
so. 
 
8.2.32 Some legal provisions if not contradictory are confusing. The Constitution explicitly 
provides powers and functions of local government. It does not pronounce on the rights 
and duties of municipalities. The Systems Act does so in sections 4(1)(a)-(c). Section 
152(2) of the Constitution constitutes a qualifier of the objects of local government set 
out in section 152(1)(a)-(e) in that it states a municipality has to “strive, within its 
financial and administrative capacity” to achieve them. Absent this capability, 
community members’ rights may be unfulfilled. Under such circumstances, it is 
incumbent upon national and provincial government to “support and strengthen the 
capacity of municipalities” until they can meet their obligations. Section 4(2) of the 
Systems Act reinforces this constitutional qualifier by stipulating that the duty applies, 
provided it is undertaken “within the municipality’s financial and administrative 
capacity and having regard to practical considerations.” An apparently contradictory 
provision is that the municipality must act “in the best interests of the community” when 
exercising its legislative and executive authority and using resources. It is unclear 
whether this stipulation overrides section 4(2) of the Systems Act where obligations are 
to be met to the extent that a municipality’s financial and administrative capacity 
permits them.  Sections 4(2)(b)-(j) reaffirm and expand on the constitutional obligations 
and particularly on the rights to the environment; property; housing; health care, food, 
water, and social security; and education. These provisions have implications for 
municipal representatives in that a council must operate optimally within a context of 
limited resources. In such a situation, intellectual capital can play a major role. 
 
8.2.33 In advocating a rights-based approach to service delivery and a generic right to adequate 
water and sanitation, the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) takes as 
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a point of departure the rights to dignity, privacy, and a clean and healthy environment. 
It considers meaningful public participation an essential component in fulfilment of 
such entitlements. Provincial and national government should be held accountable 
where municipalities fail. In attempting to fulfil these rights through service delivery, 
the Systems Act requires that municipalities must have regard to the key principles of 
active participation, social cohesion and community empowerment. They have to 
provide evidence that effective and interactive community participation with active 
communication and proactive information sharing that took place in the planning, 
implementation and evaluation of a project. This requirement is based on the belief that 
adequate consultation in conceptualisation would provide local government clear 
insight of the community’s needs and its own capacity to respond accordingly. In terms 
of the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA), it is incumbent on the municipality 
to consult communities on the budget for specific projects within the context of the 
Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), especially regarding a municipality’s 
plan to deal with water shortages. The SAHRC contends that access to information is a 
fundamental right entitling people to information that public bodies hold, and 
facilitating informed participation in decisions which affect their daily lives. 
 
8.2.34 Joseph v City of Johannesburg3 confirmed that the public has a constitutional and public 
law right to basic municipal services and the municipality is duty-bound to deliver them 
in a way that that does not infringe a resident’s right to privacy and dignity. 
 
8.2.35 Chapter 4 of the Systems Act addresses community participation. The corollary of 
citizens’ rights are the duties imposed on them by section 5(2)(a)-(e) of the Act. The 
large number of duties and responsibilities posited by the Systems Act in a context of 
resource constraints means that municipalities must find innovative ways of promoting 
socio-economic development and attracting investment for this purpose. It would also 
be necessary to work in partnership with a competent, accountable, committed, ethical 
and enlightened leadership, both in the council and within local communities. A 
municipality would need effective internal and external communications and knowledge 
sharing, raising awareness of human rights and obligations related thereto, and efficient 
municipal and ward councillors. One of the main objectives of local democracy is to 
                                                 
3 Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (CCT 43/09) [2009] ZACC 30; 2010 (3) BCLR 
212 (CC); 2010 (4) SA 455 (CC) (9 October 2009).  
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ensure public involvement and participation. The leadership must be capable of 
motivating, encouraging, and sustaining community participation. Social inclusion is 
therefore an obligation on municipalities as is citizen participation on residents. Public 
participation within all spheres of government is a constitutional prerequisite. The 
Systems Act concretises this directive and that of accountability, responsiveness, and 
openness, insofar as local government is concerned.  The structures and processes of 
securing participation and accountability is a daunting challenge for most 
municipalities. Many poor residents do not have the opportunities to express themselves 
persuasively. Lack of education and other resources serve to exclude many people from 
democratic participatory processes. 
 
8.2.36 Chapter 6 of the Systems Act deals with performance management. Sections 38-49 detail 
what municipalities must do to establish, maintain, and monitor performance. Section 
42 of the Act provides for community involvement in a municipality’s performance 
management system (PMS). 
 
8.2.37 Section 50 of the Systems Act provides that the basic values and principles governing 
local public administration are as enumerated under section 195(1) of the Constitution. 
Section 51(a) reiterates that a municipality must “be responsive to the needs of the local 
community.” 
 
8.2.38 The Systems Act is considerably long and detailed on the ‘whats’, but short on the ‘hows’ 
and the resources to achieve its admirable, pro-poor objectives. In practice, alongside 
other new legislation, it creates numerous onerous obligations on local government, 
whilst not considering adequately their resource and capacity constraints. This is 
mentioned in passing in section 10A, but only on assigned powers and functions. The 
extensive detail in the Act (and the MFMA) serve to highlight the complexity of the 
current local government system and what councillors and technocrats must deal with.  
 
8.2.39 The Structures Act reiterates that municipal councils must strive to achieve the 
objectives stipulated in section 152 of the Constitution. It furthermore stipulates that a 
municipal council must annually review, inter alia, community needs, priorities to meet 
those needs, processes for involving the community, organisational and delivery 
mechanisms for meeting community needs, and overall performance in meeting the 
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constitutionally-prescribed objectives. A municipality is duty-bound to develop 
mechanisms for community consultation in performing its functions and exercising its 
powers. Section 74 depicts the functions and powers of ward committees.  
 
8.2.40 In the Land Access Movement case4, the Constitutional Court held that South Africa’s 
democracy has both representative and participatory elements which are not mutually 
exclusive. Thus, public participation in the National Assembly and the NCoP is 
constitutionally-prescribed. 
 
8.2.41 Although statutes promulgated by the post-apartheid government are reasonably clear 
and explicit, they have to some extent been ignored or circumvented following the 2000 
local government elections when senior administrative appointments became based 
largely on political affiliations and connections, rather than on merit or competency 
(“cadre deployment”). This compounded the problem of capacity and commitment. 
 
8.2.42 The Structures Act makes it obligatory for the mayor to take several steps to identify 
and meet priority needs of the community in an economically efficient manner, mostly 
through the municipality’s integrated development plan (IDP), to monitor progress with 
implementation, and to report annually thereon. Such requirements for performance 
management and engagement with local communities are echoed throughout the 
Structures Act and the Systems Act but do not appear to be working well due to many 
objectives, outputs and outcomes not being precisely defined and thus difficult to 
quantify and measure. 
 
8.2.43 Section 42(3) of the Constitution reads: “The National Assembly is elected to represent 
the people and to ensure government by the people under the Constitution. It does this 
by choosing the President, by providing a national forum for public consideration of 
issues, by passing legislation and by scrutinizing and overseeing executive action.” This 
provision forms the basis of municipal representation by providing for democratic 
participatory governance and safeguarding the public interest through law-making and 
oversight over the executive. 
 
                                                 
4 Land Access Movement of South Africa and Others v Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces 
and Others (CCT 40/15) [2016] ZACC 22; 2016 (5) SA 635 (CC); 2016 (10) BCLR 1277 (CC) (28 July 2016).  
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8.2.44 Parliament’s Speakers’ Forum established the High-Level Panel on Assessment of Key 
Legislation and Acceleration of Fundamental Change. The Panel has eighteen months, 
commencing January 2016, to complete its work. The first hearings were on 16-17 
August 2016. The Chairperson of the Panel said: “There are more than 1 000 new laws 
aimed at supporting our democracy…It is all very well to pass laws and to have 
facilitated public participation in their making. But what effect have these laws had on 
our lives and our aim of building a new society?” 
 
8.2.45 The National Assembly is mandated to “ensure government by the people…by 
providing a national forum for public consideration of issues.” The Panel for 
Assessment of Parliament (PAP) recommended in its Report (2009) that “Parliament 
should take steps to improve the quality and substance” of its debates and should debate 
current matters of public concern timeously. Parliament acknowledged that it has an 
obligation to involve the public in its lawmaking processes and “failure to comply with 
this obligation rendered the resulting legislation constitutionally invalid.” This was 
confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Doctors for Life International and subsequent 
cases. 
 
8.2.46 Many commentators and politicians have expressed the view that even twenty years 
after its establishment, the NCoP has not been a success. It often emphasises its role but 
is silent on its contribution to the development of this country. The current Minister of 
Finance said in 2010 that the second house is a “product of political negotiations and 
compromises” during the constitutional negotiations. 
 
8.2.47 The NCoP’s pre-eminent role is to pass bills affecting the provinces, and concomitantly, 
municipalities therein. It has authority to be involved in certain important legislative 
matters in the national sphere. However, in following the dictates of lawmaking 
executives of the ruling party, the interests of local government have not been 
safeguarded or promoted by the NCoP. 
 
8.2.48 The NCoP does not currently appear to be appropriately structured to play the 
intergovernmental role meaningfully, that is, represent the people and the local sphere 
of government. Representation by SALGA is limited and qualified. On the other hand, 
municipal representatives must be of the calibre that can make a positive difference on 
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the few platforms available to them. The NCoP’s legislative contribution thus far has 
been insubstantial. Furthermore, up to now there appears to have been no major conflict 
between it and the National Assembly. The NCoP adds little value to the legislative 
process and that the need for such an institution, especially in this field, is questionable. 
 
8.2.49 The NCoP’s failure could also be partly attributed to lack of precise definition of the 
powers and functions of provinces and their general ineffectiveness.  
 
8.2.50 Provision is made for participation by local government as observers in provincial 
legislatures, either by organised local government or municipalities or both. Other 
structures provided for are provincial and district advisory forums, as well as provincial 
intergovernmental forums and premier’s co-ordinating forums. While structures and 
processes have been established, there is little to indicate their implementation and 
monitoring, including their successes and failures. There appears to be little concrete 
co-operative governance beyond that needed for integrated development plans of 
municipalities. Legislatures’ reports have little concrete evidence of provincial laws 
passed. There is also little substance in their progress reports of parliamentary Bills. 
Notwithstanding the constitutional power of the NCoP on legislation affecting 
provinces, the PAP observed in 2009 that 99 per cent of it emanates from the National 
Assembly. This may be due to the weakness of provincial legislatures to project and 
promote their perspectives into national policy.  
 
8.2.51 The NCoP’s review function, if carried out efficiently, could indirectly affect local 
government beneficially in that the NCoP could veto national and provincial executives 
when they intervene in the integrity of a province or a municipality by taking up their 
responsibility for fulfilment of executive statutory duties. 
 
8.2.52 In terms of section 66(2) of the Constitution, the NCoP may call the executive to account 
in the same way the National Assembly does. The overwhelming view appears to be 
that the NCoP since its inception had not carried out this responsibility. 
 
8.2.53 The NCoP has almost usurped the duties and responsibilities of the provinces in their 
intervention in an erring municipality in terms of section 139 of the Constitution. This 
is inimical to both local and provincial governments, and results in overlapping and 
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duplication. It also deviates from the Council’s core functions. The NCoP’s “Provincial 
Week” to ascertain the status of service delivery has not yielded positive results or 
assisted the municipalities visited. 
 
8.2.54 Representation of local government on the NCoP has not been well-conceived and 
knowing this to be so, it has not been redesigned so as to be fit for purpose. 
Representation is by organised local government. There is an assumption that SALGA 
has the capability to represent municipalities efficiently. On the other hand, the nature 
of representation and the perceived unimportance of local government results in a 
situation where organised local government does not feel it is taken seriously, and 
secondly that the Council is ineffectual and cannot effectively promote local 
government interests. A second problem is that participation occurs only “when 
necessary”. Hence, it is a privilege, not a right. If the NCoP decides the matter does not 
affect local government (when just about everything has an impact on the ground), there 
will be no representation. A third problem is that local government representatives have 
no voting rights.    
 
8.2.55 Local government can have five representatives on the Budget Council nominated by 
SALGA and one by each provincial affiliate. While such provision is laudable, the 
problem is that SALGA and her affiliates do not appear to have the capacity to 
effectively represent the country’s 267 municipalities. A strong voice is essential, as the 
forum deals with certain matters essential to the health and wellbeing of municipalities, 
especially the process of revenue sharing. 
 
8.2.56 The Committee of Chairpersons of the NCoP in their meeting with PAP on 22 October 
2007 admitted that “involvement of the local government sphere in the lawmaking 
process was erratic and inconsistent.” Deliberations on Bills were short compared to 
that in the National Assembly. This situation “reinforced the view that the NCoP was 
merely a process that needed to be followed.”  It was stated that the NCoP’s engagement 
with provinces was problematic as it only did so on section 76 matters. In its defence, 
the NCoP argued that it is the “only arena in which all three spheres of government 
could engage on matters” as it was the custodian of intergovernmental relations, but 
admitted that “this did not function well.” The Assessment Panel questioned the 
necessity of the NCoP within Parliament as well as its representation. The representative 
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function of this institution was also queried as was “whether the will of those 
represented were properly represented.”5 
 
8.2.57 The PAP queried whether the NCoP represented the view of the people or that of 
provincial legislatures. In this regard, one needs to consider whether and how provincial 
legislatures take in the views of municipal councils’ legislatures that should be 
considering the views of their residents. 
 
8.2.58 The NCoP is a political institution designed to represent the provincial legislatures and 
to articulate political positions. A contrary view was expressed in the Land Access 
Movement case where the Constitutional Court held that the NCoP’s public participation 
process was unreasonable and thus constitutionally invalid. Failure by one of the houses 
of Parliament to comply with a constitutional obligation amounts to failure by 
Parliament as a whole, tainting the entire legislative process. 
 
8.2.59 Adequate provisions have been made for local government representation on the 
Financial and Fiscal Commission and on the mechanism deliberating on the (annual) 
Division of Revenue Act. Effectiveness would be dependent on the calibre of SALGA’s 
delegates. 
 
8.2.60 The only constitutionally-mandated opportunity for municipalities to engage directly 
with national government is through participation in national development programmes, 
although how this would be undertaken is unclear. Another way of direct engagement 
is with certain ministries that do not have provincial counterparts. Some statutes require 
inter-departmental co-operation for them to function effectively. However, in all other 
cases contact is by remote control, through SALGA, a situation not ideal but practical. 
The health and wellbeing of local government depend largely on how its representative 
organ participates and makes the voice of municipalities heard. 
 
8.2.61 The Constitution recognises the “institution, status and role of traditional leadership” as 
well as traditional authorities and customary law practised by them. The Constitution 
                                                 
5 Minutes of the meeting between Committee of Chairpersons of the NCoP and the Panel for Assessment 
of Parliament, dated 22 October 2007, www.pmg.org.za, accessed 25/04/2015. See Chapter 5, 5.2.4(vii) Current 
status of the NCoP. 
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makes provision for legislation to give effect to the role of traditional leaders. This 
results in an increased the number of role players at the local government sphere in rural 
areas and thus the potential of increasing conflict showing how complex and confusing 
the local government operating environment is. While the Constitution and its 
supplementary and complementary statutes set out how the governmental system is 
structured and to be operated, the situation on the ground may be different and could be 
attested to by residents of rural areas under traditional leadership. This has implications 
for effective municipal representation. 
 
8.2.62 CoGTA plays a largely regulatory role to ensure compliance by municipalities. 
Furthermore, it is mostly process-oriented, rather than an institution contributing to 
development through capital projects. CoGTA also does not seem to have held 
provincial government to account, particularly with respect to its obligation to 
strengthen and support the capacitation of municipalities, in terms of section 154(1) of 
the Constitution. CoGTA is not a significant player in the development of South Africa. 
There appears to be no mechanisms or opportunities for municipal representation. 
However, one of CoGTA’s strategic objectives, “deepening the relationship between 
citizens and local government through improved citizen engagements by March 2019”, 
could be used to leverage it. 
 
8.2.63 CoGTA’s numerous, unfocused, and apparently unprioritized initiatives and legislative 
interventions in municipalities’ human resource practices result in over-regulation, 
overreach, and a lack of coordination. These ‘interventions’ threaten to stifle local 
government and may be contrary to the rule of law. 
 
8.2.64 The Constitution provides only eight opportunities for national – local government and 
its communities’ interaction: (i) Election of members of Parliament; (ii) By way of 
petitions, representations or submissions to the National Assembly; (iii) Public 
involvement in the legislative and other processes of the National Assembly; (iv) Local 
government representation on the NCoP; (v) By way of petitions, representations or 
submissions to the NCoP; (vi) Public involvement in the legislative and other processes 
of the NCoP; (vii) Local government participation in national development 
programmes; and (viii) Commenting on draft legislation. This appears to be limitations 
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on local government’s participation in formulating national policies that would be 
implemented in its localities. 
 
8.2.65 The Constitution and the IRFA are by far the most elaborate and detailed 
intergovernmental legal framework in the world, showing that co-operative governance 
is a wide, deep and complex field. In issue is whether a detailed, formalised 
intergovernmental relations system is appropriate for an emerging democracy. 
 
8.2.66 In reviewing foreign good practices with respect to government powers, functions, 
status, and municipal representation, many observations were made that could inform 
the redesign of South Africa’s governmental system, particularly insofar as they relate 
to municipalities: 
 
In Germany, Austria and Belgium, local authorities are protected as a separate level or 
tier of government. Federalism restricts the powers and functions of Länder (provincial) 
governments to its own demarcated spatial territory and to local authorities situated 
therein. Hence, local authorities are subjected to the rule of a Land in a hierarchical 
relationship that affects their power and functions, that is, their status. 
 
In Germany, more concentrated efforts are being made to increasingly and more 
effectively involve municipalities in federal and Land policy formulation. This change 
of heart is predicated upon the acknowledgement that governmental processes have 
become so complex that it is almost impossible to adhere to rigid structures and 
procedures or watertight division of powers and functions.  
 
In Austria, it is mandatory for both federal and Land governments to consult with 
municipalities.  
 
The trend in Germany, Austria and Belgium is for associations of local government to 
represent the interests of municipalities on the Land and federal levels Thus, the 
municipalities act jointly in their individual and aggregated interests. In these countries, 
provision is made for municipalities to co-operate with each other in areas of mutual 
concern, by means of three models within an enabling statutory framework  
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In Germany, attention is being paid to formalise relationships between Länder and local 
authorities so as to provide a firmer basis for co-operation. 
 
In most European countries, a local government representative organisation is an 
institution whereby municipalities agree with others to work jointly to achieve goals 
that may be difficult to undertake individually. It is an association or grouping of 
municipalities themselves. They do not constitute an additional tier of government. 
Hence, such an organisation is more like a co-operative, with no constitutional or legal 
basis, but permitted under the state’s laws. Therefore, their status and functions are very 
different from that of SALGA’s, an ‘external’ agency, similar to the UK Local 
Government Association. 
 
In Sweden, a country with a two-tier government, professionally-qualified mayors and 
councillors are responsible for city administration and they represent their localities 
directly in Parliament. The Germanic and Scandinavian traditions are characterised by 
a system that is organised, systematic, professional, co-ordinated, consensual, co-
operative, integrated, and an organic whole, with local authorities having a high degree 
of autonomy. 
 
Since Länder operate according to the subsidiarity principle, local authorities have, 
through long German tradition, a high degree of autonomy and responsibility. They 
have a dual role: functioning as independent governments competent to take any 
necessary action in their community’s interest, and operating as agents of both federal 
and Land governments. 
 
Unlike the federal system in the United States of America, the German governmental 
model avoided a dual political structure with state systems working in parallel, 
preferring a model of interlinked competences with a specific division of labour and 
responsibilities between the two levels of government. The relationship of the Federal 
authority with the Länder and between the latter inter se are central to the functioning 
of the political system, permeating all aspects of German political life. Detailed 
prescriptions of powers and functions and the clear allocation thereof have the 
advantage of providing certainty and protection of the various role players. Germany 
follows a dual approach to local government. The federal constitution, on the one hand, 
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establishes and protects local authorities as the third tier of government, while details of 
its organisation, powers and functions are determined by the respective Länder as one 
of their ‘exclusive’ powers, subject to adherence to any conditions imposed by the 
Grundgesetz (German Basic Law or Constitution). Local authorities function under the 
constitution of the particular Land which clearly sets out their responsibilities. 
Therefore, there is no ambiguity as with South Africa’s concurrent powers. 
Furthermore, effective functioning is facilitated by good Land-local authority relations 
promoted and managed by the Bundesrat (the second chamber of Parliament) itself. 
There was, therefore, no need to formalise intergovernmental relations by means of a 
statute. 
 
The strong position of the Land in the Bundesrat functions well to serve the interests of 
its local authorities. This is particularly so since Länder have considerable influence 
over national legislation, especially because of the trend in the Bundesrat towards joint 
policy-making, unlike the case of South Africa’s NCoP. The German intergovernmental 
system lays more emphasis on vertical and horizontal sharing of powers, responsibilities 
and resources, than their rigid separation, as in Canada. This approach gave rise to a 
constitutional practice called the Verbundsystem, resulting in collaboration, co-
operation and co-ordination in all stages of the policy-making process. This became a 
central characteristic of the federal system. Such policy-interlocking mode of operation 
is a decision-making mechanism that served to institutionalise the need for broad 
consensus and thus entrenched intergovernmental relations. This democratic, inclusive, 
and facilitative practice has, in turn, enabled a high degree of legal standardisation. 
The Teutonic level of efficiency, supplemented and complemented by the practice of 
Bundestreue, have consolidated to provide Germany with a very workable 
intergovernmental relations system and practice. Bundestreue in German constitutional 
theory and practice entails a legal obligation on the federation and Länder governments 
to assist each other, to integrate efforts to serve the people and to share capacity and 
information where and when required. It has, over time, become unambiguous, 
universally accepted, and institutionalised. Hence, it is more than a moral and social 
obligation, as is ubuntu/Batho Pele. Bundestreue is a guiding light for co-operative 
federalism in modern federal theory and has been recognised as a binding legal principle 
by the German Constitutional Court. 
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Organised local government in the form of Kreisetag (league of counties), and 
Staedtebund and Gemeindebund (league of towns and local authorities, respectively) 
facilitate and manage relations between municipalities, the Land, and the federal 
government. They do not constitute a hierarchy of government. Mitwirkungsrecht or 
right of co-operation ensures that local authorities are informed by the federal and 
Länder governments on matters affecting them. 
 
Municipalities are consolidated into sub-Land units called Kreise, organised under 
Länder legislation, and recognised by the federal constitution. Although the Kreise have 
their own institutions and functions, they are not a fourth tier, being a part of local 
government. The role of these ‘regional’ institutions is essentially to co-ordinate those 
functions between municipalities which, due to their nature, cannot be managed by them 
individually. Such activities can best be explained by the principle of subsidiarity, that 
is, they administer matters which require wider areas of control and larger resources 
than what the Gemeinde possess. All Länder have legislation enabling municipalities to 
co-operate with each other in areas of mutual concern, while the national constitution 
protects the rights of local authorities to form Gemeindeverbaende (associations). These 
provisions create a legal basis for local government to establish ad hoc associations 
(Zweckverbaende) or to conclude agreements to render services jointly. While Kreise 
(sub-Land geographical unit or ‘county’) are territorially fixed and have permanent 
members, these associations are functionally-driven, meaning that membership may 
change and one municipality may be a member of several such organisations. Due to 
pooling of resources and a common or shared vision, inter-municipal co-operation often 
obtains better results than where a local authority goes it alone.      
 
Democratic local self-government is guaranteed both by Article 28 of the Grundgesetz 
and the constitution of the Land it falls within. Germany is characterised by co-operative 
and joint decision-making in the Bundesrat by the federal and the Länder governments. 
Veto power vested in the Bundesrat gives it a strategic role in lawmaking, unlike the 
NCoP. The Länder effectively represent the interests of constituent municipalities, in 
the Bundesrat, unlike the NCoP.  
  
The governmental system in Austria is similar to that in Germany. Each Land has a 
statute depicting the organisation of local government, with its functions managed by a 
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department of local government affairs. The life of a local government association may 
be limited by function or time. As in Germany, a municipality may be a member of 
more than one association. Cities and towns may formulate their own constitutions. 
Provision exists for municipal co-operation in Verwaltungsgemeinschaften or 
administrative associations, where local governments share administrative 
responsibilities concerning particular functions.  
 
Der Österreichische Städtebund (The Austrian Association of Cities and Towns) 
represents the interests of local government in negotiations over the sharing of 
budgetary funds and taxing rights between the federal government, the Länder, and 
local authorities. It also assists with the preparation of legislation and serves as advisors 
on some environmental and welfare bodies. The association is assisted by 
approximately 40 technical committees. 
 
The Austrian Association of Municipalities (AAM), represents the interests collectively 
of 99 per cent of local authorities by way of associations of its Länder. Membership is 
voluntary. The position of sub-national governments was strengthened by the Austrian 
Stability Pact, an agreement between the federal government, the Länder, and 
municipalities on financial management co-ordination, the consolidation of public 
funds. Of interest in the Austrian government model insofar as it relates to local 
authorities is Stellungname (right to a hearing) and Volksbegerens (right to initiative), 
which give them considerable power in the legislative field.  
 
Starting in the 1970s, Belgium transformed from a unitary to a federal state whence 
constitutionalism within a federal context established very strong Geweste (provinces), 
incorporating Gemeentes (communes or municipalities). There are several 
Intercommunales (associations) where local authorities interact in functional areas to 
co-ordinate and harmonise their activities. No formal institutions exist where Geweste 
and local governments meet, but there are forums for informal interaction. Each Gewest 
has an association of towns and cities of which membership is voluntary but in which 
most local authorities participate because it is beneficial. Belgium’s constitution 
provides that local authorities and Geweste may create Intercommunales with directly-
elected governing councils. They are distinctive legal persona with own organs and 
budgets. Nevertheless, they are not a separate tier of government but a horizontal 
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extension of municipalities. Local authorities are not obliged to belong to an association 
nor are they precluded from membership of several at the same time, since participation 
is determined by functional rather than spatial considerations. Intercommunales and 
similar such public law associations can be established between municipalities on a 
voluntary basis, with the objective of facilitating co-operation in a particular field of 
common concern. Federal legislation provides that municipalities and Intercommunales 
have the right to engage each other in any matter of mutual interest. The precise nature 
and purpose of each Intercommunale is determined by its member local authorities, but 
in essence it strives towards solidarity and co-operation between municipalities. All 
members in an Intercommunale, as a distinctive legal entity, are bound by its decisions, 
even where they disagree: This heightens conflict. 
 
8.2.67 The Constitution makes a peremptory provision for the recognition of national and nine 
provincial associations representing municipalities, but is silent on local organisation. 
In other words, it does not prescribe that a statute must provide for the establishment, 
composition, powers and functions, status, accountability, and so on with respect to 
organised local government or associations for local authorities. 
 
8.2.68 While one can surmise that the onus on consultation lies with a local government 
representative body, the Organised Local Government Act (OLGA) is silent on the 
procedure, leaving SALGA in a quandary. 
 
8.2.69 After setting down the strict requirements for consultation, the OLGA nullifies them by 
stating that the (undefined) organised local government may consult with any organ of 
state, without setting down how this can be done. Whether any organ of state would 
consult with SALGA is not determined by the latter. The OLGA is an unsatisfactory 
enactment, inter alia, because it contains no description of the roles and responsibilities 
for organised local government. Rather, this information on roles and responsibilities 
has been spread across a wide range of legislation. The IRFA has ‘compensated’ for 
OLGA’s shortcomings, although in so doing made the process for efficient municipal 
representation even less effective. The IRFA states that where an obligation, not a need, 
for consultation with SALGA is required, this must be “through an appropriate 
intergovernmental structure,” and not directly. 
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8.2.70 The shortcomings of the OLGA may be one of the root causes of inadequate 
representation of local government in the NCoP. 
 
8.2.71 Neither the Constitution (nor OLGA) prescribes the establishment, nature, role, powers 
and functions, processes, source and application of funds, management, accountability, 
responsibility, monitoring and evaluation as well as other essentialia and incidentialia 
of organised local government or any institution undertaking this function. SALGA 
therefore has a wide and ‘open’ mandate (see below) wherein it could determine its own 
mechanisms and style of operations. 
 
8.2.72 SALGA was an active partner with CoGTA in the implementation of the Local 
Government Turnaround Strategy (LGTAS) with six vague objectives that lack focus 
and prioritisation based on logical sequencing and the critical path. They did not appear 
to benefit municipalities nor SALGA. 
 
8.2.73 SALGA complained that one of the major obstacles and frustrations for local 
government has been the speed at which legislative drafting has taken place, requiring 
many amendments to stabilise the legal framework, structures and system at the local 
level. 
 
8.2.74 SALGA is considering mandatory membership, but this is not possible given the 
autonomy of municipalities. 
 
8.2.75 SALGA’s objectives and functions are informed by the recently developed Five-Year 
Strategic Agenda formulated by CoGTA as the central policy thrust for local 
government. However, key performance areas (KPAs) relate largely to internal 
workings of the association which when completed would enable it to better serve its 
members. Unfortunately, SALGA has been on annual restructuring since inception and 
it is not clear whether the time, effort and money spent on these exercises really benefit 
municipalities. 
 
8.2.76 Almost without exception, where they exist, associations for local authorities in most 
countries are voluntary, part time organisations; often minimally-funded by government 
and to a lesser extent by the donor community; and are informal. They have not operated 
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in a conflictual or confrontational environment, nor duplicated work of statutory 
councils. With comparatively meagre means, they have made limited though positive 
contributions to local government development generally, and to improved 
intergovernmental relations in particular. The external local government agency, such 
as that in the UK and Canada, should be distinguished from associations established by 
the municipalities themselves for working co-operatively. They provide the requisite 
expertise or the personnel are expert volunteers. 
 
8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.3.1 Government has been operational in South Africa for over two decades. While a major 
overhaul of the governmental system is not recommended, there is need for a long term 
and sustainable approach to socio-economic development, guided by the National 
Development Plan, with local government playing a major role. At this juncture, a 
review of what plans and institutions are working, and what’s not, is necessary. 
Institutional assessments are required, especially the efficiency, efficacy, and role of 
some ministries, as well as of the IRFA, CoGTA, the NCoP, and SALGA. It may be an 
opportune time to do this, considering the 2019 national and provincial elections. 
 
8.3.2 Spheres of government have the obligation to consult each other and co-operate. This 
provides the opportunity for municipal representatives to demand that they be involved 
in policy matters affecting local government. The Systems Act operationalises many of 
the constitutional provisions to facilitate this. 
 
8.3.3 Investigations of human rights violations by municipalities highlights the need for the 
poor to be represented so their plight can be brought to the attention of decision-makers. 
 
8.3.4 Development is more than just economic growth but include life and death issues such 
as poverty, distributive equity, social justice, and environmental sustainability. The list 
of duties and responsibilities for local government is long and many municipalities 
would not be able to manage without assistance. Where it can be shown that a 
municipality did not give priority to the needs of a community and promote socio-
economic development within its jurisdiction, its actions or programmes would conflict 
with its constitutional obligations and could be declared unconstitutional and invalid. In 
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such a situation, judicial intervention is permissible. Municipal officials need be mindful 
of this. 
 
8.3.5 Municipalities need to form pacts with their communities and other parties to jointly 
plan and implement initiatives that contribute to fulfilling or meeting the developmental 
objectives of local government. Hence, sound leadership and civic responsibility are 
necessary. Municipalities must create an environment conducive to socio-economic 
development and social inclusion. 
 
8.3.6 The NCoP is not akin to the Bundesrat, but a review of both these institutions may help 
in determining how the former can function more effectively, especially in facilitating 
better municipal relations therein. 
 
8.3.7 Municipalities have sufficient autonomy to be a (potentially) major player in national 
policy-making through SALGA. However, this requires leadership and capability of the 
highest calibre. 
 
8.3.8 It is necessary to evaluate whether local government powers and functions enable it to 
meet its developmental mandate because of shortcomings in the interpretation of the 
laws and many are not developmental but rather overly prescriptive, regulatory, and 
compliance-related. 
 
8.3.9 It has been suggested that a special Cabinet Committee on provincial and local 
government be established to discuss and scrutinise all policy and legislation on sub-
national government before they go to Cabinet for decision. This is what the NCoP is 
supposed to do, but is evidently failing in its task. It is also essential to attempt to make 
laws more developmental than they currently are. 
 
8.3.10 Councillors and municipal representatives (SALGA) must be equipped to demand what 
has been promised in the Constitution and those commitments made in the SoNA, 
especially for capacity-building, in terms of section 154(1) of the Constitution, to enable 
municipalities to fulfil its objects and be developmental. 
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8.3.11 The Report by the Panel for Assessment of Parliament (PAP) recommended that the 
criteria by which any discretionary power is exercised should be set out. An impact 
assessment of legislation should be undertaken that incorporates the unintended 
consequences of statutes, regulations, directives, and assignments; failure by the 
Executive or other organs of state to take required actions in response to legislation; and 
the extent to which the objectives and implementation targets of legislation are 
achieved. 
 
8.3.12 Another of the PAP’s recommendation to Parliament was of engaging with local 
government on legislation that could result in unfunded mandates. Municipal 
representatives must have the requisite ability to analyse Bills and make inputs to ensure 
interests of the public and municipalities are protected and promoted, for example, by 
rejecting ‘unfunded mandates’ imposed through assignment. 
 
8.3.13 The Constitution provides the opportunity for local government and its representative 
organisations to influence legislation that may affect them by means of comment on 
draft enactments. These bodies, however, must themselves have the requisite 
intellectual capacity to make meaningful input and also to engage with their constituents 
to be able to gather sufficient intelligence from the ‘grassroots’. Such experiential 
knowledge can be invaluable in ensuring a better fit between need and aspirations, on 
the one hand, and the policies, programmes and projects designed to deliver them, on 
the other. Municipalities must be capacitated through development of leaders and 
technocrats of the highest calibre to undertake this role efficiently in the interests of the 
country and especially of its poor. 
 
8.3.14 It is imperative that the institutional capacity of local government is enhanced by the 
other two spheres of government to, inter alia, facilitate better quality municipal 
representation. A further mechanism to foster provincial-local government relations is 
for SALGA to be accorded observer status in provincial legislatures. This would aid 
transparency of provincial decision-making; will keep provincial legislatures informed 
of local government developments within the province concerned; and help align 
policies, plans, and programmes between the two spheres of government. While the 
Gauteng Legislature has put this proposal into practice, it is unclear as to whether 
organised local government has been able to make much meaningful contribution. The 
404 
 
question arises as to whether SALGA is to be strengthened to play this role or whether 
municipalities alone, or with the Premier’s Intergovernmental Forum (PIF), should be 
accorded observer status. 
 
8.3.15 Even where there is strong municipal representation, the limited effectiveness of the 
NCoP may nullify gains or retard progress. Secondly, the Council was established for 
the express purpose of representing the provinces to ensure their “interests are taken 
into account in the national sphere of government.” There is no equivalent institution 
for local government. The hierarchical nature of the spheres prevails in practice, with 
local government’s engagement in legislation being merely consultative. The 
‘distinctive’ three-sphere governmental system means that one sphere cannot represent 
another. Hence, provincial legislatures cannot, and will not, effectively represent the 
interests of municipalities within their jurisdictions. The limitation implied by the term 
‘when necessary’ in section 67 of the Constitution should be generously interpreted, 
considering that any legislation that affects local government triggers the participation 
right of SALGA. This also applies to the review by the NCoP of a provincial 
intervention in a municipality, and to its oversight function. However, there is a 
fundamental flaw in the design and operation of the NCoP that will not be remedied by 
more effective local government representation. If provinces and the NCoP are to be 
retained, the Council must be redesigned to be the National Council of Provinces and 
Local Government. An alternative is a careful study of the German governmental 
system wherein the powers and functions of the Länder are precisely defined; each Land 
has its own constitution protected by the Grundgesetz, and the Bundesrat has veto 
power. Under such a system, local government’s powers, functions, autonomy, status, 
and rights are protected and promoted. In South Africa, constitutional amendment 
would be required to restructure the NCoP. Given its poor performance, it is suggested 
that it is an opportune time to undertake an in-depth analysis of this institution, 
especially its contribution as one of the houses of Parliament. It may be helpful to study 
the working of the German Bundesrat alongside the Bundestag and the Länder as well 
as their relationship inter se to either improve the role and efficiency of the NCoP or 
agree that it is not salvageable and should be dissolved. The NCoP’s failure could also 
be partly attributed to lack of precise definition of the powers and functions of provinces 
and their general ineffectiveness. The German governmental system is currently 
undergoing reform. It is a model worth researching for possible amendments to the 
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powers of provinces, the NCoP, and local government. The Austrian practice of 
Stellungname (right to a hearing) and Mitwirkungsrecht or right of co-operation ensures 
that local authorities are informed by the federal and Länder governments on matters 
affecting them. Equivalent rights in South Africa may help to improve 
intergovernmental relations if section 5 of the IRFA is properly interpreted and applied. 
The German practice of Bundestreue is also worth researching. 
 
8.3.16 Absent a track record of achievements since its inauguration almost two decades ago, it 
is doubtful whether stronger and increased local government representation on the 
NCoP will achieve any useful purpose. The Council’s indirect representation of 
municipalities via their respective provincial legislatures does not disclose any benefits 
for local government. Whether there is a need for provinces and their representative 
organ in “one sovereign democratic state” has been asked since Union in 1910, but 
remains unanswered. The question, then, is how best can local government be 
represented in the legislature.  
8.3.17 Mechanisms for municipal representation or promotion of local government interests 
are submissions, petitions to the National Assembly, the NCoP, provincial legislatures, 
and municipal councils. More use should be made of them by municipal representatives. 
 
8.3.18 In a municipal council, there are opportunities for councillors to represent residents on 
the council itself, the mayoral committee, standing committees, section 79 committees, 
and ward committees. These mechanisms should be used effectively by municipal 
representatives. 
 
8.3.19 Local government representation through SALGA is inadequate but the major flaw is 
in the design of the NCoP. As it is currently designed and operates, the NCoP will not 
do much for socio-economic development and local participatory and representative 
democracy. This is because the NCoP has been designed not on an objective or scientific 
basis but on political considerations to represent and promote the interests of provinces 
and not those of the local government sphere. If provinces and the NCoP are to be 
retained, the Council should be redesigned through constitutional amendment to 
incorporate representing the interests of local government and be named the ‘National 
Council of Provinces and Local Government.’ Alternatively, a new equivalent or similar 
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institution is required for local government, alongside a Ministry of Local Government. 
This is because provincial legislatures cannot represent a ‘distinctive’ sphere of 
government. SALGA is ‘recognised’ but is not a statutory body in the conventional 
sense. Being a voluntary organisation, it cannot effectively represent government even 
where it has been given the space to do so. 
 
8.3.20 SALGA and the PLGAs must have the requisite skills to submit quality and objective 
inputs, derived from municipalities which must, in turn, have the capacity to provide 
primary intelligence in digestible format. There is need for more quantitative 
information, perhaps through an external, objective agency, as much of the strategic 
plan, annual reports, conference reports, and other publications contain numerous 
statements of intent that are somewhat philosophical, aspirational, not easily 
quantifiable, and much of these exhibit an internal focus. 
 
8.3.21 Apart from the Auditor-General’s audit outcomes reports, very few publications are in 
the public domain to objectively show the state of local government. SALGA and 
CoGTA need to undergo social cost-benefit, risk and gap analyses or comprehensive 
and in-depth reviews. Performance management systems tell one story, the integrated 
development plan, another. What is required is a tool to measure efficiency of an 
institution, with its achievements (outcomes) over the medium term measured against 
costs, predetermined objectives, key performance areas (KPAs), key performance 
indicators (KPIs), Hence an outcomes-based monitoring, evaluation, and impact 
assessment (MEIA) system is necessary to objectively determine the achievement or 
otherwise of specific (or simple, sensible, significant); measurable (or meaningful, 
motivating); achievable (or agreed, attainable); relevant (or reasonable, realistic, 
resourced, results-based); and time-bound (or time-based, time limited, time-cost 
limited, timely, time-sensitive), that is, S.M.A.R.T. goals, is required. Such a 
mechanism could objectively indicate whether an organisation and its functionaries are 
functioning or not, and why. A performance management system (PMS) is a useful tool 
to gauge individuals’ and the institutions’ achievements and failures. The latter is 
dependent and is the aggregate of councillors’ and technocrats’ performance. If not 
properly devised, the PMS would be little more than financial compliance, particularly 
spending the allocated capital and operating budgets. A system that measures or 
quantifies inputs and outputs is not an appropriate indicator of achievements in social 
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and economic development through service delivery. A detailed evaluation or audit has 
not been done on SALGA, not even by the Intergovernmental Relations Audit and 
subsequent reviews. Nor has one been undertaken on CoGTA and the NCoP. An 
independent, objective review and analysis by an external expert team of independent 
evaluators, perhaps commissioned by member municipalities or CoGTA, given that 
SALGA has been operational for two decades, may present a truer picture of its 
achievements and the cost thereof. It is also necessary to distinguish between SALGA’s 
claimed achievements and those of capacitated municipalities and to what extent their 
status has been attained through the intervention and assistance of the institution. This 
is because many publications tend to be inward-focused and self-congratulatory, littered 
with statements of intent and articulation of long-standing challenges. The MEIA would 
be used, along with the PMS to reward and sanction functionaries, and would be the 
tools to determine how and to what extent communities, especially the poor, benefited 
over a particular period. 
 
8.3.22 A comprehensive need and desirability assessment of ‘organised local government’ 
ought to also be undertaken.  
 
8.3.23 SALGA has a wide, deep, and complex mandate which it has set for itself. This needs 
to be reviewed with priorities prioritised using the critical path and logical sequencing 
approach and the Pareto principle. There is need for focus and concentration on 
development needs of municipalities, especially the weaker ones. 
 
8.3.24 The IRFA and its accomplishments to date also need review by independent evaluators. 
 
8.2.25 Given the advances in information and communications technology, it is today 
comparatively easy for reasonably-endowed municipalities to co-operate among 
themselves locally, regionally and internationally: They do not need associations for 
local authorities to fulfil their core responsibilities; rather organised local government 
can coexist and thrive where they have a role that is unique, in the sense that they can 
assist municipalities and not do their work, such as associations for local authorities in 
Germany, Austria, Belgium, in the Scandinavian countries, and the Gauteng Global City 
Region. A local example of such an institution is the SACN. The numerous annual 
statements of intent by the SALGA chairman are often not translated into concrete 
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programmes and projects. Campaigns may have some uses, but the questions are 
whether they really contribute to sustainable socio-economic development that is 
measurable. 
 
8.3.26 A major shortcoming of SALGA is its inability to make meaningful inputs into draft 
legislation, as evinced by its management of the legislative process of the Disaster 
Management Amendment Act of 2015. This is a major shortcoming that can impact 
negatively on metropolitan and district municipalities. The DMA of 2002 was one of a 
plethora of legislation passed by Parliament with what appears unseemly haste but 
understandably so, given the constitutional objective of establishing a democratic 
society. Law, per se, cannot achieve this – it should be implemented by competent and 
committed officials. The need for speed in promulgating legislation has resulted in 
several of them, or parts thereof, not being fit for purpose. Almost all statutes, 
regulations, assignments, authorisations, and directives influence and impact on local 
government. 
 
8.3.27 No independent and objective analysis have to date been done on the need and 
desirability of a local government association in South Africa. This is apart from a 
review of SALGA and its achievements since its establishment in 1996. Studies have 
shown that an advisory and co-ordinating body could well work alongside the three 
spheres of government, particularly with municipalities, without conflict or 
confrontation or duplication, as have associations in other countries. South Africa’s 
constitutional-statutory framework for co-operative governance is flexible enough for 
SALGA, or some other, perhaps permanent commission of experts, to undertake this. 
The need and desirability of SALGA, apart from that of organised local government, 
should be assessed against existing local government associations, both to determine its 
unique function or niche, and to ensure that it does not duplicate work of existing 
representative bodies and municipalities themselves. 
 
8.3.28 The plethora of statutes, regulations, and directives applicable to local government 
needs to be reviewed and analysed to eliminate or minimise duplication, overlaps, and 
redundancies, while ensuring legislation is development-oriented. Effective 
representation of municipalities would also require amendments to certain statutes, 
particularly the IRFA. A legislative review that ‘cleans up statutes and regulations 
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pertaining to local government and that would facilitate socio-economic development 
through service delivery would help. The issue of provinces and their capacitation of 
municipalities must take priority. If they are to be retained, the issue of their powers that 
are concurrent with local government should be analysed so as to minimise duplication, 
overlaps, and ‘unfunded mandates’. The approach to municipal and community 
representation and mechanisms to achieve this needs review. Finally, after adequate 
research on municipal representation or local government associations, the OLGA 
should be repealed by a local government statute that sets up the desired, developmental 
type of municipal representation. It may be opportune, two decades after democracy, to 
undertake a social cost-benefits, risk and gap analysis and MEIA of post-1994 statutes 
and regulations. Such analysis may highlight existing or dormant problems within the 
three-sphere governmental enterprise and with co-operative governance. There is need 
for a legislative system that goes beyond the purely financial, largely regulatory and 
compliance-oriented. Legislation should also incorporate review of accountability, 
fulfilment of statutory obligations, commitments made to communities, penalties for 
non-compliance, and so on, as are available in Sweden. Law-making should be 
undertaken after in-depth analysis of the problem it is based on. A social cost-benefit, 
risk, gap, strengths-weaknesses-opportunities-threats should be done, as well as an 
outcomes-based MEIA. Potential unintended consequences arising from legislation 
must be analysed, quantified, and considered when drafting bills. 
 
8.3.29 Organised local government in South Africa and SALGA as the national representative 
have been placed by the Constitution and the applicable legislation in a unique position. 
Notwithstanding this unprecedented and elevated status, the instrument of organised 
local government appears to have failed to fulfil its envisaged mandate adequately or 
innovatively, given the shortcomings of its governing statute. OLGA merely 
“recognises” a national and nine provincial associations to represent the interests of 
local government. Unlike most statutes of the democratic era, it does not prescribe in 
detail how these organs should be constituted or established, their roles, powers or 
functions, management, financing, accountability, monitoring, and reporting. 
 
8.3.30 SALGA needs to take cognisance of the National Planning Commission and the 
Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME), not only to be guided 
by them but also to ensure there is no duplication and wastage. SALGA and CoGTA 
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should compare their objectives and business plans to ensure complementarity and 
minimise duplication. The national department should also move towards a pragmatic 
and measured approach, rather than being reactive and thereby attempting to do too 
much and in the process losing focus.  
 
8.3.31 SALGA should also reduce campaigning and posturing and become more firm and 
decisive and ensure sustainability of its programmes, projects, and other initiatives. It 
should complete its work on powers and functions as well as that on provinces and their 
cost. SALGA should not embark on yet another ‘restructuring’ at this stage, but 
implement and monitor its Strategic Plan 2012-2017. 
 
8.3.32 SALGA should develop and use an outcomes-based monitoring, evaluation and impact 
assessment system to show its effectiveness. This approach could be informed by an 
independent review of its functioning and achievements since establishment, including 
a strengths, weakness, opportunities and threats (SWOT), social cost-benefit, risk, and 
gap analyses. Such a study could provide some indicators as to how best municipal 
representation could be undertaken in South Africa. 
 
8.3.33 There is need for more quantitative information, perhaps through an external, objective 
agency, as much of the strategic plan, annual reports, conference reports, and other 
publications contain numerous statements of intent that are somewhat philosophical, 
aspirational, not easily quantifiable, and much of these exhibit an internal focus. 
 
8.3.34 Residents, community leaders, and councillors should be educated in governance and 
civic responsibilities. Representatives require commitment, courage, and intellect to 
present a strong case. Hence, appropriate capacitation and education of councillors is 
necessary. Strong and committed municipal leadership and representation are necessary 
to claim the resources and support required for municipalities to fulfil their 
constitutional and statutory obligations. A solution to make local government more 
developmental and efficient can best be designed through social inclusion, with advice 
from a “mobilised, active and responsible citizenry” (NDP) where residents articulate 
their real needs, using municipal representatives to assist in widening and deepening 
local participatory democracy. Effect must be given to the ‘human-centred’ and people-
driven approach envisaged in the Freedom Charter and the Reconstruction and 
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Development Programme, as well as human dignity, equality and human rights, as 
exhorted in the Constitution. The approach by Treasury, CoGTA, and SALGA do not 
pay heed to such directives. The NDP focused on the need for a “capable state”. For 
individuals to be capable, they need, inter alia, education and skills. It stated: “Between 
now [2013] and 2030, we need to move towards a state that is more capable, more 
professional and more responsive to the needs of citizens.” 
 
8.3.35 Joseph v City of Johannesburg6 confirmed that the public has a constitutional and public 
law right to basic municipal services and the municipality is duty-bound to deliver them 
in a way that that does not infringe a resident’s right to privacy and dignity. Given such 
onerous and extensive list of rights to deliver to its communities, municipalities are 
entitled to be assisted by national and provincial governments. Since councillors, 
administrators, and municipal representatives are obliged to deliver on the municipal 
mandates, education and training to develop competent or capable persons are necessary 
 
8.3.36 The numerous rights, duties, obligations, responsibilities, and accountabilities create 
challenges but also opportunities for representation of local communities within 
municipalities and on institutions in the other spheres of government. To do justice, the 
quality and commitment of representatives must be of the highest order. To achieve this, 
capacitation of municipalities by qualified top management and their monitoring and 
evaluation are required. More than going “back to basics” is necessary as it has been 
shown that both national and provincial governments have failed in their duty to support 
and strengthen municipalities in the past fifteen years. The problems emanating from an 
extended local government mandate in a context of limited and shrinking resources is 
that the ‘lowest’ sphere has to compete with the other two spheres of government, that 
decentralisation may result in more powers and responsibilities devolving to them 
without guarantee of the accompanying resources. Hence, municipal leadership and 
representatives must be alert to these challenges and be capable of negotiating in the 
best interest of their residents. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others (CCT 43/09) [2009] ZACC 30; 2010 (3) BCLR 
212 (CC); 2010 (4) SA 455 (CC) (9 October 2009). 
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8.4 CONCLUSION  
 
The term ‘glocal’ implies a connection or link between the global and the local. In this rapidly 
changing, highly competitive and knowledge-based society enjoying unprecedented 
technological advances, local governments have been accepted as a strategic player able to 
address common or shared global issues and challenges. This will take time, political 
commitment, a developmental and productive culture, and many resources. 
 
The local government operating environment is very complex, and likely to become even more 
so. Given South Africa’s history generally, but particularly of municipalities, especially in the 
light of their constitutional status and wide mandate, there are no quick and easy solutions to 
the challenges at the local sphere. It is also not prudent to rush into anything new: Hence, co-
operative governance properly planned and genuinely engaged in, can do much to promote and 
enhance equality and socio-economic development, and thus contributes to the attainment of 
national goals and priorities. 
 
This study has looked at one of several role players that can make a positive difference to 
development in South Africa through service delivery by strengthening the status and 
responsibilities of local government and by representing the interests of municipalities 
effectively. Municipal representation is necessary where local authorities are formally part of 
an integrated governmental system. Representation has not been effective over the past twenty-
two years due to inherent weaknesses and defects in the governmental system. 
 
Given the time elapsed since commencement of transformation, it may be opportune to review 
and renovate that part of the governmental system that, objectively assessed, have been shown 
to be inefficient. This is because to a large extent, especially in the local government sphere, 
the constitutional prescripts have not been implemented in the spirit and letter of the 
Constitution. This pertains more to local government appearing to be seen de facto as the lowest 
tier in a hierarchy, more so considering its status as a sphere of government. The lack of support 
and strengthening of the capacity of municipalities, particularly by provinces and the 
inappropriateness of programmes by CoGTA, manifests itself today in the form of community 
protests (largely) on the basis of poor service delivery. The aim of this study is not to single out 
who is responsible for the current situation facing local government, but to point out that while 
much has been done by government to assist the poor in the two decades since the dawn of 
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democracy, much still needs to be done. It can, if planned and implemented properly and co-
operatively, under the guidance and according to the values enshrined in the Constitution. 
 
There is no one model that would guarantee success as, given South Africa’s history and a lack 
of democratic culture, wholesale transformation may not be prudent. However, trends and 
patterns have been discerned to enable the redesign of the dysfunctional or poorly performing 
parts of the system, as most of the challenges are related not to the blueprint or the design, but 
in implementation thereof. The state has to undertake certain actions rapidly before the situation 
degenerates into anarchy. 
 
This research has pointed out what needs to be done in the field of co-operative governance and 
how service delivery could be enhanced by effective municipal representation – what is clear 
is that much work and action is required; and less promises and sugar-coated rhetoric on the 
part of decision-makers, as in the SoNA approach. 
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